PROCEEDINGS

OF

THE BRITISH ACADEMY

1911–1912

London
Published for the British Academy
By Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press
Amen Corner, E.C.

The papers contained in this volume are issued in separate form, and can be had from the Publisher, Humphrey Milford, Amen Corner, London, E.C.

CONTENTS

OBITUARY NOTICES

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF FELLOWS, 1911

The Rt. Hon. Sir W. R. ANSON, Bart., M.P.
[3] Mr. EDWARD ARMSTRONG.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.
[1] Professor B. BOSANQUET.
[8] Dr. A. C. BRADLEY.
[5] Dr. HENRY BRADLEY.
[7] Professor HUME BROWN.
[1] Professor E. G. BROWNE.
The Rt. Hon. JAMES BRYCE.
[3] Professor F. C. BURKITT.
Professor J B. BURY.
Mr. INGRAM BYWATER.
[4] The Rev. Professor R. H. CHARLES, D.D.
[2] The Rev. Professor T. K. CHEYNE, D.D.
[1] The Rt. Hon. ARTHUR COHEN, K.C.
[1] Mr. F. C. CONYBEARE.
[4] Dr. W. J. COURTHOPE, C.B.
The Ven. WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, D.D.
[6] The Rt. Hon. Lord CURZON of Kedleston.
Professor T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
Professor A. V DICEY, K.C.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount DILLON.
The Rev. Professor S R. DRIVER, D.D.
[1] Professor F Y. EDGEWORTH.
Professor ROBINSON ELLIS.
Sir A. J. EVANS.
The Rev. A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D.D.
[1] Professor C. H. FIRTH.
[5] Mr. H. A. L. FISHER.
[4] Professor JAMES FITZMAURICE-KELLY.
[3] Professor H. S. FOXWELL.
[1] Professor A. CAMPBELL FRASER.
Dr. J. G. FRAZER.
[1] The Rt. Hon. Sir EDWARD FRY.
[1] Professor P. GARDNER.
Professor I. GOLLANCZ.
[8] Professor B. P. GRENFELL.
[2] Professor F. J. HAVERFIELD.
Dr. THOMAS HODGKIN.
Dr. S. H. HODGSON.
[8] Dr. D. G. HOGARTH.
Professor T. E. HOLLAND, K.C.
Sir COURTENAY ILBERT, G C.B., K.C.S.I.
[1] Professor HENRY JACKSON, O.M.
[1] Dr. M. R. JAMES.
[2] Professor HENRY JONES.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice KENNEDY.
[7] Professor C. S. KENNY.
[1] Dr. F. G. KENYON, C.B.
[1] Professor W. P. KER.
[4] Mr. ANDREW LANG.
[8] Sir SIDNEY LEE.
[1] The Rt. Hon. Lord LINDLEY.
[3] Professor W. M. LINDSAY.
[4] Professor A. A. MACDONELL.
[4] Dr. J McTAGGART.
Professor ALFRED MARSHALL.
Sir H. C. MAXWELL-LYTE, K.C.B.
[4] Rev. Canon MOORE, D.D.
[6] Professor GILBERT MURRAY.
Sir J. A. H. MURRAY.
[2] Professor A. S. NAPIER.
[1] Professor J. S. NICHOLSON.
[3] Professor C. W. C. OMAN.
[2] Professor A. SETH PRINGLE PATTISON.
[2] Professor W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.
The Rt. Hon. Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bar
[2] Mr. REGINALD L. POOLE.
[5] Professor J. P. POSTGATE.
[1] Dr. G. W. PROTHERO.
Sir W. M. RAMSAY.
[7] The Rev. HASTINGS RASHDALL.
The Rt Hon. Lord REAY, K.T., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.
The Rt. Hon. Sir JOHN RHŶS.
[2] Professor W. RIDGEWAY.
[1] The Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.
The Rt. Hon. the Earl of ROSEBERY, K.G., K.
[9] Professor GEORGE SAINTSBURY.
The Rev. Professor WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D.
[7] Sir J. E. SANDYS.
The Rev. Professor W. W. SKEAT.
[8] Professor W. R. SORLEY.
[1] Professor G. F. STOUT.
Rev. Professor H. B. SWETE, D.D.
[9] Professor A. E. TAYLOR.
Sir E. MAUNDE THOMPSON, G.C.B.
[9] Professor T. F. TOUT.
The Rev. H. F. TOZER.
[2] The Rt. Hon. Sir G. O. TREVELYAN, Bart., O.
[7] Mr. CUTHBERT H. TURNER.
Professor R. Y. TYRRELL.
[3] Professor PAUL VINOGRADOFF.
Dr. A. W. WARD.
Professor JAMES WARD.
[4] Sir G. F. WARNER.
[5] Professor J. COOK WILSON.
[2] Professor JOSEPH WRIGHT.

[1] Elected 1903. [2] Elected 1904. [3] Elected 1905. [4] Elected 1906. [5] Elected 1907. [6] Elected 1908. [7] Elected 1909. [8] Elected 1910. [9] Elected 1911.

CORRESPONDING FELLOWS, 1911

[3] Count UGO BALZANI (Rome).
[9] M. HENRI BERGSON (Paris).
[5] M. ÉMILE BOUTROUX (Paris).
[2] Professor H. DIELS (Berlin).
[8] Monsignor DUCHESNE (Rome).
[3] M. le Comte de FRANQUEVILLE (Paris).
[5] Professor BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE (Baltimore).
[9] Professor I. GOLDZIHER (Budapest).
[2] Professor T. GOMPERZ (Vienna).
[6] Professor ADOLF HARNACK (Berlin).
[3] Professor J. L. HEIBERG (Copenhagen).
[5] Professor HARALD HØFFDING (Copenhagen).
[5] Mr. JUSTICE HOLMES (U.S.A.).
[9] His Excellency M. JUSSERAND (Washington, U.S.A.).
[9] Professor KITTREDGE (Harvard).
[2] Professor F. LEO (Göttingen).
[7] Dr. F. LIEBERMANN (Berlin).
[8] Professor Dr. EDWARD MEYER (Berlin).
[2] M. PAUL MEYER (Paris).
[7] Don MARCELINO MENENDEZ Y PELAYO (Madrid).
[2] M. GEORGES PERROT (Paris).
[9] M. SALOMON REINACH (Paris)
[7] His Excellency M. LOUIS RENAULT (Paris).
[9] Mr. F. J. RHODES (Boston, Mass.).
[5] Professor KARL EDUARD SACHAU (Berlin).
[2] Professor C. H. SALEMANN (St. Petersburg).
[8] M. SENART (Paris).
[7] Professor E. SIEVERS (Leipzig).
[7] The Prince of TEANO (Rome).
[8] Professor ULRICH VON WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORFF (Berlin).
[8] Professor Dr. D. ERNST WINDISCH (Berlin).

DECEASED FELLOWS, 1911

Ordinary.

Mr. S. H. BUTCHER, M.P.
Dr. EDWARD CAIRD.
Professor E. B. COWELL.
The Rt. Hon. Lord DAVEY.
[1] Dr. F. J. FURNIVALL.
[3] The Rt. Hon. Lord GOSCHEN.
Sir R. C. JEBB, O.M.
The Rt. Hon. W. E. H. LECKY, O.M.
[1] The Rt. Hon. Sir A. LYALL, K.C.B., G.C.I.E.
Professor F. W. MAITLAND.
The Rev. Professor J. E. B. MAYOR.
Mr. D. B. MONRO.
[1] Professor W. R. MORFILL.
[1] Dr. A. S. MURRAY.
[3] Dr. JOHN PEILE.
Professor H. F. PELHAM.
Rev. Provost GEORGE SALMON.
Sir LESLIE STEPHEN.
Dr. WHITLEY STOKES, C.S.I., C.I.E.
[2] Sir SPENCER WALPOLE, K.C.B.
[3] The Rt. Rev. JOHN WORDSWORTH, D.D.

Corresponding.

[5] M. LEOPOLD DELISLE (Paris).
[2] Professor M. J. de GOEJE (Amsterdam).
[5] Professor WILLIAM JAMES (Harvard).
[2] Professor K. KRUMBACHER (Munich).
[7] Mr. H. C. LEA (Philadelphia).
[2] M. GEORGES PICOT (Paris).
[5] Professor FREDERICK DE MARTENS (St. Petersburg).

[1] Elected 1903. [2] Elected 1904. [3] Elected 1905. [5] Elected 1907. [7] Elected 1909. [8] Elected 1910. [9] Elected 1911.

LIST OF FELLOWS, 1912

The Rt. Hon. Sir W. R. ANSON, Bart., M.P.
[5]Mr. EDWARD ARMSTRONG.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.
[1]Professor B. BOSANQUET.
[8]Professor A. C. BRADLEY
[5]Dr. HENRY BRADLEY.
[7]Professor HUME BROWN.
[1]Professor E. G. BROWNE.
His Excellency The Rt. Hon. JAMES BRYCE.
[8]Professor F. C. BURKITT.
Professor J. B. BURY.
Mr. INGRAM BYWATER.
[4]The Rev. Dr. R. H. CHARLES, D.D.
[2]The Rev. Professor T. K. CHEYNE, D.D.
[1]The Rt. Hon. ARTHUR COHEN, K.C.
[1]Mr. F. C. CONYBEARE.
[4]Dr. W. J. COURTHOPE, C.B.
The Ven. Archdeacon CUNNINGHAM, D.D.
[6]The Rt. Hon. Earl CURZON of Kedleston.
Professor T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
Professor A. V. DICEY, K.C.
The Rt Hon. Viscount DILLON.
The Rev. Professor S. R. DRIVER, D.D.
[1]Professor F. Y. EDGEWORTH.
Professor ROBINSON ELLIS.
Sir A. J. EVANS.
[1]Professor C. H. FIRTH.
[5]Mr. H. A. L. FISHER.
[4]Professor JAMES FITZMAURICE-KELLY.
[3]Professor H. S. FOXWELL.
[1]Professor A. CAMPBELL FRASER.
Mr. J. G. FRAZER.
[1]The Rt. Hon. Sir EDWARD FRY, G.C.B.
[1]Professor P. GARDNER.
Professor I. GOLLANCZ.
[3]Professor B. P. GRENFELL.
[2]Professor F. J. HAVERFIELD.
Dr. THOMAS HODGKIN.
[3]Mr. D. G. HOGARTH.
Professor T. E. HOLLAND, K.C.
Sir COURTENAY ILBERT, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
[1]Dr. HENRY JACKSON, O.M.
[1]Dr. M. R. JAMES.
[9]Sir HENRY JONES.
[7]The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice KENNEDY.
[7]Professor C. S. KENNY.
[1]Sir F. G. KENYON, K.C.B.
[1]Professor W. P. KER.
[8]Sir SIDNEY LEE.
[1]The Rt. Hon. Lord LINDLEY.
[8]Professor W. M. LINDSAY.
[4]Professor A. A. MACDONELL.
[4]Dr. J. ELLIS McTAGGART.
Professor ALFRED MARSHALL.
Sir H. C. MAXWELL-LYTE, K.C.B.
[4]Rev. Canon MOORE, D.D.
[8]Professor GILBERT MURRAY.
Sir J. A. H. MURRAY.
[2]Professor A. S. NAPIER.
[1]Professor J. S. NICHOLSON.
[8]Professor C. W. C. OMAN.
[2]Professor A. SETH PRINGLE PATTISON.
[2]Professor W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.
The Rt. Hon. Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bart.
[2]Mr. REGINALD L. POOLE.
[5]Professor J. P. POSTGATE.
[1]Dr. G. W. PROTHERO.
Sir W. M. RAMSAY.
[7]The Rev. HASTINGS RASHDALL.
The Rt. Hon Lord REAY, K.T., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
The Rt. Hon. Sir JOHN RHŶS.
[2]Professor W. RIDGEWAY.
[1]The Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D.
The Rt. Hon. the Earl of ROSEBERY, K.G., K.T.
[5]Professor GEORGE SAINTSBURY.
The Rev. Professor WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D.
[7]Sir J. E. SANDYS.
[3]Professor W. R. SORLEY.
[1]Professor G. F. STOUT.
Rev. Professor H. B. SWETE, D.D.
[9]Professor A. E. TAYLOR.
Sir E. MAUNDE THOMPSON, G.C.B.
[8]Professor T. F. TOUT.
The Rev. H. F. TOZER.
[2]The Rt. Hon. Sir G. O. TREVELYAN, Bart., O.M.
[7]Mr. CUTHBERT H. TURNER.
Professor R. Y. TYRRELL.
[3]Professor PAUL VINOGRADOFF.
Dr. A. W. WARD.
Professor JAMES WARD.
[4]Sir G. F. WARNER.
[5]Professor J. COOK WILSON.
[2]Professor JOSEPH WRIGHT.

[1] Elected 1903. [2] Elected 1904. [3] Elected 1905. [4] Elected 1906. [5] Elected 1907 [6] Elected 1908. [7] Elected 1909. [8] Elected 1910. [9] Elected 1911.

CORRESPONDING FELLOWS, 1912

[2] Count UGO BALZANI (Rome).
[9] M. HENRI BERGSON (Paris).
[5] M. ÉMILE BOUTROUX (Paris).
[2] Professor H DIELS (Berlin).
[8] Monsignor DUCHESNE (Rome).
[2] M. le Comte de FRANQUEVILLE (Paris).
[5] Professor BASIL L GILDERSLEEVE (Baltimore).
[2] Professor I. GOLDZIHER (Budapest).
[5] Professor ADOLF HARNACK (Berlin).
[2] Professor J. L. HEIBERG (Copenhagen).
[5] Professor HARALD HØFFDING (Copenhagen).
[5] Mr JUSTICE HOLMES (U S A.)
[9] His Excellency M JUSSERAND (Washington, U S.A.).
[8] Professor KITTREDGE (Harvard).
[2] Professor F. LEO (Gottingen).
[7] Dr. F. LIEBERMANN (Berlin).
[8] Professor Dr. EDWARD MEYER (Berlin).
[2] M PAUL MEYER (Paris).
[2] M. GEORGES PERROT (Paris).
[9] M SALOMON REINACH (Paris)
[7] His Excellency M. LOUIS RENAULT (Paris).
[9] Mr. F. J. RHODES (Boston, Mass.)
[5] Professor KARL EDUARD SACHAU (Berlin)
[2] Professor C. H. SALEMANN (St. Petersburg).
[8] M SENART (Paris)
[7] Professor E SIEVERS (Leipzig)
[7] The Prince of TEANO (Rome)
[5] Professor ULRICH VON WILAMOWITZ-MOLLENDORFF (Berlin).
[8] Professor Dr. D. ERNST WINDISCH (Berlin).

DECEASED FELLOWS, 1912

Ordinary.

Mr. S. H. BUTCHER, M.P.
Dr. EDWARD CAIRD.
Professor E. B. COWELL.
[8] The Rt Hon. Lord DAVEY.
The Rev A M. FAIRBAIRN.
[1] Dr. F. J FURNIVALL.
[3] The Rt Hon. Lord GOSCHEN.
Dr S. H. HODGSON.
Sir R C. JEBB, O M.
Mr. ANDREW LANG
The Rt. Hon. W. E. H LECKY, O.M
[1] The Rt. Hon. Sir A. LYALL, K.C.B., G.C.I.E.
Professor F. W MAITLAND.
The Rev. Professor J. E. B. MAYOR.
Mr. D. B. MONRO.
[1] Professor W. R. MORFILL.
[1] Dr. A. S. MURRAY.
[2] Dr. JOHN PEILE.
Professor H. F. PELHAM
Rev. Provost GEORGE SALMON.
The Rev. Professor W. W. SKEAT.
Sir LESLIE STEPHEN.
Dr. WHITLEY STOKES, C.S.I., C.I.E.
[2] Sir SPENCER WALPOLE, K.C.B.
[3] The Rt. Rev. JOHN WORDSWORTH, D.D.

Corresponding.

[5] M. LEOPOLD DELISLE (Paris).
[2] Professor M. J. de GOEJE (Amsterdam).
[2] Professor T GOMPERZ (Vienna).
[5] Professor WILLIAM JAMES (Harvard).
[2] Professor K. KRUMBACHER (Munich).
[7] Mr. H. C. LEA (Philadelphia).
[7] Don MARCELINO MENENDEZ Y PELAYO (Madrid).
[2] M. GEORGES PICOT (Paris).
[5] Professor FREDERICK DE MARTENS (St. Petersburg).

[1] Elected 1903. [2] Elected 1904. [3] Elected 1905. [5] Elected 1907. [7] Elected 1909. [8] Elected 1910. [9] Elected 1911.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

1911-12

PRESIDENT.

DR. A. W. WARD, Litt.D, LL.D. (Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge).

COUNCIL:

[7]THE RT. HON. SIR W. R. ANSON, BART., M.P.
[7]PROFESSOR B. BOSANQUET.
[7]THE RT. HON. LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
[9]SIR A. J EVANS.
[8]PROFESSOR P. GARDNER.
[6]PROFESSOR F. J. HAVERFIELD.
[7]DR. D G HOGARTH.
[9]SIR COURTENAY ILBERT, G.C.B
[6]PROFESSOR HENRY JACKSON, O.M.
[8]DR. F. G. KENYON, C.B.
[9]PROFESSOR W. P. KER.
[7]SIR H. C. MAXWELL-LYTE, K.C.B.
[8]DR. G. W. PROTHERO.
[5]THE RT. HON. LORD REAY, K.T., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
[6]PROFESSOR P. VINOGRADOFF.

SECRETARY:

PROFESSOR I. GOLLANCZ.

BURLINGTON-HOUSE, LONDON, W.

[5] Appointed 1907. [6] Appointed 1908. [7] Appointed 1909.
[8] Appointed 1910. [9] Appointed 1911.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

1912–13

PRESIDENT:

DR. A. W. WARD (Master of Peterhouse).

COUNCIL:

[11] THE RT. HON. SIR W. R. ANSON, BART., M.P.
[12] PROFESSOR A. C. BRADLEY.
[11] SIR A. J. EVANS.
[10] PROFESSOR P. GARDNER.
[12] PROFESSOR F. J. HAVERFIELD.
[11] MR. D. G. HOGARTH.
[11] SIR COURTENAY ILBERT, G.C.B.
[10] DR. HENRY JACKSON, O.M.
[12] THE RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE KENNEDY
[13] SIR F. G. KENYON, K.C.B.
[11] PROFESSOR W. P. KER.
[12] PROFESSOR C. W. C. OMAN.
[10] DR. G. W. PROTHERO
[13] THE RT. HON. LORD REAY, K.T., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
[12] PROFESSOR P. VINOGRADOFF.

SECRETARY:

PROFESSOR I. GOLLANCZ.

BURLINGTON HOUSE, LONDON, W.

[10] Appointed 1910. [11] Appointed 1911. [12] Appointed 1912.

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

1911–1912

NINTH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

July 5, 1911

ADDRESS BY LORD REAY, ACTING PRESIDENT

It is with a deep sense of the transient nature of human life that I find myself addressing you this day from the Presidential Chair, left vacant all these months, since he who filled it with so much dignity, grace, and devotion was suddenly taken from the midst of those to whom he had endeared himself by the many charms and distinctions of his lofty character.

When he addressed you a year ago, he congratulated the Academy on reaching for the first time the prescribed limit of our full Century of Fellows. Since then our ranks have become depleted—Furnivall, Peile, Mayor, one after another, departed; then came our heavy blow, and we could scarcely realize that our President in the very prime of life had passed away! And soon after, that fine stalwart embodiment of the very best combination of culture, exact learning, and active patriotism, ripe in years, honoured, and esteemed, also paid Nature's exacting debt. By the death of Sir Alfred Lyall the Academy lost a sagacious adviser, a distinguished historian who understood the East, and worker for the cause of Humane Learning.

I, in common with so many others, paid, however inadequately, our tribute to the memory of our late President. The Office he dignified will this day be filled again; and I have little doubt that the assembled Body will acclaim the Council's nomination of his successor. To-day, too, we will fill up some of the gaps in our ranks. And so, though our dear comrades fall, with renewed strength and redoubled effort we march onward, in faith, and trust, and hope; believing that successors will never fail us, able to carry to the highest success the cause for which the British Academy has its being.

It is not for me, to-day, to deal with any such problems as those which were treated successively by our late President in his Annual Addresses. At the beginning of next Session the task will fall to our

new President to address you, and to give expression to his views on aspects of the Academy's work and aims. My duty, as Chairman this day, is briefly to recount some points in the past year's history of the Academy. We have had a series of excellent Papers on topics which come within the scope of our activities. In addition to the Ordinary Papers, Dr. Adam Smith's course of Schweich Lectures on 'the Poetry of the Hebrews' was a noteworthy achievement; at least a thousand must have attended the Lectures, which will soon, we hope, be given to the world as the Third Volume of the series on Biblical Archaeology In November last a beginning was made with the new fund, which we owe to an anonymous donor, for English Literature and Language, and more particularly for the Warton Lecture on English Poetry and the Annual Shakespeare Lecture. Professor W. P. Ker's Inaugural Lecture on 'Thomas Warton' was all that his friends looked for from so erudite a critic. Especially gratifying was the due tribute paid by him to another distinguished fellow-worker in the same field—I allude to Dr. Courthope, whose great work on 'The History of English Poetry' has been brought to its conclusion. The Council has invited Dr. Courthope to deliver the Second Warton Lecture at the beginning of the next Session: he has chosen as his theme 'The Connexion of Ancient and Modern Romance'. To-day we are inaugurating the Annual Shakespeare Lectures; and I rejoice that when we meet M. Jusserand this evening we shall be able to welcome him as one of the small and distinguished band of Corresponding Fellows of the British Academy. It gives me pleasure also to announce to the Academy that the Council has recently decided to undertake the issue of the reproduction of the famous Caedmon MS. of Anglo-Saxon Poetical Paraphrases of the Bible, preserved at the Bodleian Library, and one of its greatest possessions. During the past twenty years, it has been the cherished desire among scholars to possess this priceless treasure of antiquity in facsimile, a MS. of such deep interest for the history of Old English Poetry and also of Early English Art. Perhaps a dozen futile efforts have been made to bring this about, and more recently an effort, promoted by American scholars, has not been more successful, though those concerned will be delighted to hear that, through means privately and personally placed at the disposal of Professor Gollancz, the Academy, having obtained permission from the Curators, has put the work in hand, and at the Oxford Press it is already making progress. The Caedmon Volume may be considered as the Academy's contribution to the more comprehensive scheme, approved by the E. E. Text Society, to promote the issue of a series

of facsimiles of the chief Anglo-Saxon and Middle English MSS., in the first instance as a memorial to the Founder of the Society, our indefatigable late Fellow, Dr. Furnivall. In America, the Modern Language Association is desirous of furthering such a project. The Council of the Academy has expressed its strongest approval of so important a scheme, and it is hoped that the Academy may at some time or other be in a position to assist the combined efforts of English, American, and foreign scholars in this direction. It is gratifying to the Academy that the Secretary has, by Dr. Furnivall's expressed wish, succeeded the veteran Founder as Director of the Early English Text Society. I personally am specially glad to be able to state that the reproduction of the Caedmon MS. is being guaranteed on the express condition that it be issued to commemorate the recent Tercentenary of the Authorized Version of the Bible: in this way, the Academy will be able to evince perhaps in the best manner possible its participation in what was the most important literary commemoration of the year.

As regards the various enterprises which the Academy is helping forward, I have but to remark that the Encyclopaedia of Islam is making steady progress, and that preparations for the Critical Text of the *Mahābhāratha* are proceeding satisfactorily; the British Academy's series of 'Records of British Economic and Social History' will soon be inaugurated, we hope, by the publication of two or three volumes, consisting of 'the Cartulary of the Abbey of St. Augustine', the Record Office Survey of the Knights' Templar, and the Kentish Cartulary. I desire to call attention also to the Academy's new series of Supplemental Papers, of which the first has been recently published, Professor Bury's edition of 'The Kletorologion of Philotheos', with its important study on 'the Administrative System of the Ninth Century'.

As one thinks of the work that the Academy might so well do, if it received but a small subsidy from the State, our late President's words are recalled in which he maintained that the denial of State support to Organized Learning, outside the sphere of the Physical Sciences, tended to lower the intellectual dignity of Great Britain in international relations; and through this cold neglect the British Academy was crippled in the exercise of precisely those functions which were most distinctive of an Academy of Learning.

We desire again to express our sincerest thanks to the Royal Society for its most gracious hospitality.

It is my pleasant duty to express the Academy's hearty congratulations to members of our Body upon whom various honours, so well

merited, have recently been bestowed. And first I would name Sir George Trevelyan, who now joins that most select of all Orders, the Order of Merit, which already numbers Bryce and Dr. Henry Jackson on its illustrious roll, and which in the past included the names of Jebb and Lecky; to Sir William Anson, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Sir John Rhys we offer our congratulations on their promotion to the Privy Council; to Dr. Evans, Dr. Sandys, and Mr. Sidney Lee on their knighthoods, and to Dr. Kenyon on his Companionship of the Bath. Our Fellows have received welcome recognition from foreign Universities and Academies, and I may single out particularly the honorary degree of Doctor of Law conferred upon Professor Vinogradoff by the University of Berlin; he has been elected also a Corresponding Member of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences.

It is now my privilege to propose to you the Council's unanimous nomination for the Office of President: when one takes into account Dr. Ward's distinction as a scholar, his services to Learning, his position as Head of the most ancient College in the great University of Cambridge, when one further recalls his devotion to the Academy, there can be little doubt that the choice of the Council and of the general Body could fall upon no one more fitting for the Presidential Chair; and I feel sure you will unanimously invite him to succeed our lamented friend Mr. S. H. Butcher. He is one of the very few remaining of the band who were originally called upon to deal with the whole question of the foundation of the British Academy. Acton, Sidgwick, Jebb, Lecky, Leslie Stephen, Caird, Maitland, all these early pioneers have passed. He, we feel sure, will advance their aims, their aspirations, and their hopes. Without any further comment on my part, I have the honour to submit to you the name of Dr. A. W. Ward for the Office of President, and in doing so, as your first President, would once again express my fervent good wishes for the future of our Academy—

'*Floreat Academia Britannica.*'

TENTH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

July 1, 1912

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
DR. A. W. WARD

SINCE I had the honour of addressing the Fellows of the British Academy barely three-quarters of a year have passed, and what I have to add to the record I then attempted of the eventful experiences of the preceding twelvemonth need not detain you long. It is, however, my mournful duty to recall to you that in the interval two distinguished names have been added to the growing roll of our Fellows whose task is done, and who are no longer with us, except in the spirit of their labours. That spirit—the spirit of truth which knows of no faltering and of no yielding, but which nevertheless works in perfect harmony with the spirit of love and (I venture to add) the spirit of prayer, as they presented themselves to our great English eighteenth-century mystic—no scholar and divine of our own age has more signally attested than the late Dr. Fairbairn, who died in reverend old age on February 9 last, mourned by many generations of learners. To their successors he has bequeathed a rich store of *studies*—as he loved to call his works—in religious philosophy and history, and to us the memory of a nature singularly sympathetic and gentle in the midst of arduous research and subtle controversy.

Within the last few days, and since I had put on paper my brief notes for this annual address, there has been announced to us the death, at the advanced age of seventy-nine, of one of the most distinguished of the original Fellows of our Academy, and one of the most notable members of its philosophical section—Dr. Shadworth Hodgson. I trust that the pen of one of the members of that section, and perhaps of the Aristotelian Society over whose inception and earlier labours he presided, and in whose work he took a close interest till within a few years before his death, will before long do justice to his long-continued labours and their results, as well as to the sympathy and encouragement which he never failed to extend to workers, older

or younger, in the same field. The papers which he read before the Academy, and more especially that on 'The Interrelation of the Academical Sciences', are well remembered. Wherever the complete picture of the ideal philosopher is to be found, or however it may be most successfully presented, it will not fail to reproduce some of the most distinctive features of the broad-minded and highly cultured brother-Fellow whose loss we are suddenly called upon to deplore.

I have also to record the death, on May 19 last, of one of the Corresponding Fellows of this Academy, Señor Menendez y Palayo, President of the Spanish Academy of History, and Director of the National Library at Madrid. His career, the narrative of which forms one of the most striking pages in the history of modern scholarship, will, I confidently hope, be retraced with full knowledge as well as sympathy by one of our own Fellows. On the present occasion it must suffice to say that while our late Corresponding Fellow by his continuous labours indisputably raised the standard of historical research and literary workmanship throughout his native country, the work of his wonderful youth, the *History of Heterodox Spaniards* (*Historia de los Heterodoxos Españoles*) is an achievement of extraordinary learning, very wide in range and exact in detail, the merits of which have been freely acknowledged by European historians of widely different views.

The summer season is at hand, which, in accordance with the habit of our times, lends itself with increasing facility to celebrations recalling the past history and marking the present progress of learned bodies with all of which we enjoy some measure of friendly intercourse. One foreign University, however, summoned us to send a representative to its jubilee while the apples were yet fresh upon the oaks, and while we were unable to respond to the hospitable call. On May 29 last the University of Lemberg celebrated the 250th anniversary of its foundation, which, in 1661, was decreed by John Casimir, the last of the Jagellon kings of Poland, a prince whose own mournful experiences seem like a premonition of the tremendous national tragedy which was to follow soon after. Established under the control of the Order of Jesus and reestablished under King Augustus III, the University, in consequence of the partition of Poland, became Austrian, and was once more refounded, under very different auspices, by the Emperor Joseph II; and its scheme has been completed by the addition of a medical faculty under the venerable reigning emperor. A University which has preserved and augmented its vitality through such a series of vicissitudes as that which I have indicated has a strong claim upon the friendly goodwill of all bodies interested in the

unswerving pursuit of high literary and scientific aims, and our own congratulations, though a little out of date, are not the less sincere.

In April last the twofold celebration—academic and patriotic—at Athens was attended on our behalf by Mr. Hogarth, who bore with him sympathies deeper than almost any other solemnity of the kind could have evoked, and associating themselves with cherished memories of the love of Hellas and of Greek scholarship that animated such leaders of our own as Jebb and Butcher. At the Congress of Orientalists held at the same time at Athens Professor Driver represented the British Academy. Mr. Arthur Balfour has been good enough to undertake to represent us at the first Eugenics Congress, to be held in London in July, and Sir Arthur Evans and Professor Percy Gardner at the Archaeological Congress which will meet at Rome in October.

Among the home gatherings during the present summer are two to which we are looking forward with particular interest, and to which you will perhaps allow me very briefly to advert. The earlier of these, indeed—the Congress of the Universities of the Empire—is to be opened to-morrow morning by the Chancellor of the University of London, and we have made bold to invite the attendance of the Delegates at our own gathering at Burlington House this evening, when our friends and ourselves are to have the pleasure of listening to Professor Andrew Cecil Bradley's oration on Shakespeare—the second of a series for which the munificence of one of our benefactors has enabled us to arrange as a most appropriate annual function of the Academy. The Congress will have its hands full in dealing with problems pressing for solution, and of which in many cases I feel assured that cooperation between the Universities, old and new, will prove a most effective solvent. Fortunately, these problems are under no special necessity of including the relations of Universities at the present day to bodies of the nature of our own—relations which rest on assured conditions of mutual goodwill, and the pursuit, though to some extent in different ways, of the same intellectual ends. In France the foundation of the Academy had been from the first almost the direct emanation of the authority of the monarchy, and thus formed an organic part of a system of regulated progress affecting the whole intellectual life of the nation. But, in at least two other leading European countries, the learned societies founded in the latter half of the seventeenth century were directly designed to resuscitate the waning intellectual aspirations and renovate the zeal of study for the sake of study—in other words, the love of Truth for the sake of Truth—which had owed so much to the Renascence, but which, in

different ways and in different degrees no doubt, had been deeply depressed, in Germany by the Thirty Years' War, and in England by the hardly much briefer period of civil troubles. The fact that the Universities of Europe have long since recovered from this depression, and, in no age more eagerly than in our own, are proving themselves conscious of their duties as homes of research and learning, has not (how could it have done so?) lessened either the cordiality of the relations between them and the chief learned Societies of Europe, or the value of their cooperation. The actual interfusion of the work of Universities and that of Academies at the present day would, in any case, make it difficult to estimate their indebtedness to one another; without the Universities our Academies might be in occasional danger of finding their foundations built in clouds and air; on the other hand, it is not going too far to say had it not been for the labours of Leibniz—I might almost say, for his dreams—it would be difficult to imagine a development of German university life and an advance in the highest conceptions of its purposes such as has been achieved since Wilhelm von Humboldt relit the flickering torch; while, were a curtain drawn over the 250 years of strenuous endeavour, crowned by achievement in every field of scientific research, which are registered in the Royal Society's record, the tale of achievement on which the Universities of the British Empire can base their plans of a progress such as the Empire expects from them in the expanding vista of the future, would be very different from what it actually is.

We of the British Academy, mindful of the glorious history of the Royal Society, mindful, too, of the many distinguished literary names to be found on the roll of that Society in the past, and, above all, mindful of the origin of our own body and of the unfailing courtesy and goodwill shown towards us by an illustrious institution of which we may take pride in regarding ourselves as a latter-day offshoot, shall not be among the last to tender our cordial congratulations to the Royal Society on the approaching 250th anniversary of its foundation. An address to this end has been drawn up by the Council.

To one other contemplated meeting of scholars united by their common studies I directed your attention already in my last address, because upon the British Academy has devolved the organization of a gathering of considerable significance for the world of historical studies. The preparations for the third meeting of the International Historical Congress, which is to be held in London from the 3rd to the 9th of April, 1913—in succession to previous Congresses at Rome in 1903 and at Berlin in 1908—on which a representative Committee assembled on the invitation of the Academy and executive bodies

appointed by that Committee has been diligently engaged, are already in an advanced state; and, as you are doubtless aware, His Majesty the King has signified his gracious intention of becoming the Patron of the Congress. Mr. Bryce, whose name is a tower of strength wherever, on either side of the ocean, historical studies are cherished, will be its President; Vice-Presidents and officers of the Sections into which the work of the Congress will be divided have been appointed; and I need not say that due publicity will be given to the arrangements made as we proceed. I may add that among the Committees of the Congress the Financial Committee will have a responsibility thrown upon it which it is hoped the generous support of Fellows of the Academy and others will enable it to meet.

In the same connexion, I should like to mention that, hampered though it is by the slenderness of its resources, the Academy has contributed a small grant (of £60) to an international fund for the completion of an important statistical work, first undertaken by the Carlsberg Institution at Copenhagen, on the Sound Dues registers during the period from 1497 to 1657. These registers furnish the completest possible record of navigation and mercantile activity in the Baltic during nearly three centuries, in the course of which the leading part in the control of the traffic passed from the German Hansa to the United Provinces, and from the United Provinces to England. It is mortifying that for the completion of this great undertaking, which will furnish full tables of the numbers, approximate tonnage, destination, and freight of the mercantile navies of Europe during a momentous period of modern political and commercial history, so small a measure of support even relatively speaking—(Germany, for instance, has promised an annual contribution of between three and four times, and the Netherlands of between two and three times the amount)—should have proved obtainable in the country whose trade is more largely concerned in the story than that of any other; and if what I have said should lead to an addition to a few private subscriptions by which the Academy has been augmented, I shall not be ashamed of having once more taken up your time on the subject. It is difficult to persuade our foreign friends and fellow-workers that our Academy's funds are wholly inadequate for the prosecution of its own undertakings, and that the dues which many of us and which this representative body would be glad enough to pay as a contribution to work done at foreign centres of historical research cannot correspond to our wishes or to the interest which we take in that work.

I have much pleasure in stating that the Master of St. Catharine's

College, Cambridge, Dr. Johns, has accepted the invitation of the Council to deliver in December next the annual course of lectures in connexion with the study of Biblical Archaeology, for which the Schweich Fund enables the Academy to arrange. His subject will be taken from a field of which he is master and will probably be 'The Laws of Babylon and Israel'.

I have already reminded you that this evening Professor Andrew Cecil Bradley will deliver to his brother Fellows and our friends the annual Shakespeare Oration, taking for his special subject the tragedy of *Coriolanus*. More than ever, as we draw near the celebration of the most interesting commemoration which our age is likely to witness, the worldwide spread of Shakespeare's fame is brought home to us; and we are in hopes that in 1913 a distinguished man of letters, whose scholarship fitly represents that of the nation by which, apart from Shakespeare's own, the study of the poet has been most enduringly cherished, will take the place occupied this year and last by Professor Bradley and M. Jusserand.

Another Fellow of the Academy and another literary critic of proved power and acknowledged eminence, Professor Saintsbury, will in the course of October deliver the second of the Warton Lectures on English Poetry, provided by the munificence of the benefactor who has endowed the Shakespeare Oration. Professor Saintsbury has chosen as his subject 'The Historical Character of English Lyric'.

I close this brief account of work that has been done or undertaken, on the note which hitherto has as it were imposed itself, rather than been freely chosen, by Presidents of the British Academy. Not to lighten the personal labours, much less to gratify the personal ambition, of those scholars who might be reckoned among its Fellows, was this Academy founded, but to establish a body to which in matters of historical, philosophical, philological, and other branches of literary learning, both the educated community of this country and the authorities of the State might look for advice and guidance in whatever might advance the interests and promote the progress of letters in this land and Empire. It was thought best to establish this Academy of Humane Learning side by side with, rather than as an integral part of, that famous Academy of Natural Knowledge—the Royal Society of London. The decision once made was made, as they say, 'for good.' On us of the early years of the Academy devolves the duty of proving that it was a decision which admits of being worked out into fruitful achievement; and this duty we must perform, with the aid of private munificence and of such contributions from public resources as may accrue to us. The tasks awaiting those who

have at heart the progress of which I have spoken, are many and arduous—and most of them, from the nature of the case, can only be carried through by cooperative effort. On our part I think I may confidently say the effort will not be wanting; but the measure in which it can be applied, and in which its results can be gathered in, will be determined by the goodwill of those with whom it lies to decide whether among the highest public interests of this country and Empire are those which this Academy is by its Charter of foundation called upon to regard as its province.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

Dr. A. W. WARD

Read October 25, 1911

It seems fitting that the few observations which I propose to offer to the Fellows of the British Academy on taking the chair to which they have done me the honour of calling me, should be prefaced by a single word of sincere thanks. To myself my election is the crowning honour of a long literary life; nor can I prove my sense of its being such in any other way than by placing my services, so far as my powers reach, unreservedly at the Academy's disposal during my tenure of the office which it has conferred upon me. Occasions will be frequent during that tenure, however brief it may prove, of holding counsel with the Fellows, collectively or individually, or through their executive body and special committees, on steps to be taken or to be avoided by the Academy, in order that, while consistently adhering to the principles of its original foundation, it may develop and extend its usefulness as a national organ of learning. To-day, and before I have gained that closer experience both of our organization and of our work to which with your continued indulgence and co-operation I may look forward, I will enter into no speculations as to the future, and content myself with a brief reference to those undertakings in which we are already engaged, and which nothing but the narrowness of our corporate resources, partially supplemented though they recently have been by generous benefactions, can prevent us from expanding and multiplying.

Permit me one other personal word before I proceed. In doing my best to fulfil the duties which your confidence imposed upon me, I know that I may depend upon the advice and the support of our Council, and upon the devoted assistance of our Honorary Secretary. And I trust that I may also have recourse, at least occasionally, to the wise experience of Lord Reay, who not only as the first President of the Academy guided its initial years—years during which it had to acquire the confidence in itself and in its work necessary to the

existence and progress of any national institution—with a statesmanlike prudence and a firm dignity all his own, but who, when the great calamity befel us of the loss of his successor, was, to our general relief, found ready to act as our President during the greater part of the current year. It thus also came to pass that there devolved upon him the duty—a duty which no other member of our body could have performed with the same authority or with more dignity and grace—to dwell upon the losses which we have undergone in the course of the present session, and above all that of our honoured third President, the late Mr. Henry Butcher.

In the address delivered by Lord Reay on assuming the duties of Acting President, he paid to the memory of his immediate predecessor a tribute worthy of Henry Butcher's services and powers, of his personality and ideals. I have since, as no doubt have many other Fellows of the Academy, had the advantage of reading an account of his academical, literary, and political work by a brother member of our body united to him by the closest personal ties as well as by perfect intellectual sympathy; and I cannot but feel that after what Lord Reay has said and Dr. Prothero has written of the man we all mourn, no additional word from me either is needed or would perhaps be seemly. 'The fruitful plot of scholarism' was never 'grac'd' by a more assiduous husbandman; the turbid sphere of political conflict was never clarified by a nobler visitant; at least three great Universities are proud to claim him as their own, because to each of the three he rendered unstinted service.—I can attest this of the one which honoured him earliest and which he served latest, and where he was beloved in his constituency as he was in his Irish home.

I have touched on the loss of our third President; may I say how sincerely we hope that a learned leisure and the rest which it should bring with it is attending the retirement of our honoured second President, Sir Edward Maunde Thompson, under whose chairmanship our Academy first formed itself in his sanctuary at the British Museum.

Of another Fellow of the Academy, too, whom we lost later in the year, Lord Reay also spoke on the occasion to which I have referred with the same complete sympathy and with the special insight of one distinguished Indian administrator into the public career of another. The late Sir Alfred Lyall's indefatigable interest in affairs could remain no secret to any one who has sat with him at our council board; but his name will hold its place on the roll of our past worthies as that of a writer possessed of rare gifts and of a still

rarer combination of them—an historian of wide grasp, a literary critic of fine perception, and a master of fine English, whether in prose or in verse.

Yet a third of our Academicians has passed away, and he only since we last met to reckon the melancholy tale of our losses. The death, on August 16th last, of Dr. John Wordsworth, Bishop of Salisbury, came with suddenness to his diocese and to the country, in the midst of his continuous activity as a divine. Though, in the many notices of him that have appeared since his death, special attention has been called to his great learning, which was almost without a parallel in matters connected with the literature, dogma, and history of the Church, as well as to his rare excellence as a Latinist, and though it is as a scholar that he should be particularly commemorated in this Academy, no Divine ever more fully illustrated in his person the ancient maxim that 'a learned Church is an active Church'. Familiar as he was with the records and the teaching of the past, he—in the words of a member of one of those Continental Churches to which he always held out a friendly hand—'hopefully and carefully sowed for the future', and the memory of this great scholar will long be cherished in circles which, unlike our own, the inspiring influence of his personality could never reach.

The losses on which I have touched cannot be redeemed except by a recognition of the fact that in the intellectual world what is good and great has alone the prerogative of enduring. And in a body such as ours we can never banish the satisfaction which flows from its continuous self-renewal, or dwell exclusively on our losses, however nearly these may come home to a *sodalitas* which should be ever drawing closer and closer the bonds of intellectual intimacy. To our numbers have recently been added three Fellows to whom we all extend a cordial welcome, and whom, if I may say so, it is a great personal pleasure to myself to see among us, since with two of them I have been closely associated in certain of the literary labours, and again with two in some of the academical experiences, of my life. It is a delight to us all to number among our Fellows Professor Saintsbury, a literary historian and critic of long-established and widespread renown; Professor Tout, to whom students of medieval and of general national history, and the study of history as a whole, are under deep obligations; and Professor A. E. Taylor who at a relatively early age has already done much first-rate work on a great variety of philosophical topics, and has produced important writings on Ethics and on Metaphysics, besides a number of learned and penetrating articles on the history of Philosophy, ancient and modern. We have also had

the honour of electing as Corresponding Fellows his Excellency M. Jusserand, whom all lovers of English scholarship and letters regard as one of the most distinguished members of their body, and who has this very year rendered a conspicuous service to our Academy; M. Henri Bergson, whose book on *Creative Evolution* is recognized by our own philosophical authorities as a work of rare originality and importance; M. Solomon Reinach, late President of the Académie des Inscriptions, to whom homage is due wherever a living interest is felt in the field of philosophical and archaeological studies which he has himself materially widened; and Mr. James Ford Rhodes, the veteran American historian, honoured not less in the old country than in the new whose later annals he has faithfully written.

I turn to some other experiences of the past year that are of interest to the Academy. The genial summer of *1911* has been marked by a series of interesting University jubilees, to all of which the British Academy was invited to send representatives. At Christiania a University—founded by private enterprise in days of depression and dependence—celebrated its centenary with extraordinary enthusiasm in the presence of its own national king. Here Professor Ker found himself in the midst of a distinguished assembly in which few other English scholars could have been so thoroughly at home, and which he addressed in a Latin oration, not lost, as we may trust, to regions whence it is only in later days that many return visits have been paid to the Northmen.

At the celebration of the Centenary of the University of Breslau, where the Academy was represented by Professor Burkitt, on whom the University conferred an honorary doctorate of Divinity, the proceedings and the welcome offered to the delegates of other Universities and learned bodies were equally genial. The occasion was full of interest; for, though the history of the actual University only goes back a hundred years, it is the representative of an Austrian and Roman Catholic Academical foundation, dating from a century earlier, as well as of another University, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, incorporated with Breslau in the great days of Humboldt, Fichte, and the Silesian Schleiermacher. Thus the University of Breslau represents two distinct stages of Silesian history as well as the cultured development of a Germanized land which in a still earlier century—the seventeenth—exercised a notable influence upon the progress of German literature.

The last of these celebrations was that at St. Andrews, and to this I had the honour of accompanying Lord Reay, a former Lord Rector of the University, as well as our own former President. The five-hundredth anniversary (for the University of St. Andrews could not

but refuse its own recognition to the word 'quincentenary') of the Mother University of Scotland was solemnized by a confluence of scholars and men of science from every part of the world, and by a flow of eloquence sufficient to fertilize the hallowed ground for a further long-continued growth. The historic note in these speeches was singularly marked, and rarely on such an occasion has the *admonitus loci*—in this case the silent eloquence of one of the most venerable havens of religion and learning in our island—met with a more inspiriting and copious response. St. Andrews, at least, though her stones have grown grey with time and though she has associated with herself a vigorous younger College, will never be transplanted.

These celebrations call to mind a meeting of a rather different kind which is to take place in the year 1913, and to which together with ourselves a large number of other learned Societies at home and abroad, and what (though with the fear of Agathon before my eyes) I may call the world of historical studies, is looking forward with unusual interest. Leibniz's idea of a federation of learned Societies belonging to different lands is approaching realization, not only in that Association of Academies to a meeting of which in Paris our own Academy indirectly owes its being; but in meetings in the great centres of civilization of the members of Societies and others devoted to the pursuit and study of one of the great branches or departments of learning. The experiment of a meeting of historians and historical investigators from all parts of the civilized world was conducted with so much success at Rome in 1903 and at Berlin in 1908 that in 1913 it is to be repeated, we may hope with not inferior success, in London. The British Academy has thought it right to take the initial steps for ensuring the success of this great meeting, and in co-operation with the national Universities, as well as with the Royal Historical Society, the Society of Antiquaries and kindred bodies, is already engaged upon preparations necessarily entailing a good deal of labour. I may be forgiven for remarking that besides much labour they will also entail much expense, and that the Executive Committee which the Academy, in conjunction with other representative bodies, is setting on foot will, it is hoped, not appeal in vain for support which will be urgently needed.

The ordinary work of the Academy divides itself naturally into two halves, each of which is a necessary complement to the other. On the one hand, the flow of special contributions to learning in the form of papers and lectures has shown no sign of decrease or drought; and in our lecture-theatre at least we need not fear the cry against undue

specialization of research which in the last year has been raised so loudly—I will not here examine with what justice—against recent University developments both at home and abroad. Our august Sister on the Seine can take care of her own interests and her own credit, and judge for herself of the measure in which she has developed the conceptions of her illustrious founder and satisfied the ideals which half a century ago were—in a spirit blending enthusiasm with just a little irony—placed before her by one of the most brilliant of her members, the late Ernest Renan. She has certainly had no reason for being depressed by recent attacks; the last of these which has fallen under my notice impugns her time-honoured mode of election; but the censor is fain to confess that, so far as results are concerned, a popular vote would be unlikely to have a very different issue. For ourselves, it is enough—at all events for the present—that we should pursue with unremitting zeal, though also with constant circumspection, the various pathways of research which in continually growing numbers lead us and our fellow-students towards the same sanctuary of knowledge, and offer the fruits of our labours without overlooking the fact that we are a *British* Academy—the organ of studies of which the records claim to form part of the national *literature*. Thanks to the untiring labours of our Honorary Secretary, vols. iii and iv of our Proceedings are now, or will be very soon, in your hands. In the particular field of Biblical Archaeological research the liberality of an anonymous friend of Professor Gollancz has provided us with a trust fund of £10,000—the Schweich Lecture fund—under which three largely attended courses of public lectures have already been given by eminent scholars—Professors Driver and Kennett, and Principal George Adam Smith—under the auspices of the Academy; a course of lectures under this fund will be delivered before Christmas next by Professor S. Macalister on the subject of the *Philistines*. Another benefactor, who also desires to remain anonymous, has through our Honorary Secretary enabled us to found an annual Warton lecture on English Poetry, and an annual Shakespeare Oration. You are aware that the Academy was fortunate in inducing one of its Fellows, Professor W. P. Ker, to be our first Warton lecturer (though it could not induce him to accept any fee); and we are all looking forward this afternoon to the second Warton lecture by another of our Fellows, the author of a history which enters into direct competition with Warton's own classical work. You are also aware that the first Shakespeare Oration on the foundation of the same benefactor was—to our great and general delight—delivered in July last by M. Jusserand, whom on the same day we had elected one of our Corresponding

Fellows, and that on this memorable occasion the Academy had the pleasure of welcoming a large number of its friends at a friendly gathering.

The other division of the Academy's work is one still attended by great difficulties, inasmuch as it is only step by step, and by co-operation with other authorities and institutions, that we can at present hope to perform our natural function of promoting important collective undertakings whereby those branches of learning with the cultivation of which we are directly concerned will be materially advanced. In the early days of the Academy it was fortunate enough to be able to obtain a substantial grant from the Secretary of State for India (£200 for ten years) in aid of the *Dictionary of Islam*, which is progressing towards completion under the distinguished editorship of Dr. Snouck Hurgronje; and from the same source we are now in the position of aiding the critical condition of the *Mahabharata*, by means of a lesser grant for the same period. From our own slender resources, as yet unreplenished by any Government grant, we are, so far as we can, supporting the preparation of the *Dictionary of Pali*, and that of a *Bibliography of British History*, from the Tudor reigns onwards, which has been undertaken by a joint Committee of British and American Scholars presided over by one of our Fellows, Dr. Prothero. We have further made ourselves responsible for the publication of *Social and Economic Records*, under the editorship of yet another of our Fellows, Professor Vinogradoff, of which the volumes now at press are the Cartulary of the Abbey of St. Augustine, the Record Office Survey of the Knights Templar, and the Kentish Cartulary. Finally—through means privately and personally generously placed at the disposal of our Honorary Secretary—the Academy has undertaken to issue the reproduction of the Cædmon MS.—perhaps the most important of Anglo-Saxon MSS.—in commemoration of the recent Tercentenary of the Authorized Version of the Bible; and it is hoped that other Anglo-Saxon MSS. will also be issued in fac-simile. I have much pleasure in stating that M. Jusserand has gracefully signified his wish that the fee due to him for his recent Shakespeare Oration should be handed over as his contribution towards this project which is meeting with as hearty a welcome from American and continental scholars as from those at home. In the same connexion I am desirous of mentioning that the Academy has expressed its goodwill, and will, many of us hope, at some not distant date, be able substantially to contribute to the scheme of the Early English Text Society for the reproduction of some of the chief MSS. of Early English Literature in memory of the Society's first Director, the late Dr. Furnivall, one of

the original Fellows of our body, which had to regret the loss of him in the summer of last year as that of one of the most strenuous and large-hearted English scholars of any age. The first volume of the Series (*Pearl, Patience, Cleanness,* and *Sir Gawayne and the Grene Knight*), edited by Dr. Furnivall's successor in the Directorship, Professor Gollancz, our Honorary Secretary, will, it is hoped, be issued on February 4th, the anniversary of Dr. Furnivall's birthday; and the reproduction of other Early English MSS. will follow as soon as possible. I am particularly anxious to impress upon Fellows of the Academy who take a leading part in the affairs of other learned Societies, the expediency of associating with their activities that of our own institution, there is not one of these Societies, in so far as their work has any homogeneity with our own, with which it is not expedient and desirable that the Academy should be in the closest touch. In this connexion I may perhaps mention that the Council of the Academy has to-day resolved to memorialize the Secretary of State for India against the proposed abolition of the office of Director-General of Indian Archaeology, which, as administered by its present distinguished occupant, has signally contributed to the advance of a study of the deepest interest to our body.

I must not detain you a moment longer, and I therefore beg you to draw your own inferences from the facts which it seems only right on this annual occasion to bring before you. If our resources grow with our years, and above all if the State recognizes the significance of the services which we desire to render, and which we believe we can render, to the promotion of a wide range of learned studies in this country and Empire; the purposes for which the Academy was founded and chartered, and which all its Fellows have at heart, may find ample fulfilment. If we of the present generation are destined to see those purposes only partially and imperfectly accomplished, let us take refuge in the reflexion of the great Optimist, who never had a better excuse for despondency than the scanty immediate outcome of his efforts for the foundation of Academies, but to whom the majority of modern Academies owe perhaps more than to any other man—in the reflexion of Leibniz:—'I confess that we must work for posterity. One often builds houses which one will never inhabit, and plants trees whose fruits one is not to enjoy.'

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

Dr. A. W. WARD

Read October 30, 1912

WITHIN the brief interval which has elapsed since I last had the pleasure of addressing the Fellows of the British Academy, two very distinguished members of our body have passed away, and it is fitting that any other words I may have to address to you should be preceded by some reference, however brief and inadequate, to our common loss. Professor WALTER WILLIAM SKEAT, whom I mention first, since he was an original Fellow of our Academy, warmly cherished his connexion with it, and took an interest both in its actual work and in the development of its usefulness to which he not unfrequently gave direct expression at our meetings. In return, we have always felt proud of the fact that his name should have from the first been included in the list of the distinguished men whom we could claim as representing among us a branch of research peculiarly germane to the purposes of a national Academy, and appealing with almost unequalled directness to the sympathies of us all. Yet, even in learned centres, and more especially in those seminaries of learning where the scholarship of the country is formed by example as well as by practice, how scant was the response to any such appeal before Skeat and one or two others made the systematic study of the English language the subject of their life's work, and succeeded at last in impressing upon the generation that sat at their feet the historical as well as the philological significance of the continuity of our tongue. Skeat and those whose names will be permanently associated with his own in the history of our Academy as well as in that of national learning at large may almost be said to have conquered for English scholarship this new field—a field which previous generations had been contented to leave but little cultivated or only touched here and there by a tentative and irresponsible spade, though it as it were lay just outside their own doors. Thus, the men who really began the work of English scholarship had necessarily, as is the case with new sciences,

to teach themselves, and their labours were attended by the peculiar difficulties as well as by the incomparable delights of discovery. Skeat, who was an excellent German scholar, and who found great delight in translating German lyric and other verse, was fortunately not isolated from the contemporary endeavours of continental scholarship in the field which he had chosen as his own.

The first Elrington and Bosworth Professor of Anglo-Saxon in the University of Cambridge (as well he might in what, at the time of his return to the University, was the condition of English studies there) took the view that his range of work was not bounded by the precise designation of his chair any more than limited to the fifteen annual lectures prescribed by its conditions.

The influence of his academical lectures as well as of his literary productions, in consequence, stirred a living interest in periods of our language and literature on the hither side, also, of the Norman Conquest. Among his achievements, indeed, as a textual critic and commentator, none have carried his name so far as his standard editions of Langland and Chaucer; while his edition of Chatterton is, on a smaller scale, an extraordinary effort of learning and critical ingenuity. On the other hand, the breadth of his knowledge and the sureness of his combinative power as an English philologist is shown by those etymological works, the great *Etymological Dictionary* and its hardly less admirable compendium. Any one with knowledge who compares the fourth edition of the *Dictionary* with the original edition will find reason for admiring, among Skeat's distinctive qualities as a scholar, his rare capacity for growing with his subject. While he successfully sought to keep pace with the steadily expanding work in the science of etymology, which was being carried out both in this country and abroad, he had when necessary the courage to admit that his decisions in certain points demanded revision, and thus at the same time gave proof of the true scholar's humility, for which those honoured him most who knew him best. His last book, *The Science of Etymology*, appeared only a week before his death. How in this field of research, as indeed in any of the fields which were familiar with his footfall, the late Professor Skeat was at all times ready to act as guide to enquirers who asked his assistance, many of us here and in his University, where he spared no effort and no sacrifice for the advance and organisation of his chosen department of study, would at all times be ready to testify. His services were, however, always at the disposal of those engaged in undertakings for the furtherance of the studies with which he was identified. He was a pillar of the Early English Text Society in its earlier days; and

among his other merits should not be forgotten the all-important assistance given by him to the recording of English dialects. He organized the Dialect Society, and thus brought together the materials ultimately welded into an enduring whole by another Fellow of our Academy in the great *Dialect Dictionary*.

His distinguished fellow workers among us, and the Academy as a whole, will, for the sake of our body as well as for that of English scholarship in both hemispheres, long deplore his loss.

The loss of Mr. ANDREW LANG, who had been a Fellow of this Academy since 1906, but whom of late years it seemed more difficult than ever to seduce from his beloved Highlands, in the very heart of which he died on July 20th last, was one in which many learned and literary associations beside our own body, and more than one section of this, might prefer a special claim of sharing. Perhaps we think of him most readily as a historian—for to history in the broader and truer sense, as to Andrew Lang, what field of human study and what line of scholarly research is altogether alien? Yet there must always be some aspect or side of it which comes specially home to the heart and mind of the particular student, and twice happy the historian with whom that side is the past of his own people. I like to think that I can myself remember the brilliant writer whose productions, whether in verse or in prose, attest his familiarity with so many and diverse scenes and their associations, pen in hand over his *History of Scotland from the Roman Occupation*, in the University Library at St. Andrews. His narrative power, which of its kind was not surpassed by many other historical writers of his generation, stood him in good stead even in his treatment of so broad a canvas; but he excelled in that kind of historical composition which we seem to have agreed to designate by the name of the monograph, and in which his narrative and his critical gifts alike had free play. More than one *victa causa*, as interpreted by him with indefatigable zeal or not less notable acumen, might through his writings alone prove to future generations, as those of Sir Walter Scott, whom he so thoroughly admired, proved to our fathers as well as to ourselves, how strong a hold it had upon the imagination and the sympathies of their ancestors. For, though no one was better qualified than Mr. Lang to trace the line of demarcation between history and legend, since his feet moved surely in the chiaroscuro of mythology, he was never disposed to allow any theory to elbow out its human element. And if he was a great master of style—if in conjunction with our late beloved President, Mr. Butcher, he could reproduce the Homeric poems in that noble vehicle of expression, English prose, which in their hands was adequate

even to what might have seemed almost (I say almost) as venturesome a task as it ever attempted; if, on the other hand, the cunning of his craft did not desert him in the daily round of criticism and comment on all things and a few besides—he thereby gave proof that he was an artist, born and bred, and trained in a discipline of which the world as it read him might well be slow to discern the traces. For my part I rejoice that so widely accomplished a man of letters and one who, while he had so much to say, never failed to take thought of *how* to say it, should have formed part of our learned community.

I also desire, on behalf of our Academy, to record with deep regret the recent death of Professor T. GOMPERZ of Vienna. He is best known for his great work on Greek Thinkers (*Griechische Geister*), which by means of translation is familiar to the English-speaking world, and which has secured him a place among the recognized interpreters of Greek genius. In his own country, his merits were acknowledged by the high public position conferred on him, and he was by general consent numbered among the leading spirits of the intellectual life of Vienna, more especially as regards humanistic studies. In the Vienna Academy and its work he was so deeply interested that his loss must be felt very keenly there. The representatives of our body at the International Association of Academies held in Vienna in 1907 can testify to the important and gracious part he took in that international function. His enthusiasm for England, with which he had many ties, was most sincere, and English scholars heartily reciprocated his good will. The British Academy will not fail to convey its expression of sympathy to Professor Gomperz's family and to the Vienna Academy.

The various jubilees to the meetings in honour of which during the past summer our Academy was invited to send representatives are over, including the 250th anniversary of the foundation of the Royal Society, to whose hospitality we are so deeply indebted. On July 1 last, Professor Bradley delivered to a large meeting of Fellows and friends of the Academy the annual Shakespeare Oration, applying to the tragedy of *Coriolanus* his singularly lucid method of expository criticism. The Oration to which we look forward in the coming spring or summer will be given by a German Shakespeare scholar of great renown, Professor Aloys Brandl of Berlin. His subject will probably be *Shakespeare in Germany*, or some similar theme. We are to-day to have the pleasure of listening to the Warton Lecture by another of our Fellows, another literary critic of high eminence. Dr. Johns, Master of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, will give on Nov. 6, 11, and 13 a course of three

lectures under the Schweich Fund for Biblical Archaeology on the subject of *The Laws of Israel and Babylon*. In the near future—at Easter 1913—as I very specially desire to remind the Fellows of the Academy, the next International Congress of Historical Studies will hold its sittings in London. The organizing Committee, of representatives of the Royal Historical Society and other Societies interested in Historical Studies, as well as of Universities and other learned bodies, which was summoned by the Academy, appointed an Executive Committee, and this is at the present moment actively carrying on preparations for the Meeting of the Congress. A large number of invitations for attendance and for the reading of papers has already been issued in consultation with the several Sections into which the Congress is to be divided. A complete list of the Officers of the Congress and of its Sections and Committees will very speedily be issued to those interested in the Congress; and these Sections and Committees, including the very important Finance Committee, are busily engaged with the Secretary of the Congress and the Secretary for Papers in the preparatory work undertaken by them. I am sure that the Fellows of the Academy, which has from the first shown a special interest in the Congress, will do what lies in their power to ensure to it a conspicuous success.

I reserve for our Eleventh Annual General Meeting in the course of the coming summer some account of the literary labours of the Academy, as represented by its ordinary Transactions, as well as by particular undertakings with which it has specially associated itself.

SOME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read January 18, 1911

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

I. The common-sense view of the Universe, which we may call experience in a loose sense, is that experience which it is the first business of philosophy simply to analyse, without making any assumptions to begin with, not even that of a Conscious Being, or Subject of the Experience (paragraphs 1–3 inclusive).

II. The ultimate data of experience are empirical percepts, which are never *perfectly* simple, and the first, lowest, and simplest which we have, are objectified contents of consciousness (pars. 4–9).

III. After analysing a supposed instance of a short series of such simplest empirical percepts, a point is insisted on, which is perhaps the most important in all philosophical analysis, viz. the twofold movement of one and the same present experience in two opposite directions of time *at once*, backwards into the past as a *knowing*, and forwards into the future as an *existent*; which latter distinction is the immediate consequence of that twofold movement (pars. 10–18).

IV. Consciousness as a knowing is the sole *evidence* we have for anything whatever, including itself as an *existent*. The nature or *kind* of the specific qualities of its ultimate data is incapable of being accounted for. But we cannot avoid inquiring into their genesis as *existents* (pars. 11–23).

V. Our knowledge of the Reality of Matter is derived from the exercise of sight and touch together. But our knowledge of the nature of Matter itself is due to touch (involving sense of stress) only. Touch is the only sense which has a *replica* of itself, at once

as its *object* and (since the *replica* is separable from the original perception of it) as a *real condition* of the occurrence of *new* sensations of the same kind. Moreover, it is evident from the physical sciences, that the *replica* is capable of many analyses quite different from those sensations which give us our immediate knowledge of it, though always into constituents which derive their whole meaning from touch and stress sensations (pars. 24–32). [There follow here some remarks on Pragmatism, a doctrine very much in vogue at the present time (pars. 33–8).]

VI. We locate, in thought, consciousness *within* the organism, because it is within the organism that we cannot but locate its *proximate* real conditions as an existent (pars. 39–49).

VII. The elements which are inseparable from one another in all human empirical experience may be grouped under two heads, formal and material, the formal being those of time-duration and space-extension, and the material some mode or modes of feeling. But we cannot avoid conceiving the possibility of an indefinite variety of modes of consciousness other than our own, of which we can form no positive idea whatever (par. 50).

VIII. The Emotions are those modes of feeling, the existence of which is immediately conditioned upon intra-cerebral activities, just as that of sensations is upon stimuli received by the peripheral terminations of the neuro-cerebral system. Their specific qualities in point of *kind* are as incapable of being thought to be caused or conditioned, as those of sensation are. They have thus an equal title with the sensations, and with the formal co-elements of time and space, which are common to both, to rank as ultimate sources of man's whole knowledge of Being and Existence, of the Universe and of Reality. We cannot avoid understanding the terms *Being* and *Existence* to mean that which, at the least, is knowable by some consciousness or other (pars. 51–5).

IX. Emotions are the *motives* (including in that term the *unperceived* activity of their proximate real conditions) of all Desire, Volition, Thought, and Conscious Action. When consciously adopted they are known as Final Causes (pars. 56–9).

X. Theology differs from Philosophy in having a special object of inquiry, viz. the *Power* which upholds the Totality of Being—not that Totality itself It differs from Religion in not being emotional, but theoretical only (pars. 60–1).

XI. Four sources of Religion, deeply rooted in human nature, are then enumerated, with some consequences which they seem to necessitate (pars. 62–6).

XII Speculative knowledge begins with empirical perceptions and ends with empirical ideas. Plato was the first to grapple with the question of Becoming, γίγνεσθαι, in his dialogue the *Parmenides*, which has sometimes been said to contain his Epistemology. His relation to Parmenides the Eleatic (pars 67–72).

XIII. Meaning of the term *understanding*. Thought being founded on attention, which is an act of *arrest*, we see how the Eleatic proofs of the impossibility of motion are to be dealt with. Yet it is to Parmenides the Eleatic that we must accord the honour of being the first to distinguish Philosophy from Science, by his doctrine of The Two Roads—that of Truth, and that of Opinion (pars. 73–7).

XIV. The *arrest* in attention, with which thought begins, is an arrest of something belonging to consciousness as a *knowing*, by that same consciousness as an *existent*, which itself continues to deal with the arrested idea. We can no more transcend the idea of Reality as something knowable by consciousness, than we can limit by thought the Totality of the Real which is its object thought of (pars. 78–81).

SOME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE

I

1. When Philosophy begins to exist, there is a vast mass of experience already acquired, including both fact and fancy, into which it has to inquire. We have in this mass of experience the common-sense view of things; language has grown up *pari passu* with the acquisition of it, and with the acquisition of the conceptions by means of which it groups and endeavours to understand its phenomena. Both the common-sense view of things and the investigation of that view, which is philosophy, have the nature of the Universe as their object of pursuit, though philosophy far more definitely and self-consciously than common-sense, namely, to understand the Universe so far as possible, or, if and where it is not possible, to understand what and where is the reason for its being withdrawn from our understanding. The fact, which I take to be indisputable, that language has grown up *pari passu* with the common-sense view of things, is significant; its meaning is that philosophy has to deal with language precisely as it deals with common-sense ideas, which language represents.

2. It should be noted that common-sense itself warrants its being made the object inquired into by philosophy, on the practical maxim of testing beliefs and avoiding illusions, by examining from all sides; or, in other words, philosophy has the warrant of common-sense for existing, and for distinguishing itself as a mode of thought in some way specifically different from common-sense. It would not be common-sense, but prejudice, which should refuse to give that warrant to philosophy. But common-sense does more than this. It also to some extent prescribes the method of philosophical inquiry into the nature of the Universe, and of itself as common-sense knowledge of it. For it demands that we should proceed without making any assumptions, that is, that we should ask *what* it is we have got as our object of inquiry, viz. our common-sense experience, before asking how *it comes* to be in our experience, how it comes to be an object having a whatness. To inquire *first* into its *genesis* would be

to make the *a priori* assumption that we already know what genesis is. And it is plain to common-sense that it is impossible to ask what the genesis of anything is without having something, some experience, however small or confused, concerning which the question of genesis can be put. In philosophy, therefore, the question *What* is always prior to the question *How comes.*

3. Essentially there are only two lines possible for it, that of the *a priorist* and that of the *experientialist.* And it is clear, I think, from what precedes, that the *knowing* of objects, the *subjective aspect* of objects, or briefly our consciousness or awareness of things, is the first essential characteristic of the field of philosophy; consciousness is the sole evidence we have of or for anything whatever, itself included. Consequently philosophy must proceed by analysis of that evidence, i. e. of consciousness; and also all assumptions not forced upon us by experience of them as ultimate, immediate, and unavoidable *data*, or given *facts* of experience, must be avoided, even such apparently necessary ideas as that of a conscious being or agent—Mind, Soul, Self, or Ego—who *has* the experience; an assumption which is made, for instance, by Ferrier, in the First Proposition of his *Institutes of Metaphysic,* and which he lays at the basis of his philosophical system. There is a wide difference between immediate and ultimate perceptions which cannot be demonstrated, solely because they are immediate and ultimate, or in other words because they cannot be doubted, and objects of belief which may be held with unwavering tenacity, *although* they are not and perhaps cannot be demonstrated. The former class are facts, the latter are beliefs only. Facts are not to be confused with beliefs simply because they are like them in being indemonstrable.

4. The first and least thing in consciousness is a *content* of consciousness, what we afterwards call an *object* of consciousness, an empirical percept. It is not at first distinguished from the process of perceiving it, nor perceived as the conclusion or accompaniment of that process. When we call it an *object*, we must be on our guard against taking the process perceiving it as what we afterwards call its *subjectivity* or *subjective aspect.* To do so would be to make the tacit assumption of a Perceiving Subject, for making which, as an initial assumption, there is no warrant in experience. Empirical percepts are the first things in knowledge. He who, in philosophy, bases himself on the psychological assumption of a conscious Subject, as in drawing the distinction between Subject and Object as an initial distinction, is like a man who in astronomy should base himself on the geocentric theory of the visible universe.

5. But the process perceiving such an empirical percept is also subsequently distinguished from the content perceived, which is called its object, and, as so distinguished, is thereby itself *objectified*, i.e. made an object of a subsequent perception. The original process of perceiving a content, as distinguished from the content of which it is originally an undistinguished part, is now perceived as itself an object, and *in that character* is consciousness, not as a knowing of contents or of objects, but simply as an *existent*, an existing process of knowing. At the same time, *what it is* as an *existent*, what it is as a *process*, can be known only from the contents, its own contents, which it objectifies. Among these objects is itself as an existent process; *it* also is knowable only by being objectified, just as all other contents of consciousness are. The process as well as its contents, the contents of the process, is objectified in being known as a process—a process having and objectifying contents.

6. Henceforward, i. e. when in philosophy we take consciousness with both its constituents—process and contents—*included*, though now distinguished from one another, we are precluded from taking the process as the subjectivity of the objectified contents, if we were ever tempted to do so, for it is itself objectified along with and equally with its contents. Consciousness with its process and contents included is our sole evidence for everything we can possibly think of, although it is itself of necessity thought of as an existent process, and that too a self-objectifying process. Henceforward therefore, in philosophy, the objectified contents of consciousness (process and contents included) become for us the subjective aspect, or subjectivity, of whatever we can think of or imagine as *Being* or *Existing*, independently of, or not included in, our own existent consciousness. And the question is raised, *Is* there such a thing as *Being* or *Existing* which is *non-consciousness*? Is not such an idea a mere futility and will-o'-the-wisp?

7. The reply which I should make to this question, relying solely on what has been already said in this paper, a reply which leaves the complete answer open to further evidence, but at the same time precludes the *a priori* adoption either of Idealism or Transcendentalism, is as follows. Our notion of Being or Existing, the very meaning of those words, is derived from the objectified content of consciousness—the subjectivity, or subjective aspect, or evidence, of everything whatever. We cannot perceive, think of, or imagine Being or Existence except by perceiving, thinking of, or imagining them. Consequently the *fact* of being perceived, imagined, or thought of, is our ulitmate meaning, and indispensable meaning, of

the words *Being* and *Existence*. But this does not imply that what is our sole evidence of being, existence, or in one word *reality*, is commensurate with the reality which it informs us of. The whole nature of perceived contents or objects is not exhausted by our perceiving or objectifying those contents. Whether it is or is not is open to evidence which our own consciousness, which raises the question, must afford. It is only in the case of consciousness itself, as a process distinguished but not separated from its own immediate objects, that perceiving and being perceived are identical. It is here that my distinction between consciousness as an existent and consciousness as a knowing is of service, enabling us to avoid the puzzles so frequently involved in premature assertion. There is no reason why we should attribute consciousness as an existent, and therefore also as a knowing, to all objects which we perceive or think of, simply because our consciousness objectifies them, just as in existing it objectifies itself. From the fact that all consciousness is objectification it does not follow that everything objectified is consciousness. Consciousness is the only *evidence* of fact, true—but this does not mean that the evidence alone, and not the fact, *exists*. Consciousness (as we shall see) is not all that exists; it is the *sine qua non* of our idea of existence. In short, consciousness is *revelation*. Proof of *what* it is there is none; proof *that it exists* is given only by its existing. At the same time the relativity of Being or Existing to consciousness, the *meaning* of those terms for us, is preserved. We still find that *objectivity* or *perceivability* is their meaning in general terms, *not* another *sort* of Being or Existence, at the back of, or underlying, or causing the phenomenal sort to which we are restricted—a transcendental sort. We cannot think of Being or Existence except as relative or phenomenal, that is, by thinking of it. Similarly our own Subjectivity, which must be, and in fact is, objectified in thinking of it, must be taken and understood as the generalized character of perceiving, thinking of, or imagining objects; that is, as an attribute common to all Subjects (supposing the notion of Subjects established), not as a transcendental attribute of a non-phenomenal sort.

8. Such notions as these—a non-phenomenal Being or Existence, and a non-phenomenal Subject or Subjectivity—are themselves derived solely from certain interpretations which we put upon the phenomena of our own consciousness, our own experience, and which are fallaciously derived therefrom. The true interpretation to be put on those phenomena is, not that Being or existence is *per se*, or *a parte rei*, either consciousness or else unknowable (which latter is a contradiction in terms), but that our human modes of knowing are limited. But how

and why this is the true interpretation can be seen only from further examination of the phenomena themselves. There is something in our experience which compels us to look for an explanation of every fact, and yet of this fact—of experiencing itself—no explanation can be given which does not itself contain another instance of the fact to be explained.

9. Again, in knowing, the discrete presupposes the continuous; the continuous does not presuppose the discrete. The abstract presupposes the concrete; the concrete does not presuppose the abstract. Part presupposes whole; whole does not presuppose part. Subject presupposes object; object does not presuppose Subject. Yet in each of these pairs, and more might be added, each member of them *appears* to presuppose the other, being alike in this respect. How and why is this? The appearance comes from the fact that we understand the given only when we have to some extent analysed it, and made each member throw light, by contrast, upon the other: we *understand* the continuous only by contrast with the discrete, the concrete only by contrast with the abstract, wholes only by contrast with their parts, objects only by contrast with their Subjects. Now if abstract thinking, abstract thought, alone was the giver of our ultimate data of consciousness, oppositions of this sort would be our ultimate data in experience, and the appearance of each member of a pair being *alike* in presupposing the other, would be the truth, a true appearance, a fact; the Not-being, the Nothing, of Hegel's first pair of opposites would be as much the presupposition of Being as Being is of Not-being. But then this idea, that abstract thought is the *giver* of the ultimate data of consciousness, is a pure assumption, and one which is refuted by all actual and unavoidable experience. How is this? The ultimate data of consciousness are all empirical. Take the simplest and lowest moment of consciousness you can imagine or think of—a simple feeling of pleasure, for instance, or of pain, or of any sensation, or of any so-called inner feeling or affection, or of any thought or judgement—it is what we call *empirical*, it is not *perfectly* simple, it has at any rate distinguishable but non-separable elements, it has some duration as well as some specific quality; its felt specific quality has some duration without which it would not exist either as a feeling or as a thought. To imagine it existing for *no duration* is to imagine it *not-existing, non-existent*. The fact to which I may give the general name, *the distinction of inseparables* in all experience, is, I believe, the most important and fundamental fact in philosophy, and insistence on it the most characteristic feature of metaphysical method, precluding the understanding of single names

as expressive of single, simple, and separable contents of consciousness. The two opposite time-directions in consciousness, presently to be spoken of, are an instance of this distinction. I may add that the fundamental character of the distinction in philosophy, because found as a fact in all perception, was clearly enunciated in my *Time and Space*, 1865 (e.g. Part I, ch. ii, § 11, pp. 45–7), and all my subsequent work in philosophy has, I think, tended unequivocally to support the validity of that judgement. There are in fact no such things as *atoms* in consciousness.

10. Now what is it that we do in actually experiencing, in being conscious or aware of a content or contents, in being aware of it or them, apart or abstracting from any particular quality or property which may be theirs; for some such quality or property all alike possess? Do we find anything in them which is common to all contents alike and involved in all alike, whatever their specific differences may be? So taken, what we find is this, that we have in consciousness a sequence of empirical moments of consciousness, a sequence of what perhaps may best be called *presentations*, no matter what other characteristics they may contain, quite apart from any idea or knowledge of their being *presented* to us from outside objects and coming in the guise of sensations, or from within the mind or from within the brain, and so coming in the guise of representations, ideas, or thoughts, or desires, or feelings of any kind. Whatever their specific nature, they are actually *present* moments of consciousness. Let us take them as a sequence of single sensations, abstracting from their co-existing context if any, and call them *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*. Of these, *a* is a presentation which becomes vivid, then becomes less vivid, and before it has ceased being in consciousness is followed by *b*, which in its turn becomes vivid, then becomes less vivid, and again is followed before ceasing to exist by *c*, and *c* again in like manner by *d*. I take a short series in order to be able to treat the whole, the four presentations it consists of, as one presentation, notwithstanding that each of its three earlier members has changed its character, in respect of vividness, when *d* is present, and *d* itself is also undergoing the same change. The member called *d* in fact retains, in what we may call retentive (not recalling) memory, itself being still vivid, an awareness of the three earlier presentations, *a*, *b*, and *c*, having risen into vividness and then ceased to be vivid, whereby it includes a memory of them as part and parcel of its own awareness, so long as it continues to be an actually present member of the series.

11. In the next place let it be observed that this whole presentation as it is in the supposed last member of it, *d*, is entirely independent of

any act of thought. We here and now are using thought to analyse it, and we are using terms acquired by means of thought to describe it, but the presentation itself shows no trace of thought, or of having been produced by thinking. No effort, no purpose, no act of conceiving or judging, is included in it. If such acts were to occur in a presentation they would be a specific modification of any such simple presentation as that which we have figured, and would presuppose some such presentation as their own material and field of operation.

12. In the next place be it noted—and this perhaps is the most important feature of all—that a sequence such as that now described seems in its changes to move *at once* in two opposite directions of time, from present to past *and* from past to present. For the presentation which we have called *d* is an awareness *at once* of the *c*, the *b*, and the *a*, as memories which *recede* from itself as a vivid presentation, *c* standing nearest, and *a* farthest from itself, while at the same time it is aware of these same members having occurred, that is, of having been vivid presentations, in the opposite order of sequence, the contrary direction of time, the *a* having occurred *before* the *b*, the *b* before the *c*, and the *c* before itself the *d*. In *d* itself also the same two contrary movements, co-existing with each other, are experienced by it as it recedes, so that they must be thought of (subsequently) as co-existing in every strictly present portion of consciousness. In brief, *d* is an awareness of the whole *content* of the series as a change from present to past, and of the *occurrence* of the series as a change from past to present.

13. Be it noted also that there is, in such simple presentations as the one just figured, no idea or suggestion whatever of time future. Time is not originally experienced as divided into past, present, and future. The idea of future time, or of the future as continuous with the present and the past, requires some further modification of experience not included in the simplest cases of it. But time past and time present, both of them being found, by analysis, as contained in the simplest empirical members of consciousness, are found as essential elements of those members which are the ultimate *data* of our experience.

14. How then are we to figure to ourselves, how *understand* the experience which seems at first sight so paradoxical? I mean the change, that is, the movement in point of time, of one and the same presentation, one and the same empirical member of consciousness, in two opposite time-directions at once. I think we must deal with it as follows—we must distinguish between the bare *fact* of being conscious

or aware of anything, that is, of the occurrence of empirical members of consciousness, and the *what* of those members, or the *content* apart from the fact of their occurrence or of their being perceived. Their content is in fact the sole evidence we have for anything whatever, including the occurrence of the members of consciousness themselves. So that the term, *content* of consciousness, is co-extensive with the term *consciousness* itself, while at the same time it characterizes consciousness as a *knowing*, in contradistinction from the occurrence of those members of it, of which occurrence as a fact it is the evidence. The bare fact of the occurrence of such members, on the other hand, is the bare fact that some content or other is perceived, that they come into being as consciousness; that is, they are consciousness as an *existent*. In this latter character they must be held to have some real conditions of existence, conditions which the ultimate elements of consciousness as a *knowing* cannot be conceived as even capable of having, since they are themselves the source of our notion of *conditions*, as of all other notions or ideas whatever. There are thus two orders of sequence in consciousness, the order of knowledge (by which is not meant the logical order of understanding things), and the order of existence. Consciousness must be thought of as existing, in dependence upon some real condition or conditions of its existence, before it can be thought of as a knowing, and must exist as a knowing before it can contain the thought of itself as an existent. The two contrary time-directions in consciousness belong, not to consciousness imagined as an unchanging entity, a conscious agent or faculty, but to consciousness experienced as a process-content—all process in time involving some change and differentiation of its proceeding content, and thereby, in the case of consciousness, admitting its differentiation into opposite aspects, objective and subjective, and into opposite directions of its sequences, without losing its own continuity, both aspects and both sequences being alike objects of consciousness as a *knowing*, which is our sole *evidence* for the existence, as well as for the content or whatness, of anything whatever, real conditions of existence included. Observe, moreover, that the change of an immediate presentation into a memory which is its representation is essential to every empirical present moment of consciousness or experience, and that every such moment is both a process itself and must be thought of as part of a larger process, whether this latter is a process of consciousness only or of objects of consciousness also, with which it is continuous. But the two opposite time-directions spoken of are co-existent in every empirical present moment of consciousness, and this very co-existence it is which, since they

co-exist and do not divide it, enables us to understand its special and unique nature as consciousness, a nature which differentiates it from everything else that the Universe may contain. This special nature is, if we may so speak, a certain *doubleness*, whereby it has its own content, its own specific feelings or qualities, as its own immediate objects. It is awareness of its own contents as representations, while those contents are themselves an awareness as presentations; though if (*per impossibile*) it were not a process, we should never be able to perceive this its special and unique nature by distinguishing, as we now do, its contents from its awareness of them. But as it is, the receding time-direction of contents which we are aware of occupies of necessity the same portion of time as the advancing time-direction of our awareness of them occupies, and that in every empirical present moment of consciousness.

15. To realize the difference between the orders of existence and of knowledge, and of the opposite directions in which one and the same consciousness, one and the same experience, seems to be moving, take any moment, a point of time, in any ordinary experience as we have it at the present day, with our ideas of future as well as past and present time already familiar; adopt that point as your point of view, and ask what that experience is, as seen from it. You will then, I think, find, since it is a present moment of that experience from which you suppose yourself to be looking, that on one side you have an unknown and at present non-existent *future*, into which your experience seems to be advancing, while on the other side your experience has taken the form of memory, a more or less correct representation of a *past*, which, though it has once existed, is existent no longer. Your experience as it advances into the future is experience as an *existent*, and as it, in so advancing, changes into memory, becomes representation of a past, a lengthening and receding chain of representation, which is experience as a *knowing*.

16. Returning now with this analytical key in our hands to the case of presentation with which we began, we can see that what we called the empirical member d of consciousness, in the sequence a, b, c, d, is an empirical present member, in which the two orders of knowledge and of existence coincide; but this is now thought of as part of an ever-changing process-content, admitting whatever differentiations may have the warrant of experience, which process-content is no longer thought of as an unchanging entity, obviously chargeable with self-contradiction if thought of as moving in two contrary time-directions at once. For observe, what is of the greatest importance, the time-duration which is common to both the orders,

or in which they coincide, is not itself perceived as moving or changing. Having of itself no content whatever, but being merely an essential co-element in the empirical members of consciousness, it must be thought of as time-duration simply, not as changing or flowing at all, however equably; not as static or at rest, nor as dynamic or in motion; not as distinguished into past, present, and future, or even into past and present only. All these distinctions belong, not to time-duration *per se* or in the abstract, but only as it is found in the empirical data into which it enters as an essential and inseparable constituent or element, empirical data which, though analysable into distinguishable elements, are the ultimate data of experience. The different specific feelings or sensations, which are its co-element in the ultimate empirical data, are the element which introduces, or which originally enables the introduction of any distinction whatever into time-duration *per se*. In a least empirical present member, say for instance any one of our *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* series, imagining it for that purpose as reduced to a *minimum*, no change or motion would be perceivable by our sensitivity; duration (but no change) would be sensibly perceived in it. But this does not mean that it is perceived as static or at rest. It is given to perception, but of course not thought of, as what we subsequently call a *continuum*. But then no single empirical least member of experience (supposing it possible) would be enough of itself, taken singly or in isolation, to constitute any experience that we can think of. In experience, such least empirical members always occur in sequences such as compose our *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* series, and in some context of simultaneously occurring members. We distinguish their *minimal* character only by thought, and as so distinguished they stand to the experiences, which they then seem to compose, in a relation very similar to that in which their own constituent elements, the formal and the material, stand towards them.

17. It is the stream of empirical experience alone which, when mathematically divided, or held to be divisible, by thought,—divisions the thought of which is originally made possible by differences perceived in the material or sensation co-element of consciousness,—can be held to flow equably; which it does by virtue of its mathematical divisibility into ideally equal portions. In that sense, Time-duration, in Newton's phrase, *aequabiliter fluit*. And in fact we have—in the distinction between the two orders of knowledge and of existence—the justification, the origin in experience, of the great distinction of Method, the distinction between the *Nature* and the *Genesis* of everything, a distinction insisted on by Plato in several

places. It is the *nature* of consciousness to be a *knowing*; it is the *genesis* of consciousness that, in Man at any rate, is known, because discovered, to be dependent on real conditions of existence. And it is the analysis of the *nature* of consciousness which enables and compels us to draw this distinction, as well as that between the two orders, of knowledge and of existence, themselves. Man's consciousness has not to provide for its own genesis, it is not known *a priori* as creative; it has only to provide, in its metaphysical department, for understanding, so far as it can, its own nature and genesis, these conceptions having been arrived at by experience. In its nature, philosophy is a knowing. That knowing and existing should follow opposite time-directions is no contradiction, even if they coincide in occupying the same empirical portions of time-duration, in which no time-direction, and therefore no difference of time-directions, is perceivable. We now see that, when we think of an empirical present member of the stream of consciousness as moving from past to present, we are thinking of it as an *existent*, and when we think of it as moving from present to past we are thinking of it as a *knowing*. The perception or thought of it as an existent is the subjective aspect of it as an existent; the perception or thought of it as a knowing is the perception or thought of it as the evidence, and the sole evidence, that is, the subjective aspect, of anything and everything whatever.

18. Moreover, we must think of any empirical and actual present member as belonging to consciousness as an existent, and therefore to the order of existence of consciousness; it is actual only as so belonging. But then also, being thereby generalized, it has no special content attached to it or included in it, except its actuality, any more than the bare generalized fact of the existence of consciousness has. It is, so to speak, a movable and moving *present*. It moves forwards in time over all the contents which it leaves behind it as it were, contents which have once been present members themselves, as the *a*, *b*, and *c* of our instance, when they have become memories to *d*. And to think of the actually present member as moving forwards is, *eo ipso*, to think of those memories as moving backwards from it, that is, as receding farther and farther into the past. I say *eo ipso* because it is only the receding order of knowledge which enables us to think of a forward-moving consciousness at all. The memory-order is prior to the existence-order, in order of knowledge. As an existent, consciousness objectifies its own content as a knowing, and the content of one actually present member becomes, as it recedes into memory, the object of the next actually present member as it

advances into what, at a later stage of experience than that which we have now been examining, we call the Future.

19. But when we say that consciousness objectifies its own content, as the rules of grammar compel us to do, we must remember that the whole agency, effectiveness, or power, the *doing* involved or intended in the use of the verb active, belongs to the real condition of the process, to that which (whatever it may turn out to be) brings consciousness as a knowing into existence, and makes an existent of it. And it is the fact of the *occurrence*, the *arising*, of feelings, sensations, or ideas, as conscious states, that we have now to consider, as for instance, of the *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* of the series we have already had before us. The occurrence of particular conscious states in such series as we have described is something that plainly requires accounting for, and accordingly we look for something which we call the real condition or conditions on which it depends. It is not the nature or whatness of the specific qualities of the simplest data of consciousness, or of consciousness itself abstracting from the particular instances of it, into which we are then inquiring. These are incapable of being thought of as conditioned; no efficient agent or agency without specific qualities of its own, which must be thought of either as, or as objects of, modes of consciousness, being conceivable. But what the real conditioning of the occurrence of conscious states, that is, of their existence, which is also indirectly (owing to the nature of consciousness) the real conditioning of consciousness as a knowing, accounts for or would account for, supposing it to be ascertained, is its arising, its genesis, its continuance, but not primarily or directly its nature as a knowing. When it arises or comes into existence, it comes in shape of empirical perceptual members of a process, members which are our ultimate data of knowledge, and the nature of which, and even the nature of their connexion with their real conditions of existence, must if possible be learnt from their analysis, or by way of inference therefrom, since their actual arising as perceivings, or production as states of consciousness by what we afterwards call their *proximate* real condition, cannot be itself objectified as a content of consciousness at the very instant of its producing them. We cannot perceive a perceiving, till the process is perceived to which it belongs.

20. What then do we know, what are we compelled to infer, concerning the arising of consciousness as an existent, in dependence upon its real conditions, from the objectified content of consciousness as a knowing, which is the sole evidence we have for anything whatever? Consciousness is plainly a very different thing for us,

according as it is thought of as a knowing or as an existent. As an existent it is a more or less permanent object among other objects, intermittent in its objectification, as for instance when interrupted by sleep, but capable of contents in immense variety, among which are the premisses from which its own identity, notwithstanding its intermittence, as an existent is inferred. As a knowing it is that stream of contents which comes before us portion by portion, in a way which we may call its own self-objectification as a stream; into which stream attention, thought, desire, and indeed a vast variety of other modes of consciousness may enter, quite different from such simple members as those contemplated in our selected instance. Now what is it that guarantees the greater or less permanence as an existent of this stream of knowing, every portion of which is transitory, arising once and then passing away, apparently never to return? Whatever it may be, it is this which is meant when we speak of the real condition or conditions of consciousness.

21. And here the inferential character of our knowledge of the real conditions and conditioning of consciousness should be explicitly recognized. We can perceive consciousness *per se*, that is, without at the same time perceiving that it is consciousness which we perceive, we are then simply objectifying a content; but we cannot perceive the perceiving process apart from a content, or the perceiver apart from his perceiving process with its content; that is, we cannot perceive either the perceiver or his perceiving *per se*, because perceiving *is* objectifying, and to perceive either the pure Subject, or the pure process of perceiving, would be to make objects of them in the very act of perceiving them, so that the idea of doing so involves a contradiction in terms. I mean that it is self-contradictory to distinguish a perceiver or a perceiving from their contents or objects, and to imagine them perceivable in that abstract shape, or as so distinguished. It would be a case of what is commonly called making entities of abstractions.

22. Consequently when we think or speak of the pure Subject, or of pure Subjectivity, we must not imagine that we are thinking of, or expressing in those terms, any immediate perception or knowledge of a Self, or an Ego, a Soul, or a Mind, and so on; what we are objectifying, when so thinking, is our own thought of consciousness in the abstract, or as contradistinguished from objects and objectivity. This of course does not mean that the contents of such terms are unreal; but they are real only in the concrete, and as distinguished in the concrete by our thought of what the concrete involves as its essential elements or characters. As so involved they depend for

their existence, as consciousness itself does, upon some real condition or conditions of existence. If among these conditions any should be found which can only, or preferably, be denoted by such terms as Self, Ego, Soul, Mind, and so on, it can only be so because some positive knowledge of those conditions will have been acquired, a positive knowledge very different from the knowledge of them as pure abstractions, which those terms may, as we have just seen, be also employed to express. They must, in consequence of any positive knowledge of them, be treated as concrete realities, and not as abstractions. As real conditions they must be known as concrete realities, and not as abstract elements of that which they are held to condition. And this, I think, explains and justifies the reason why we have to dismiss, as noted above, that first distinction which, at the outset of philosophizing, we might be inclined to draw, between the objectified content of consciousness as the objectivity, and the mere process of perceiving as the subjectivity of experience, and have to replace it, as was also noted, by distinguishing, also within consciousness itself, the content of consciousness as a knowing, which is its subjectivity, from its own objective aspect as a known, that is to say, from the perceived fact of its coming into existence as consciousness.

23. Consciousness as an existent, then, is a real conditionate of some real condition or conditions which we must think of as not-consciousness, whatever it or they may turn out to be. But we know consciousness as an existent, that is, we know the fact of its existence, solely through its own content as a knowing. And we do not in the first instance perceive its existential character, or distinguish it as an existent from itself as a knowing. It gives us therefore no knowledge of locality, or of its own location within the body, which is afterwards perceived as the constant central object of its own panorama. Neither the abstract fact of being conscious, nor any of the simplest and lowest empirical perceptions, give us any knowledge of spatial extension, or even of place in a time-series of experiences, though it may possibly, and I think truly, be argued, that the merely abstract fact of being conscious, that is, consciousness being taken without any specific content being thought of, involves some time-duration, without which this abstract fact itself would be impossible. However this may be, it is clear that the distinct perception, both of time-duration and of place in any time-series of experiences, belongs to the content of consciousness as a knowing, just as much as our perception of the body and of spatial extension does. The time-duration involved in the abstract fact of consciousness is common to it with that involved in the special content of any and every particular actual

awareness or moment of concrete consciousness; they both occupy one and the same portion of time-duration; and this fact constitutes the immediacy of that special and particular content of consciousness, or in other words is our knowledge of it as an existent percept.

24. Now it is only from the two senses of sight and touch (the latter intensified, it may be, by the muscular sensations combined with it) that we obtain the first rudiments, the first basis, of our knowledge of the world of Space. And that they are exercised together is a plain fact of experience, resting on no assumption, and requiring no previous knowledge of what the terms, *senses*, *exercising*, and *together*, mean. Before analysing any sensation, or any immediate experience whatever, I have, of necessity, to use the name for it as *designative* only, that is, as merely indicating what it is that I am intending to analyse Grammatical language, which is formed subsequently to the first formation of some theory or other concerning such immediate experiences as those now in question, leaves no other course open to me; since the name, taken by itself, contains no distinction between the experience *per se* and the theoretical construction to which it belongs, and to the formation of which it has contributed. In short, language represents and expresses that common-sense view of things which I take to be the *analysandum* of philosophy; and these remarks may serve to elucidate the method which I follow throughout this inquiry, as well as in the case of those sensations, the visual and the tactual, which are just now under consideration. But to proceed.—Organic sensations of all kinds, with their pleasures and pains, do not of themselves alone impart any knowledge of the organic body, or of a spatial world. The same is true of emotional feelings of all kinds, with their pleasures and pains. And the same is also true of the senses of taste, smell, and sound, with their specific pleasures and pains. But visual sensations give us the perception of space-extension in two dimensions of space, namely, length and breadth; and tactual sensations (especially when intensified by muscular) give us the perception of space-extension in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, that is, of what we call solid bodies, in the cases when these, one or more, come into contact with that one of them, our own organism, which is the constant central object of our own panorama, and which is itself perceived as a solid body solely by means of these same tactual and muscular sensations.

25. Now the perception and the idea of Matter as a real existent, of our own organism as a material body, of the location of our consciousness within that body, and of the conditioning of our con-

their existence, as consciousness itself does, upon some real condition or conditions of existence. If among these conditions any should be found which can only, or preferably, be denoted by such terms as Self, Ego, Soul, Mind, and so on, it can only be so because some positive knowledge of those conditions will have been acquired, a positive knowledge very different from the knowledge of them as pure abstractions, which those terms may, as we have just seen, be also employed to express. They must, in consequence of any positive knowledge of them, be treated as concrete realities, and not as abstractions. As real conditions they must be known as concrete realities, and not as abstract elements of that which they are held to condition. And this, I think, explains and justifies the reason why we have to dismiss, as noted above, that first distinction which, at the outset of philosophizing, we might be inclined to draw, between the objectified content of consciousness as the objectivity, and the mere process of perceiving as the subjectivity of experience, and have to replace it, as was also noted, by distinguishing, also within consciousness itself, the content of consciousness as a knowing, which is its subjectivity, from its own objective aspect as a known, that is to say, from the perceived fact of its coming into existence as consciousness.

23. Consciousness as an existent, then, is a real conditionate of some real condition or conditions which we must think of as not-consciousness, whatever it or they may turn out to be. But we know consciousness as an existent, that is, we know the fact of its existence, solely through its own content as a knowing. And we do not in the first instance perceive its existential character, or distinguish it as an existent from itself as a knowing. It gives us therefore no knowledge of locality, or of its own location within the body, which is afterwards perceived as the constant central object of its own panorama. Neither the abstract fact of being conscious, nor any of the simplest and lowest empirical perceptions, give us any knowledge of spatial extension, or even of place in a time-series of experiences, though it may possibly, and I think truly, be argued, that the merely abstract fact of being conscious, that is, consciousness being taken without any specific content being thought of, involves some time-duration, without which this abstract fact itself would be impossible. However this may be, it is clear that the distinct perception, both of time-duration and of place in any time-series of experiences, belongs to the content of consciousness as a knowing, just as much as our perception of the body and of spatial extension does. The time-duration involved in the abstract fact of consciousness is common to it with that involved in the special content of any and every particular actual

awareness or moment of concrete consciousness; they both occupy one and the same portion of time-duration; and this fact constitutes the immediacy of that special and particular content of consciousness, or in other words is our knowledge of it as an existent percept.

24. Now it is only from the two senses of sight and touch (the latter intensified, it may be, by the muscular sensations combined with it) that we obtain the first rudiments, the first basis, of our knowledge of the world of Space. And that they are exercised together is a plain fact of experience, resting on no assumption, and requiring no previous knowledge of what the terms, *senses*, *exercising*, and *together*, mean. Before analysing any sensation, or any immediate experience whatever, I have, of necessity, to use the name for it as *designative* only, that is, as merely indicating what it is that I am intending to analyse. Grammatical language, which is formed subsequently to the first formation of some theory or other concerning such immediate experiences as those now in question, leaves no other course open to me; since the name, taken by itself, contains no distinction between the experience *per se* and the theoretical construction to which it belongs, and to the formation of which it has contributed. In short, language represents and expresses that common-sense view of things which I take to be the *analysandum* of philosophy; and these remarks may serve to elucidate the method which I follow throughout this inquiry, as well as in the case of those sensations, the visual and the tactual, which are just now under consideration. But to proceed.—Organic sensations of all kinds, with their pleasures and pains, do not of themselves alone impart any knowledge of the organic body, or of a spatial world. The same is true of emotional feelings of all kinds, with their pleasures and pains. And the same is also true of the senses of taste, smell, and sound, with their specific pleasures and pains. But visual sensations give us the perception of space-extension in two dimensions of space, namely, length and breadth; and tactual sensations (especially when intensified by muscular) give us the perception of space-extension in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, that is, of what we call solid bodies, in the cases when these, one or more, come into contact with that one of them, our own organism, which is the constant central object of our own panorama, and which is itself perceived as a solid body solely by means of these same tactual and muscular sensations.

25. Now the perception and the idea of Matter as a real existent, of our own organism as a material body, of the location of our consciousness within that body, and of the conditioning of our con-

sciousness by material objects, the existence of which is independent of the existence of the consciousness which they condition,—these are perceptions and ideas which (though of course not originally capable of being stated in such terms as I have used in describing them) are formed very early in the life both of individuals and of the race. They are in fact part and parcel of that common-sense knowledge which, as noted at the outset, is the *analysandum* of philosophy. They are part and parcel of that common-sense knowledge of adults at the present day, just as much as in the earliest stages of human history. When we begin to analyse them philosophically at the present day, that is to say, in reliance upon the results reached by previous philosophical investigations, we find ourselves met by certain time-honoured problems, first and foremost of which is the Reality of Matter, and then connected with it the Location of Consciousness within the organism, and the Real Conditioning of consciousness by the interaction of material objects organic and inorganic. On these three questions I propose, with your permission, to offer some brief remarks, from my own point of view as already set forth in the present paper.

26. And first as to the Reality of Matter. When we distinguish consciousness from its own particular contents or objects, that is, from those contents or objects which constitute it a knowing as well as an existent, then it seems to us, since we are then objectifying our own thought of it, to be perceiving its own body from outside, just as it perceives other solid bodies which are outside its own body. It is in fact by inference that we, subsequently to the simplest perceptions, locate our consciousness *within*, and not without, its own body, the central object of its own panorama. Tactual sensations, intensified it may be by muscular, are the only sensations,—touch, with the sense of effort which comes from muscular tension, is the only sense,—to which we owe our positive knowledge of a reality which is not-consciousness, and which possesses an efficiency of its own independent of that consciousness which is a knowledge of it, and of the existence of which it is a real condition. It is only through the sense of touch and muscular effort that we know the nature and are aware of the existence of solid material objects. Why? Because these are the only sensations, or feelings of any kind, which have a *replica* of themselves as their immediately perceived object, and that a *replica* which has, what they have not, efficiency as a real condition, or real conditions, inasmuch as they are at once the object and the real condition of those sensations of which they are the *replica*. How is this?

27. Briefly stated, the answer is as follows. These sensations, as experienced for instance in grasping and feeling one hand with the other, or in grasping and feeling any small solid object, occupy the same portion of space, at and for the same portion of time-duration, as their *replica*, the solid object, occupies; while this same object, the *replica*, is known as different from, and not wholly identical with, but independent of, those sensations of which it is the *replica*, by two facts—first of its being capable of an entirely different analysis from theirs, and secondly of its producing their occurrence as sensations in consciousness. The identity of the *replica*, in point of quality and contour, with the sensations which are the immediate perception of it is shown by the sameness of the space and the time occupied by both, I mean, during the time of their actual presentation; its difference from those sensations is shown by its operation in conditioning their occurrence, and its analysis into physical parts and forces, or modes of motion, in addition to its analysis as a percept into modes of consciousness. These latter of course are consciousness; the *replica* is non-consciousness; but both alike occupy one and the same portion of three-dimensional space for one and the same portion of time, namely, the time of their actual presentation in experience. (The term *replica*, applied as here to tangible objects, will be found in my *Metaphysic of Experience*, book i, chap. viii, § 4: *Analytical discrimination of real Conditions from real Existents*, near the end, at p. 405 of vol i.)

28. This presentation therefore, the presentation in actual experience of solid objects by the sense of Touch, including muscular sensation or sense of effort, which we may call stress, is the point at which we have immediate evidence of the reality of an external world, a world of non-consciousness, since it is the point at which that world and our consciousness coincide, the point at which a portion of that world is experienced as actually operative and efficient, by its producing or conditioning the actual occurrence of those sensations, of which it is also the object. It is as their object that we can characterize it as their *replica*. As sensations they are themselves objective to consciousness, which is a self-objectifying process. But in that same conscious process, of which they are a part, they are also themselves perceived as having an object which is a *replica* of themselves in point of quality, while it is also independent of them, and prior to them, in point of existence, inasmuch as it is upon its existence that their occurrence in consciousness depends. For let one solid object come into visually perceived contact with our organism, which is another solid object, and *new* tactual sensations,

not before existing, come into consciousness as actually presented experiences.

29. Observe, moreover, that it is from these sensations of touch and stress that all the ideas, terms, and hypotheses of physical science derive their meaning. (See on this point Professor Stout's paper, *Primary and Secondary Qualities*, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. iv, N. S., for 1903–4.) However different may be the analysis of their *replica* as a solid physical object from that of the sensations which are our knowledge of it, we cannot but imagine the objects arrived at by that analysis, for the purpose of understanding them, as objects of tactual and muscular sensitivity, though of a sensitivity indefinitely exceeding ours in range, delicacy, and acuteness. The whole *meaning* of the terms denoting and describing them is derived from our own tactual and muscular sensitivity. Atoms (and their components, if any) or molecules of Matter, and the forces or modes of motion combining or separating them mechanically, fusing or dissolving their fusion chemically, or organizing them vitally, as for instance in protoplasm, or in the germ-plasm, ids, biophors, and determinants of Professor Weismann's theory; air and the waves of air transmitting sound; ether and the waves of ether transmitting light; electrons and the electric and magnetic forces which govern their structure and their motions, and, so to speak, organize that continuous something which is often held to make space itself a *plenum*;—all these alike, as objects, are conceived as objects of possible sensations of touch and stress, and not of any other sense. The sense of hearing does not hear the air or the waves of air transmitting sound; what it hears is *sound*. Seeing does not see the ether or the waves of ether transmitting light or its variously coloured modes; what it sees is *light* and *colour*. The sensation of touch with its combined stress alone has as its immediate object a *replica* of itself, which is at once its object and the real condition producing, or contributing to produce, the sensation of it.

30. Nevertheless it may well be doubted whether the sense of touch with stress would alone suffice, or have sufficed, to give us a perception of solid bodies, or of an extended material world of space, without the co-operation, so to speak, of the sense of sight. These two senses are normally, as a fact, exercised together. We experience the sensations of the two senses simultaneously. In many cases we see and we touch one and the same object at one and the same time; that is to say, the object of both kinds of sensation, in those cases, occupies one and the same portion of time, the time of its presentation, its solidity being given us by touch with stress, its contour by the dis-

5. But the process perceiving such an empirical percept is also subsequently distinguished from the content perceived, which is called its object, and, as so distinguished, is thereby itself *objectified*, i.e. made an object of a subsequent perception. The original process of perceiving a content, as distinguished from the content of which it is originally an undistinguished part, is now perceived as itself an object, and *in that character* is consciousness, not as a knowing of contents or of objects, but simply as an *existent*, an existing process of knowing. At the same time, *what it is* as an *existent*, what it is as a *process*, can be known only from the contents, its own contents, which it objectifies. Among these objects is itself as an existent process; *it* also is knowable only by being objectified, just as all other contents of consciousness are. The process as well as its contents, the contents of the process, is objectified in being known as a process—a process having and objectifying contents

6. Henceforward, i.e. when in philosophy we take consciousness with both its constituents—process and contents—*included*, though now distinguished from one another, we are precluded from taking the process as the subjectivity of the objectified contents, if we were ever tempted to do so, for it is itself objectified along with and equally with its contents. Consciousness with its process and contents included is our sole evidence for everything we can possibly think of, although it is itself of necessity thought of as an existent process, and that too a self-objectifying process. Henceforward therefore, in philosophy, the objectified contents of consciousness (process and contents included) become for us the subjective aspect, or subjectivity, of whatever we can think of or imagine as *Being* or *Existing*, independently of, or not included in, our own existent consciousness. And the question is raised, *Is* there such a thing as *Being* or *Existing* which is *non-consciousness?* Is not such an idea a mere futility and will-o'-the-wisp?

7. The reply which I should make to this question, relying solely on what has been already said in this paper, a reply which leaves the complete answer open to further evidence, but at the same time precludes the *a priori* adoption either of Idealism or Transcendentalism, is as follows. Our notion of Being or Existing, the very meaning of those words, is derived from the objectified content of consciousness—the subjectivity, or subjective aspect, or evidence, of everything whatever. We cannot perceive, think of, or imagine Being or Existence except by perceiving, thinking of, or imagining them. Consequently the *fact* of being perceived, imagined, or thought of, is our ultimate meaning, and indispensable meaning, of

the words *Being* and *Existence*. But this does not imply that what is our sole evidence of being, existence, or in one word *reality*, is commensurate with the reality which it informs us of. The whole nature of perceived contents or objects is not exhausted by our perceiving or objectifying those contents. Whether it is or is not is open to evidence which our own consciousness, which raises the question, must afford. It is only in the case of consciousness itself, as a process distinguished but not separated from its own immediate objects, that perceiving and being perceived are identical. It is here that my distinction between consciousness as an existent and consciousness as a knowing is of service, enabling us to avoid the puzzles so frequently involved in premature assertion. There is no reason why we should attribute consciousness as an existent, and therefore also as a knowing, to all objects which we perceive or think of, simply because our consciousness objectifies them, just as in existing it objectifies itself. From the fact that all consciousness is objectification it does not follow that everything objectified is consciousness. Consciousness is the only *evidence* of fact, true—but this does not mean that the evidence alone, and not the fact, *exists*. Consciousness (as we shall see) is not all that exists; it is the *sine qua non* of our idea of existence. In short, consciousness is *revelation*. Proof of *what* it is there is none; proof *that it exists* is given only by its existing. At the same time the relativity of Being or Existing to consciousness, the *meaning* of those terms for us, is preserved. We still find that *objectivity* or *perceivability* is their meaning in general terms, *not* another *sort* of Being or Existence, at the back of, or underlying, or causing the phenomenal sort to which we are restricted—a trans-cendental sort. We cannot think of Being or Existence except as relative or phenomenal, that is, by thinking of it. Similarly our own Subjectivity, which must be, and in fact is, objectified in thinking of it, must be taken and understood as the generalized character of perceiving, thinking of, or imagining objects; that is, as an attribute common to all Subjects (supposing the notion of Subjects established), not as a transcendental attribute of a non-phenomenal sort.

8. Such notions as these—a non-phenomenal Being or Existence, and a non-phenomenal Subject or Subjectivity—are themselves derived solely from certain interpretations which we put upon the phenomena of our own consciousness, our own experience, and which are fallaciously derived therefrom. The true interpretation to be put on those phenomena is, not that Being or existence is *per se*, or *a parte rei*, either consciousness or else unknowable (which latter is a contradiction in terms), but that our human modes of knowing are limited. But how

and why this is the true interpretation can be seen only from further examination of the phenomena themselves. There is something in our experience which compels us to look for an explanation of every fact, and yet of this fact—of experiencing itself—no explanation can be given which does not itself contain another instance of the fact to be explained.

9. Again, in knowing, the discrete presupposes the continuous; the continuous does not presuppose the discrete. The abstract presupposes the concrete; the concrete does not presuppose the abstract. Part presupposes whole; whole does not presuppose part. Subject presupposes object; object does not presuppose Subject. Yet in each of these pairs, and more might be added, each member of them *appears* to presuppose the other, being alike in this respect. How and why is this? The appearance comes from the fact that we understand the given only when we have to some extent analysed it, and made each member throw light, by contrast, upon the other; we *understand* the continuous only by contrast with the discrete, the concrete only by contrast with the abstract, wholes only by contrast with their parts, objects only by contrast with their Subjects. Now if abstract thinking, abstract thought, alone was the giver of our ultimate data of consciousness, oppositions of this sort would be our ultimate data in experience, and the appearance of each member of a pair being *alike* in presupposing the other, would be the truth, a true appearance, a fact; the Not-being, the Nothing, of Hegel's first pair of opposites would be as much the presupposition of Being as Being is of Not-being. But then this idea, that abstract thought is the *giver* of the ultimate data of consciousness, is a pure assumption, and one which is refuted by all actual and unavoidable experience. How is this? The ultimate data of consciousness are all empirical. Take the simplest and lowest moment of consciousness you can imagine or think of—a simple feeling of pleasure, for instance, or of pain, or of any sensation, or of any so-called inner feeling or affection, or of any thought or judgement—it is what we call *empirical*, it is not *perfectly* simple, it has at any rate distinguishable but non-separable elements, it has some duration as well as some specific quality; its felt specific quality has some duration without which it would not exist either as a feeling or as a thought. To imagine it existing for *no duration* is to imagine it *not-existing*, *non-existent*. The fact to which I may give the general name, *the distinction of inseparables* in all experience, is, I believe, the most important and fundamental fact in philosophy, and insistence on it the most characteristic feature of metaphysical method, precluding the understanding of single names

as expressive of single, simple, and separable contents of consciousness. The two opposite time-directions in consciousness, presently to be spoken of, are an instance of this distinction. I may add that the fundamental character of the distinction in philosophy, because found as a fact in all perception, was clearly enunciated in my *Time and Space*, 1865 (e.g. Part I, ch. ii, § 11, pp. 45-7), and all my subsequent work in philosophy has, I think, tended unequivocally to support the validity of that judgement. There are in fact no such things as *atoms* in consciousness.

10. Now what is it that we do in actually experiencing, in being conscious or aware of a content or contents, in being aware of it or them, apart or abstracting from any particular quality or property which may be theirs; for some such quality or property all alike possess? Do we find anything in them which is common to all contents alike and involved in all alike, whatever their specific differences may be? So taken, what we find is this, that we have in consciousness a sequence of empirical moments of consciousness, a sequence of what perhaps may best be called *presentations*, no matter what other characteristics they may contain, quite apart from any idea or knowledge of their being *presented* to us from outside objects and coming in the guise of sensations, or from within the mind or from within the brain, and so coming in the guise of representations, ideas, or thoughts, or desires, or feelings of any kind. Whatever their specific nature, they are actually *present* moments of consciousness. Let us take them as a sequence of single sensations, abstracting from their co-existing context if any, and call them *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*. Of these, *a* is a presentation which becomes vivid, then becomes less vivid, and before it has ceased being in consciousness is followed by *b*, which in its turn becomes vivid, then becomes less vivid, and again is followed before ceasing to exist by *c*, and *c* again in like manner by *d*. I take a short series in order to be able to treat the whole, the four presentations it consists of, as one presentation, notwithstanding that each of its three earlier members has changed its character, in respect of vividness, when *d* is present, and *d* itself is also undergoing the same change. The member called *d* in fact retains, in what we may call retentive (not recalling) memory, itself being still vivid, an awareness of the three earlier presentations, *a*, *b*, and *c*, having risen into vividness and then ceased to be vivid, whereby it includes a memory of them as part and parcel of its own awareness, so long as it continues to be an actually present member of the series.

11. In the next place let it be observed that this whole presentation as it is in the supposed last member of it, *d*, is entirely independent of

any act of thought. We here and now are using thought to analyse it, and we are using terms acquired by means of thought to describe it, but the presentation itself shows no trace of thought, or of having been produced by thinking. No effort, no purpose, no act of conceiving or judging, is included in it. If such acts were to occur in a presentation they would be a specific modification of any such simple presentation as that which we have figured, and would presuppose some such presentation as their own material and field of operation.

12. In the next place be it noted—and this perhaps is the most important feature of all—that a sequence such as that now described seems in its changes to move *at once* in two opposite directions of time, from present to past *and* from past to present. For the presentation which we have called *d* is an awareness *at once* of the *c*, the *b*, and the *a*, as memories which *recede* from itself as a vivid presentation, *c* standing nearest, and *a* farthest from itself, while at the same time it is aware of these same members having occurred, that is, of having been vivid presentations, in the opposite order of sequence, the contrary direction of time, the *a* having occurred *before* the *b*, the *b* before the *c*, and the *c* before itself the *d*. In *d* itself also the same two contrary movements, co-existing with each other, are experienced by it as it recedes, so that they must be thought of (subsequently) as co-existing in every strictly present portion of consciousness. In brief, *d* is an awareness of the whole *content* of the series as a change from present to past, and of the *occurrence* of the series as a change from past to present.

13. Be it noted also that there is, in such simple presentations as the one just figured, no idea or suggestion whatever of time future. Time is not originally experienced as divided into past, present, and future. The idea of future time, or of the future as continuous with the present and the past, requires some further modification of experience not included in the simplest cases of it. But time past and time present, both of them being found, by analysis, as contained in the simplest empirical members of consciousness, are found as essential elements of those members which are the ultimate *data* of our experience.

14. How then are we to figure to ourselves, how *understand* the experience which seems at first sight so paradoxical? I mean the change, that is, the movement in point of time, of one and the same presentation, one and the same empirical member of consciousness, in two opposite time-directions at once. I think we must deal with it as follows—we must distinguish between the bare *fact* of being conscious

or aware of anything, that is, of the occurrence of empirical members of consciousness, and the *what* of those members, or the *content* apart from the fact of their occurrence or of their being perceived. Their content is in fact the sole evidence we have for anything whatever, including the occurrence of the members of consciousness themselves. So that the term, *content* of consciousness, is co-extensive with the term *consciousness* itself, while at the same time it characterizes consciousness as a *knowing*, in contradistinction from the occurrence of those members of it, of which occurrence as a fact it is the evidence. The bare fact of the occurrence of such members, on the other hand, is the bare fact that some content or other is perceived, that they come into being as consciousness, that is, they are consciousness as an *existent*. In this latter character they must be held to have some real conditions of existence, conditions which the ultimate elements of consciousness as a *knowing* cannot be conceived as even capable of having, since they are themselves the source of our notion of *conditions*, as of all other notions or ideas whatever. There are thus two orders of sequence in consciousness, the order of knowledge (by which is not meant the logical order of understanding things), and the order of existence. Consciousness must be thought of as existing, in dependence upon some real condition or conditions of its existence, before it can be thought of as a knowing, and must exist as a knowing before it can contain the thought of itself as an existent. The two contrary time-directions in consciousness belong, not to consciousness imagined as an unchanging entity, a conscious agent or faculty, but to consciousness experienced as a process-content—all process in time involving some change and differentiation of its proceeding content, and thereby, in the case of consciousness, admitting its differentiation into opposite aspects, objective and subjective, and into opposite directions of its sequences, without losing its own continuity, both aspects and both sequences being alike objects of consciousness as a *knowing*, which is our sole *evidence* for the existence, as well as for the content or whatness, of anything whatever, real conditions of existence included. Observe, moreover, that the change of an immediate presentation into a memory which is its representation is essential to every empirical present moment of consciousness or experience, and that every such moment is both a process itself and must be thought of as part of a larger process, whether this latter is a process of consciousness only or of objects of consciousness also, with which it is continuous. But the two opposite time-directions spoken of are co-existent in every empirical present moment of consciousness, and this very co-existence it is which, since they

co-exist and do not divide it, enables us to understand its special and unique nature as consciousness, a nature which differentiates it from everything else that the Universe may contain. This special nature is, if we may so speak, a certain *doubleness*, whereby it has its own content, its own specific feelings or qualities, as its own immediate objects. It is awareness of its own contents as representations, while those contents are themselves an awareness as presentations; though if (*per impossibile*) it were not a process, we should never be able to perceive this its special and unique nature by distinguishing, as we now do, its contents from its awareness of them. But as it is, the receding time-direction of contents which we are aware of occupies of necessity the same portion of time as the advancing time-direction of our awareness of them occupies, and that in every empirical present moment of consciousness.

15. To realize the difference between the orders of existence and of knowledge, and of the opposite directions in which one and the same consciousness, one and the same experience, seems to be moving, take any moment, a point of time, in any ordinary experience as we have it at the present day, with our ideas of future as well as past and present time already familiar; adopt that point as your point of view, and ask what that experience is, as seen from it. You will then, I think, find, since it is a present moment of that experience from which you suppose yourself to be looking, that on one side you have an unknown and at present non-existent *future*, into which your experience seems to be advancing, while on the other side your experience has taken the form of memory, a more or less correct representation of a *past*, which, though it has once existed, is existent no longer. Your experience as it advances into the future is experience as an *existent*, and as it, in so advancing, changes into memory, becomes representation of a past, a lengthening and receding chain of representation, which is experience as a *knowing*.

16. Returning now with this analytical key in our hands to the case of presentation with which we began, we can see that what we called the empirical member *d* of consciousness, in the sequence *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, is an empirical present member, in which the two orders of knowledge and of existence coincide; but this is now thought of as part of an ever-changing process-content, admitting whatever differentiations may have the warrant of experience, which process-content is no longer thought of as an unchanging entity, obviously chargeable with self-contradiction if thought of as moving in two contrary time-directions at once. For observe, what is of the greatest importance, the time-duration which is common to both the orders,

or in which they coincide, is not itself perceived as moving or changing. Having of itself no content whatever, but being merely an essential co-element in the empirical members of consciousness, it must be thought of as time-duration simply, not as changing or flowing at all, however equably; not as static or at rest, nor as dynamic or in motion; not as distinguished into past, present, and future, or even into past and present only. All these distinctions belong, not to time-duration *per se* or in the abstract, but only as it is found in the empirical data into which it enters as an essential and inseparable constituent or element, empirical data which, though analysable into distinguishable elements, are the ultimate data of experience. The different specific feelings or sensations, which are its co-element in the ultimate empirical data, are the element which introduces, or which originally enables the introduction of any distinction whatever into time-duration *per se*. In a least empirical present member, say for instance any one of our *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* series, imagining it for that purpose as reduced to a *minimum*, no change or motion would be perceivable by our sensitivity; duration (but no change) would be sensibly perceived in it. But this does not mean that it is perceived as static or at rest. It is given to perception, but of course not thought of, as what we subsequently call a *continuum*. But then no single empirical least member of experience (supposing it possible) would be enough of itself, taken singly or in isolation, to constitute any experience that we can think of. In experience, such least empirical members always occur in sequences such as compose our *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* series, and in some context of simultaneously occurring members. We distinguish their *minimal* character only by thought, and as so distinguished they stand to the experiences, which they then seem to compose, in a relation very similar to that in which their own constituent elements, the formal and the material, stand towards them.

17. It is the stream of empirical experience alone which, when mathematically divided, or held to be divisible, by thought,—divisions the thought of which is originally made possible by differences perceived in the material or sensation co-element of consciousness,—can be held to flow equably; which it does by virtue of its mathematical divisibility into ideally equal portions. In that sense, Time-duration, in Newton's phrase, *aequabiliter fluit*. And in fact we have—in the distinction between the two orders of knowledge and of existence—the justification, the origin in experience, of the great distinction of Method, the distinction between the *Nature* and the *Genesis* of everything, a distinction insisted on by Plato in several

places. It is the *nature* of consciousness to be a *knowing*; it is the *genesis* of consciousness that, in Man at any rate, is known, because discovered, to be dependent on real conditions of existence. And it is the analysis of the *nature* of consciousness which enables and compels us to draw this distinction, as well as that between the two orders, of knowledge and of existence, themselves. Man's consciousness has not to provide for its own genesis; it is not known *a priori* as creative, it has only to provide, in its metaphysical department, for understanding, so far as it can, its own nature and genesis, these conceptions having been arrived at by experience. In its nature, philosophy is a knowing. That knowing and existing should follow opposite time-directions is no contradiction, even if they coincide in occupying the same empirical portions of time-duration, in which no time-direction, and therefore no difference of time-directions, is perceivable. We now see that, when we think of an empirical present member of the stream of consciousness as moving from past to present, we are thinking of it as an *existent*, and when we think of it as moving from present to past we are thinking of it as a *knowing*. The perception or thought of it as an existent is the subjective aspect of it as an existent; the perception or thought of it as a knowing is the perception or thought of it as the evidence, and the sole evidence, that is, the subjective aspect, of anything and everything whatever.

18. Moreover, we must think of any empirical and actual present member as belonging to consciousness as an existent, and therefore to the order of existence of consciousness; it is actual only as so belonging. But then also, being thereby generalized, it has no special content attached to it or included in it, except its actuality, any more than the bare generalized fact of the existence of consciousness has. It is, so to speak, a movable and moving *present*. It moves forwards in time over all the contents which it leaves behind it as it were, contents which have once been present members themselves, as the *a*, *b*, and *c* of our instance, when they have become memories to *d*. And to think of the actually present member as moving forwards is, *eo ipso*, to think of those memories as moving backwards from it, that is, as receding farther and farther into the past. I say *eo ipso* because it is only the receding order of knowledge which enables us to think of a forward-moving consciousness at all. The memory-order is prior to the existence-order, in order of knowledge. As an existent, consciousness objectifies its own content as a knowing, and the content of one actually present member becomes, as it recedes into memory, the object of the next actually present member as it

advances into what, at a later stage of experience than that which we have now been examining, we call the Future.

19. But when we say that consciousness objectifies its own content, as the rules of grammar compel us to do, we must remember that the whole agency, effectiveness, or power, the *doing* involved or intended in the use of the verb active, belongs to the real condition of the process, to that which (whatever it may turn out to be) brings consciousness as a knowing into existence, and makes an existent of it. And it is the fact of the *occurrence*, the *arising*, of feelings, sensations, or ideas, as conscious states, that we have now to consider, as for instance, of the *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* of the series we have already had before us. The occurrence of particular conscious states in such series as we have described is something that plainly requires accounting for, and accordingly we look for something which we call the real condition or conditions on which it depends. It is not the nature or whatness of the specific qualities of the simplest data of consciousness, or of consciousness itself abstracting from the particular instances of it, into which we are then inquiring. These are incapable of being thought of as conditioned; no efficient agent or agency without specific qualities of its own, which must be thought of either as, or as objects of, modes of consciousness, being conceivable. But what the real conditioning of the occurrence of conscious states, that is, of their existence, which is also indirectly (owing to the nature of consciousness) the real conditioning of consciousness as a knowing, accounts for or would account for, supposing it to be ascertained, is its arising, its genesis, its continuance, but not primarily or directly its nature as a knowing. When it arises or comes into existence, it comes in shape of empirical perceptual members of a process, members which are our ultimate data of knowledge, and the nature of which, and even the nature of their connexion with their real conditions of existence, must if possible be learnt from their analysis, or by way of inference therefrom, since their actual arising as perceivings, or production as states of consciousness by what we afterwards call their *proximate* real condition, cannot be itself objectified as a content of consciousness at the very instant of its producing them. We cannot perceive a perceiving, till the process is perceived to which it belongs.

20. What then do we know, what are we compelled to infer, concerning the arising of consciousness as an existent, in dependence upon its real conditions, from the objectified content of consciousness as a knowing, which is the sole evidence we have for anything whatever? Consciousness is plainly a very different thing for us,

according as it is thought of as a knowing or as an existent. As an existent it is a more or less permanent object among other objects, intermittent in its objectification, as for instance when interrupted by sleep, but capable of contents in immense variety, among which are the premisses from which its own identity, notwithstanding its intermittence, as an existent is inferred. As a knowing it is that stream of contents which comes before us portion by portion, in a way which we may call its own self-objectification as a stream; into which stream attention, thought, desire, and indeed a vast variety of other modes of consciousness may enter, quite different from such simple members as those contemplated in our selected instance. Now what is it that guarantees the greater or less permanence as an existent of this stream of knowing, every portion of which is transitory, arising once and then passing away, apparently never to return? Whatever it may be, it is this which is meant when we speak of the real condition or conditions of consciousness.

21. And here the inferential character of our knowledge of the real conditions and conditioning of consciousness should be explicitly recognized. We can perceive consciousness *per se*, that is, without at the same time perceiving that it is consciousness which we perceive; we are then simply objectifying a content; but we cannot perceive the perceiving process apart from a content, or the perceiver apart from his perceiving process with its content; that is, we cannot perceive either the perceiver or his perceiving *per se*, because perceiving *is* objectifying, and to perceive either the pure Subject, or the pure process of perceiving, would be to make objects of them in the very act of perceiving them, so that the idea of doing so involves a contradiction in terms. I mean that it is self-contradictory to distinguish a perceiver or a perceiving from their contents or objects, and to imagine them perceivable in that abstract shape, or as so distinguished. It would be a case of what is commonly called making entities of abstractions.

22. Consequently when we think or speak of the pure Subject, or of pure Subjectivity, we must not imagine that we are thinking of, or expressing in those terms, any immediate perception or knowledge of a Self, or an Ego, a Soul, or a Mind, and so on; what we are objectifying, when so thinking, is our own thought of consciousness in the abstract, or as contradistinguished from objects and objectivity. This of course does not mean that the contents of such terms are unreal; but they are real only in the concrete, and as distinguished in the concrete by our thought of what the concrete involves as its essential elements or characters. As so involved they depend for

their existence, as consciousness itself does, upon some real condition or conditions of existence. If among these conditions any should be found which can only, or preferably, be denoted by such terms as Self, Ego, Soul, Mind, and so on, it can only be so because some positive knowledge of those conditions will have been acquired, a positive knowledge very different from the knowledge of them as pure abstractions, which those terms may, as we have just seen, be also employed to express. They must, in consequence of any positive knowledge of them, be treated as concrete realities, and not as abstractions. As real conditions they must be known as concrete realities, and not as abstract elements of that which they are held to condition. And this, I think, explains and justifies the reason why we have to dismiss, as noted above, that first distinction which, at the outset of philosophizing, we might be inclined to draw, between the objectified content of consciousness as the objectivity, and the mere process of perceiving as the subjectivity of experience, and have to replace it, as was also noted, by distinguishing, also within consciousness itself, the content of consciousness as a knowing, which is its subjectivity, from its own objective aspect as a known, that is to say, from the perceived fact of its coming into existence as consciousness.

23. Consciousness as an existent, then, is a real conditionate of some real condition or conditions which we must think of as not-consciousness, whatever it or they may turn out to be. But we know consciousness as an existent, that is, we know the fact of its existence, solely through its own content as a knowing. And we do not in the first instance perceive its existential character, or distinguish it as an existent from itself as a knowing. It gives us therefore no knowledge of locality, or of its own location within the body, which is afterwards perceived as the constant central object of its own panorama. Neither the abstract fact of being conscious, nor any of the simplest and lowest empirical perceptions, give us any knowledge of spatial extension, or even of place in a time-series of experiences, though it may possibly, and I think truly, be argued, that the merely abstract fact of being conscious, that is, consciousness being taken without any specific content being thought of, involves some time-duration, without which this abstract fact itself would be impossible. However this may be, it is clear that the distinct perception, both of time-duration and of place in any time-series of experiences, belongs to the content of consciousness as a knowing, just as much as our perception of the body and of spatial extension does. The time-duration involved in the abstract fact of consciousness is common to it with that involved in the special content of any and every particular actual

awareness or moment of concrete consciousness; they both occupy one and the same portion of time-duration; and this fact constitutes the immediacy of that special and particular content of consciousness, or in other words is our knowledge of it as an existent percept.

24. Now it is only from the two senses of sight and touch (the latter intensified, it may be, by the muscular sensations combined with it) that we obtain the first rudiments, the first basis, of our knowledge of the world of Space. And that they are exercised together is a plain fact of experience, resting on no assumption, and requiring no previous knowledge of what the terms, *senses*, *exercising*, and *together*, mean. Before analysing any sensation, or any immediate experience whatever, I have, of necessity, to use the name for it as *designative* only, that is, as merely indicating what it is that I am intending to analyse. Grammatical language, which is formed subsequently to the first formation of some theory or other concerning such immediate experiences as those now in question, leaves no other course open to me; since the name, taken by itself, contains no distinction between the experience *per se* and the theoretical construction to which it belongs, and to the formation of which it has contributed. In short, language represents and expresses that common-sense view of things which I take to be the *analysandum* of philosophy; and these remarks may serve to elucidate the method which I follow throughout this inquiry, as well as in the case of those sensations, the visual and the tactual, which are just now under consideration. But to proceed.—Organic sensations of all kinds, with their pleasures and pains, do not of themselves alone impart any knowledge of the organic body, or of a spatial world. The same is true of emotional feelings of all kinds, with their pleasures and pains. And the same is also true of the senses of taste, smell, and sound, with their specific pleasures and pains. But visual sensations give us the perception of space-extension in two dimensions of space, namely, length and breadth; and tactual sensations (especially when intensified by muscular) give us the perception of space-extension in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, that is, of what we call solid bodies, in the cases when these, one or more, come into contact with that one of them, our own organism, which is the constant central object of our own panorama, and which is itself perceived as a solid body solely by means of these same tactual and muscular sensations.

25. Now the perception and the idea of Matter as a real existent, of our own organism as a material body, of the location of our consciousness within that body, and of the conditioning of our con-

sciousness by material objects, the existence of which is independent of the existence of the consciousness which they condition,—these are perceptions and ideas which (though of course not originally capable of being stated in such terms as I have used in describing them) are formed very early in the life both of individuals and of the race They are in fact part and parcel of that common-sense knowledge which, as noted at the outset, is the *analysandum* of philosophy. They are part and parcel of that common-sense knowledge of adults at the present day, just as much as in the earliest stages of human history. When we begin to analyse them philosophically at the present day, that is to say, in reliance upon the results reached by previous philosophical investigations, we find ourselves met by certain time-honoured problems, first and foremost of which is the Reality of Matter, and then connected with it the Location of Consciousness within the organism, and the Real Conditioning of consciousness by the interaction of material objects organic and inorganic. On these three questions I propose, with your permission, to offer some brief remarks, from my own point of view as already set forth in the present paper.

26. And first as to the Reality of Matter. When we distinguish consciousness from its own particular contents or objects, that is, from those contents or objects which constitute it a knowing as well as an existent, then it seems to us, since we are then objectifying our own thought of it, to be perceiving its own body from outside, just as it perceives other solid bodies which are outside its own body. It is in fact by inference that we, subsequently to the simplest perceptions, locate our consciousness *within*, and not without, its own body, the central object of its own panorama. Tactual sensations, intensified it may be by muscular, are the only sensations,—touch, with the sense of effort which comes from muscular tension, is the only sense,—to which we owe our positive knowledge of a reality which is not-consciousness, and which possesses an efficiency of its own independent of that consciousness which is a knowledge of it, and of the existence of which it is a real condition. It is only through the sense of touch and muscular effort that we know the nature and are aware of the existence of solid material objects. Why? Because these are the only sensations, or feelings of any kind, which have a *replica* of themselves as their immediately perceived object, and that a *replica* which has, what they have not, efficiency as a real condition, or real conditions, inasmuch as they are at once the object and the real condition of those sensations of which they are the *replica*. How is this?

27. Briefly stated, the answer is as follows. These sensations, as experienced for instance in grasping and feeling one hand with the other, or in grasping and feeling any small solid object, occupy the same portion of space, at and for the same portion of time-duration, as their *replica*, the solid object, occupies, while this same object, the *replica*, is known as different from, and not wholly identical with, but independent of, those sensations of which it is the *replica*, by two facts—first of its being capable of an entirely different analysis from theirs, and secondly of its producing their occurrence as sensations in consciousness. The identity of the *replica*, in point of quality and contour, with the sensations which are the immediate perception of it is shown by the sameness of the space and the time occupied by both, I mean, during the time of their actual presentation; its difference from those sensations is shown by its operation in conditioning their occurrence, and its analysis into physical parts and forces, or modes of motion, in addition to its analysis as a percept into modes of consciousness. These latter of course are consciousness; the *replica* is non-consciousness; but both alike occupy one and the same portion of three-dimensional space for one and the same portion of time, namely, the time of their actual presentation in experience. (The term *replica*, applied as here to tangible objects, will be found in my *Metaphysic of Experience*, book I, chap. viii, § 4: *Analytical discrimination of real Conditions from real Existents*, near the end, at p. 405 of vol. i.)

28. This presentation therefore, the presentation in actual experience of solid objects by the sense of Touch, including muscular sensation or sense of effort, which we may call stress, is the point at which we have immediate evidence of the reality of an external world, a world of non-consciousness, since it is the point at which that world and our consciousness coincide, the point at which a portion of that world is experienced as actually operative and efficient, by its producing or conditioning the actual occurrence of those sensations, of which it is also the object. It is as their object that we can characterize it as their *replica*. As sensations they are themselves objective to consciousness, which is a self-objectifying process. But in that same conscious process, of which they are a part, they are also themselves perceived as having an object which is a *replica* of themselves in point of quality, while it is also independent of them, and prior to them, in point of existence, inasmuch as it is upon its existence that their occurrence in consciousness depends. For let one solid object come into visually perceived contact with our organism, which is another solid object, and *new* tactual sensations,

not before existing, come into consciousness as actually presented experiences.

29. Observe, moreover, that it is from these sensations of touch and stress that all the ideas, terms, and hypotheses of physical science derive their meaning. (See on this point Professor Stout's paper, *Primary and Secondary Qualities*, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. iv, N. S., for 1903–4.) However different may be the analysis of their *replica* as a solid physical object from that of the sensations which are our knowledge of it, we cannot but imagine the objects arrived at by that analysis, for the purpose of understanding them, as objects of tactual and muscular sensitivity, though of a sensitivity indefinitely exceeding ours in range, delicacy, and acuteness. The whole *meaning* of the terms denoting and describing them is derived from our own tactual and muscular sensitivity. Atoms (and their components, if any) or molecules of Matter, and the forces or modes of motion combining or separating them mechanically, fusing or dissolving their fusion chemically, or organizing them vitally, as for instance in protoplasm, or in the germ-plasm, ids, biophors, and determinants of Professor Weismann's theory; air and the waves of air transmitting sound; ether and the waves of ether transmitting light; electrons and the electric and magnetic forces which govern their structure and their motions, and, so to speak, organize that continuous something which is often held to make space itself a *plenum*;—all these alike, as objects, are conceived as objects of possible sensations of touch and stress, and not of any other sense. The sense of hearing does not hear the air or the waves of air transmitting sound; what it hears is *sound*. Seeing does not see the ether or the waves of ether transmitting light or its variously coloured modes; what it sees is *light* and *colour*. The sensation of touch with its combined stress alone has as its immediate object a *replica* of itself, which is at once its object and the real condition producing, or contributing to produce, the sensation of it.

30. Nevertheless it may well be doubted whether the sense of touch with stress would alone suffice, or have sufficed, to give us a perception of solid bodies, or of an extended material world of space, without the co-operation, so to speak, of the sense of sight. These two senses are normally, as a fact, exercised together. We experience the sensations of the two senses simultaneously. In many cases we see and we touch one and the same object at one and the same time; that is to say, the object of both kinds of sensation, in those cases, occupies one and the same portion of time, the time of its presentation, its solidity being given us by touch with stress, its contour by the dis-

the knowing and the known, between the subjective and objective aspects of experience itself—distinctions very different from that between Subject and Object, which is a distinction involving the isolation of Subjects from their own Objects, and from one another, an isolation which, being introduced as it is by pure assumption as the first step in philosophy, it will be found difficult if not impossible to remove by reasoning—reasoning which may then be itself no more than the illusory imagination of a single Subject.

56. Recurring now (after these somewhat, I fear, too lengthy remarks) to the emotional co-element in ideas, it is, I think, to be accepted as a fact, that these emotional modes of feeling give us as deep and true an insight into the nature of Real Being as is given by the sensational co-element in sensations, or the formal co-elements, time and space, which are common to both. This of course does not mean that the emotional co-element in ideas guarantees the truth or validity of the ideas in which they are from time to time co-elements. The cognitive co-element in ideas is subject to perpetual change and development, as we know from the fact that new knowledge is perpetually being gained, that ideas once held to be true are being perpetually discarded as partly or even wholly erroneous. It is doubtless also true that with the changes in ideas their emotional co-element in some measure changes also; but this does not alter the fact that the specific quality of all emotions, as distinguished from their occurrence, is incapable of being conceived as caused or conditioned by anything. The variety of kinds of emotion, of their sub-kinds, and of the combinations of these with one another is enormous. They have to a great extent been distinguished, named, and classified. I cannot here attempt their enumeration. Far more still remains to be done. Their modifications apparently far exceed our powers of definite distinction in thought, and still more of naming and describing. They differ also as between different individuals, and it is probable that the immense variety of characters and types of character among men depends chiefly on the great differences in the strength with which the different emotions and groups of emotion preponderate in different individuals, and on the variety of the modes in which their emotions interact and combine with one another;—of course always in dependence on the brain structure and the brain activity, which are their real condition as states of consciousness.

57. Another point relating to the intensity of feeling is remarkable. The intensity of emotional (as well as sensational) feeling, its various degrees, and the various degrees of comparative value, goodness and badness, pleasure and pain, and their modes, of which it is capable—

all this entirely escapes the power of definite distinction, and expression by names or words of language alone. We distinguish two great divisions of intensity in emotions by classing high degrees of them as passions, just as we have names for certain emotions; but this is a *descriptive* process, the names describe but do not express for the speaker, or convey to the hearer, the intensity of the feeling named. To do this, even partially and inadequately, the aid of Song, or of Rhetoric, or of Poetry must be sought. The secret of Music, its charm as a Fine Art, is that it awakens the emotional element in consciousness without any other imagery than that of the retained combination and succession of its sounds; in doing which it makes great use of imitation of the inarticulate cries which are the involuntary utterances prompted by various intensities both of sensations and of various emotions and passions. The secret and charm of Poetry as a Fine Art is that, by means of the rhythm, the stresses, and the cadences, which it introduces into the articulate language which it uses, it combines musical tone which awakens emotion with trains of images, ideas, and thoughts which have an intellectual significance.

58. It is in emotional feeling that the connexion between knowing and consciously acting is to be traced. Emotions and Passions are the motives of choice and volition. But of course, in calling these states of consciousness *motives*, we must remember that we are including in them the agency which in reality belongs to the unperceived activity of their immediate real conditions, of which activity they are the only evidence, and the different modes of which (at least at the present stage of physiological knowledge) we can distinguish and specify only by means of them; just as in the case of the Self or Ego spoken of above, in which the agency involved in the genesis of consciousness itself is combined with consciousness in the idea of a single unanalysed Conscious Being. This must be remembered whenever conscious motives, purposes, or acts are spoken of, as for instance when it was said above (par. 56) that differences in character depend chiefly upon differences in the strength of emotions, or of the groups into which they may be distributed. Emotions, taken simply as modes of consciousness, are themselves included in any meaning we can give to the term *character*. Consciously entertained Desires, then, anticipating a future state of consciousness which at the present is only imagined, whether it be to escape from some evil or to attain to some good, are the evidence for that kind of action in the conscious being which, when determined either by a judgement of comparative values, or by a preponderating intensity of one feeling over another,

is characterized as an act of Will. If it is determined by a judgement, we characterize it also as teleological. The anticipated End or τέλος is then the determining motive of the choice or act of volition, is what we call its Final Cause. No other kind of efficiency or agency in the conscious being is required to account for acts of choice than is required for other intra-cerebral operations which are not teleological. The difference is simply this, that two distinct stages are included in teleological acts; there is first the present anticipation of an uncertain future state of consciousness, and then secondly there is the judgement of the comparative values of the possible alternatives to that state. There is no need to suppose any other kind of efficiency in the conscious being, peculiar to his teleological acts, or due to the operation of Final Causes upon him. There is no need, for instance, to suppose the existence of an agent or agency which, though consisting of nothing but consciousness, may yet be imagined capable of influencing, and being influenced by, its own ideas. We need not hypostasize consciousness, nor need we hypostasize any faculty of consciousness, as an entity, calling it, say, the Will, in order to account for the special nature of teleological acts. The very meaning of the determination of choice by judgement is, that the anticipated alternative which is judged to be best thereby becomes *ipso facto* the strongest motive.

59. Just as Plato's distinction between Being and Becoming, οὐσία and γένεσις, sweeps exhaustively the whole region of Being in the largest sense of the term, so Aristotle's luminous distinction of the Four Causes—the Material, the Formal, the Efficient, and the Final—sweeps exhaustively the whole region of Genesis or Becoming. But we must remember that, in modern positive and scientific thought, it is the efficient cause only that is the object of discovery, including in the search for it all inquiries into the form and the matter of phenomena, considering these also as possible co-operative causes, and thereby enlarging Aristotle's *efficient cause* at the expense of two others of his four. The object of discovery is now described usually by the figurative phrase Law or Laws of Nature, meaning thereby *Uniformity*, whether static or kinetic, that is, whether of structure or of process. The figurative term *law* has done incalculable mischief in making *freedom* an almost insoluble problem; so far from being governed by previously fixed edicts, all natural agencies are more strictly, in acting, makers of the laws by which they are said to be governed. The uniformity is inseparable from the action. But in all Genesis, change is the fundamental fact; in Genesis, structure presupposes process, the static presupposes the kinetic. Moreover, Uniformity itself, whether static or kinetic, presupposes Difference;

the term has meaning only as uniformity in some respects of objects which are different in other respects; and that which is Variety in the static, or in structure, is Variation in the kinetic, or in process. This I take to be the meaning and the justification of the flux, the πάντα ῥεῖ, of Heracleitus; to all process it is essential, process cannot be thought of without it. Variation therefore may rightly be assumed as a fact universally found, by all experience, in all physical substances, and in that general character may be made one of the data or premisses in any inquiry into their history, as for instance was done by Darwin in his theory of natural selection of favourable variations as the chief agency in determining the origination of new species of organic beings. The general fact of variation, in the case of any particular physical substance, becomes and is identical with the *variability* of that particular substance. We know that it will vary, without necessarily knowing *what* any of its variations will be. Every one of these will have its own determining causes or conditions, internal or external, and to discover these at all the stages in the genesis of a species, from the first to the last, would be not the first but the last step, in fact the completion of our knowledge of the origination of that species of physical substance. If, then, by the term *causation* at the present day it is efficient causation only, in the above enlarged sense, that is intended, we see that no one can now speak without confusion of Final Causes, unless he is prepared to show that some states of consciousness, as distinguished from their own immediate real condition or conditions, react upon and are productive of change in the activity of those real conditions, and mediately thereby in other parts of the organism to which they belong.

60. Conscious choice, when determined by judgement, which is the normal case, is always upward and onward looking; the desire chosen is that which at the time is judged to be best. Among these desires, the desire for knowledge of fact, whatever the fact may be, whether welcome or unwelcome to ourselves on other grounds, is a constantly present desire, and one which is capable also of the greatest strength. It is not the same thing as the desire for useful knowledge, or knowledge of means of attaining other purposes than that of increasing the knowledge itself. It may be said to be the special motive of Philosophy, the desire for knowing all that can possibly be known of the Universe or Totality of Being. Nothing short of this totality, however its nature may be conceived or imagined, or wherever its limits may be drawn, from time to time, as knowledge advances from generation to generation, is an object capable of satisfying this desire. The desire is deeply rooted in the nature of man, and will doubtless continue to

operate in him as a motive so long as he continues to be an upward and onward looking conscious being. It is here, that is, in taking this view of the Universe or Totality of Being, that Philosophy coincides with Theology. The Power in the Universe, upholding, governing, and accounting for the existence of all things, Almighty Power—the idea of *power* being an idea unanalysable by us—this is what is meant by *Divinity* in the least and lowest sense which is essential to that idea. Now philosophy and theology doubtless do coincide at this point, and in this idea. But though the idea itself is thus common to both pursuits, it is not reached by both in the same way, nor does it hold the same position or perform the same function in both alike. So that it would be a fatal mistake, fatal to both pursuits, to identify them completely on that account, as many persons do, and to consider that they are but one pursuit, though called by different names, and consequently that you can lay the foundations of your philosophy in theological ideas. To do this would be in fact to base philosophy on assumptions, the one thing which is destructive from the first of its nature and value as philosophy. Theology in fact treats the great Object of its pursuit, the Divine Being, as a particular object, and thereby becomes itself a particular science; it is not an inquiry into the nature and validity of knowledge in general. And as to what philosophy is, it must, I think, be admitted that no method of pursuing knowledge can possibly override it, since none can be conceived more comprehensive or all embracing than that which is based on pure analysis, without assumptions, of the subjective side or aspect of phenomena, that is, of the content of knowing as distinguished from being, including even the existence of the content, that is, of the knowing itself.

61. But while, for these reasons, Theology differs so widely from Philosophy, it differs still more widely from Religion, notwithstanding that here also the identification of the two is very far from uncommon. Theology is some system of ideas or conceptions in which the state of our constantly changing philosophical knowledge enables us from time to time to clothe, as it were, and fix by investing with a certain definiteness, that particular group of needs, desires, and emotions, deeply rooted in the nature of man, which are the essential and permanent constituent of Religion. It is of the essence of Religion to be emotional. No system of ideas or conceptions which does not serve as the embodiment or vehicle of emotions, which are felt and judged to be of the highest worth, in fact of supreme moral excellence and value, deserves the title of Theology. For the whole moral nature of man, including all its judgements of the relative value of feelings,

its approvals and disapprovals of them, and of the volitional acts of choice which they prompt—to which whole nature the religious emotions and acts prompted by them belong—must be presupposed in any inquiry into the special characteristics which entitle any emotion or group of emotions to be distinguished as religious, and make them the originators and foundation of Religion.

62. What, then, must we conceive of the nature of the religious emotions, and what are those ideas which, without being a systematic theology, are essential to their entertainment and conscious realization by individuals? I can do no more than barely enumerate them—barely enumerate what appear to me to be the sources of religion, all of them deeply rooted in human nature. It is impossible, and indeed would be undesirable in a paper like the present, to attempt more. I state them therefore not as ascertained fact, but only as the result of my own speculation on this intricate topic. And of course here also, as throughout this paper, I must be understood to be speaking analytically of the matters dealt with, as we know them in our own experience and philosophical thought at the present day, and not as attempting to give an account of the stages whereby that experience and that thought have been attained, either in the history of mankind, in advancing from primitive, perhaps even pre-human, to modern times, or in that of the individual in advancing from birth to death. The sources I speak of seem to me to be four:—

1. The distinction of Being and Doing on the one hand from Feeling and Judging on the other, in consciousness alone.
2. The idea of the Infinity and Eternity of the Universe, and of the vast regions inaccessible to human positive knowledge.
3. Man's need of Sympathy, moral and intellectual, and his desire for it. This is the specially emotional source of religion, this the moral emotion which is specially religious.
4. The felt inadequacy of all human sympathy to satisfy this desire, owing to the total incommunicability of every individual's consciousness as it is in him to every other individual.

63. Consequently, springing from these sources, the Postulate of an Omniscient Being who knows every inmost thought, feeling, desire, and choice—this Postulate is the first article of a religious Faith. It is a Postulate in the strict sense of the term, a practical and fundamental demand, not like the so-called Postulates of Logic, the

fundamental law of Thought—Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle—which are more properly to be called Axioms than Postulates, since the term *Axiom* has come to signify something not demanded but found as an ultimate and universal fact in the thinking process.[1] And we are enabled to make the postulate of Omniscience, giving it a rational meaning, by conceiving it as the consciousness that inseparably accompanies eternal and infinite Power, the efficient agency in the eternal and infinite Universe, throughout all its regions seen and unseen, and reaching to its minutest processes and changes as well as to its largest, so as to share (so to speak) the eternity and infinity of that Power. Not that we thereby gain any insight into the nature of *power*, which still remains, as before, the general term under which we gather up the *facts* of existence and continuance, of change and process, as realities or facts simply. But we can and we do conceive the possibility that every one of these facts should have a consciousness of itself, attaching to it in such a way that, in it, being and knowing, though distinct, are inseparable and co-eternal. Yet in whatever way we may conceive Omniscience as possible, the reality of it which we postulate is still a matter of Faith, not of Knowledge. The fact that we conceive it as infinite and eternal, that is, as sharing the infinity and eternity of the divine power and of the universe which it sustains, shows that we conceive it, equally with them, as far exceeding any positive knowledge which is possible to us as human beings. Whatever is thought of as infinite or eternal is thought of as something the *totality* of which thereby escapes circumscription or limitation by conceptual thought.

64. At the same time we conceive the Omniscience which we postulate as sympathetic with our own moral nature. That sympathy with our own otherwise incommunicable feelings is, in fact, our special motive in postulating it. And in this it is postulated as sympathetic with our own moral judgements as well as feelings, with our judgements of the relative value of our own feelings, and with our own approvals and disapprovals of our own acts. Nor is it possible to desire such sympathy from any Being whose nature we should conceive as morally lower than our own. Moreover, owing to its inseparability from the infinite and eternal Universe and the Power which sustains it, no judgements of the relative value of feelings, or approvals and disapprovals of acts of choice, can be conceived as possible which can override, in point of validity and truth, those which we conceive, from our human point of view, as passed and entertained by

[1] I have not always taken this view of the right name for the 'Postulates of Logic'.

Omniscience. They have, in our conception, a morally binding power which is the same in kind as that of our own Conscience, while we attribute to them, as passed and entertained by Omniscience, an ultimate and irreversible validity and truth. The ultimate validity, truth, and morally binding power of the judgements of our own Conscience are thus conceived as based upon their harmony with the laws of nature, which are the laws of Omniscient Power. Our own felt and welcomed relation to this Omniscient Power, a relation postulated by us because it alone gives us the sympathy which we need, this alone is religious Faith, nothing else has any claim to be entitled Religion.

65. Now we cannot construct a theory of that which is shown, by the analysis of our consciousness, to be conceivable only as escaping conception, because infinite and eternal; to say nothing of the fact that we can and do conceive the possibility of there being, in reality, other modes of consciousness than ours, and other worlds besides that material world of sun and stars and planets which is revealed to our senses, a world which we must then think of as but a part of a far greater and more comprehensive totality. But while this totality thus of necessity escapes our positive knowledge, it is not beyond the purview of religious Faith, which is based upon a desire ineradicable in human nature, and (prompted by this desire) upon the postulate of an omniscient and almighty power. We have no knowledge, as distinguished from faith, of the nature of the Divine Being. At the same time we have no ideas or conceptions but such as are derived from human experience, by which to represent and think of that nature, and of the relation of the Divine Being to ourselves; so that we have to recognize that the Divine Being is far more and (in that *more*) far other than it is possible for us, as human beings, to conceive or imagine.

66. When we come, in speculation, to the end of our positively conceivable ideas, as, e.g. in the case of our trying to conceive a beginning or an ending of the Universe, we tend to mark that stop to our ideas by some self-contradictory, and on that account strictly inconceivable idea, as for instance the idea of Chance, or Chaos, or spontaneous generation of something *ex nihilo*, or of a Creator whose own Being we endeavour to conceive by the self-contradictory idea of *Causa Sui*. Ideas such as these are nugatory, not because they are ideals which are taken to be realizable only *at infinity*, but because they are self-contradictory, Chance and Chaos, for instance, being terms predicated of a real universe, notwithstanding that the idea of all real being, of all existence and becoming, involves the idea of some

correspondence of parts, of some order, some regularity, essentially attaching to it. Such supposed ideas as these, being strictly inconceivable, because self-contradictory, give us no positive knowledge whatever of the Universe, though appearing as if they might possibly do so. They simply indicate that we have reached a limit in that positive knowledge. True, this latter characteristic of marking a limit is one which they share with such general ideas as those of Force, Energy, Power, Agency, Efficiency, which of themselves tell us nothing of how or why existents exist, events occur. They are not ideas of abstract but hypostasized entities; they are ideas of the abstract but very real *fact* in concrete experiences that existents *do* exist, events *do* occur, whatever may be the kind of their being or the mode of their occurrence. Consequently these ideas also (though not self-contradictory) mark limits in our knowledge; but these limits are limits in our analysis of positively known existents and events; which limiting ideas we therefore have to accept as final results of philosophical as well as scientific inquiry.

67. Speculative knowledge begins with empirical perceptions and ends with empirical ideas. The Universe is the object of an empirical idea. We cannot construct that object in thought, because we cannot limit or circumscribe in thought that which we must think of as infinite and eternal. Something has been already said in this paper of the term *empirical*, but it will perhaps not be out of place to add some few remarks on it in conclusion. It was described above as the objectified content of a process, and a certain complexity was pointed out as essential to it. This description may now be characterized somewhat more minutely by saying, that the term *empirical* expresses the fact that the perceptions and retained ideas representing perceptions, which are the data of experience, occupy some duration of time (though it may be brief), or some duration of time and some extension of space together (though it may be small), so that some specific feeling combined with some duration, or duration and extension together, constitute a perceptual datum of experience. It is its composite character that is its empirical character. Now, in the case of the supposed *minima* of perception—the least possible empirical perceptions—no difference within them of former and latter in time is perceived, and likewise no difference in position of parts of space within them. The difference has to be inferred, because it escapes the acuteness of our perceptive powers; but inferred it must be. For no other fact is compatible with the fact of empirical perception on the larger scale, that is, as actually given in the varied process-content of experience, which is the *analysandum* of philosophy.

What we find as belonging to these facts we have to think of as belonging to them throughout all their parts, even when these are thought of as so minute as to escape the distinguishing capacity of perception; and it must be noted that it is only by thought that the *minima perceptibilia* themselves are distinguished; as *minima* they are not *data* of experience; consciousness is not *given* to us in *minima* ready marked out as such in perception; nor yet is experience given in originally separate empirical units, in such units as we have selected by analysis out of our *analysandum*, e.g. the *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* of the present paper, as the simplest kind of facts empirically known to us, and therefore the best to take first in proceeding to analyse it; but wherever there is extension, or duration, there also is divisibility *by thought*. These perceptions we may divide, *in thought*, by introducing mathematical points, and may picture these points by so-called *minima perceptibilia*; but mathematical points, being dividings only, are not perceptible by sense. Nor are those *minima perceptibilia* by which we picture them, e.g. the dots on paper picturing mathematical points, perceivable separately as ultimate percepts, but only as parts of larger percepts; the dots are not perceivable without a background or context of some sort or other, on which and as parts of which they appear and are distinguished.

68. Now mathematical divisions, points in duration, points, lines, and surfaces in extension, are no perceivable break or solution in the continuity of the abstract but inseparable perceptual continua—duration and extension—into which they are introduced by thought. Still less are they solutions of the continuity of any strictly homogeneous content of those continua. These homogeneous continua are data of *perception*, or of representations imagined as perceptual, not data of *thought*. Change or motion in any such continuous homogeneous content of duration or extension, which is the lowest and simplest shape either change or motion can assume, and therefore that which is most essential to them, and also that in which they may escape the highest degree of acuteness of human perceptivity, shares the continuity of that homogeneous content into which divisions may be introduced by *thought*, without any break in its continuity being introduced thereby. Divisions introduced by thought presuppose continua given in perception; to think of a continuum is to think of something which is divisible by thought, without solution of its continuity as a percept. Change and Motion therefore, when thought of in their lowest and therefore most essential shape, let us say, for argument's sake, as a passing from a *this* to a *that* over a mathematical division introduced by thought, must be thought of as continuous

transitions unbroken by the mathematical division, which thinking introduces into perceptual continua for the purpose of understanding perceptual data, continuity among them. Transition or passing *per se*, or in the abstract, is no more perceptible than is a mathematical point or division in duration or extension, the number 1, for instance, in arithmetic. When changes or motions or units are empirically given in perception, it is because there is some heterogeneity, some difference in kind, in the content to which they belong, enabling the *this* and the *that* of the transition (or the unit and its context) to be distinguished as different, independently of any mathematical division (or act of counting in arithmetic). Purely mathematical divisions make no difference to the continuity of the content into which they are introduced by thought, nor do they effect any arrest or stoppage of continuous transitions (changes or motions) in perceptual continua.

69. Plato was the first, so far as I am aware, to signalize this nature of change and motion, calling it τὸ ἐξαίφνης, in his wonderful dialogue, the *Parmenides*, where he not only reveals to us the laws of pure, that is, purely logical thought, apart from any particular mode of it, such, for instance, as the mathematical, but also, by distinguishing the logical concept *unity* from *existent* unity as its object thought of, lays the logical basis for a consistent theory of a World of Changing Realities at once phenomenal and real, without identifying, as Parmenides the Eleatic philosopher had done, the concept *unity* with the *existent* permanent and eternal Universe, or contrasting the two, taken together and undiscriminated, with ever changing phenomena, which the Eleatic philosopher held to be illusory and unreal, because transitory, and not *real* like the one eternal Universe. See for τὸ ἐξαίφνης the concluding portion of the second division of the argument of the Second Part of the *Parmenides*, pp. 155 E to 157 B, and perhaps more particularly the words ἄλλ' ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι (*Parm.*, p. 156 D, E).

70. Plato in this Second Part of the dialogue *Parmenides* again makes Parmenides himself the chief speaker, expounding and developing his own strictly philosophical theory, the 'Road of Truth' (the significance of which expressions will be touched on presently), expanding it in fact into a theory justifying the application of logical thought to the whole phenomenal Universe. It deals only with the purely logical part of the Platonic Theory of Knowledge; it is Plato's development of the Eleatic philosophy. It is Parmenides

that gave Plato the most powerful mental stimulus. Parmenides rather than Socrates was Plato's chief 'Father' in philosophy, though the Socratic influence was also of cardinal importance. The whole argument of this expansion turns upon the distinction between the *whatness* or meaning expressed by single terms and the *thatness* or existence of those whatnesses. Plato never accounts for the existence of that distinction, nor yet for difference, or genesis, or change, or motion, or any of their derivatives (though in the case of one derivative which I shall presently notice he seems to me to make a strenuous attempt to do so),—all he says is—it is only by drawing these primary distinctions and those which are deducible from them that we can *understand* the phenomenal universe. (Perhaps I may be allowed to say here that all serious students of the *Parmenides* will find Professor Henry Jackson's articles on the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*, in vols. x and xi of the *Journal of Philology*, London and Cambridge, 1882, most valuable aids in understanding it. These articles are the two first of a series entitled *Plato's Later Theory of Ideas* contributed by him to that Journal. But in saying this I by no means intend to imply complete agreement with Prof. Jackson's interpretation of the Second Part of the *Parmenides*. To the two articles just mentioned should be added the third article in the series, that on the *Timaeus*, in vol. xiii, and the fifth, on the *Sophist*, in vol. xiv, of the Journal.)

71. Thus the Second Part of the *Parmenides* is Plato's chief attempt to grapple with the ambiguities involved in the apparently simple terms οὐσία, εἶναι, ὄν, μὴ ὄν, and οὐκ ὄν,—ambiguities the full significance and deceptiveness of which it may be said to have discovered in and by the act of grappling with them in this and other Dialogues, as for instance in the *Sophist*. For, along with all their apparent simplicity and real ambiguity, they are the terms which we employ and cannot avoid employing, tacitly or openly, in every act of thought. We have the *is* of the copula connecting subject with predicate in an act of judgement, as in 'red is a colour', and we have the *is* of existence where it is predicate also, as in 'red exists', i.e. 'red is existent'. Similarly with οὐσία, which includes both *being* as a fact, and the *whatness* of any being, which, if defined or definable, we call its *essence*, that is, the characteristics which are essential to its being what it is. It is, moreover, quite possible that there should be some whatnesses which are perfectly well known to us, and the names of which convey a well-known meaning, and yet are wholly undefinable, being ultimates in thought, and therefore, as such whatnesses, have no predicates, not even that

of their own meaning as distinguished from the whatnesses themselves. Such an ultimate in thought is the whatness (or meaning) of the term One, as handled by Parmenides in the Dialogue. In the first part of the eight divisions into which the Second Part of the Dialogue falls (pp. 137 C–142 B), he shows that the term One, so understood, has literally no predicates, not even that of οὐσία. It is like the subject A, of the first so-called Postulate of Logic, A is A, but *without* its predicated A. It is rather an act of counting than of thought. In the second division (pp. 142 B–157 B) he makes the supposition, that the One of the first division has Being in the sense of Existence, or becomes (for our thought) Existent. That composite Unit, so to speak, both exists and is one. Although it is One, it yet contains difference within itself; its components are different, ἕτερα, from each other. And this is true of all its parts, τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, as parts of a whole, supposing such parts to exist, since every one of them must contain the same *difference* of components that the One contains. It is by this line of thought that the Parmenidean Unit Universe is argued to contain plurality, and to have predicates which are not only different from one another, but also in many cases contraries of one another, contraries which become, as we should now say, contradictories, if predicated of one and the same unit, at one and the same time, and in one and the same respect. His definition of εἶναι — μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος,—will be found at p. 151 E, and that of γίγνεσθαι, — μεταλαμβάνειν οὐσίας,—at p. 156 A, in this second division. It should be noted that he brings in time, χρόνος, into his definition of εἶναι, and consequently has to assume it as necessary to the understanding of γίγνεσθαι, which he shows to be a process in time. The one case, spoken of in the preceding paragraph, in which he seems to make a strenuous attempt to account for the existence of one of his derivative facts, is that of the existence of τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, which at the beginning of division 3, at p. 157 C sqq., he seeks to show is deducible from the fact of difference between its components ἕν and ὄν, these latter of course being inseparable by hypothesis. The plurality of parts, τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, all severally containing the same difference of components as the ἓν ὄν, is another matter. Yet this is what he attempts to deduce from that hypothesis. And this attempt it is, in which I cannot think he is successful, since it brings him into contradiction with his own argument in division 2, where τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός were frankly accepted as parts, μόρια, belonging to the ἓν ὄν. But now, in division 3, p. 157 C, we are told that τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός are different from it solely in virtue of their having parts, μόρια, without

which *differentia* they would not be ἄλλα, but identical with ἕν. The ἕν which is ὄν or which exists, is perfectly simple, incapable of having parts. As we should now say, its simplicity is its nature, its οὐσία in the sense of *essence*, and this simplicity it carries with it into the existence which the hypothesis affirms of it. Plato must therefore, in my opinion, look elsewhere than to the mere meaning of ἕν for the existence of τἆλλα, or that plurality of existent parts which experience shows that the ἓν ὄν contains, though, supposing the genesis of the parts to be given, it is very true that they will one and all contain that difference of components which the ἓν ὄν itself contains.

72. It would be out of place in a paper like the present to follow the argument through all the eight divisions of which it consists, the four last of which are based on the hypotheses either of the non-meaning or of the non-existence of One (ἕν), that is, upon the contradictories of the hypotheses either of its meaning or of its existence, which are the bases of the argument in the four first divisions. I will confine myself to saying that the conclusions reached both on the affirmative hypotheses and on the negatives, which are their contradictories, are in perfect harmony with each other, namely, that if One does not in any sense exist, nothing whatever exists, while it would also seem that, whether One exist, or not, both One itself and all other things whatever, in all possible relations, both exist and do not exist, both are and are not manifested as phenomena, φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται, p. 166 C, which is the concluding sentence of the Dialogue. It seems, therefore, that the real existence of a permanent Universe, consisting of parts which though transitory are also real, is rendered intelligible by the affirmative hypotheses. Nor is there any suggestion of a transcendent reality in contrast with the phenomenal, as in Kant. And the apparently open contradictions which this last sentence contains must be thought of as resolved by the ἄτοπός τις φύσις, τὸ ἐξαίφνης, spoken of in the concluding part of the second division (pp. 155 E–157 B), which is the conception by means of which Becoming or Genesis is rendered intelligible. In fact, we seem to have in this concluding sentence Plato's mode of saying, that after all there are sense, opinion, thought, &c., &c., the phenomena of *consciousness*, whatever their nature may be.

I venture with great diffidence, considering the difficulty of this much controverted subject, to append here a summary (involving paraphrase) of the principal argument of the Second Part of the *Parmenides* as I apprehend it. I take that Second Part to begin with some introductory remarks, Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; κτλ. at p. 135 C down to p. 137 C, the principal argument occupying the

rest of the Dialogue. This argument falls into two Divisions, the first positive, the second negative, ending with the word Ἀληθέστατα, at p. 166 C.

First Division, positive.

I.	137 C to 142 B	If unity is unity — It has no predicates.
II.	142 B to 157 B	If unity has being — It has all (and contrary) predicates.
	155 E to 157 B	Concluding passage of II clearly discriminated from what precedes by the words ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν, 155 E to 157 B — How Change in the widest sense, including genesis and predication, is possible;—τὸ ἐξαίφνης, the instant of Change in time-duration.[1]
III.	157 B to 159 B	If unity has being — Other things have all (and contrary) predicates.
IV.	159 B to 160 B	If unity is unity — Other things have no predicates.

Second Division, negative.

V.	160 B to 163 B	If unity is not unity — It has all (and contrary) predicates.
VI.	163 B to 164 B	If unity has not being — It has no predicates.
VII.	164 B to 165 E	If unity is not unity — Other things are illusory Phenomena, appearing to possess all (and contrary) predicates.
VIII.	165 E to 166 C	If unity has not being — Other things have no predicates, and do not appear as Phenomena at all.

[1] In Dr. Thomas Maguire's edition of the *Parmenides*, 1882, I am spoken of as follows, in a note at p. 88, on this which I have called the 'concluding passage of II': 'Shadworth Hodgson seems to suppose that Plato held that the point [which cuts time in two] possessed duration.' No reference is given to any writing of mine, though the writer was certainly acquainted with my *Time and Space*, as another note in his volume shows. I certainly never entertained such an opinion, either as to the fact, or as to Plato. True, the *thinking* of a division of time has duration, but the division thought of *per se* is thought of as durationless, and why? Simply because, in thinking of it *per se*, we abstract from the continuous duration which it divides. This was my opinion

There the dialogue ends. Now by accepting the four affirmative hypotheses, and denying their contradictories, the four negative hypotheses,—which four in each case are only two, since two are merely repetitions;—that is, by affirming that

(1) unity is unity, *i.e.*, *means* unity and nothing else, and
(2) unity is combined with *being*,

we get a clear and consistent view of the World of ἓν καὶ πολλά, without anything *per se*, or *a parte rei*, unknowable in it, or any wholly non-existent illusions; indeed, if anything could be wholly illusory, it would be the ἕν, the unity which was unity only. In short, we are here presented with a World of *Changing Realities*, some more durable than others, but the whole of which, that is, the World which they compose, is everlasting. Plato must mean to deny the four negative hypotheses, because, if they were accepted, instead of the four corresponding affirmatives, the result, so far from being a method leading to knowledge, would be a wholly unthinkable Chaos. This then is, in my opinion, what Plato intended to establish by the argument in the Second Part of the Dialogue, in substitution for the incomplete doctrine of the real Parmenides, the Eleatic philosopher, who had left his statement of the case open to many unsolved objections. At the same time, it cannot be called an Epistemology, it is not complete as a theory of knowledge. It is nothing more than just the *basis* of a Methodology, showing the validity and the universal applicability of logical thought to any and every kind of subject-matter; but this or some equivalent basis of the same kind is one of the most indispensable requirements of Philosophy. And for my part I have little doubt that Plato himself finds this basis in the ἄτοπός τις φύσις, τὸ ἐξαίφνης, of p. 156 D–E, and that what he describes in those terms is the logical, or mathematical *division* of time-duration in the act of thinking.—Still less does this Second Part deal with any particular theory, such as Plato's own theory of the part played by Ideas, in Nature or in Philosophy, but, the earlier form of that theory having been frankly surrendered, though not without suggesting another, in the First Part of the Dialogue, as I think Prof. Jackson has very clearly shown, it leaves the theory of Ideas to be developed, if at all, in subsequent or possibly contemporaneously written Dialogues. The unapproachable merit, the pre-eminence, of Plato in Philosophy seems to me to consist, by no means in his theory of Ideas, but in his power of bringing to

when I wrote that former work, just as it is now in writing the present paper. See my *Time and Space*, Part I, ch. ii, § 16, and Part II, ch. vii, div. 1, §§ 41 to 44, inclusive.

light the subtlest facts of experience, owing to his constantly speaking from close observation of the operations of his own consciousness.

73. What then is the effect of the introduction of purely mathematical divisions by thought into perceptually given continua? How do they conduce to understanding the facts of change or of motion in their lowest and most essential shape? Plainly we must ask what is meant by *understanding*, understanding anything whatever. Understanding I take to be a process of thought, a thinking, which in its lowest and most essential shape assimilates its object-matter to some perceptually given object taken as already known. And we say that we understand anything into which we are inquiring when, and just so far as, we either perceive its likeness to some ultimate empirically given datum of perception, or deduce it inferentially from such ultimate data. Now in the case before us,—the facts of change and motion in their lowest and most essential shape,—this assimilation (to be followed by inference) is effected by introducing, into the duration and extension of homogeneous contents, distinctions similar to those which are empirically given in the heterogeneous contents of ultimate perceptual data. We understand the *this* and the *that* on opposite sides of a mathematical division solely by assimilating them, though introduced by thought, to the contents different in kind from one another which are simultaneously perceived in an empirical heterogeneous perceptual object. In short, the thinking of the real nature of Change or of Motion bears witness to the ultimate character of perceptual and empirical data in knowledge.

74. But we are not yet at the end of our embarrassments. We have still to consider how the foregoing remarks apply to the case of *minima perceptibilia*, themselves (in that character) a product of thought, and to the idea of Changing or Becoming in its simplest shape, that is, of a real former and latter in time-duration, in cases where no such difference is empirically perceived. It is here that Zeno's famous paradoxes aimed against the possibility of Motion have their stronghold; the reason being that, while *minima perceptibilia* seem both to be indisputably real and to owe that reality solely to thought, they yet have no change or motion perceptible within them. Of these two, change is the simplest and most fundamental, motion the more complex, being change in time and space together. Change may be found in time alone, and it is here that the real *crux* of the controversy lies. The question is this, Are *minima perceptibilia*, are mathematical infinitesimals, the products solely of thought? It seems to me indisputable that they are *not*. Both of them are products of divisory acts of thought, but in both cases continua must

be given in perception or perceptual ideas, before division of them in thought can take place. A division presupposes a continuum to be divided; a continuum does not presuppose a division. It is only by hypostasizing divisory acts of thought that you can change them, in imagination, either into *minima perceptibilia* themselves, or into mathematical infinitesimals, which again are themselves continua; unless, indeed, by a still further stretch of imaginative fiction, you suppose them to *create* the continua which they then proceed to divide. In short, there are, in abstract Time, no time-atoms, but only thought-divisions of Time. Now since thought begins with an act of attention, that is, an *arresting*, in thought, of the content to which it attends, if you hypostasize those acts, whether as creative or as divisive of continua, whatever they give you as their product is necessarily something in a state of Rest, not of change or of motion. So that, if thought alone gives you Reality, all that is real is at rest; while change and motion are an illusory appearance. Such at least I apprehend to be the original Eleatic doctrine, and it is plainly incapable of furnishing any scientific or philosophical theory of a world which it regards as consisting of illusory phenomena.

75. Professor Burnet in his valuable and most instructive work *Early Greek Philosophy* maintains, along with other writers whom he names, that Zeno's arguments against the possibility of motion were directed against the Pythagoreans. 'The system of Parmenides (he says) made all motion impossible, and his successors had been driven to abandon the monistic hypothesis in order to avoid this very consequence. Zeno does not bring any fresh proofs of the impossibility of motion; all he does is to show that a pluralist theory, such as the Pythagorean, is just as unable to explain it as was that of Parmenides.' (Work cited, p. 366, and see also pp. 357, 362, 369, &c., of the same second edition, 1908.) This, I think, may very well be the case. At least it would harmonize very well with my own view of the Eleatic doctrine. But I would remark that if Pythagoreanism, as well as the doctrine of Parmenides, was precluded from accounting for the apparent change and motion of the world as actually experienced, that is, for the Heraclitean *flux* of all things therein, it would be for precisely the same reason, namely, that both doctrines alike set up certain thought-concepts, supposed to be products of pure thought, as rival realities to perceptual data conceptualized by thought—thus making realities of the concepts and illusions of the data. Moreover, both doctrines belong to the same kind of thought, namely, the mathematical. Unity and units are mathematical ideas. Zeno's arguments against the possibility of motion show that no thought-unit of spatial

length however small, if taken as a reality, can ever be traversed and left behind by another thought-unit of it taken as a reality, because the process taken as a reality would require an infinitely long time-duration for its performance, space-continua being divisible *ad infinitum*; that is to say, the traversing could *never* be really performed, and even if, *per impossibile*, we should suppose it performed, it would thereby have destroyed the continuum which was its own presupposition and condition of existence. Consequently phenomenal motion becomes an illusion if purely mathematical units are realities.

76. What we find of the utmost value in Parmenides is something which in my opinion marks him as the originator of the strictly philosophical line of thought as distinguished from the scientific. I mean his insistence on the distinction between the two roads, of truth and of opinion, the former leading to a real knowledge of Being, the latter to an apparent knowledge of Not-Being. But why and how is this important? Because it embodies the first clear perception of the subjective aspect, or our *knowledge* of things, as the special field of philosophy. All consciousness, he says, has a positive content, has Being of some sort or other as its object; and pure Nothing, if (*per impossibile*) we could think it *per se*, would *be* Not-being, a contradiction in terms:

> Οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γάρ ἐφικτον)
> οὔτε φράσαις. (vv. 39–40.)

(I quote from the *Fragmenta Philosophorum Græcorum.* Ed. F. G. A. Mullachius. Parisiis. A. Firmin Didot. Vol. I. 1860. pp. 114–130. *Parmenides.*) We have here the first dawn of the *philosophical* distinction between the subjective and the objective aspects of experience, which is a fact otherwise expressible by saying that all Being is relative to Knowing, or again, that consciousness is the only evidence we have or can have of anything whatever. I hold Parmenides, therefore, to be the first founder of Philosophy as distinct from Science. I understand his two roads, the road of Truth and the road of Opinion, to mean—the former *philosophical*, the latter *scientific* Thought, the former leading to universal and necessary ideas of the One eternal and unchanging Universe, including all its phenomenal varieties, the latter to theories of these same phenomenal varieties which are one and all impermanent and transitory. No one at the present day can endorse precisely *this* distinction between philosophy and science. Nevertheless the fact that it was drawn at all, based as it was upon the observed universal and irrefragable fact that consciousness is our sole *evidence* for anything whatever, is the most

important, because the originating fact, in the history of Philosophy. This is very far from being Professor Burnet's view. Yet Parmenides was no Idealist. His doctrine, as Professor Burnet has shown, launched scientific thought upon the track of strictly physical speculation. His own thought of the One Real Universe is materialistic. In the first part of his poem, the 'Road of Truth', he argues for it as being an immense but still limited Sphere (vv. 102–105), that is, as we should say, *finite* in point of Space, while at the same time it is unlimited in point of Time-duration, endless both *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, or as we should say, *eternal*, having no genesis, no destruction:

ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος
τῆλε μάλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής. (vv. 83–4.)

But this eternity he also conceives as embracing all particular things, which are conceived as belonging, all of them, to an eternal *Now*,—

ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν
ἓν ξυνεχές. (vv. 61–2.)

Such, however imperfect, is the first, strictly speaking, philosophical conception of the Universe ever framed by man, at least in the Western world. And it is this subjective and strictly philosophical line of thought which Plato follows in his Dialogue *Parmenides*, in the Second Part of which he represents Parmenides as himself enforcing and dialectically developing his own Eleatic doctrine.

77. The only logically valid way of dealing with *minima perceptibilia* within which no change or motion is perceptible, and which therefore are not perceived as a process or a becoming what they are, or as having a former and a latter within them, while they are still in the inchoate stage of becoming what they are as *minima perceptibilia*, is in my opinion the following. We must analyse them as we find them, namely, as products of thought in its endeavour to understand the given stream of empirical perceptions. We shall then find, if what I have said above of the meaning of *understanding* holds good, that it is only by assimilating them in thought to process-contents of the varied empirically given stream of consciousness that we can understand them as parts of that varied stream (without falling into self-contradictory ideas in doing so), and therefore by attributing to them continuous change and transition, even though those changes and transitions are not perceivable by human sensitivity. They are not made into unchanging atoms by being thought of as *minima perceptibilia*. It is merely the limit of human sensitivity that is marked by thinking of them as *minima*. They could only be conceived as indivisible units

excluding change, if they were conceived as ultimate data given by thought, and not as products of thought applied to interpret perceptually given data.

78. What, then, supposing this to be so, are we to think of that arrest or stoppage which, though introduced by thought, is yet apparently introduced as an essential attribute of the objects thought of? Here again I think that my distinction between consciousness as an existent and the same consciousness as a knowing will be found capable of throwing light and clearing up much confusion. Thought as an existent is itself a process. Neither the perception nor the idea of Rest is a datum of consciousness at once ultimate and universal. But the very first step in all thinking, as distinguished from perceiving, is an act of *arrest*; it is an arrest by attention of the ever-changing process given in perception. This, however, is no real arrest of the stream of consciousness, no arrest of consciousness as an existent. It is an arrest of some member of the consciousness as a knowing, of some object in that apparently backward-flowing stream of consciousness, by a member arising in the same stream as an existent, flowing apparently forwards into the future. It is the retention, in retentive memory, of the representation of a perception or idea, so as still to make part of the present and future stream of consciousness, although that perception or idea has or may have ceased to exist as it was when it first occurred. It is only as so retained that it appears to be static, at rest, or unchanging. We arrest it by attention for the purpose of knowing more about it than the first perception tells us; and this is the first step in our endeavouring to understand as well as perceive it. We then endeavour to give it some place in a numerical series, and some definition in a logical series. But consciousness is not made what it is by these purposive acts of thought. Nor have we to say *what* it is in its inchoate stage, when we conceive it as *not yet* being, but only as *becoming* consciousness, since we have nothing but empirical perceptions from which to derive an idea of what it is, while its genesis as an existent is being conditioned.

79. It is as an *existent* that consciousness arises, *becomes*, γίγνεται. But since it is consciousness that is spoken of, this arising, becoming, genesis, can only be inferred from what it is when it *has become*, that is, from its objectified content as a *knowing*. The Laws of Nature also, so to call them, including the most general of all, the Uniformity of Nature both static and kinetic, belong to consciousness as a *knowing*, and are applied to the explanation or understanding of Nature—the Nature of everything, consciousness included—as existent. There are just two facts, or sets of facts, which escape all possibility of

human explanation or understanding, namely, the fact of Existence itself, the efficiency which makes the Laws by which it is said to be governed, and the specific natures or qualities of the feelings and forms which constitute man's consciousness as a knowing.

80. All we can say, then, of any inchoate state of consciousness prior to the moment of its objectification, or crossing the threshold of consciousness, is that it is either something that takes place in the proximate real conditions of that objectification, or else, if we take it, by abstraction, as belonging to the objectification, but therein separately and apart from its context and thus below the minimum of perceivability, it is some increase in the intensity or the distinctness, or both, of the empirical state of consciousness objectified. Thought of in this latter way, *minima perceptibilia* may possibly seem to bear a relation to the process of perceiving analogous to that which its inseparable elements, formal and material, bear to an empirical percept when formed, namely, in being imperceptible in separation from the whole which they form; though in their case the imperceptibility is due solely to their minuteness as separable parts, not elements, of the perceptive process. The parts of a continuum, even when not separately perceivable, must be conceived, when thought of as parts, to be essential to its continuity, with which they cannot be thought of as interfering.

81. It seems, then, that there is nothing in experience to show either the impossibility of Change or of Motion, or the priority of Rest to either of them in the real Universe. If we attempt to characterize the Universe of Being or Existence as the content or object of Omniscience, and regard it in that respect as constituting for Omniscience an eternal *Now*, an idea originating, I believe, with Parmenides,—this is not to retain the idea of *time present* as explanatory; it is to retain the idea of *time-duration* as a continuum, when thought of in abstraction from its content, and so taking it to abolish the distinctions of past, present, and future within it. We are then simply thinking of time-duration as sharing the eternity of Omniscience, the eternity of the Universe, and using the idea of *time present*, or a *Now*, to characterize the immediacy and certainty of Omniscience, that is to say, the identity of truth (subjective aspect) and fact (objective aspect), both of which aspects we then think of as the inseparable attributes of a Being at once omniscient and omnipotent. We as human beings must conceive or endeavour to conceive that omniscient consciousness as a single empirical idea of infinite complexity, embracing contents of infinite variety, and among them the distinctions of past, present, and future time, as contained

within what is to us the infinite and eternal Universe. Our human consciousness begins with empirical perceptions, and we can to some extent analyse the knowledge which we derive by thought from empirical data. It is from those data that our idea of Reality is derived. Consequently the idea of Reality or Real Being, as the object of an empirical idea, is an idea which, being what we are, we find it as impossible to transcend, as we find it impossible to limit or circumscribe by thought the Totality of its object.

PROLEGOMENA TO THE STUDY OF THE LATER IRISH BARDS 1200-1500

By E. C. QUIGGIN

FELLOW AND LECTURER IN KELTIC, CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

Read March 22, 1911

ONE of the most characteristic movements of the present time is the growing interest in Keltic studies. This movement has had the effect of stimulating investigations which serve to illuminate many of the dark corners of the history and literature of Ireland and Wales. It is consequently much easier at the present day to form some idea of the general conditions of these countries in mediaeval times than it was twenty years ago. A considerable time must elapse before the whole of the literature surviving in MSS. can be published. But certain broad features are already emerging, and in many cases it is possible to sketch the outlines, leaving details to be filled in later. One of the fields which is now being opened up for the first time is the work of the later Irish bards.[1] The family poets who flourished in Ireland in the period following the Norman invasion have left behind them a considerable body of verse which is as yet all but unknown. In this paper an attempt will be made to give some account of the nature and extent of the literature of this kind produced in Ireland and Scotland between 1200 and 1500.[2] But before proceeding to deal with the work of the later bards in detail, it will be well for us briefly to examine the relation in which the bards stood to their Irish predecessors on the one hand, and to their contemporaries in Western Europe on the other.

It is fortunately now no longer necessary to insist upon the merits and originality of Old Irish literature. The claims of Ireland upon the attention of all students have been eloquently summed up by

[1] It is not without interest to note that some of the corresponding literature in Wales has been in print for over three-quarters of a century. The *Myvyrian Archaiology* appeared in 1801-7, and the works of Lewis Glyn Cothi were issued in 1837.

[2] The reason for the superior limit will appear later. The inferior limit was chosen, partly because this paper has arisen out of my studies in connexion with the Book of the Dean of Lismore, and partly because the extensive bardic literature composed between 1570 and 1620, though substantially the same, is slightly different in character owing to the changed conditions.

Prof. Kuno Meyer in the brief introduction to his *Ancient Irish Poetry*. For the space of two or three centuries the lettered classes of the island appear to have been seized with an inspiration which found expression no less in the fervid appeals of the Hibernian missionaries among Angles, Franks, and Germans, than in the glowing verses of the poets of nature. It would almost seem as if the Muse had in anticipation of the troublous years in store been doubly lavish in her gifts. At the very time that literature in the vernacular begins in France the greatest monuments of Irish poetry and romance had already taken shape, and it may be doubted if in the four centuries which succeeded the battle of Clontarf any literary form was employed which was not current in the days of Adamnan. Irish literature presents many points of similarity to that of Iceland, and one of the most remarkable features common to the two islands is, that a century or two of great splendour is followed by a long period marked by an almost uniform lack of originality or brilliance. The political decay which was caused by the storm and stress of the Viking invasions is only too clearly reflected in the literature of the centuries after the death of Brian Boruma. From about the beginning of the second millennium of our era onwards Ireland loses her high place among the literary peoples of Western Europe. With the decline of originality in the treatment of native themes it might have been possible for Irish men of letters to come under the influence of French poetry—'the source of literary inspiration in the whole of the West.' But, doubtless from a variety of causes, they did not. It is true that it became the fashion to translate classical and mediaeval authors into the mother-tongue. So, as is well known, we find versions among other things of Statius' Thebaid, Guy of Warwick, Bevis of Hamptoun, and others. But these translations, or rather free adaptations, so far as is known, did not exercise any influence upon the productions of the professional literary men in Ireland. Though the greatest poets of England and Germany in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were often indebted to Romance literature for their materials, yet they stamped their own impress so thoroughly on their borrowed themes that their works became truly national. Even Wales came under this influence. For it is now definitely established that Dafydd ab Gwilym owes much to Provençal poets.[1] This is in striking contrast with what we find in Ireland. The loftier conception of the Arthurian epic as developed by Wolfram von Eschenbach, the allegory as represented in the Kingis Quair and the love-poetry as treated by

[1] See L. C. Stern, *Zeitschr. für celt. Phil.*, vii. 238 ff.

the great bard of Wales are all absent from Irish literature. Ireland stood characteristically aloof from the main currents in European literature, though this does not imply that she had no connexion with the outside world. It is therefore not a mere accident or oversight, or due to a dearth of published texts that in Prof. Saintsbury's *Periods of European Literature* Ireland is only taken into account in the first volume on the Dark Ages by Prof. Ker.[1] Hence it cannot be claimed that the period with which we are here concerned is the most fascinating period of Irish literature; in fact it is in some ways rather the reverse. Nevertheless, although in the three centuries which elapsed between the arrival of Strongbow and the accession of Henry VII there is little or no literature of supreme excellence, there was an almost countless array of poets, and the work of these men is of the highest importance if we wish to understand the social conditions of the period over the greater part of the island. The compositions of the later bards are almost our only source of information, if we desire to form any idea of the intellectual horizon of the better situated classes outside the English pale.

From the beginning of the thirteenth century down to the middle of the seventeenth, when the steady advance of the English power in the island practically put an end to native learning and old literary forms, the professional bard played a very important part in Irish society. As was also the case in Wales, the English Government realized only too clearly the power wielded by the men who followed the poet's calling and endeavoured to put an end to them.[2] Although bardic compositions only really become frequent in the thirteenth century the fraternity had existed from time immemorial. At an earlier period the bard had been looked down upon by the more learned *fili*. According to the metrical tract published by Thurneysen the bards were divided into a number of grades like the higher order, but as they corresponded more to the strolling minstrels of other countries, they were not able to claim payment for their compositions

[1] Icelandic literature is likewise only noticed in this volume.

[2] Cp. the entry in the *Annals of the Four Masters*, a. 1415 : 'Lord Furnival . . . harried a large contingent of Ireland's poets, as : O'Daly of Meath, Hugh Oge Magrath, Duffach son of the learned Eochaidh, and Maurice O'Daly. In the ensuing summer too he raided O'Daly of Corcomrua.' See O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 341. In 1403 a statute was passed forbidding the bards to follow their vocation in North Wales, cp. Gweirydd ap Rhys, *Hanes Llenyddiaeth Gymreig*, p. 195. An earlier attempt to suppress the vagrant bards had been made in the reign of Edward I It should, however, be stated that the English Government did not scruple to employ the Irish bards to satirize their late patrons when an opportunity presented itself.

according to a fixed tariff as in the case of the *fili*.[1] In the huge miscellaneous MSS. which have come down to us the *fili* occupies the stage to the exclusion of others. The style of composition beloved of this class during the tenth and eleventh centuries was the lengthy historical or genealogical poem, often a mere catalogue of names, in which their learning could be displayed. And reams and reams of this ponderous stuff have been preserved in the Book of Leinster and elsewhere. Hence it is a mere chance if the verses of a gifted son of the muses who had not qualified for the highest degree in the poetic order have come down. During the last few years we have become familiar with the delightful little poems by young clerics and others which Kuno Meyer has rescued from oblivion, and among the despised bards in olden times there must have been many endowed with the gift of song who are unrepresented in the meagre body of spontaneous verse which has been preserved.

The office of *fili* appears to have gradually decayed during the Viking period and the age of lawlessness by which it was followed, though the stages are by no means clear. Meanwhile the humbler bard, advancing in dignity, assumed many of the functions of the learned order. Of the earlier court-poetry comparatively few complete specimens have survived (*infra*, p. 100), and of the little that is known, scarcely anything has been published. It will be seen later that this court-poetry is the oldest literary form in the straight metres with which we are acquainted in Ireland. Such compositions, apart from fragments, are not at all well represented in our surviving MSS. until we reach the time of Brian Boruma, connected with whose court were the well-known poets Erard Mac Coisse and Mac Liag.

In the century and a half which elapsed between the death of Brian and the arrival of the Normans there is a curious gap in this kind of literature. But from the time of Cathal O'Conor (*d.* 1224) down to the beginning of the seventeenth century there is a more or less uninterrupted stream of bardic verse. The island was divided up into the domains of a large number of feudal lords, each of whom—at any rate in the north, west, and south—would have his family bard. Such men might attach themselves to one patron for a long period, but most of them appear to have wandered from mansion to mansion as was the case in France, Germany, and in the Scandinavian North.[2]

[1] *Irische Texte*, iii. 107. Thurneysen points out that in the metrical texts all memory of a separate metrical system for *fili* and bard has disappeared (l. c., p. 167).

[2] In Wales the bards had fixed patrons and places of abode. But in addition they made a tour of the country once in three years. This practice was known as *clera*. Cp. Stephens, *Literature of the Kymry*[2], p. 89.

In mediaeval Ireland all the learned professions were hereditary, and the poet's calling formed no exception to the rule.[1] Thus certain bardic families can be traced for 200 or 300 years or even longer, as in the case of the O'Dalys, the O'Higgins, the Macawards, and several others. In addition to the historical and genealogical lore which they had taken over from the older *fili*, the bards were in all probability the repositories of as much of the old heroic stories as was remembered. To them we perhaps owe in large measure the development of the Ossianic cycle. And to them we certainly owe many, if not all, of the heroic ballads dealing with Finn and his warriors. However, they did not content themselves with the composition of court-poetry and heroic ballads. Being the encyclopaedias of the day, they also wrote a large number of religious poems. At the present moment it is not easy to estimate how much of this later bardic literature has survived, as scarcely anything has been published. It will be well, therefore, to enumerate as briefly as possible our chief sources of information. The numerous late MSS. which contain a few poems dating from the period with which we are concerned are not noticed here. Among the collections preserved in Ireland the following are of the greatest importance[2]:—

1. The Book of Hy Many, a large vellum written about 1360, which has recently found a resting-place in the Royal Irish Academy. It contains religious poems by Godfrey O'Clery, Donnchad Mor O'Daly (*d.* 1244), Maelmuire O'Lennain, and others. A description of the volume was given by Kuno Meyer in the *Archiv fur celt. Lexik.*, ii. 138-46. Five important poems of the period from this MS. are printed by the same scholar in *Archiv*, iii, p. 234 ff.

2. The Yellow Book of Lecan, into which was inserted a *duanaire* or song-book written by Seanchan son of Maelmuire O'Mulconry in 1473. This invaluable collection, which is however in many places very difficult to decipher, contains about three score poems chiefly by Tadhg Óg O'Higgin (*d.* 1448) and another writer, to my knowledge otherwise unknown, Tuathal Macaward. Thirty of the compositions in this collection occur elsewhere in Dublin, Edinburgh, and Oxford.[3] The miscellany is of interest as showing that it was not unusual to gather together the works of one or two bards to form a book. Thanks to the considerable number of his poems preserved in the Yellow Book we are able to follow Tadhg's movements for a period of years, which

[1] Prof. J. E. Lloyd, in his *History of Wales*, vol. ii, p. 529, quotes evidence which seems to show that a similar state of affairs existed in Wales.

[2] Collections containing poems addressed to one family are mentioned later (p. 102 f.).

[3] These I hope to publish shortly.

is scarcely possible in the case of any other poet previous to the time of Elizabeth.

3. THE BOOK OF FERMOY, in the Royal Irish Academy, written in part in the fifteenth century. It contains thirty bardic poems; several addressed to the Roche family date from the fifteenth century.[1]

4. A paper MS. belonging to the O'Conor Don, written about 1630 in the Netherlands for a certain Captain Sorley Mac Donnell, who was taking part in the campaign in the Low Countries. We have much reason to be grateful to this keen lover of Irish letters, as this is not the only collection of poems which was copied for him. To his interest in late mediaeval verse we owe the preservation of Finn's Song-book and the collection of poems addressed to the O'Donnells, now in the Royal Library at Brussels.[2]

5. THE O'GARA MS., in the Royal Irish Academy, written on paper at Antwerp and Lisle in 1656 by Fergal Dubh O'Gara, a priest O.S.A., whom Cromwell's dissolution of the religious houses had forced to seek refuge in the Low Countries. A description of the contents of the copy made by O'Scannail is given in O'Grady's *Catalogue of Irish MSS. in the British Museum*, p. 339 ff.

6. A seventeenth-century vellum in Trinity College, Dublin (H. 3. 19), consisting in the main of religious poems. See Abbott's *Catalogue*, p. 361.

7. A small paper MS. of the end of the sixteenth or beginning of the seventeenth century, in the Library of the Franciscans on Merchants' Quay, Dublin.

Of the Bodleian collection of Irish MSS. Rawlinson B 514 contains forty-nine bardic poems, several of which do not occur elsewhere to my knowledge.[3] The British Museum MS. Add. 19995 (O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 328) has unfortunately suffered so much from the ravages of time that the interesting unique poems preserved in it cannot be satisfactorily made out. Gaelic MS. No. xxix in the Advocates' Library (a sixteenth-century vellum) contains ten religious poems by

[1] See the description given by J. H. Todd in the *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 1870. Of the non-religious poems only two have so far been published. The one beginning *Baile suthain sioth Eamhna* is printed, with a translation by Hennessy, in vol. iii of Skene's *Celtic Scotland*, p. 410 ff. The address to David O'Keeffe has been recently edited and translated by Miss Knott, *Ériu*, iv. 209 ff.

[2] The contents of this book were described by Kuno Meyer in *Ériu*, iv. 183-90. He overlooked the following half-illegible note at the end: 'Sorle mac Donnell Captin of muskedtre the best of the Irish wither he will or nott witnes my hand John mac Donell and so till deth . . . and so he shall . . . . till deth.' Elsewhere the date 'xii day of Sept. 1622' is given.

[3] A list of first lines is given in the Appendix.

Tadhg Óg O'Higgin. No. lxiv in the same collection is a very much torn paper volume which preserves poems rarely found elsewhere.[1] But the most important miscellany of poems of the period outside Ireland is unquestionably the strange medley known as the Book of the Dean of Lismore. As regards contents the Dean's Book resembles two of the volumes written for Capt. Sorley Mac Donnell in the Netherlands about 1630, i. e. half the book is taken up with heroic poetry, for which see the editions by Skene and M'Lauchlan (1862) and Alex. Cameron (1892). The unpublished half consists mainly of encomiastic and religious poetry by Irish and Scottish bards. Other styles of composition, notably satire, are also represented to a degree unknown in contemporary Irish MSS. This Edinburgh book preserves a large number of compositions not found in Irish collections, but it is perhaps chiefly interesting to us as showing the kind of verse in which a Highland gentleman delighted at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

As the compositions of the later bards fall in the main into two distinct classes, it will be convenient to treat the two divisions separately.

Encomiastic Verse.

The panegyric has doubtless existed in one form or another in every country in Europe ever since the beginnings of an ordered state of society. Our common conception of a poet is that of a needy man dependent on the bounty of his patron, and if the vanity of so great a monarch as Louis XIV could be gratified by the eulogies of a Molière written to order, can it be a matter for wonder that the petty princelings of other lands should delight in listening to the extravagant praises of their humbler bards? Court-poetry, as it is often termed, is known to have been practised from very early times among the Kelts and Teutons. It is held by Mr. Chadwick and others that the Old English epic developed out of the panegyric, but such early encomiastic verse has not been preserved in any Teutonic language,[2] though there are indications that it once existed. In later times this species of poetry was only developed to a high degree by the northern branch of the Teutonic race, more particularly in Norway and Iceland. The Old Norse encomia present such close analogies to the work of the later bards in Ireland that it will be more convenient to speak of them later.

[1] A list of first lines is given in the Appendix.

[2] The Old High German *Ludwigslied* is later than the date commonly assigned to Bragi.

In Gaul it is possible to trace the composition of encomiastic poetry at a considerably earlier date than among the Teutons. Diodorus Siculus, writing about the middle of the first century B. C., says: 'Among the Gauls there are lyric poets called bards. They compose praises for some and satires on others and chant them to the accompaniment of a kind of lyre.'[1] A few decades earlier a Greek traveller relates the story of a bard who chanted the praises of Lovernios, king of the Arverni. This Lovernios was the father of Bituitos, who was sent as a prisoner to Rome in 121 B. C. To celebrate a great banquet a special building had been constructed, as in the well-known Irish story of Bricriu's Feast. The bard in question arrived too late for the festivities, ran after the royal chariot, chanting a poem in praise of the king and at the same time deploring the unfortunate accident which had detained him. The king threw him a bag of gold, which he picked up, exclaiming, 'The track of thy chariot on the ground brings gold and benefits to men,' a sentiment very similar to what we find in the later Irish poetry.[2]

Encomiastic verse of a highly rhetorical character bulks very largely in the poetic literature of Wales. Leaving out of account the poems printed in Skene's *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, purporting to be addressed to Urien Rheged and others, as of uncertain date, the section of the *Myvyrian Archaiology* entitled Gogynfeirdd comprises a large number of panegyrics by poets who flourished between 1120 and 1370. The most voluminous writers, such as Cynddelw, Llywarch ab Llywelyn and Prydydd Bychan, flourished almost without exception before the final subjection of Gwynedd by Edward I. The early Welsh bards were fond of indulging in high-flown language, and employed numerous metaphors and turns of expression which disappeared with them. The loss of national independence naturally robbed them of their chief theme. With the fall of Llywelyn the patriotic fire which glows in the lines of the afore-mentioned Llywarch becomes extinguished. But the formal panegyric survived the downfall

[1] Εἰσὶ δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ποιηταὶ μελῶν, οὓς βάρδους ὀνομάζουσιν. οὗτοι δὲ μετ' ὀργάνων ταῖς λύραις ὁμοίων ᾄδοντες, οὓς μὲν ὑμνοῦσιν, οὓς δὲ βλασφημοῦσι, Diodorus 5, 31, 2. Cf. also Ammianus 15, 9, 8 'Et bardi quidem fortia virorum illustrium facta heroicis composita versibus cum dulcibus lyrae modulis cantitarunt'. Other passages in Holder, *Altcelt. Sprachschatz*, s. *bardos*.

[2] Ἀφορίσαντος δ' αὐτοῦ προθεσμίαν ποτὲ τῆς θοίνης, ἀφυστερήσαντά τινα τῶν βαρβάρων ποιητὴν ἀφικέσθαι, καὶ συναντήσαντα μετὰ ᾠδῆς ὑμνεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ἑαυτὸν δ' ἀποθρηνεῖν ὅτι ὑστέρηκε, τὸν δὲ τερφθέντα θυλάκιον αἰτῆσαι χρυσίου, καὶ ῥῖψαι αὐτῷ παρατρέχοντι, ἀνελόμενον δ' ἐκεῖνον πάλιν ὑμνεῖν, λέγοντα, διότι τὰ ἴχνη τῆς γῆς, ἐφ' ἧς ἁρματηλατεῖ, χρυσὸν καὶ εὐεργεσίας ἀνθρώποις φέρει, Athenaeus 4, 37. See Holder, s. *Lovernios*.

of the native princes, though in a somewhat emasculated form. Thus Dafydd ab Gwilym praises the liberality of Ivor Hael in the days of Chaucer, Lewis Glyn Cothi and Gutto'r Glyn celebrate their aristocratic patrons at the time of the Wars of the Roses, and the bounty of the Vaughans, Wynnes, Lloyds, and others is extolled by William Llŷn under Mary and Elizabeth. The productions of these and other writers of necessity suggest comparison with contemporary verse in Ireland, and the general similarity will be noticed later. Perhaps the most striking difference between the Irish and Welsh compositions of the period is to be found in the fact that the Irish princes celebrated were virtually independent. The martial fame of the Welsh nobles who figure in the poems of Lewis Glyn Cothi and Gutto'r Glyn was gained in fighting under the banner of an English leader, whilst Tadhg Óg O'Higgin's patrons are chiefly extolled for the losses they have inflicted one upon the other. With the lapse of time the life of the Welsh nobles became too humdrum to stir the poets to great rhetorical flights. Hence we are frequently treated to exaggerated accounts of extravagance in food and drink. Thus Dafydd Nanmor, who flourished in the second half of the fifteenth century, sings of a feast given by Rhys of Towyn :—

'Though Rhys owned on his lands one hundred thousand ploughs and three hundred vineyards with wine and a hundred mills a-grinding, though the earth were bread or the taste of water like good Osey, 'twere a wonder were water and earth to last three days at his banquet.'[1]

At some future time when a fair number of Irish specimens have been edited, it will be an interesting task to institute a comparison between the panegyric verse of Ireland and Wales. In this manner much light might be thrown upon the state of civilization in the two countries.

Of all the lands in the west of Europe, the panegyric was most extensively practised in Ireland. This may be due in some measure to a fondness on the part of the Irish for the kind of rhetoric which

[1] Cp. W. J. Gruffydd, *Y Flodeugerdd Newydd*, p. 96. In James and Evans' *Hen Gwndidau*, a poet, singing the praises of Sir Walter Herbert, says :

Ny bu ve wys, yn llys brenin
o bob rhyw rhost, vwy gost kegin
bir kwrw er bod, bragod gasgwin
bara bwrdd tal, nys mal melin.—l. c. p. 21.

That these exaggerated accounts of feasting had some foundation in actual fact is shown, if other evidence were wanting, by the description of the hospitality at the coming of age of Sir Watkin Williams Wynn in 1770, *Archaeologia Cambrensis*, 3rd ser. vol. x. p 334.

is almost inevitably associated with encomiastic poetry, but the chief cause is doubtless to be sought in the political conditions. In later mediaeval times much of Ireland remained largely unaffected by the progress which we find in most Latin and Teutonic countries. Consequently an archaic type of society lingered on over the greater part of the island until the beginning of the seventeenth century.[1] This is perhaps the chief interest of Ireland for the student if he can succeed in detaching intellectual interest from patriotic sentiment. And the archaic character of Irish civilization is reflected to a certain extent in the literature. In a lecture delivered before the British Academy some time ago, my friend and colleague Prof. Ridgeway emphasized the value of the curious document known as the Book of Rights, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel anywhere else in Europe. And this encomiastic poetry, though not by any means confined to Ireland, is one of those survivors of a stage of civilization which had run its course, one might almost say, in England, France, and Germany, before our literary documents in the vernacular begin. The panegyric can be better studied in Ireland than in any other European country. In Scandinavia it is possible to trace similar court-poetry from about 800 to 1200, whereas in Ireland it begins earlier and continues down to the first half of the seventeenth century. The curious thing in Ireland is, that some of the earliest poems in the rhyming metres with which we are acquainted, and the last poems in the old measures about 1630, belong to this class. The earliest panegyrics were doubtless the archaic alliterative rhetorics, as they are termed, which are found imbedded in the oldest Irish epics. It is held by some scholars that the epic in Ireland originally consisted of a string of such rhetorics[2] in declamatory alliterative prose with short narrative passages connecting them. And the fact that the rhyming metres were introduced from Latin before the epic had attained its highest development, thus destroying the older system, may explain in some measure the amorphous state of the Táin Bó Cúalnge.[3] In Teutonic, it should be observed, the influence of Latin metrics was not felt for at least three centuries after the date of their introduction into Ireland. It should also be noted that it was apparently only the archaic rhetorics which led up to the regular epic

[1] Cp. the remarks by Mr. Orpen in his *Norman Conquest of Ireland*, vol. ii, p. 328.

[2] Cp. the introduction to Windisch's edition of the *Táin Bó Cúalnge*, p. lxxxi.

[3] On the analogy of the Icelandic sagas, however, it would be legitimate to argue that the form of the Irish epic is secondary. This must remain an open question unless it should become possible to derive further evidence from Early Brythonic or Gaulish.

in Ireland. Although we can trace the panegyric addressed to living princes for a thousand years, no great epic poetry resulted from it. The Ulster cycle determined for all time the form of the Irish epic. The germs of the epic in verse may be seen in the Fenian ballads and the *Siaburcharpat Conculainn.* Otherwise the histories of the exploits of Cellachan of Cashel and Turlough O'Conor are in prose, and the story of the great struggle of Clontarf, instead of giving rise to a *chanson de geste* with Brian as its hero, became merged in the *omnium gatherum* of Ossianic matter with the Battle of Ventry as the result.

Irish tradition regards a poem by Cairpre, son of Etan, addressed to Fiachna, son of Delbaeth, as the first panegyric composed in the island.[1] The subject of this eulogy lived according to the synchronists of the ninth and tenth centuries some seventeen centuries before our era. That this poem is a fiction of a late date is demonstrated by the fact that it is in the rhyming metres. Otherwise the oldest complete composition of this nature is, as far as I am aware, an address to an indeterminable Leinster princeling named Aed, contained in the ninth-century Codex S. Pauli in Carinthia. The poem contains eight stanzas, the last six of which run according to the version given by Stokes and Strachan.[2]

> Son of Diarmait dear to me, though it be to be asked, it is easy, his praise is more beautiful than treasures, it will be sung in lays by me.
>
> Beloved the name—they are no new fames—of Aed who deserves not reproach: the pure form—renown that is not hidden—to whom lovely Liffey belongs.
>
> Descendant of Muredach at every time, rock of choice for noble dignity: a descendant—no evil person was found, of the kings of the clans of Cualu.
>
> The lordship, this is his heritage, every good to him of gods or ungods: the scion of a family without reproach, of the handsome kings of Marg.
>
> He is the bole of a great tree—noble dignity: for battle he is a pre-eminent stock: he is the sapling of silver—high worth—of the children of a hundred kings, of a hundred queens.
>
> At ale poems are chanted: fine (genealogical) ladders are climbed: melodious bardisms modulate through pools of liquor the name of Aed.

But it is possible to trace the panegyric in Ireland still further back beyond the eighth century. In the collections of Irish Annals old poems are sometimes cited in support of statements, and even the Annals of the Four Masters, compiled in the seventeenth century, contain stanzas which, from the language, must go back to the Old Irish period. The possibility that some of the oldest verse preserved in Irish may go back to the sixth century has been pleaded by Kuno

[1] Yellow Book of Lecan, 16[b], 28.

[2] *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus,* ii, p. 295.

is almost inevitably associated with encomiastic poetry, but the chief cause is doubtless to be sought in the political conditions. In later mediaeval times much of Ireland remained largely unaffected by the progress which we find in most Latin and Teutonic countries. Consequently an archaic type of society lingered on over the greater part of the island until the beginning of the seventeenth century.[1] This is perhaps the chief interest of Ireland for the student if he can succeed in detaching intellectual interest from patriotic sentiment. And the archaic character of Irish civilization is reflected to a certain extent in the literature. In a lecture delivered before the British Academy some time ago, my friend and colleague Prof. Ridgeway emphasized the value of the curious document known as the Book of Rights, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel anywhere else in Europe. And this encomiastic poetry, though not by any means confined to Ireland, is one of those survivors of a stage of civilization which had run its course, one might almost say, in England, France, and Germany, before our literary documents in the vernacular begin. The panegyric can be better studied in Ireland than in any other European country. In Scandinavia it is possible to trace similar court-poetry from about 800 to 1200, whereas in Ireland it begins earlier and continues down to the first half of the seventeenth century. The curious thing in Ireland is, that some of the earliest poems in the rhyming metres with which we are acquainted, and the last poems in the old measures about 1630, belong to this class. The earliest panegyrics were doubtless the archaic alliterative rhetorics, as they are termed, which are found imbedded in the oldest Irish epics. It is held by some scholars that the epic in Ireland originally consisted of a string of such rhetorics[2] in declamatory alliterative prose with short narrative passages connecting them. And the fact that the rhyming metres were introduced from Latin before the epic had attained its highest development, thus destroying the older system, may explain in some measure the amorphous state of the Táin Bó Cúalnge.[3] In Teutonic, it should be observed, the influence of Latin metrics was not felt for at least three centuries after the date of their introduction into Ireland. It should also be noted that it was apparently only the archaic rhetorics which led up to the regular epic

[1] Cp. the remarks by Mr. Orpen in his *Norman Conquest of Ireland*, vol. ii, p. 328.

[2] Cp. the introduction to Windisch's edition of the *Táin Bó Cúalnge*, p. lxxxi.

[3] On the analogy of the Icelandic sagas, however, it would be legitimate to argue that the form of the Irish epic is secondary. This must remain an open question unless it should become possible to derive further evidence from Early Brythonic or Gaulish.

in Ireland. Although we can trace the panegyric addressed to living princes for a thousand years, no great epic poetry resulted from it. The Ulster cycle determined for all time the form of the Irish epic. The germs of the epic in verse may be seen in the Fenian ballads and the *Siaburcharpat Conculainn.* Otherwise the histories of the exploits of Cellachan of Cashel and Turlough O'Conor are in prose, and the story of the great struggle of Clontarf, instead of giving rise to a *chanson de geste* with Brian as its hero, became merged in the *omnium gatherum* of Ossianic matter with the Battle of Ventry as the result.

Irish tradition regards a poem by Cairpre, son of Etan, addressed to Fiachna, son of Delbaeth, as the first panegyric composed in the island.[1] The subject of this eulogy lived according to the synchronists of the ninth and tenth centuries some seventeen centuries before our era. That this poem is a fiction of a late date is demonstrated by the fact that it is in the rhyming metres. Otherwise the oldest complete composition of this nature is, as far as I am aware, an address to an indeterminable Leinster princeling named Aed, contained in the ninth-century Codex S. Pauli in Carinthia. The poem contains eight stanzas, the last six of which run according to the version given by Stokes and Strachan:[2]

Son of Diarmait dear to me, though it be to be asked, it is easy, his praise is more beautiful than treasures, it will be sung in lays by me

Beloved the name—they are no new fancies—of Aed who deserves not reproach: the pure form—renown that is not hidden—to whom lovely Liffey belongs.

Descendant of Muredach at every time, rock of choice for noble dignity: a descendant—no evil person was found, of the kings of the clans of Cualu.

The lordship, this is his heritage, every good to him of gods or ungods. the scion of a family without reproach, of the handsome kings of Marg.

He is the bole of a great tree—noble dignity: for battle he is a pre-eminent stock: he is the sapling of silver—high worth—of the children of a hundred kings, of a hundred queens.

At ale poems are chanted: fine (genealogical) ladders are climbed: melodious bardisms modulate through pools of liquor the name of Aed.

But it is possible to trace the panegyric in Ireland still further back beyond the eighth century. In the collections of Irish Annals old poems are sometimes cited in support of statements, and even the Annals of the Four Masters, compiled in the seventeenth century, contain stanzas which, from the language, must go back to the Old Irish period. The possibility that some of the oldest verse preserved in Irish may go back to the sixth century has been pleaded by Kuno

[1] Yellow Book of Lecan, 16^b, 28.

[2] *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus*, ii, p. 295.

Meyer and the late Prof. Zimmer,[1] but this requires further investigation. In the seventh century we are on safer ground. At the year 645 the Four Masters quote stanzas bearing on the vengeance taken for Ragallach, son of the king of Connaught, by his brother Cathal.

> He slew six men and fifty, he committed sixteen devastations.
> I had my share like another in the revenge of Raghallach,
> I have the grey beard in my hand of Maelbrighde son of Mothlachan.[2]

I see no reason for doubting that this may be a contemporary description. Entire poems dealing with the eighth century and with the Viking period are hardly as frequent as one might expect. However, a considerable number of fragments have been preserved.[3] Stanzas from such poems are frequently quoted as illustrations in the eleventh-century treatise on versification. K. Meyer has familiarized us with the ninth-century song to Cerball's Sword by Dallan mac Móre.[4] Immediately preceding this in the Book of Leinster is another poem by the same author addressed to the same prince of Ossory:

> Cerball of the curragh of the lovely Liffey, overthrower of battles on Conn's Half—when he beheld his beautiful countenance Cnogba Corr fell dead.
>
> Our friend and our darling, of lovely aspect, in his hand a spear; great famous son of Muiregan, with triumphs, with glory.
>
> The triumph of beauty, the triumph of noble race are held by Cerball of Carnsore, the triumph of murderous sword-red battle, the triumph of raiment, the triumph of weapons.
>
> Stately scion, pure, bright, and fair, he will seize mighty Banba; fair-sheltering bush, most glorious brave man, that is the description of Donn's descendant.
>
> The enumeration of his triumphs shall be heard till Doom; his battles and his fights, all shall hear them from me.

Whereupon Dallan with true Irish love of detail proceeds to enumerate forty battles in which his patron had taken part.[5]

Although the body of panegyric verse preserved in Ireland is probably of very much greater bulk than that of the Scandinavian North, there is unfortunately nothing corresponding to the Skaldatal. This document gives a list of the northern rulers with the skalds

[1] *Zeitschr. f. celt. Phil.*, viii. 179 f., and *Sitzungsber. d. kön. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1910, p. 1031 ff.

[2] For still earlier verses which may be contemporary with the events see the Annals of Tigernach, *Rev. Celt.*, xvii, pp. 168, 173.

[3] Prof. Kuno Meyer informs me that he has counted portions of no less than 130 such poems composed before the year 1000.

[4] *Rev. Celt.*, xx, p. 7 ff. *Ancient Irish Poetry*, p. 72.

[5] The whole poem is edited and translated by K. Meyer in *Rev. Celt.*, xxix. 210 ff.

who sang their praises beginning with Bragi (*c.* 800) down to 1260, thus covering the whole period of court-poetry in Norway, which came to an end in the thirteenth century. Several Irish compositions dating from the time of Brian Boruma have been published, e. g. the lament of Eochaid on the death of King Aed O'Neill (*d.* 1004)[1] and another by Erard Mac Coisse on the death of King Malachy II (*d.* 1022).[2] In an interesting poetical dialogue between Erard and Mac Liag the generosity of Brian Boruma is compared with the liberality of Tadhg O'Kelly.[3] The latter is also celebrated by Mac Liag in four other poems.[4] Mac Liag's poem on Kincora has long been familiar.[5] Several others await an editor.[6] It is unnecessary to quote any specimens from this period as the ideas expressed are very similar to those found in later compositions.

At the present moment there is a gulf separating the men just mentioned from the poets of the thirteenth century beginning with Murray O'Daly and Gilbride Macnamee. The surviving compositions of the writers enumerated by O'Reilly consist mainly of genealogical and historical pieces, and very few specimens of panegyric are known to me from this age of turmoil. The Book of Fermoy preserves a poem composed before 1095 and addressed to Ragnall, son of Godfrey, King of the Hebrides. It is printed by Skene in the Appendix to vol. iii of *Celtic Scotland*, who holds, however, that the prince celebrated is Reginald, son of Godred, Norwegian King of Man and the Isles from 1188 to 1226.[7] The Dean's Book has a poem beginning *Dursin tosg Dunche vac Vrane*,[8] addressed to Donnchad, son of Brian Boruma, but whether it was actually composed at the time is a matter of uncertainty.

In his recently published *Norman Conquest of Ireland*, Mr. Orpen claims to have shown that the period following Strongbow's invasion

[1] The text is printed by K. Meyer in *Archiv f. celt. Lexik.*, iii. 304; for a translation see his *Ancient Irish Poetry*, p. 75.

[2] The text is printed by K. Meyer in *Archiv f. celt. Lexik.*, iii. 305; for a translation see his *Ancient Irish Poetry*, p. 77.

[3] Printed by K. Meyer in *Zeitschr. f. celt. Phil.*, viii. 218 ff.

[4] K. Meyer, *Z. f. c. P.*, viii. 222-31.

[5] Hardiman, *Irish Minstrelsy*, ii. 196.

[6] O'Curry (*Manners and Customs*, ii, p. 117 ff.) enumerates three eulogies of Brian and his family. Extant poems by Erard in praise of Malachy, Maelruanaidh, and Fergal O'Ruairc, are also mentioned by the same scholar (ibid., pp. 127-9).

[7] It is a curious fact that the test of language fails almost completely in dealing with poetry composed between 1000 and 1600.

[8] Macgregor, No. LXXIII. (This refers to the number of the poem in my forthcoming edition of the unpublished portion of The Dean's Book.)

was one of peace and prosperity, thus forming a notable contrast to the preceding era of turbulence and unrest. And it is probably not without significance that the stream of encomiastic verse commences to flow steadily once more under the rule of Cathal O'Conor (*d.* 1224) and Donnchad Cairbrech O'Brien (*d.* 1242).[1] This stream, it might be said, continues unbroken down to the first half of the seventeenth century.

From the short description already given of the *duanaire* or song-book in the Yellow Book of Lecan, as well as from other indications, it is clear that it was not unusual for the poems of one or more bards to be collected together to form a book. Hence a large miscellany of bardic poetry might arise by uniting the contents of several such books in one volume. And portions of our extant MSS. doubtless took shape in this manner.

But there is abundant evidence for another method of preserving or collecting bardic compositions. In Wales where the bards periodically went on circuit, the poet was expected to leave a sample of his versification behind him as a return for the hospitality he had received. In this way many Welsh MSS. came to be written [2] and the same thing may well have occurred in Ireland. This is rather suggested by the contents of the Book of Fermoy. Certain it is that in a number of cases we find a cycle of poems addressed by different authors to the ruler or rulers of one clan collected together. The earliest of such family books now in existence is probably the Book of the Mac Governs or Mac Gaurans (Mac Samhradhain), a fourteenth-century vellum, in the possession of the O'Conor Don, a fragment of a larger book. A century or so later comes the Book of Fermoy which contains some fifteen poems on the Roche family. The next in point of date is preserved in the Advocates' Library, and has remained unnoticed hitherto. It consists of some ten battered leaves of vellum on which are entered half a dozen very difficult encomia by different persons addressed to an O'Reilly chief who flourished about 1500.[3]

[1] These princes were probably more firmly established than their predecessors owing to the intimate and friendly character of their relations with the English. See Chaps. XVIII–XXII of Mr. Orpen's work. Cathal O'Conor is celebrated by Gilbride Macnamee in the poem beginning *Tainic an Croibhdherg go Crúachain* (edited and translated by me in K. Meyer's *Miscellany*, p. 167 ff.), and by Murray O'Daly in a piece beginning *Fada in chabair a Cruachain* (O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 337). For poems to Donnchad Cairbrech O'Brien see O'Curry, *M. and C.*, iii. 270 f., 281. The verses in praise of O'Donnell by Murray O'Daly are printed in the Appendix to this paper.

[2] Stephens, *Literature of the Kymry*[2], p. 137; W. J. Gruffydd in article 'Celt—Language and Literature', *Encycl. Britannica*, 11th ed., p. 643, col. 2.

[3] Gaelic MS. No. XXX.

As far as I am aware none of these particular compositions occurs elsewhere. In a MS. in the Royal Library at Brussels there are thirty poems addressed to the O'Donnells. Most of these refer to chieftains who lived at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but a few are somewhat earlier in date.[1] A collection of some three score poems on the O'Byrnes made between 1570 and 1615 only survives in a transcript which a fellow of Trinity College had made for him in the eighteenth century.[2] A few years ago the Cambridge University Library acquired a miscellaneous Irish vellum MS. containing, besides other matter, a score of leaves which originally belonged to a large book of poems on the O'Reillys. The twenty poems which have survived are almost all addressed to a Philip O'Reilly who died in 1598. Similarly the Royal Library at Copenhagen possesses a paper volume containing about thirty pieces addressed to a chief of the M'Guires who lived about 1600.[3] As it may reasonably be inferred that each princely house took care to maintain a collection of the eulogies of their race, it is possible for us to realize how many of these old books there must have been in existence and now irretrievably lost. The O'Briens, the O'Kellys, the O'Conors, and the O'Neills,[4] not to mention others, must all have possessed similar monuments of bardic tribute to the glory of their ancestry, but these have disappeared without trace except in so far as some of the more highly prized of the pieces were thought worthy of a place in other collections. Thus it is evident that the person who wrote the Dean's Book had relations with some bard or bards who had access to a miscellany of poems in praise of the Mac Dermott family.

As our typical bard of the pre-Tudor period we are obliged to take Tadhg Óg O'Higgin, since he is the only one whose career can be followed in any detail. The year of his birth is unknown and his poems give us no domestic details.[5] In one of them he laments the death of his elder brother and teacher Fergal O'Higgin[6] who is not directly mentioned by the annalists. We first find him in 1397 in Ulster with Niall Óg O'Neill of Cinel Eogain.[7] In 1403 he sings a

[1] See *Ériu*, iv. 183–90.

[2] D. Hyde, *Literary History of Ireland*, p. 472.

[3] For an account of this MS. see the description given by Stern in *Z. f. c. P.*, ii. 325–65.

[4] Since the above was written I learn that a late collection of poems addressed to the O'Neills of Clannaboy is being edited for the Irish Texts Society.

[5] He was the son of Tadhg ollam in poetry (*d.* 1391) son of Gillacolum.

[6] See O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 366. For a poem by this Fergal see Appendix, p. 137.

[7] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 363 f.

dirge over Tadhg O'Conor Sligo with whom he had evidently spent some time.[1] In 1410 he laments the death of Tadhg O'Kelly.[2] At some date between 1412 and 1420 he composed a poem to James, Earl of Ormonde, urging him to return to Ireland (Y. B. L., 379ᵇ, 10 ff.). He was on terms of great intimacy with Ulick Mac William, whose death in 1424 is lamented in a lengthy poem,[3] and somewhere between 1426 and 1438 he visited Tadhg O'Brien.[4] More than once he seems to have been attached to the O'Donnells.[5] The following princes have one poem each addressed to them in the Yellow Book—Mulrony O'Carroll, lord of Ely, who died in 1443 (380ᵃ, 31 ff.), Thomas M'Guire who became prince of Fermanagh in 1430 (384ᵃ, 17 ff.), and Henry O'Neill, Lord of Tyrone (385ᵃ, 9 ff.) At the year 1448 we find this entry in the Annals of the Four Masters: 'Teige Oge, the son of Teige, son of Gilla-colaim O'Higgin, chief Preceptor of the Poets of Ireland and Scotland, died after penance, at Cill-Connla,[6] and was interred in the monastery of Ath-leathan.'[7] There is no direct evidence that Tadhg was ever in Scotland, but it might almost be inferred from the popularity of his poems in the Highlands as evidenced by the MSS. Against this, however, must be set a poem (Y. B. L., 387ᵇ, 7 ff.) addressed to the Lord of the Isles in which he acknowledges the receipt of a present of a golden beaker. At the same time he pleads the risks of the journey and the political situation at home which requires his presence, as an excuse for not acceding to an invitation to visit Alba.

The above are the houses known to have been celebrated by Tadhg. They do, as a matter of fact, include most of the families commonly addressed by other bards in the period with which we are dealing. A complete survey of this literature will be impossible until all the

[1] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 364, and Y. B. L., 388ᵇ, 3.

[2] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 365. For other poems addressed by Tadhg to the same family cf. Y. B. L., 383ᵇ, 9, 389ᵇ, 12.

[3] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 365, and the poem beginning *Fada in ráithsi romum*, Y. B. L., 377ᵇ, 30. In a poem beginning *Toghaidh Dia nech na naeidin*, Y. B. L., 382ᵇ, 8, he celebrates Walter son of Thomas son of Edmund Mac William Burke. According to the Annals of Ulster Walter was made Mac William in 1402. The Four Masters record his death in 1440. There is no means of fixing accurately the date of composition of this poem. Edmund, Walter's successor, is celebrated in a poem in Y. B. L., 386ᵃ, 44.

[4] Y. B. L., 389ᵃ, 1.

[5] Toirdhealbhach-an-Fhíona (d. 1423) appears to be addressed in a poem beginning *La a Teamraigh ac Toirrdealbach* (Y. B. L., 373ᵇ, 1), and a piece commencing *Foillsigh do mirbuile a Muire* (Y. B. L., 373ᵃ, 3) takes the form of a prayer to the Virgin to deliver Niall Garbh O'Donnell (*d.* 1439) from captivity in London, where he was sent in 1435.

[6] In the barony of Dunmore, co. Galway.

[7] Strade Abbey, near Foxford.

treasures of the Royal Irish Academy have been described. Nevertheless it may perhaps be as well to give some account of what is readily accessible.

Leinster would be almost entirely unrepresented between 1200 and 1500, were it not for the fact that at least one poem has come down addressed to the well-known Art Mac Morrough.[1] The renown of such a prince must have attracted many bards to his court, but perhaps owing to political conditions as good as none have survived. Further west in Munster we find the O'Keeffes sparingly represented. Miss Knott has recently published an address to David O'Keeffe,[2] whilst a poem in praise of Conchobar O'Keeffe (thirteenth century), which I have not encountered in Irish collections, is preserved in the Dean's Book.[3] The Roches, as already stated, are celebrated in nearly a score of poems in the Book of Fermoy. The O'Gara MS. preserves a few compositions addressed to Mac Carthy Riach,[4] but other families such as the O'Sullivans and the O'Loghlins of Clare only appear in bardic compositions of the sixteenth century. For a poem addressed to Gerald, Earl of Desmond, see O'Reilly's *Irish Writers*, p. cxxxiii.[5] Other clans which are represented by a considerable number of eulogies at the beginning of the seventeenth century, such as the Mac Sweeneys,[6] either do not occur at all before 1500, or only very sparingly, as in the case of the O'Reillys, who only appear in the little Edinburgh book already mentioned. Poems in praise of the O'Rourkes are likewise few and far between in the period in question. The Dean's Book preserves one poem addressed to this house which I have failed to discover in any Irish collection.[7] Other families represented by isolated pieces are the O'Melaghlins,[8] the O'Maddens,[9] the Mac Mahons of Oriel,[10] and the O'Mornas or Mac Gilmurry.[11] The

[1] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 359.

[2] *Ériu*, iv. 209.

[3] Macgregor, No. XXXIV. See also O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 443.

[4] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 358

[5] By Geoffrey Finn O'Daly, now contained in 23 D 14 (R. I. A.). This Earl Gerald was well known in his day as a patron of letters and as a writer of Irish verse. There is a short poem attributed to him in the Book of Fermoy, and several others are contained in the Dean's Book. A century later a member of a kindred house, Lord Thomas Fitzgerald, had in his train a bard named de Nelan, as we are informed by Holinshed. It was under the influence of this man's declamation in the Dublin council-chamber that Silken Thomas finally decided to rise in rebellion.

[6] O'Grady, *Cat.*, pp. 386, 420-5, 464.

[7] Macgr. No. XXXVII.

[8] O'Grady, *Cat.*, pp. 359, 362.

[9] O'Reilly, *Irish Writers*, p. cxxxiii.

[10] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 404 (see also p. 471).

[11] Ibid., p. 345 = Macgregor, No. XXXV.

fortunes of several families naturally fluctuated considerably with the unsettled state of society. Hence it is not surprising to find that a house like the Mac Dermotts which figures somewhat prominently in the Dean's Book [1] should, as far as I am aware, disappear entirely from this class of literature after 1500. For the sake of completeness we may mention that a British Museum MS. preserves poems in praise of Sir Richard fitz Walter de Burgo, second Earl of Ulster (d. 1326), and Sir William M'Keorish de Bermingham.[2] Another MS. not yet catalogued has eulogies of John Cantwell, Archbishop of Cashel (d. about 1466), James Pursell, Baron of Louth, and Tadhg Mac Donough.[3]

Scotland is of course much worse situated than Ireland. No doubt the Irish bards who visited North Britain composed countless panegyrics in praise of Highland chiefs. But the whole of this literature has unfortunately disappeared with the exception of what is preserved in the Dean's Book. As far as I am aware, the Irish collections only contain three pieces addressed to princes outside Ireland, one in the O'Gara MS. to John Macdonald of the Isles by Donall, son of Brian O'Higgin, who died in 1501.[4] The other two are to a King of the Hebrides and a Lord of the Isles already mentioned (*supra*, pp. 101, 104). Otherwise, Scottish families are only celebrated during this period in poems preserved in the Dean's Book. The houses addressed are spread over a fairly limited area. These are the Macgregors, the Campbells of Glenurchy, the Mac Dougalls of Dunolly, the M'Neils of Castle Sween, the Earl of Argyle, Macleod of Dunvegan, Macleod of Lewis, Macdonald of the Isles, Stewart of Rannoch. At the time there were several other powerful clans in the Highlands who doubtless took care that their fame should be extolled in verse just as much as the nobles with whom the Macgregors came into contact. It should, moreover, be remembered that the Books of Clanranald contain ten panegyrics composed at various times between 1514 and 1736, thus proving that the old encomiastic poetry lingered on in Scotland for about a century after it had disappeared in Ireland, a fact first pointed out, I believe, by Prof. Douglas Hyde.[5]

[1] Nos. XVI, XXV, XXXIII; cp. also O'Reilly, pp. lxxxvi, cxi.

[2] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 338.

[3] This MS., which I know through the kindness of Mr. Flower, is marked Add. 33993.

[4] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 370.

[5] *A Literary History of Ireland*, p. 547; Magnus Maclean, *Literature of the Celts*, pp. 129–32. For yet others see now Mackinnon's *Catalogue*, pp. 116–17, 119 and 124. We are, of course, here only concerned with poems in the straight metres. The old encomiastic poetry, however, survives to a small extent at the present day in the Highlands, wherever the clan spirit is fostered. Cp. a

If we wish to draw a picture of the Irish bard, we have to rely for our materials almost entirely on the extant compositions of the poets themselves. Descriptions in English writers are not frequent. Fergus Mac Ivor's bard in *Waverley* is drawn in part from the imagination. In making the poet very old, Scott was doubtless influenced by the sentimentality of Macpherson and his imitators, one of whom composed a piece entitled *The Wish of the Aged Bard.*[1] But the Wizard of the North was, as we know, acquainted with the Red Book of Clanranald, which preserves a number of panegyrics by the M'Vurichs, who had an hereditary estate in S. Uist as shanachies to Clanranald till the middle of the eighteenth century. Whether Sir Walter had these poems actually translated for him I cannot say. It is a matter of common knowledge, also, that he corresponded with William Owen about the early poetry of Wales. Scott, however, was familiar with the few English writers who give any details concerning the Irish bards. Spenser's description has often been quoted, but it may be as well to reproduce a portion of it here:—

> There is none so bad, Eudoxus, but shall finde some to favour his doings; but such licentious partes as these, tending for the most part to the hurt of the English, or maintenance of their owne lewde libertie, they themselves being most desirous therof, doe most allow. . . . A yong minde cannot rest; if he be not still busied in some goodnesse, he will finde himselfe such businesse, as shall soone busie all about him. In which if he shall finde any to praise him, and to give him encouragement, as those Bardes and rythmers doe for little reward, or a share of a stolne cow, then waxeth he most insolent and halfe madde with the love of himselfe, and his owne lewd deeds. And as for words to set forth such lewdnes, it is not hard for them to give a goodly and painted shew thereunto, borrowed even from the praises which are proper to vertue itselfe. As of a most notorious thiefe and wicked out-law, which had lived all his life-time of spoyles and robberies, one of their Bardes in his praise will say, That he was none of the idle milke-sops that was brought up by the fire side, but that most of his dayes he spent in armes and valiant enterprises, that he did never eat his meat, before he had won it with his sword, that he lay not all night slugging in a cabbin under his mantle, but used commonly to keepe others waking to defend their lives, and did light his candle at the flames of their houses, to leade him in the darknesse; that the day was his night, and the night his day; that he loved not to be long wooing of wenches to yeeld to him, but where he came he tooke by force the spoyle of other mens love, and left but lamentations to their lovers; that his musick was not the harpe, nor layes of love, but the cryes of people, and clashing of armor; and finally, that he died not bewayled of many, but made many waile when he died, that dearly bought his death. Doe you not thinke that many of these praises might be

---

Lament on Sir Charles Mac Gregor on p. 96 of the collection entitled *Luinneagan Luaineach* (London, 1897), by John Macgregor, M.D., Honorary Bard to the Clan Macgregor.

[1] Mackenzie, *Beauties of Gaelic Poetry*, p. 14

applyed to men of best deserts? yet are they all yeelded to a most notable traytor, and amongst some of the Irish not smally accounted of. For the song, when it was first made and sung to a person of high degree there, was bought (as their manner is) for fourty crownes.

If due allowance is made for Spenser's anti-Irish bias and for the reduced fortunes of many of the Irish families at the time when he wrote, it will be found that the above description enables us to form some idea of the content of many of the panegyrics in the time of Elizabeth. The second witness I should like to call is the bitter Dublin apothecary, Thomas Smyth, who wrote in 1561 as follows:—

The thirde sorte is called the Aeosdan, which is to saye in English, the bards, or the rimine sepctes; and these people be very hurtfull to the comonwhealle, for they chifflie manyntayne the rebells, and, further they do cause them that would be true, to be rebelious theves, extorcioners, mutherers, ravners, yea and worse if it were possible. Their furst practisse is, if they se anye younge man discended of the septs of *Ose* or *Max*, and have half a dowsen aboute him, then will they make him a Rime, wherein they will commend his father and his aunchetours, nowmbrying howe many heades they have cut of, howe many townes they have burned, and howe many virgins they have defloured,[1] howe many notable murthers they have done, and in the ende they will compare them to Aniball, or Scipio, or Hercules, or some other famous person[2]; wherewithall the pore foole runs madde,[3] and thinkes indede it is so. Then will he gather a sorte of rackells to him, and other he most geat him a Proficer, who shall tell him howe he shall spede (as he thinkes). Then will he geat him lurking to a syde of a woode, and ther keepith him close til morninge; and when it is daye light, then will they go to the poore vilages, not sparinge to distroye young infants, aged people; and if the women be ever so great withe childe, her they will kill; burninge the houses and corne, and ransackinge of the poore cottes. They will then drive all the kine and plowe horses, with all other cattell, and drive them awaye. Then muste they have a bagpipe bloinge afore them; and if any of theis cattell fortune to waxe wearie or faynt, they will kill them, rather than it sholde do the honeur's goode. . . . And when he

[1] Cp. what is stated below, p. 113.

[2] This appears to be true of the compositions of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (cp. Stern, *Z. c. P.*, ii, p. 351), but not to the same extent of the earlier period. Troy and Laomedon are referred to in the stanza printed in O'Grady's *Catalogue*, p. 354. However, in 25 encomiastic poems by Tadhg Óg comprising 890 stanzas, there are but two instances, and these only in the alliterative formula *Gall nGreg*, Y. B. L., 385[b], 27 and 380[a], 19. Cp. also *aighnes choinnle gloine Grég* in Gilbride Macnamee's poem *Miscellany presented to K. Meyer*, p. 168. In an elegy on Llywelyn ab Gruffydd, Bleddyn Vardd describes his hero as *gwr prut uegys Priaf*, 'a serious man like Priam,' *Myv. Arch.*, p. 253, col. 1. Similarly Rhys Gryg is compared by Llywarch ab Llywelyn to Hercules and Hector, ibid., p. 208[a], 31, 33.

[3] Compare the remark of the Bailie Jarvie in *Rob Roy*: 'It's a queer thing o' me, gentlemen, that am a man o' peace mysell, and a peacefu' man's son, for the deacon my father quarrelled wi' nane out o' the town-council—it's a queer thing, I say, but I think the Hieland blude o' me warms at thae daft tales, and whiles I like to hear better them than a word o' profit, gude forgie me!'

is in a safe place, they will fall to the devision of the spoile, accordinge to the dyscresion of the captin. . . . Now comes the Rymer that made the Ryme, with his Rakry.[1] The Rakry is he that shall utter the ryme ; and the Rymer himself sitts by with the captain verie proudlye. He brings with him also his Harper, who please all the while that the raker sings the ryme. Also he hath his Barde, which is a kinde of folise fellowe ; who also must have a horse geven him , the harper must have a new safern shurte, and a mantell, and a hacnaye ; and the rakry must have xx or xxx kine, and the Rymer himself horse and harnes with a nag to ride on, a silver goblett, a pair of bedes of corall, with buttons of silver ; and this, with more, they loke for to have, for reducinge distruxione of the Comenwealth, and to the blasfemye of God ; and this is the best thinge that y^e Rymers causith them to do.[2]

The third contemporary source of information is the curious volume entitled the *Image of Irelande*, published by Derricke in 1581. In one of the woodcuts at the end of the work Mac Sweyn is represented as sitting at a rude board for a table with a harper and bard at hand to entertain. With regard to these men the poem has the following lines :—

Now when their gutts be full, then comes the pastyme in
The Barde and Harper mellodie, unto them doe beginne
This Barde, he doeth reporte the noble conquestes done;
And eke in Rimes shewes forth at large, their glorie thereby wonne.
Thus he at randome ronneth, he pricks the Rebells on :
And shewes by suche externall deeds, their honour lyes upon.
And more to stirre them up, to prosecute their ill:
What greate renowne their fathers gotte, thei shewe by Rimyng skill.
And thei moste gladsome are, to heare of Parents name
As how by spoilyng honest menne, thei wonne such endlesse fame.
Wherefore like gracelesse graftes, sprong from a wicked tree :
Thei grow through daily exercise to all iniquitie.

As the panegyric was extensively practised over a very long period in Ireland, it is but natural that it should have become somewhat stereotyped in form before our period begins. It is, therefore, in many ways, not surprising if we find little or nothing to set by the side of some of the more imaginative encomia of the Scandinavian North, as, for instance, the tenth-century Raven-Song, describing the deeds of Harold Fairhair, or the reception of Eric Blood-Axe in Valhalla.[3] One of the most striking poems in this connexion is a poem of incitement addressed to Rolfe Mac Mahon of Oriel by the thirteenth-century poet Gilbride Macnamee.[4]

[1] Ir. *reacaire.*

[2] *Ulster Journal of Archaeology*, vi. 166–7.

[3] Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, i, pp. 254 ff.

[4] The following summary is taken from O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 405 : 'On a mild May morning the poet wanders off to contemplate Emain Macha. He enters the ancient precinct, sits down and deep sleep invades him. Soon he is

What the Irish bards lack in originality is often made up for by a dignified simplicity,[1] and, though all Keltic poetry presents serious difficulty to the student, there is here little or none of the intentional obscurity which is so frequent in the compositions of the skalds. Such kennings as 'wolf of valour', 'glistening fierce dragon', 'fierce blood-stained raven', are common enough, and a bard may endeavour to find a different name or epithet for his lord in each stanza. Thus, a Connaught prince may be styled 'warden of the English', 'lord of Thomond', 'ruler of Leinster', or 'conqueror of Ulster'. The difficult nature of the rhetoric, as in Welsh, is inherent in all stanzas of such forbidding metrical complexity.

There are three points on which the poetry of the bards differs profoundly from the compositions of the Scandinavian skalds, which it may be well to mention at the outset.

1. In the Irish poems there are practically no references to mythology, whereas in the Roman poet Claudian and in the earlier Northern Court-poetry the pagan gods and goddesses are introduced with great effect. In this respect the later Irish and Welsh panegyrists were at a serious disadvantage.

2. The Irish princes celebrated by Gilbride Macnamee and Tadhg Óg O'Higgin had little or no direct connexion with countries oversea, whereas the skald's chief theme is the roving piratical life of the Viking.

3. The later Irish bards never describe at great length any single achievement of the chieftain they celebrate. There is little or nothing which may be compared with Sighvat's description of the Battle of Sticklestead,[2] or Llywarch ab Llywelyn's account of the battle of Porth Aethwy.[3] Otherwise many poems, or at any rate parts of poems, might just as well have been composed in Scandinavia or Wales as in Ireland or Scotland. When a larger number of the compositions of the Irish bards has been published, it will be neces-

aware that his guardian angel stands beside him, and on the instant marks a great body of horsemen that out of the north ride towards Emain : the plain being whitened with the dust of their horses and again made to glow with their red pennons ; he asks his companion who tells him that yonder are the sons of kings of Eoghan's seed. Who are these from the eastward, helmeted, with parti-coloured shields slung at their backs, with sword and spear ? The Ulidians. Who come up out of the southern airt? Emain's own tribes. Out of the west on foot and all weaponless ? The Tuatha Dé. The four divisions converging meet at the Navan Hill, where the first three ground their spears and by acclaim choose Rolfe as their leader, the bards in chorus setting forth his praise.'

[1] W. P. Ker, *The Dark Ages*, p. 332.

[2] *C. P. B.*, ii, p. 139.

[3] *Myv. Arch.*, p. 210, col. 2–211, col. 1. Such sustained descriptions are not, however, frequent in the poems of the Gogynfeirdd or Lewis Glyn Cothi.

sary to inquire if there are any traces of Irish influence in the Northern Court-poetry. Such an inquiry would at the present moment be premature. It is, however, worthy of note that some of the Icelandic poets were of Hibernian descent, so Kormak Ogmundarson and Einarr Helgason.[1]

When Icelandic poets came to seek the favour of a new patron they introduced themselves with a carefully composed panegyric.[2] Sighvat the Poet makes himself known to St. Olaf in this manner.[3] Something of the kind is also found in Ireland. The Irish Egill Skallagrimsson, Murray O'Daly, who flourished in the first half of the thirteenth century, drew down upon himself the displeasure of O'Donnell by slaying his steward, and had to fly to Clanrickard for protection. In one of the very few poems of his which have survived we find him appealing to Richard de Burgo. He seems to have had a full measure of the notorious impudence of the bardic fraternity in Ireland. This is how he opens:—

> This band in your house has come to you from afar. They were wont to quaff wine from the hand of kings or knights.
>
> Ofttimes did they partake of repast at the hands of abbot or bishop. They disturb no foreign house with their converse, their carousing is not over-talkative.
>
> I am their master of teaching, many 's the time I was in the midst of foreign courts; little ceremony I make, I sit in the presence of monarchs.
>
> I attain great power from every prince, pleasant to me to be abroad, my person is respected in the eastern land, I was wont to have a knight in attendance.[4]

Certain ideas almost of necessity become conventional. As the bard was partly or wholly dependent on the bounty of his patron, opulence and liberality cannot fail to be a stock theme. This is the same all the world over. Of O'Neill Tadhg Og O'Higgin says:—

> A man is he that receiveth the tribute of each province and bestoweth cattle at the first draught, a feast given by the lord of Etar is not consumed without enriching some one.[5]

---

[1] Mogk in Paul's *Grundriss d. germ. Phil.*, ii, p. 677. It is probably an accident that these two writers are perhaps the most obscure of all the skalds.

[2] Cp. what Mogk says about Gunnlaugr Ormstunga, l. c., p. 680.

[3] *Corp. Poet. Bor.*, ii, p. 124 ff.

[4] Macgr. XV., st. 2–5. See also O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 337.

[5] *Fer ga bfuil cáin gach cúigidh*
ag dáil chruidh leisan ccéiddigh
ní hibhther fled fir Édair
nac méduigh sin fer éigin.
—From the O'Conor Don's Book = Y. B. L., 381b, 46–7.

or—

> Niall's son will not tolerate (leave) a mantle amongst his band in making gifts to us, he satisfies a band that is hard to please so that it grows ashamed of its complaints.[1]

Tadhg Óg O'Higgin and others state that they were wont to receive twenty milch-kine for each lay or it might be a wand with rings of gold.[2] Murray O'Daly represents himself as obtaining a steed every year and a golden beaker.[3] In a poem on the death of Malachy II the older poet Erard Mac Coisse says that he received from the monarch 300 goblets, 300 steeds, and 300 bridles.[4] The following description of MacDermott is perhaps worthy of quotation:—

> Mac Dermot would sacrifice his eye to save his honour; if he found any one to desire it he would not be the one to refuse it.[5]
>
> He covets nought on earth save to distribute it to each man.
>
> What matters it however much is demanded of Tomaltach Mac Dermot, son of the princess from Rath Croghan, seeing that his wealth is ever increasing?
>
> The royal race of Mulroney to whom a glorious reputation is secured, wine from cups of gold is quaffed around it from morning to morning.
>
> Illustrious is the guardian of their honour; no single man was yet seen leaving his presence with a refusal.
>
> Of short duration would be the store of his wealth unless God assisted him, seeing that one of his hands is engaged in bestowing gifts and the other in making presents.
>
> 'Tis not a first night's portion which God grants this man of the gentle white countenance, but to be ever satisfying each single band, that in truth is what He cares for.
>
> What Conor's son bestows and receives, there is nothing like to it save it be ebb and flood.[6]

Brat ca fein ni fuilenga
mac Neill ag ar neimera
riaruidh se dhaim ndoidhila
le gur nair a neimela.—Y. B. L., 374a, 11 f.

Fichi bo dobeiredh dham
ar gach nduain dia dho chunnradh.
Dogheibhinn uadh fichti bo
leig an aighidh an annro
in tslat fainne dho uair me
o mac Grainne uair eile.—Y. B. L., 375a, 31 ff.

[3] Macgr. XV. 26.

[4] K. Meyer, *Ancient Irish Poetry*, p. 77. Cp. also the interesting dialogue between Erard and Mac Liag, *Z. c. P.*, viii, p. 218 ff.

[5] This refers to the well-known story of Athirne.

[6] Macgr. XVI. 4–12. For Welsh descriptions of the kind see Dafydd ab Gwilym, iii. 25 ff., xiii. 29 ff. (= Stern, *Z. f. c. P.*, vii. 16–17). Even the above is not so extravagant as these lines by Lewis Glyn Cothi:—

Yr aur oedd amlach no'r irwydd yn ddellt,
No'r main ac no'r mellt, no'r gwellt a'r gwydd.
—*Gweithiau*, p. 173, 55–6.

Personal beauty is such an ever-recurring theme in all Irish literature that it would be superfluous to lay stress here on this feature in connexion with the poetry of the bards. Let us note that Irish men of letters in this respect resemble the poets of Wales and ancient Greece, thus furnishing a striking contrast to the framers of the Old Teutonic Epics.[1] The noble addressed is invariably compared to Cuchulinn or Conn or Niall Glundub or some other hero of old, but not as in the later poets to the warriors of Greece and Rome. And in this connexion an ancient Irish story is not infrequently introduced. Thus John O'Cluan relates the history of Tuathal Techtmar's youth (Macgr. No. XX), Torna O'Mulchoury the tale of the hag at Mac Dermott's court (Macgr. No. XVI) which is repeated by a Highland author for the benefit of Macgregor (Macgr. No. XXXIII). Tadhg Óg gives the story of Fiacha Sraibtine (Y. B. L., 376ᵃ, 37) and of Cormac Connlongas (Y. B. L., 375ᵇ, 39). The curious narrative of the showers of Niall Frasach is given by Tadhg O'Daly (Macgr. No. XIX) whilst Godfrey Finn recalls the story of Conn Cédchathach's youth (O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 358). It might also be mentioned here that the rule of the prince in question is commonly represented as having been foretold in the prophecies of Berchan. Occasionally the poet alludes to his patron's success with the fair sex, as in the stanza:—

> As in the concourse of a fair the snares of (Dermot) O'Duibne were cast over their women—the wooing of an expert—so a woman leaps out of her five senses to go towards Niall Óg, Eoghan's descendant [2]

In many countries plentiful harvests are associated with just rule. So in the nineteenth book of the Odyssey Odysseus says to Penelope:—

> Thy fame goes up to the wide heaven, as doth the fame of a blameless king, one that fears the gods, and reigns among men and mighty, maintaining right, and the black earth bears wheat and barley, and the trees are laden with fruit, and the sheep bring forth and fail not, and the sea gives stores of fish and all out of his good guidance, and the people prosper under him.[3]

But nowhere, perhaps, does this idea occur so frequently as in Irish literature. This gives the bard an opportunity of introducing characteristic descriptions of nature. We must, however, bear in mind the small range of natural produce of which he could make use. This is

[1] R. M. Meyer, *Die altgermanische Poesie*, p. 40.

[2] *Líonta í Dhuibhne a ndail áonaigh*
ar[a] mhnáib suirge seolaigh
ben ag leim da cóig ciallaibh
diarraidh Neill Óig i Eóghuin.
—From the O'Conor Don's Book = Y. B. L., 382ᵃ, 28-9.

[3] I am indebted to Prof. Ridgeway for this reference.

very striking, for instance, if we compare such poems with panegyrics by Turkish authors who had a much wider selection of fruits and flowers to choose from. In Ireland wheat is frequently mentioned, as also apples. It should be remembered that the apple is the ambrosial food of the Irish in all the old stories. But the harvest on which the greatest stress is laid is the supply of hazel-nuts. It cannot be a matter for surprise that the hazel should supply the poets with a large proportion of their metaphors, if we reflect that nearly two-thirds of the soil of Ireland is composed of the calcareous formations so beloved of this tree.[1] As one of the best specimens the following verses from a poem addressed to Cathal Redhand, King of Connaught (d. 1224), by Gilbride Macnamee may be quoted:—

Croghan's Redhand has rendered fruitful the green woods of the warm land; if a beetle strike any white hazel it will yield a vat full.

His rule has put grain into the ground, it has made blossoms to sprout through the tips of the branches, the sentences of the bright shining light of the Greeks have caused mast to grow in the oak-wood.

Ireland has recognized her ruler; she has brought forth the increase of a quarter in one month, so that the forest which trembled with age has put forth fruit again under his rule.

When comes the autumn the fruit will reach Galway's prince of the swift steeds, ear upon ear, cluster upon cluster will there be from Kesh Corrin to Croagh.

The arms of each apple-tree are weighed to the ground in the land of Cathal of Cruachan-Aoi, each bright hazel therein perforce bends down.

Each smooth nut puts forth its shell at the end of its branch on the margin of the cornland, the yellow grain dons its husk underneath a fresh bending brake.

A ruddy cluster on dark leaves amid green woods with soft grass, in plentiful store the nuts fall down with their brown shells.[2]

---

[1] It is difficult for non-fruitarians to realize the esteem in which nuts were held in mediaeval times as an article of diet. In the Brehon Laws the hazel is reckoned a 'chieftain-tree' along with oak, holly, yew, ash, pine, and apple. Apart from the nuts it bears the hazel was also valued for its twigs, which were extensively employed in wattling. See Joyce, *Social History*, ii, pp 155–6, 286–7. Similarly the Scandinavian poets Sighvat and Othere the Black both state that they have received gifts of nuts from King Olaf Cp. *Corp. Poet. Bor.*, ii, pp. 150, 157. It is curious to note, on the other hand, that in the Welsh laws the fine for felling a hazel is only one quarter of that for cutting down an apple-tree, which, in its turn, is only accounted half as valuable as the oak or the beech. Wade-Evans, p. 248.

[2] The poem is printed in the *Miscellany presented to K Meyer.* It also contains these characteristic stanzas:

When the curly-locked (prince) rises betimes on a summer's morning to hunt deer, there is the on the grass, the blackbird sings, the frost has yielded its strength.

Swift steeds by the Shannon's bank on purple straths white with flowers, a graceful stud on the carse of the Moy with green-headed ducks on each ford.

Prowess is, of course, an essential theme of every panegyric, and as we should expect from what we know in general of mediaeval Ireland, freebooting expeditions play a great part. Numbers of these raids are mentioned in the Annals, and what they were really like we may gather from other sources. In one of the plates in Derricke's *Image of Irelande* a picture of such a creagh is given. One party is setting fire to the house of the victim, another is driving away his horses and cattle, whilst a third body is advancing with a piper at their head. A more detailed account corroborating all this occurs in an entry in the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1592–1599, vol. v:—

In July 1592, the Stewarts of Lochearnside, with an armed body of 'Hieland-men and sorners of clans' invaded the lands of Drumquhassil, wounded many of the tenants, drove away '20 tydie ky, 16 yeild ky, 10 oxin and 12 stirks, and harried the whole guids, geir, insicht and plenishing' of their houses. In October, they renewed the raid on the same lands, appearing this time as a body 'of 200 persons with twa bagpypis blawand befoir thame,' and harried the 'puir tenantis' of 190 cows, 66 horses, and 300 sheep. In 1593, an attack was made by the Roses of Kilravock on the house of George Dunbar of Clune. They came armed with 'bowis, darlochis, and twa-handit swordis, steel-bonnettis, haberschonis, hacquebutis, and pistolletis', plundered and burnt the house, and went off with a booty of seventy head of horses and cattle. This raid was distinguished by exceptional barbarity, for 'sa mony of the nolt as wald not dryve they barbarously hoicht and slew,' while on the women they 'put violent hands, tirvit thair claiths aff thame, and schoit thame naked furth of thair houssis.' Dunbar's wife was not exempted from this treatment, and her infant of twelve days old they 'maist barbarously kaist furth in the midding'.[1]

Details of such cruelty are naturally not found in the poems of the bards, but the general state of affairs disclosed is pretty much the same. Let us see what Tadhg Óg finds to extol in the deeds of his patrons. Of one of the O'Donnells it is said:—

An attendant from Tralee follows thee, such is the spoil thou hast sought out, thy charger is checked by the bridle to stay raids by offers of gifts.[2]

And of Ulick Bourke:—

From Cnoc Laithrig hither many's the grave and tomb-stone (set) in the ground through thee. . . .

Assisting thy hereditary friends thou didst make a circuit of Thomond without leaving a cow from Limerick to this place unless it be a survivor from the raid.

Thou didst not deem it proper to march by night to attack Kilkenny: a wide raid was conducted by thee in daylight to harry the county.

---

[1] Quoted in the reprint of Derricke's *Image of Irelande*, by John Small, Edinburgh, 1883, p. 124.

[2] *Comtha o Tráighli ad lenamain*
asi in tain do thoghabair
fosdar hech ar aradhain
dfosdadh crech re comadhaibh.—Y B. L., 373[b], 31.

> The meteor-like host, with which thou didst move on this expedition; on the edge of Fethard it left not a people which it did not break in pieces as far as the sea.[1]

Note the stress laid on the marching by day. Similarly the superior force of the enemy is not infrequently emphasized. There are numerous other instances where recklessness is extolled. So we read as follows of the foolhardiness of Mac William:—

> At Ath Imdain thou didst not think it worth while, though the O'Conors were advancing against thee, to leave the ford without bathing lest they should impute it to fear.[2]

Or the difficulties encountered may be curiously exaggerated as in a poem by Angus son of Carroll O'Daly:—

> Reaving the cattle of the men of Donegal was like meddling with a cold tempestuous sea[3]

Reference has already been made to the arrogance of the Irish poets, to which Wales and Iceland scarcely afford a parallel. The tradition started very early, as we know from the story of Athirne, and in the later centuries there is abundant evidence that the bard frequently forfeited the goodwill of his lord as a result of overstepping the mark. To attempt to restore himself to favour he composed a

Imdha o chnuc Laithrigh ille
fert is oil a nuir uaibse
ni fiu mfeirg a sena sin
na séla atciu ar leirg Laithrigh.
Ac cur let cháirdib bunaidh
do thimchills Tuadhmumain
gan boin o Luimnech ille
muna bfoil dfuighlech airgne.
Sibal oidhchi nir fiu lib
dinnsoighidh Cilli Coindigh
do seolad ruaig lethan laei
uaib do chreachad na cundaei.
An chaer sluaigh thainig tusa
re toighecht don turusa
tuath nachar minairg co muir
a mbruach Fidhaird nir fagaib.

—Y B. L., 378ᵃ, 38–9, ibid. 44–379ᵇ, 3.

A nAth Iomdhain nir fiu lat
is síol gConchobair chugat
tocht gun ionnladh asan áth
go ttiobradh ort na ursgáth.

—From Stowe A iv 3 = Y. B. L., 383ᵇ, 4–5.

Fa buain ré muir fuair anfadh
buain a gcruidh do Conallchaibh.

—For the poem cp. O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 353.

poem corresponding in some measure to the *hǫfuð-lausn* of the skalds.[1] Several of these apologies have survived. Thus, in a late sixteenth-century composition addressed to Cuchonnacht Maguire, Fergal Óg Macaward apologizes for having flung a beaker of wine in his master's face.[2] In another Tadhg Óg has called Ulick Mac William a drunkard:—

Travelling by night is my state after what I have heard from Clanwilliam; myself in concealment from house to house, 'tis like to my death.

Thou wouldst have known had I spoken unjustly of thee in solitude, demand a poem from me for my injustice; let not thy mind be set on an honour-price.[3]

In another poem preserved in a considerable number of MSS. John O'Cluan apologizes for having struck his lord Aed O'Conor. The chief is flattered for his forbearance as follows:—

I dealt, Aed of the sleek hair, a blow to thee with my hand and thou hast not taken vengeance; if it had been lopped off in thy house, O chief of Colt, it were not a buffet without retaliation.

Banish me not, son of Eogan, for the hand I lifted in thy house; strike off my hand as a due, but let not thy reproach be upon me

Had it been abroad in the Southern Half that I had given the blow, or yet in Ulster, 'tis a weapon surely that had been reddened with my fist, O hawk-like blue-eyed genius of battle.

Thine 'tis in payment of my blow to lop the right hand from me, O gentle noble countenance, thy due 'tis to have a lay of its value, or else the very hand, O Gairide's griffin.

---

[1] Although it may be inferred from the poems of Dafydd ab Gwilym and others that the Welsh poets were on a footing of privileged intimacy with their patrons, such compositions as those about to be described are unknown. In one piece, it is true, Phylip Brydydd remonstrates with Rhys Gryg for being indignant with him for composing verses to any other patron beside himself, and Elidir Sais in two poems endeavours to appease the wrath of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth. Cp. *Myvyrian Arch.*, pp. 240, 257; Stephens, *Lit. of the Kymry*, pp. 87, 150 ff., 156 ff.

[2] *Corn deighfleidhe do doirt me*
i nucht laoic Locha hÉirne
don feirg do eirigh oirne
nir cheilligh an chomairle.
Do doirtios do druim feirge
beirios buaid ndibeirge
cuach fin ndighe ara gruaidh gloin
ri bile nach bfuair iorgoil.—Cp. Stern, *Z. f. c. P.*, ii. 338.
Sibal oidhchi issed doniam
déis a cuala o chloinn Uilliam
me ar falachta o thigh dho thigh
samalta he is moighidh.
Letrom gloir dogebtha a fis
da ndernainn ort a nuaignis
ben dim laeidh isin leatrom
na bidh háeidh re heineclond.
—Y. B. L., 377ᵇ, 42–3, 378ᵃ, 22–3.

Not kine, not horses, not artificers' gold are promised thee, O ruddy one benign of face! Neither hand shalt thou have, no, nor foot, but a poem in lieu of that which I have done.[1]

As in Wales and Scandinavia, and all other countries where the poet was dependent on the bounty of an aristocratic or royal patron, the elegy or dirge is very frequent. The bardic poems falling under this head throw an interesting light on the life of the period, even after due allowance has been made for poetic exaggeration. A powerful prince may be succeeded by a man with no military genius, thus exposing the land to attack from outside. Accordingly Tadhg Óg sings as follows on the death of Ulick Mac William (d. 1424).—

Since our lord departed who is there furthermore whose hand is not against you? Who would dare, were he alone alive in our midst, to come to the confines of our territory to observe the boundary ditch?

Tal's sept has received no insult from us from which our land will not be in conflagration, in other days fires were oftener kindled by us in return for insults offered to us.

Those of the men of Ireland whom Ulick injured are about to encircle you; like a ring of smouldering fire, such is the end of fair Clanwilliam.[2]

Or the bard may picture what the loss means to him personally:—

My share in the sorrow for Cathal O'Conor's son is all the greater, I stayed with no other lord in the days of Tadhg, would that I had done so!

Unhappy the man who like myself has gained the affection of a constant patron; in expectation of encountering misfortune 'tis fitting to shun the honour.[3]

---

[1] Macgr. No. XXX; O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 367.

[2] *Cia fesda ac iach fuil derna*
riab ó thosta ar tigerna?
Techt ar cimsaib ar crich
dfeghain in chladh coicrichi
cia do lémhadh a Leth Cuinn
da mbeth na enar againd?
Gan oirbiri ac aicme Thail
nach bia ar tir ina tendail
doba menci uair eile
teinti uaim ar noirbeiri.
Atait ar ti bur timchail
ar loit Uilleg d'Eirindchaib
mar timchall na teinedh diadh
a dheiredh finnchlainn Uilliam.—Y. B. L., 377a, 2–4, 11–14.

[3] *Moide mo chuid da chumaidh*
mac Cathail Hi Chonchubair
nir an me maig nach derna
re re Thaidhg ac tigerna
Mairg do uair mar uair [illegible]
muirn tigerna tairisi
a ndoich in ansoidh dhfaghail
coir in anoir dhinggabail.—Y. B. L., 374a, 3, 13–14.

Or:—

Ireland has no means of subsistence for the man of learning since O'Kelly's death; far removed from Banba is any prince or royal successor save the one who is most powerful.[1]

In order to vary the theme the bard, instead of addressing his master in person, may celebrate his sword,[2] or his standard,[3] or his shield,[4] or his belt,[5] or more commonly his patron's hall or rath.[6] The latter form of address also occurs in Wales and elsewhere. The poet's imagination almost makes us forget the character of the timbered banqueting-halls, or the grim strongholds erected in imitation of the Norman castles. The brilliance of the company is always a favourite theme in such pieces. So in a fourteenth-century lament on the reduced fortunes of the O'Briens:—

On the hither side there was wont to be a concourse of poets around his bright breast; what the company received from the successor to Ireland's monarch was oppressive.

On the other side of the house would be the valiant men of Limerick, every poet received his due from the company, there was drinking of wine to the very door-posts.

No women in the casements, no chess-playing in yon doorway, no carousing, no kindling of lights, it is a great cause for sadness.[7]

An interesting poem, by Godfrey Finn O'Daly, describing a bardic festival has been recently printed in *Ériu*, v, pp. 50-69, with a translation by Miss Knott.

One of the most difficult of the bardic compositions of the period consists of an address to the stronghold of Cloonfree in Roscommon, the residence of Aed O'Conor. A long poem of thirty-eight quatrains, it may be considered a miracle of technical skill, as in addition to the obligatory end-rhymes and alliteration each line contains two and often three internal rhymes. Two stanzas may be quoted here:—

In the palace is the sheen of each smooth hilt so that the bright abode has never grown dark; men find the gleaming dry path into the house by the brightness of the women's footwear.

Mighty palace of gentle outline, rath of princes, rath of bardic schools. Munstermen and Ulstermen gather round Bregia's chieftain, on its hill it hath not selected a niggardly lord.[8]

---

[1] *Sligh in egnaigh nocha nfuil*
ag Eirinn deis Hi Chealluigh
ingar ri na damna dhi
Banba acht inti bus treisi.—Y. B. L., 376[a], 33-4.

[2] K. Meyer, *Ancient Irish Poetry*, p. 72. [3] Y. B. L., 377[a], 37 ff.

[4] *Zeitschr. f. celt. Phil.*, viii. 227; Hardiman, *Irish Minstrelsy*, ii, p. 190.

[5] Macgr. No. XXII.

[6] Macgr. Nos. XVIII, XXI, XXXIII; cp. O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 353.

[7] Macgr. No. XVIII.

[8] Macgr. No. XXI.

Compositions of such extraordinary metrical complexity appear to have enjoyed great popularity and were evidently recited in the halls of other princes than those to whom they were originally addressed. In this case a stanza was usually added at the close in praise of the poet's patron for the time being. The number of such adventitious stanzas varies in different MSS., the O'Conor Don's Book usually having the maximum. The common practice of appending two or three stanzas to the patron's wife was pointed out by Stern (*Z. f. c. P.*, ii, pp. 333, 337, 339, 348 f., &c.).

From what has been said it will be clear that the secular compositions of the later bards furnish a valuable source of evidence for the study of social conditions in Ireland during the period in question. This source has not hitherto been accessible to historians, with the consequence that eminently fair writers have been under the necessity of ignoring in large measure the state of culture obtaining in the North and West. Up to the present, works on Irish history professing to deal with the centuries under consideration contain little but a chronicle of the affairs of the English Pale. It may be expected that within a few years the great bulk of bardic verse will have been edited and translated. Then, and not till then, will it be possible to write a dispassionate history of Ireland from the Norman Invasion to the Reformation.

RELIGIOUS POETRY.

The religious poetry of the later bards naturally bears a great resemblance to their secular compositions. In the one case the liberality and munificence of an earthly patron is extolled, in the other the succour of the Virgin or of some saint is invoked. The themes and manner of treatment are, in part at any rate, a legacy from the poets of preceding centuries, but there is a marked change. The poets of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, who are known as the authors of devotional verse, were evidently familiar with the religious literature in the Latin language which flourished chiefly in France. Mediaeval Latin literature reached its high-water mark between 1050 and 1350, and it would be a matter for surprise if the well-informed poets of Ireland had not come under its influence.

The Christian poetry of the Old Irish period, apart from learned compositions as the Félire of Oengus, the Saltair na Rann and the versified monastic rules, exhibits the same peculiarities as the secular lyrics. There is the same love of suggestion and of saying half-seen things, the same delight in colour and sound and the tiniest manifestations of nature, all expressed with a freshness that appears to us

surprisingly modern. Some of the best instances are collected together in K. Meyer's *Ancient Irish Poetry*. At the end of the Viking Period, however, life seems to have worn a more sombre aspect than during the preceding centuries, as the early note is more rarely struck. The compositions which have survived become more highly reflective, which is equivalent to saying that they are less spontaneous. The most celebrated devotional poet of the thirteenth century is undoubtedly Donnchad Mór O'Daly (d. 1244), who is styled the Ovid of Ireland in the Annals. Edward O'Reilly in his *Irish Writers* ascribes some thirty pieces to this author, but several of those mentioned are certainly the work of others. It is unfortunate that his poems are for the most part scattered about in late MSS., so that a considerable amount of sifting will be required before a critical edition can be prepared. The pieces beginning —

Éist ream faoisdin a Íosa
Creidim dhuit abhlainn uasail
Gabhaim deachmhadh ar ndana

bear a general resemblance to the Latin verses of Marbod of Rennes (d. 1123) and Hildebert of Tours (d. 1134),[1] and I am inclined to think that Donnchad may have been influenced by these writers. It is probably not without significance that he composed a poem on the Fifteen Tokens of the Day of Judgement[2] on precisely the same lines as the one in Latin on the same subject attributed, though on doubtful grounds, to Hildebert.[3]

A few religious compositions in much the same strain are ascribed to a contemporary of Donnchad Mór, the turbulent Murray O'Daly.[4] The chief theme is contrition and prayer for guidance. One of these writers is also the author of a poem on the Legend of the Holy Rood.[5] A piece of unknown authorship on the Harrowing of Hell has been edited and translated by Prof. Bergin[6] from the Book of Fermoy, and there is more than one metrical version of the Three Marys.[7] The

[1] Migne, vol. clxxi.

[2] Macgr No. VI. This theme is also treated metrically in Welsh by Llewelyn Fardd, see *Myvyr. Arch.*, p. 260. An Irish prose version was printed by Whitley Stokes in the *Revue Celtique*, xxviii. 308.

[3] Migne, vol. clxxi, col. 1287-8; Groeber, *Grundriss d. roman. Phil.*, ii. 1, p. 369.

[4] Skene-Maclauchlan, *Book of the Dean of Lismore*, pp. 157-60

[5] Macgr. No. V. In this poem the well-known Three Kisses of St. Bernard are introduced.

[6] *Ériu*, iv. 112.

[7] Macgr. No IX, attributed by the Dean to Murray O'Daly. A poem on the same subject, beginning *Trí hingiona rug Anna*, is found in Maynooth MSS., and in R. I. A., 23 L 17, but in this copy the first stanza commences, *Sagart dobhí fecht eile*

Old French versions by Wace and a writer named Pierre at the beginning of the thirteenth century are held to go back to a Latin original which has not as yet been discovered.[1] Other poems deal with the Nativity of the Virgin and the Infancy of Christ.[2]

As early as the middle of the tenth century an Irishman had made a metrical version of the chief portions of Old Testament history. Poems on biblical subjects were, however, a favourite exercise with writers of Latin verse in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. We may take Peter Riga of Rheims (d. 1209) as a typical instance. He is the author of metrical versions, among other things, of the stories of Noah, Daniel, Susanna, and the Magi.[3] Similarly in Irish we find a poem on the Epiphany [4] and the Beheading of John the Baptist.[5]

The rapid circulation of the *Golden Legend* of Jacobus de Voragine and of collections of exempla at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century, furnished the later bards with new sources of material. This may go hand in hand with an increasing fondness for introducing narrative into their secular compositions (*supra*, p. 113). The poet begins by stating a theme which is elaborated for several stanzas. Then the story is introduced in illustration, and finally there is a moral application. The first bard known to me who made use of a story of this nature was Godfrey Finn O'Daly (d. 1387). He is the author of what appears to have been for centuries the most popular religious composition in Ireland, if one may judge by the large number of MS. copies. It begins thus [6]:—

> Alas for him whom love of the world deceives, the glamour of the great Fair endures but for a brief space, alas for him who keepeth not utterly aloof from it during the life of this troublous evil world.
>
> A kingdom vast (bartered) for brief mirth; life eternal for fleeting space; to forsake God for vain World's transitory season, such is a worthless covenant.
>
> O ye to whom prosperity is assured (here), and that deem the measure of your merriness all-sufficing; therefore it is that your happiness seems sufficient to you, for that joys greater (than such) ye have never seen.
>
> Felicity of the celestial host that, up above surrounds the Lord, as against that all felicity that is underneath Heaven is but as the life of one entombed.
>
> To certify that, here's a story bearing on the matter according to the just, a story by which heaven is to be sought, whatever holy book it was taken from.

---

[1] Groeber, *Grundriss d. roman. Phil.*, ii. 1, p. 647.

[2] Macgr. No. VIII = *Archiv f. celt. Lex.*, iii. 244, and *Z. f. c. P.*, viii, p. 561 ff. For a Welsh cywydd on this subject see Ashton's *Gweithiau Iolo Goch*, p. 550.

[3] Groeber, *Grundriss*, ii. 1, p. 370.

[4] Macgr. No. II. A lengthy Welsh poem on the same subject by Madawg ab Gwallter (1250-1300) is printed in the *Myvyr. Arch.*, p. 274.

[5] *Ériu*, iv. 173.

[6] Macgr. No. I; O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 357.

Then the poet proceeds to tell a story from the *Gesta Romanorum*[1] of a boy who was born in a dungeon, and who, though unacquainted with the light of day, grows apace, whilst his mother pines away. One day he sees tears streaming down her face and asks her the cause. This affords the poet an opportunity of comparing the mother and son to the dwellers upon earth, and of describing the joys of heaven and the terrors of hell. Another favourite story was that of a pious monk who was saved by the Virgin from the temptation of the Devil in the form of a woman.[2] A story of two monks[3] is told by Mahon O'Higgin (d. 1441). The Dean's Book preserves a variant of the curious story of the Woman and the Consecrated Wafer,[4] in addition to metrical versions of the Man in the Tree,[5] from Barlaam and Josaphat, and the North French story of the monk who spent 300 years in his garden listening to the song of a bird.[6] These appear to be the work of Finlay MacNab, the Red Bard, who was probably official poet to the Macgregor.[7]

However, apart from Donnchad Mór, the only bard in the period with which we are concerned whose religious compositions have survived in any quantity, is Tadhg Óg O'Higgin. By a fortunate chance some twenty-one poems of this nature by him are preserved in the Song-book which was inserted into the Yellow Book of Lecan. I do not think that Tadhg was by any means the most gifted of the later bards, but fate has decreed for some reason or other that he should be the one who is best represented in the MSS. that have been spared by the ravages of time. Apart from the miscellany just mentioned Tadhg's poems are better preserved in Edinburgh than anywhere else. A number of them are scattered through various MSS., but Gaelic MS. No. XXIX in the Advocates' Library is a little vellum book containing nothing but devotional poems—ten in number—by this author. Eight of them occur in the Yellow Book of Lecan. A number of his compositions consist of addresses to the Virgin, into which a consider-

[1] *Gesta Romanorum*, ed. Oesterley, No. 86, p. 414.

[2] Macgr. No. VII. Probably a variant of the story in Rufinus, cp. *Migne*, vol xxi, col. 399, ibid. lxxiii, col. 1147. See also *Catalogue of Romances in the Brit. Mus.*, iii, pp. 180, 459.

[3] O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 380. The source of the story is unknown to me.

[4] Wright, *Latin Stories*, p. 133. [5] Macgr. No. XIV.

[6] Macgr. XIII; cp. A. J. Herbert, *Romania*, xxxviii. 427.

[7] It always seems strange to me that no Welsh poet appears to have drawn upon the exempla literature. Was narrative eschewed in the cywydd? In a note on Dafydd Nanmor's poem on Damon and Phidias Mr. W. J. Gruffydd says in his anthology entitled, *Y Flodeugerdd Newydd* (p. 226): 'This is, as far as we know, the only cywydd of this period that tells a story.'

able amount of narrative matter from the Old and New Testaments is introduced. The remainder are drawn in part from the Golden Legend, but sometimes one has to have recourse to the Apocryphal Acts in order to understand incidents referred to by Tadhg. One of his poems is addressed to St. Dominic,[1] whose life was the subject of metrical treatment at the hands of a French poet as early as 1240.[2]

Another poem contains an invocation to St. Patrick [3] which presupposes acquaintance with the life of the Saint as contained in the Book of Lismore. It is not without interest to note that this is the only case, so far as I know at present, in which a native saint is addressed during this period.[4] Tadhg's most popular composition of this nature, if one may judge from the frequency of its occurrence in MSS., deals with a theme which was first treated by a French poet in the thirteenth century, and which is attributed to the influence of Clairvaux.[5] The soul is represented as being confronted by three adversaries, the world, the flesh, and the devil.

The more one studies the works of these bards, the more one is impressed with the range of their attainments. They were not in holy orders, and yet they must have been better versed in Latin than most of the clergy. Some of them in all probability paid visits to Highland chiefs, and may have acquired English and French, though we could not assume this from merely studying the sources of their compositions. And unfortunately we have evidence of continental travel in the case of one member of the fraternity alone, viz. Murray O'Daly, who may have taken part in a crusade.[6] In any case, it was no mean achievement on the part of men like Tadhg O'Higgin to show such acquaintance with the voluminous Latin religious literature [7] of the day in addition to the huge store of native learning exemplified in their other works.

In addition to the compositions already mentioned, Tadhg's poems deal with Mary Magdalen,[8] John the Baptist,[9] St. John the Divine,[10] St. Paul,[11] St. Andrew, and others. He also treats the story of the Discovery of the Saviour's Cross by Helena.[12] This is of interest as

[1] Y. B. L., 364ª, 12.

[2] Groeber, *Grundriss*, ii 1, p. 648.

[3] Y. B. L., 370ª, 34.

[4] In Welsh there is similarly a cywydd to St. David, see Ashton's *Gweithiau Iolo Goch*, p. 589.

[5] Macgr. No. III; O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 363; Groeber, *Grundriss*, ii. 1, p. 696 ff.

[6] O'Grady, *Cat.*, pp. 366–8. In st. 6 of the poem printed in the Appendix, p. 44, he laments that he has been absent from Ireland for fifteen years.

[7] See note, p. 143.

[8] Y. B. L., 365ª, 28.

[9] Y. B. L., 369ᵇ, 17.

[10] Y. B. L., 362ª, 19.

[11] Y. B. L., 365ᵇ, 30.

[12] Macgr. IV; Y. B. L., 363ª, 31.

being, to my knowledge, the only poetic treatment of the subject in Irish, although a number of prose versions are known, some of which have appeared in print.[1]

These religious poems can scarcely be expected to afford such valuable information as regards the life of the period as the panegyrics. Nevertheless some of the metaphors are of interest in this connexion. So the custom of giving hostages is frequently brought in:—

> Behold thy captive, O God, who is bold in selling Thee, O King, prepare fetters for me, O God, the end of my days is at hand.
>
> I would fain not be without chains, Thou that didst ascend the tree, better for me to be placed in thy bonds as a hostage than . . . .[2]
>
> I am a hostage though not in custody through failing to find repentance.
>
> The world only gives on loan to men, this world is no estate of theirs, they hold it on rack-rent[3]

In other poems Tadhg confesses his weaknesses:—

> I am slow to rise at time of matins; allow for that, O Lord, each cold night on which I have arisen.
>
> I have forgotten the King of the Elements, all the times when I have verged on intoxication: to make up for this forgetfulness allow all the wine I have forsaken for water.[4]

---

[1] Cp. G. Schirmer, *Die Kreuzeslegenden im Leabhar Breac*, St. Gallen, 1886.

[2]
Ag so braighi dheit a Dhe
is dana ar dho reic a rí
ullmaidh geimeal dam a Dhe
mo ré is gar a deredh dhi.
Gan beth san igh ni hail lim
a fir dochaidh isa chrann
mo car at geimil[l]a ngeall
ferr dham ina medhar ann.—Y. B. L., 363[a], 11-15.

Me am braighid gan beth a laim
do dith aithreachais dfaghail
Ar iasacht as eadh dobir
in doman dona daeinib
in bith cé ni duthaidh daib
achi se futhaibh ar formail.
—Y. B. L., 401[b], 26, ib. 401[a], 27-8.

Ní hom nach aimhlesg eirghe
a n-ionam na hiarmheirghe
leig uam ina aghaidh sin
gach adhuigh fúar dar eirigh.
Rí na ndúl do dhermhuid me
gach trath da ttaighlim [meisce]
ar treig dfíon ar an uisge
leig a ndiol an dermhuid-se.
—From the O'Conor Don's Book = Y. B. L., 364[a], 41 ff.

able amount of narrative matter from the Old and New Testaments is introduced. The remainder are drawn in part from the Golden Legend, but sometimes one has to have recourse to the Apocryphal Acts in order to understand incidents referred to by Tadhg. One of his poems is addressed to St. Dominic,[1] whose life was the subject of metrical treatment at the hands of a French poet as early as 1240.[2]

Another poem contains an invocation to St. Patrick[3] which presupposes acquaintance with the life of the Saint as contained in the Book of Lismore. It is not without interest to note that this is the only case, so far as I know at present, in which a native saint is addressed during this period.[4] Tadhg's most popular composition of this nature, if one may judge from the frequency of its occurrence in MSS., deals with a theme which was first treated by a French poet in the thirteenth century, and which is attributed to the influence of Clairvaux.[5] The soul is represented as being confronted by three adversaries, the world, the flesh, and the devil.

The more one studies the works of these bards, the more one is impressed with the range of their attainments. They were not in holy orders, and yet they must have been better versed in Latin than most of the clergy. Some of them in all probability paid visits to Highland chiefs, and may have acquired English and French, though we could not assume this from merely studying the sources of their compositions. And unfortunately we have evidence of continental travel in the case of one member of the fraternity alone, viz. Murray O'Daly, who may have taken part in a crusade.[6] In any case, it was no mean achievement on the part of men like Tadhg O'Higgin to show such acquaintance with the voluminous Latin religious literature[7] of the day in addition to the huge store of native learning exemplified in their other works.

In addition to the compositions already mentioned, Tadhg's poems deal with Mary Magdalen,[8] John the Baptist,[9] St. John the Divine,[10] St. Paul,[11] St. Andrew, and others. He also treats the story of the Discovery of the Saviour's Cross by Helena.[12] This is of interest as

[1] Y. B. L., 364a, 12.

[2] Groeber, *Grundriss*, ii. 1, p. 648.

[3] Y. B. L., 370a, 34.

[4] In Welsh there is similarly a cywydd to St. David, see Ashton's *Gweithiau Iolo Goch*, p. 589.

[5] Macgr. No. III; O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 363; Groeber, *Grundriss*, ii. 1, p. 696 ff.

[6] O'Grady, *Cat.*, pp. 366–8. In st. 6 of the poem printed in the Appendix, p. 44, he laments that he has been absent from Ireland for fifteen years.

[7] See note, p. 143.

[8] Y. B. L., 365a, 28.

[9] Y. B. L., 369b, 17.

[10] Y. B. L., 362a, 19.

[11] Y. B. L., 365b, 30.

[12] Macgr. IV; Y. B. L., 363a, 31.

being, to my knowledge, the only poetic treatment of the subject in Irish, although a number of prose versions are known, some of which have appeared in print.[1]

These religious poems can scarcely be expected to afford such valuable information as regards the life of the period as the panegyrics. Nevertheless some of the metaphors are of interest in this connexion So the custom of giving hostages is frequently brought in:—

Behold thy captive, O God, who is bold in selling Thee, O King, prepare fetters for me, O God, the end of my days is at hand.

I would fain not be without chains, Thou that didst ascend the tree, better for me to be placed in thy bonds as a hostage than . . . .[2]

I am a hostage though not in custody through failing to find repentance.

The world only gives on loan to men, this world is no estate of theirs, they hold it on rack-rent.[3]

In other poems Tadhg confesses his weaknesses:—

I am slow to rise at time of matins; allow for that, O Lord, each cold night on which I have arisen

I have forgotten the King of the Elements, all the times when I have verged on intoxication: to make up for this forgetfulness allow all the wine I have forsaken for water.[4]

---

[1] Cp. G. Schirmer, *Die Kreuzeslegenden im Leabhar Breac*, St. Gallen, 1886.

[2]
Ag so braighi dheit a Dhe
is dana ar dho reic a ri
ullmaidh geimeal dam a Dhe
mo ré is gar a deredh dhi.
Gan beth san igh ni hail lim
a fir dochaidh isa chrann
mo car at geimil'a ngeall
ferr dham ina medhar ann.—Y. B. L., 368[a], 11-15.

Me am braighid gan beth a laim
do dith aithreachais d'fagbail
Ar iasacht as eadh dobir
in doman dona daeinib
in bith cé ni duthaidh daib
acht se futhaibh ar formail.
—Y. B. L., 401[b], 26, ib. 401[a], 27-8.

Ní liom nach aimhlesg eirghe
a n-ionam na hiarmheirghe
leig uam ina aghaidh sin
gach adhuigh fúar dar eirigh.
Rí na ndúl do dhermhuid me
gach trath da ttaighlim [meisce]
ar treig dfion ar an uisge
leig a ndiol an dermhuid-se.
—From the O'Conor Don's Book = Y. B. L., 364[a], 41 ff.

In other passages the poet uses images drawn from nature:—

From the day that I came on to the earth I am as a straying salmon, put me safe into the river from the bank, daughter of Joachim.[1]

Elsewhere Tadhg is fond of dwelling on the marvels of the Creator shown forth in nature:—

Who could control the flow and ebb, or the growth of the egg in the bird? Let us attempt to discover an artificer skilled to fashion hazel and apple-tree side by side.[2]

'Tis Thou that givest the bright sun along with the ice Thou it was that orderedst the rivers and the salmon in the river.

That the hazel should put forth its blossom, O Christ, 'tis a strange art; with Thy skill alike Thou causest the kernel to grow and the shapely ear on our wheat.

Though the children of Eve ill deserve to behold the flocks of birds and the salmon, the Living One that was on the Cross it is that creates both salmon and fowl.

'Tis He that causes the sloe-blossom to pierce the side of the blackthorn, the hazel-blossom through another tree, by the side of that, what miracle is greater?[3]

Finally, I should like to quote a few stanzas from two fifteenth-century poems by other writers. The first is attributed to Godfrey

On lo tainig an talum
eigne me is me ar merugad
tuc slan ar an innmer inn
on trag d' ingen Iachim.—From Adv. xxix. = Y.B.L., 372^{a}, 6.

Cia dofidfudh tuili is tragh
na techtadh uighi san eon
call is aball taeb re taeb
fagham saer ann dha budh eol.—Y. B. L., 368^{b}, 15–16.

Is tu dober in grian ghel
a nenecht is toidregh
is tu thug na haibni ann
sna maigri ar fut na habann.
An cnu do beth ina blath
a Crist is cerdacht nemgnath
dot gres araen su teitni
a dhess chaem dhar cruithneichtni.
Gidh olc cennchait clann Eaba
na healta sna heignedha
ise in beo dobi sa croich
doni itir eo acus enlaith.
Blath na nairni is he dobeir
do thecht tre thaeb in droighin
blath na cno tre craeib eili
re thaeib ca mo mirboili?—Y. B. L., 366^{b}, 19–26.

O'Clery, and deals with the Nativity of the Virgin and the Birth of Christ:—

> Mary, the smooth white ewe, bore an illustrious Lamb in the stall of an ass; she merited not a mean cold lodging when the illustrious Lamb was with His mother.
>
> The High-King of Heaven was born in kindly Bethlehem at Christmas, when He was born He took a course from the sun so that He warmed the world with His glowing heat
>
> The windows of the moon and ether opened at the tidings, so that the sun flung wide his doors, heretofore there had been a veil over his light.
>
> The air was full of his radiance, 'twas easy to notice it, it was one bright grove of angels reaching to heaven over Holy Mary.[1]

The other poem is a short anonymous piece on St. Catherine of Alexandria:—

> The King of the Greeks' daughter who never refused entreaty, has a bright brow; the complexion of the strawberry is in the hue of her fair cheek.
>
> In her bright cheek is the hue of the strawberry and sunlit eyes, manifold' is the waving and the coils and the curling (?) of her coifed tresses.
>
> No Grecian woman surpassed the maiden in . . . form; (she has) a well-set eye that never gazed on youthful warrior, bright lips with white teeth.
>
> Her countenance (glowed) like fire, with bosom like the swan, a virgin that was never defiled; blossom is not whiter than her pale-white hand, her eye is grey in a fair cheek.[2]

OTHER VERSE

In Wales and Scandinavia the court-poets did not confine themselves to the composition of official and religious verse. In the North love-songs (mansǫngr) are preserved in which Kormak, Gunnlaug, and others sing the praises of Steingerd or the fair Helga, whilst in Wales erotic verse is met with from the time of Howel ab Owain onwards.[3] In Ireland, on the other hand, no love-poetry known to be composed by the later bards in the period in question has been preserved. It can scarcely be doubted that the men who played such an important part in the society of their day actually wrote many love-poems in praise of the ladies they met at the various houses they visited. As it is, almost all the verses of this description which have survived are in the Dean's Book, and are attributed to Isabella Countess of Argyle.[4]

[1] *Archiv f. celt. Lexicog.*, iii, p. 244; Macgr. No. VIII. Kuno Meyer has recently printed another poem on the same subject, *Z. f. c. P.*, viii. 561 ff.

[2] Macgr. No. XXXI.

[3] Stephens, p. 37 ff.

[4] According to Henderson, *Home Life of the Highlanders*, p. 97, this lady was the daughter of the second Earl of Argyle, and wife of the second Earl of Cassilis, who was killed at Prestwick in 1527 For a poem by her see

Short satirical poems also occur in considerable numbers in the same Edinburgh book. But here again the authors are, it would seem, exclusively of aristocratic origin, chief amongst them being Countess Isabella, Gerald the Rhymer, Earl of Desmond (d. 1397),[1] and Sir Duncan Campbell. The subjects of the satires which are often of the grossest description, are, as elsewhere, the fickleness of women and the dissolute life of the clergy.[2] Two of these compositions were in all probability suggested by Brant's *Ship of Fools.*[3]

The skill of the Irish in playing the harp is noticed by several writers, and is grudgingly admitted by Gerald the Welshman, who had very little that was good to say about the island. Given this passion for music, it is easy to understand how it comes about that the harp forms the subject of a number of poems. O'Curry in his Lectures published two, one by Gilbride Macnamee,[4] the other a sixteenth-century composition.[5] Similarly Macgregor preserves an address to a harp which is found also in the O'Conor Don's Book and a Stowe MS :—

> O harp of O'Coscair's Hill that bringest slumber to waking eyes, thou of the sweet melodious voice, pleasant, refreshing, grave.
>
> O choice instrument of the gentle curve, loud-tongued one, crimson as hemlock (?), melodious harp that lulled us to sleep played by harmonious fingers.
>
> Thou healer of every wounded warrior, prince to woo women, sound of carousing that is wont to be heard o'er the dark ale, mystic sweet-sounding voice.
>
> Thou especial delight of all that know thee, smooth sweet-musical weir, bright star above fairy mansions, cherished diadem of monarchs.
>
> O plash of the beach against the gentle wave, shady tree of true melody, feasts consumed in thy presence are like the song of the swan on beautiful lakes.
>
> O strain of fairy women from the mound of Ler, peerless in respect of melody, under thy guidance every abode is full of harmony, thou highest glory of the harp's minstrelsy.[6]

Maclauchlan and Skene, p. 156, and Sigerson, *Bards of the Gael and Gall*, p. 211. Macgregor also preserves the following verses by this lady :—

> There is a youth intent upon me, King of Kings, may he come to fortune! he was denied by my wrangling (?) and yet 'tis him I choose as companion.
>
> Were all according to my desire there would ne'er be distance between us ; is it not enough to say that, seeing that he understands not how things are?
>
> Alas! 'tis not easy unless his ship come—a tale that is grievous to us both ; he is east and I am west, so that our mutual desire will not come to pass again. (No. LXI.)

[1] It is curious to note that whilst the Dean's Book preserves poems by this writer, only one specimen of his verse is known to me from other sources. See Todd's *Analysis of the Book of Fermoy*, p. 33.

[2] Cp. S. M. Tucker, *Verse Satire in England before the Renaissance*, more especially, pp. 175–7.

[3] Skene-Maclauchlan, p. 107; Macgr. No. LII.

[4] *Manners and Customs*, iii. 271.

[5] Ibid., iii. 287.

[6] Macgr. No. XL.

From what has already been said, it will be clear that we are merely acquainted with a few stray representatives of the non-official poetry of the later bards. The Irish collections consist almost exclusively of panegyrics and religious poems, but until all the material in the Royal Irish Academy has been described, we may continue to cherish the hope that pieces of a more personal nature will be discovered.

In conclusion, I should like to draw attention to a lament in the Dean's Book on the death of a bard's wife Macgregor ascribes the poem to Murray O'Daly As the verses are unique in character there is no need to apologize for the length of the quotation :—

My soul parted from me yestere'en, a fair form that was dear to me lay in the grave ; a gentle, stately lady was taken away from me with a linen shroud around her.

Myself alone to-night, O God, evil is this crooked world Thou beholdest ; fair and whole was the goodly form which was here last night, O King.

Sad for me (to behold) that couch over there, my long pallet . . . . ; we have seen a tall noble form with scattered tresses upon thee, couch.

A woman with gentle countenance lay upon half of my pallet, with naught save the hazel-blossom like to the one with the sweet-spoken dark womanly form.

Mael Mheadha of dark brows, my mead-vessel along with me ; the flower that has left me was my (dearest) heart, the royal blossom after being planted has drooped.

My body has passed from my control and has fallen to her share ; I am a body in two pieces now that the fair gentle beauteous one has passed away.

She was one of my two feet, one of my sides, her countenance was like the white-thorn; she was one of my eyes, one of my (two) hands.

She was the half of my body, the bright candle ; Thou hast dealt harshly with me, O King, I am faint in saying it, she was the full half of my soul.

Her large soft eye was my first love, her white teeth and . . . ; her fair body belonged to no man before me.

Twenty years we spent together ; our converse grew ever sweeter ; the tall bright stem with tapering fingers bore to me children eleven.

Though I am alive, I no longer exist since my smooth hazel-nut departed, after my dear love has parted from me, the dark world is empty and bare.

Mael Mheadha's voice was full of mirth . . . ; my maidens and my school have dispersed since the gentle fair one has gone from us.

The Lord of Hosts and the Lord of Roads has taken her from us ; small the affection on the part of the one of the flowing tresses so bright and young to die leaving her husband.

Dear the soft hand that was here, King of bells and churchyards ; alas for the hand that never sware (false) oath ; 'tis a pain for me that it is not placed under my head.[1]

[1] Macgr. No. XXVII. The restoration of the text of this poem is due to Prof. Bergin, who has kindly answered a number of inquiries with regard to the rendering of other quotations.

APPENDIX

A

Two Poems by Murray O'Daly from Rawlinson B 514.

Addressed to Donnell Mór O'Donnell (d. 1241).

I

1 A Dombnaill, deglam fa sid, denu-sa aicned indrig;
ni maith sidh *acht* co sub*ach*, na bidh flaith co *fri*chnumach.

2 Dena righacht is reidhe, ni haicned rig rodheine;
as lat Erne acus Eine, brat ar n-erghe a hainbfine.

3 Tarla damh lamach, dar lem, dofetar isse m'fuighell,
ni derna fuighell acht *fer* ar nach cuirenn a cáinedh.

4 Geis do righ, a rí Finde, sceinm re scel an *cet*-gille;
ni dlesidh gach duine tren go fess*idh* luidhe ar l*eth*sc*el*.

5 An mc docuaid d'iarruid Finn? fiarf*aig* da fuil 'san airdchill;
fech, a c*ri*dhe solus s[a]in, ca dorus tighe a torcair. •

6 Is hi an foiridhin fallsa do soiss*ed* uaib oramsa,
g*ur* b'e, a Domn*aill*, do dill*echt* do congbhuinn ret cipine*cht* (?).

7 Dob'e an coimes echt oile M*ac* Coissi 's a cirmoiri;
dail nar b'ferr rium doronadh Find am cend do *com*óradh.

8 Tainic is tuc mo lois fa xx. id am fiadhn*ais*e,
dosía ara *corp no* ara cruth, cia les n*ach* olc an t-enghuth?

9 Da marband *acus* me ad tig mac rig maith no m*ac* taisig,
ful*ang* hanf*aid* dob'ussa *tri*asan tarbchoin turussa.

10 Mo a ndernais inam dlighe d'fal*ad* at fir muin*n*t*ire*;
ge sith donessi anossa f*rit*[h] do sith d'eis Aengossa.

11 An ced long *tri*allfus tar tuind uaid, a ri Doiri, a Domn*aill*,
leic, a mil*id*, me *tar* ais lesna tirib ó tucais.

12 Oirdeoch*ad* duid a ndlige •rim, a ṡoercl*ann* tSuil*ige*;
a n-íc Finn *no* Duib *no* Duinn na cuir ind dít, a Domn*aill*.

13 Eacail leamsa do moid m*er*, a Domn*aill* D*r*oma Lighen;
ar los do rímhoide rim c*ros* na *tri*nnoide a timchiull.

14 Ge tussa nac[h] ti *tar* aiss ar an *cet*glór docanais,
gach *Con*allach 'sa cruinde go rolonduch romhuinde.

15 Clann aindílis an fuind gloin, cl*ann* Eoch*ach* is cl*ann* Ceall*aig*,
Sil mBaigill ni biad am cinn, ni ṡailim íad dom indill.[1]

16 Muindtir *Teircheirt* ar mo thí   ni creidim uaid, a airdrigh,
mó sailim mo cin do ceilt   d'fir mar ó taibseing *Tercheirt*.
17 Da ngreistea, a ri, dom rochtain   *muintir* dedgheal Dochartaich,
cuich dob'anathlamh ann sin   *no clann* maluchdub Maen*aig*.[1]
18 Cl*ann* Breislein ni biad am cenn   ge bhud d'aicm*edaib* Eir*enn*,
mac Duinn, ge bocc do bunadh,   is *mac Cuinn* is *Con*cub*ar*.
19 Dócha iad uili ar mo druim   ina duine d'Ib Domhn*aill*,
ní ticc *mac* daib *no* dalta   lat a ndail na dighalta.
20 Gach maith do tír is do tuind   cugaib, a cinel *Con*uill,
na raib d'foghail *no* d'esb*uid*   oraib *acht* an t-enf*er*-soin.
21 Ni facadhus re hathaidh   me, a m*ic* í *Cuind Cetcathaig*;
a Domn*aill*, na dum mar sin   an suil mongduinn red m*uintir*.
22 Traethfud-sa th'ferc da fédar,   dligth*er* airdr*ic* d'uirbrég*adh*;
bráithf*ed*, a flaith Br*eg*, do *bét*,   ni maith cnedh gan a *com*éd.
23 Cet*hrar* is *gru*amdha dar ghin,   leom*an* buidhe *is* beith*ir*,
matgham*ain* finn, dregan donn,   dar lium tecar 'na timcholl.
24 Hferg mor-sa *is* do miri   baidfe ceol ar cerdi-ne;
dan *agus* gan duais da cinn,   sámh les *gach* cluais dá cluinenn.
25 Sloindf*ed* da cr eide, a cul lag,   a m*ic* *bua* n-Ech*ach* Fanad,
ni fuil, a d*er*cc ceibfinn cais,   *cerd* a n-Ei*rinn* at fecmais.
26 Tucais leat, a cais corc*ra*,   c*er*da bregtha banntr*o*chta,
comláine gach*a* cerde,   bondbaine *is* beild*ei*rge.
27 Deige n-aigthe is n-ingen,   rosc leat*han* gan luathfill*ed*,
maigr*i* saer tana tr*o*ighed,   mala cael nar caeloidh*edh*.
28 Colpa seda, sliasad geal,   mala dub, Dia dá díden,
ded as caeimhe 'sa *cru*inde,   med is saire is sulcuirri.
29 Long do brondadh *cona* b*e*rt   is cloidhem co n-ór d'imb*er*t;
long *cona* b*e*rt do bronnadh   's gan a ceilt ar *cet*longadh.
30 Tinnscnamh ar sidha ise sin,   a m*ic* Ecnech*ain* Oilig,
anadh b*ud* lomlainn leam sunn,   ma ferr, a Domn*aill* deglum. A Domn*aill*.
31 Do corc*ras* clochan don aib,   a Maeil Mhaedoic M*ic* Amlaib,
nir b'f*ur*ail deit degláid glan,   a M*ic* Aml*aib*, 'na inadh.
32 Logh damh a ndernus ad cill,   a Í Neill Team*ra*, a Tailcinn,
is tu caraim is ru-m-car,   a Cal*uim* dan clú *crabad*.
33 A Dubgaill, na delaig rind,   a codhn*aig* cloinde Baighill,
a Í Baigill duinn Doiri   ó tuind taibseng Thor*aige*.
34 Na deglam ar Dia do nimh,   a Diarm*aid* finn Í Firgil,
is tú at aenar is imlán   ót aeradh ot athimradh.
35 A I Bresl*ein*, a barr lacc,   a m*ic* Duinn a dun Fanad,
na dísl*ig* mesi, a m*ic* Duinn,   ma deit budh tresi ad trench*u*ing.
36 A Aed Í T[h]erc*heirt*, na treicc   mesi *no* mac mo leithéid,
a cinn Caisil od omhnair,   taisich ind 'nar n-ollomhn*aib*.

37 A *Chon*cubair duinn dalt*aig*   m*ic* Domn*all* 7 Dochart*aig*,
na leic loidhe oirnn ón Dal*aigh*[1]   do géicc Doiri dimbádhaigh.
38 Na deglam ar Día nime,   a Mailtsechl*ainn* tSuil*igi*,
masa leir deit ar ndograing,   a m*ic* réidh í righ-Domn*aill*
A Domn*aill*.

II

1 Cían ó d'ibess digh ndermaid   ro-m-scar re Siúir sibhenbhuice,
risin Sinainn moir maigridh,   re Boinn srublainn srubhaibn*igh*.
2 Nocha dermódainn don digh   Muaidh na Suca nó Sibhinn,
no Buill an buinne braenaidh   'nar muime 'nar macaemhuibh
3 *No* Finn no Drobhais nó Duib,   no Sliccidh n-ughaid n-énaigh,
no ar mbuime núaidhes nellne,   no ruaidhes na righ-Erne.
4 Nó Eithne na n-ecn*ed* ngel   no Life leath*an* Laighen
no Banna no Tuinn Tuaide,   no clanna Cuinn Craebruaidhe.
5 Gidh imdha do clannaib Cuinn   gilla ag oirbhiri oruinn,
a cíall go c*ert* no a cuimne   t*erc* da mbiad 'nar mbeth*uid*-ne.
6 *Cóic* bliadhna dec as doigh lim   damh a n-ingnuis na hEr*enn*;
a suil rinn ní fuil *festa*,   ó soin ind ar enmhesca
7 Rainec me, maith an sidhe,   saerclann Tiri Tairrng*ire*,
ní mé rainec fer b*ud* ferr,   ass *ed*[2] tainec im thimchell.
8 *Con*nachta, Dal Cais cialla,   Conull, Eog*an*, Oirghíalla,
sluaigh an brogha 's na bruigne   uaim ar ndola ar dichuimhne.
9 Mar budh eadh as e ar sam*ail*   ar an echtra allmaraich
bretha Col*uim* ceibfinn caidh   orainn fa Er*inn* d'fácbail.
10 Farír do radsat*ar* Goill,   brechrug*ad* ingnadh orainn,
Goill dom srained tar sal soir   o lár Gaid*el* do gelladh.
11 As eadh bud amharus lium   da roisind óca Eir*ionn*
gan m'aithne ag righ *nó* ac ruiri   dib a haithli m'amhsuine.
12 Bess nocha bertha a cal*ad*   me a Fodla na findchal*ad*,
me úaim gan adhradh a fad   sluaigh na talman o tanag
13 Eagail lem croidhe ni cél,   da rísainn Inis[3] Samher,
gan áes ogbad d'anadh rinn   'na caladh fódglan aibinn.
14 Cach uaim 'ga fiarf*aig*e damh,   cuich mé fen ar tuinn talm*an*?
cet fir[4] deroil dím ag cách   am senóir crín gan *chon*ach.
15 Gidh eadh ro facbus, dar leam,   aenocl*ach* d'fer*aib* Er*enn*,
m'aithne doberudh go becht   ar feghadh m'aighte ainf*echt*.
16 Da mbeith clann aelta Aml*aib*   adrum 's a d*erg* dondabr*aig*,
sáilim aithne ar an guth nglan   gan c*ru*th a aighte d'fégadh.
17 Inmain oclaech airm fada,   leom*an* Leptha Díarmada,
nar leic orainn orlann airm,   Domn*all* *Con*uill a comhainm
18 Conall*aigh* mo chroinn mela,   *Connacht*aigh as íad m'oideadha;
na sl*uaigh* fá sech ar m'óigh ann,   is suaill n*ach* leath doib Domn*all*.

[1] leg. oirnn na leic loidhe ón Dalaigh?
[2] MS. aṡs.
[3] vel co sruth MS. (recte).
[4] MS. .c. f.

19 Do-ad*ras* ó ais lenaib Domn*all* Dúna ná innenaidh,[1]
mala goirmseda mar Goll, a coimleaba do-clechtsum.
20 Da maired m'aicne*d* and sin acam am airdrigh Oil*ig*,
gilla an ruisc gormmoill gleghlais, Ó Domn*aill* ni der*medmais*.
21 Ni dermed(a)*mar* a gnúis ngloin 'ga cedlenmain a Cruach*oin*,
toss*ach* gach beinde buab*aill* fa linne ar a leathgual*ainn*.
22 Día dá íc re folt ródglan an tres *fecht* ro-in-furfóc*ra*dh,
b*ud* nemom*an* dá cul cam dealog*ad* dúnn re Domn*all*.
23 Da treicinn an finn fallan, Domn*all* Dúine Cremthannán,
dobeir cend Codhail is Cuilt mo cenn a comhair *cét*-fuilt
24 Nir chara d*amh* rí remhe failte flatha Suil*ig*e,
mar dobínn 'ga gruaidh gelbuilc docím úaim nach indermaid.
25 Ní deirméd écusc an ḟir Domn*all* Ó Domn*aill* déidghil;
déd ban *agus* bel corcra dán trén bágh an banntro*chta*.
26 Bricht serce a n-urlabra an fir, gen gáiri 'na gruaidh thibr*igh*,
sduaidh ina dhegmal*aig* duinn os gruaid gelbhan*aig* (?)[2] Domn*aill*.
27 Rogha na ce*r*d, an Coimdhe, do-ch*um* delb ai nDomhnaill-ne;
snas donn a cúil 'na caraib, súil gl*as* corr fá caemmal*aigh*.
28 Domn*all* Indse Saimér sin mac Ecnech*án* úa Donnch*aidh*
beithir Fánad mar Ḟer nDiadh ó tanac re headh n-imcían.
Cian o d'ibes.

B

I

A Description of the Poems contained in Rawlinson B 514.

The first 60 leaves are taken up with the Life of St. Columba by Magnus O'Donnell. The following 18 leaves have their own pagination :—

1 *a.* 58 stanzas attributed to Fland Mainistrech, beginning :
Conall cuingidh cloinde Neill tainic a Temraig taibreidh
*daithe a falaidh sa tír thú*aidh *a cuicedh Uladh armruaidh.*
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

1 *b.* A poem of 30 stanzas, beginning :
*Ata sund rulla na righ cland Ech*ach *nach ob essídh*
[cúig] *mic Ech*ach *fá trén tress dleaghar dím a ríseucus*
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

2 *a.* A poem in 32 stanzas, beginning :
A eolcha Conaill ceoluigh sloinnid dunn dail co treóru
*ga cúis far gab Dála*ch *dil urlamhus ar a braith*ib.
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

Ibid. A poem in 46 stanzas, beginning:
Enna dalta Cairpri cruaid *rogab tir nEnda armr*uaidh
*faeb*aid *an cuingidh a cl*ann *a fosc*adh *cinidh* Con*aill.*
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

2 *b*. Under the heading of *Slicht seinliubair Caillin andso* there is a poem of 12 stanzas, beginning.
*Cairpri Eog*ain *Enna eimh* agus *Conall mor mac Neill*
as mesi as eolcha na roinn *a truchadha sa tóraind.*
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

3 *a*. A similar heading is prefixed, *Slicht an tseinliubair cedna an duan-sa.* There follows a poem of 23 stanzas, beginning:
Eistigh re Conall calma *agus re hEoghan amra*
mar dorinneadar an dail *a mullach Droma Cruachain*
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

Ibid. A poem of 17 stanzas, beginning.
A liubhair ata ar do lar *senchus Coinchub*air *comhlan*
do righ echtach Oilig uill *is do righ cinil* Con*uill.*
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

Ibid. Another poem of 17 stanzas, beginning·
Ata sunn senchus nach *suaill* *do righ Essa rogloin Ruaidh*
*gach ní dlighes ni duaithn*idh *as sires o primthuath*aibh.
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book. Printed by K. Meyer from B iv 2 in *Z f. c. P.*, viii. 115.

3 *b*. A well-known poem of 12 stanzas, beginning:
Bendacht ort, a Floind Aidhne, *gab ot mh*athan *comairle,*
na bidh gan gart at gnim ngle *oir is lat g*ach *ní cuinghe.*
Printed by K. Meyer in *Z. f. c. P.*, viii, p. 109. Other copies in the O'Conor Don's Book and in a MS. at Stoneyhurst.

Ibid. A poem ascribed to Fland mac Lonain ollamh Connacht. 64 stanzas, beginning:
Ard do scela a mic na cuach *doraduis lat as gnimh truagh*
*Ecnach*an *mac Dálaig dil* *do dhul fon talm*ain *tromdhil.*
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

4 *b*. 66 stanzas ascribed to Coluim-cille.
Eistea frim a Baithin buain *guth mo cluic aní adhuair*
gon indiser iar sodhain *a ticc fri deredh domhain*
See *Ériu*, v. 11; *Abbott's Cat.*, pp. 291, 307 (?).

5 *a*. A poem of 35 stanzas attributed to Caillin. Begins:
Ata sunn lecht Con*uill cruaidh* *mor f*echt *ruc buaidh ar cech leth*
sochuide ro-cuir a n-ég *mor cuiri mor* crich *i o-crech.*

5 b. The next poem has the heading, *Slicht seinliub*air *Caillin so.* It contains 9 stanzas similar to the following:

Caillin caidh cumhachtach
espoc uassal oirnidhe
dorinde mór d'fertaibh
as cach tír a bfuair
tainic Caillin caimhfertach
is aingeal Dé ga for*congra*
corub ann ro-suidhestar
ac dún Baili buain.

Ibid. 14 stanzas ascribed to the same Caillin, beginning:

Gebaidh crith an talumh tend *gach tír fal*am *iar mbráth nglonn*
ba deimhin do cách an brath *faiclet ticfa in muir ar cach.*

6 a. A dialogue between Caillin and an angel with the heading, *Aingeal* dixit *fri Caillin.* Contains 8 stanzas similar to the following:

*Codludh san imd*aidh-*se*
don mind óir oirnide
*don merge lasamn*a
do Caillin caidh
an mhuir tar minnlochuib
don grein os minnrendaib
don breithir blaith.

Ibid. A poem of 17 stanzas ascribed to Caireall mac Curnain. Begins:

Is olc ata a nEri anocht *Goill is Gaid*il *folt ar folt*
*siad Gaid*il *bus mel*aigh *de* co *n-eir sraonghalaig Doiri.*

Abbott's Cat., p. 291.

Ibid. A poem of 18 stanzas attributed to Ulltan. Begins:

Foghar na gaithe-si anoir *benus re bord* *no curaicch*
is saeth lium an ní diata *claidh find na heculsa.*

Abbott's Cat., p. 291.

6 b. Seven stanzas, beginning:

*Martha*in tar*ais d'Eirinn uaim* *re toighecht go hArainn uair*
biaidh Eri gan rian gan rath noco *toir an t-Aedh Eng*ach.

Abbott's Cat., p. 292.

Ibid. A poem of 47 stanzas ascribed to Find. Begins:

A Oisin an raide rinn *ni d'faisdine* mic *Cumaill*
*ar tairrngi*re *and rig co rath* *fír ainglid*e *a adhradh.*

Abbott's Cat., pp. 291, 292.

7 a. 9 stanzas ascribed to Find, beginning:

A ben labrus rium an laech *ata ni as mó do-traoth mo ceill*
tadbhas damh-sa taibrid recht *ruc mo nert is ruc mo ceill.*

Abbott's Cat., p. 291. *Duanaire Finn*, p. 85.

Ibid. 20 stanzas ascribed to Find, beginning:

*Uath*mar *me a Temr*aig *anocht* *a Adlainn as docht mo scel*
ni mairend don rigraidh reil *acht Fiach*na *fen damnader.*

7 *b*. 7 stanzas, beginning:

Congal cind magair maith ri bliadain *da bliadain fo tri*
d'Erind gan cogadh can cath *fa rí sona secht bliadhnach.*

Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book

Ibid. A short prose extract with the heading, *Slicht senlubair is cingín ó Ard Carna andso*:

*Buand*acht *bona I Domn*aill *ar cúicid Ulad andso .i. cuid da xx ar thir Conuill agus cuid tri xx ar clonn Aedha Buidhe agus cuid v bfer ndec co leith agus dá fich*it *ar Ó Cathan. Cuid tri xx ar Cinel Moain agus cuid dá xx sa raithe ar Úa Floind agus cuid dá xx ar Mac Gillamuiri agus cuid tri xx ar Ib Each*ach *agus cuid dá xx ar Oirr thearaib* agus *an uirrdail cetna ar Oirgiallaib* agus *cuid da xx ar feraib Manach agus cuid da xx ar Tir Fiachrach Arda Sratha agus cuid da xx ar Mac Cathmail agus cuid da fer déc ar Mág Cana agus cuid dá fer décc ar xx ar muindt*ir *Birn agus cuid sesir ar Ó Charagán agus rl.*

Ibid. A poem of 41 stanzas by Gillabrighde Mac Conmidhe, beginning:

Rogha na cloinne Conall *togha na droinge aderaim*
*tolc dar seol*ad *ruc romham* Con*all tuc d'Eogan ferann.*

There is another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book. O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 353.

8 *a*. A poem of 33 stanzas by the same, beginning:

Conall cuingidh cloinne Neill *mac dob'uaisli don aidreim*
*les doch*uaid *a Midhe amach* gach *fine tuaidh ar tossach.*

For other copies see *Ériu*, iv. 187, and the O'Conor Don's Book.

8 *b*. A poem of 33 stanzas by the same, beginning:

Tainic tairngeri na n-erlum *uaisli Fodla fer*i*de daib*
ni cian co foirther a forrad *fóirf*ed *ar fiadh fonnbog Fail.*

Ibid. A poem of 39 stanzas by the same, beginning.

Cethrar as feili fuair Flann *on lo do-crec a cét-rann*
ar tolladh Erend uili *d'ollamh meirseng Maenmhuighe.*

9 *a* A poem of 26 stanzas by the same, beginning:

Do-fidir Dia Cinel Conuill *do cur an imsnímh ar ais*
*tai*nic *trebaidh cride Col*uim *ar fine caidh* Con*aill cais.*

See O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 350.

9 *b*. A poem of 25 stanzas by the same, beginning:

*Testa eochair glais Gaid*il *fá Eirinn do-heccáinedh*
budh *anbfuinn doib greim a nglais* *isa seim óir na fécmus.*

10 *a*. A poem of 45 stanzas by the same, beginning:

Do slan úaim a Áth Senuig *docuaidh cach ad claindeb*uid
*tárrus ort meing as meb*uil *olc do greim do Gaidhel*uibh.

10 *b*. A poem of 37 stanzas attributed to Brian Ruadh Mac Conmidhe, beginning:

*Imdha urruim ac Ult*aibh *dligi*d *uaisli imarc*aidh
asse dleghar do dhuine *lenadh sé na sochaidhe.*

For other copies see *Ériu*, iv. 187, and the O'Conor Don's Book.

Ibid. A poem of 38 stanzas by the same, beginning.
Lenfat mo chert ar cloinn Dalaig *mo dhúthchas riu recfa me*
ní ghébh acht *lé cert don* cet-*śeal* *dogén* nert *mad eccen he.*

11 *a.* A poem of 33 stanzas by the same, beginning.
Dimghach do Chonall Dálach *dimg*ach *ar* nach *oirches dlái*
ní ní acht *mar do-an ar eneing* *an ri is Magh Feilim fái.*

11 *b.* A poem of 44 stanzas attributed to Ruaidri Ruadh O hUiginn. Begins:
Fulang annróidh adbhar soidh *fadla ar tús as tuar fledhoil*
asse as túr anóra ann *run an ansodha d'fulang.*
For other copies see *Ériu*, iv. 188.

12 *a.* A poem of 33 stanzas ascribed to Fergal Ruad O hUiginn. Begins:
*Fada adert*ar *na deich rig* *do breith na leab*aid *go leir*
go roich an t-aenmadh dec dibh deich *righ décc a naembhrugh Neill.*

12 *b* A poem of 15 stanzas by Tadg Occ O hUicind. Begins:
Faillsigh do mirbaili a Muiri *maidem assad asse ar lon*
bid mo cás ort ina eri *nocht do gras a Muiri mór.*
Another copy in Y. B. L., 373ª, 8.

Ibid. A poem of 28 stanzas, probably by the same writer, beginning:
Olc cuimhnighim mo cumann *aic*ned *muna athcumam*
mo cuimhne docóidh a richt nach *cóir suirghe ré sesiucht.*

13 *a.* A poem of 36 stanzas attributed to Diarmaid O Cleirig. Begins:
*Maruid fós f*erta *Coluim* *laide da lucht uraduill*
la ar a cumachta ní cuir *mar tá a n-*ádhacht*a an erlaimh.*

13 *b.* A poem of 37 stanzas, beginning.
*Ní deor*aidh *meisi a Manainn* *me este ni hintadhaill*
do-gab baid re Manainn me *dot grad anaim a Éri.*
For another copy see Y. B. L., 395ª, 40.

14 *a.* A poem of 29 stanzas attributed to Muireduch Lesa-an-Doill. Begins:
Cían ó d'ibess digh ndermaid *ro-m-scar re Siúir sibhenbhuicc*
risin Sinainn moir maigridh *re Boinn sriubfainn sriubhaibn*igh.
Supra, p. 132.

Ibid. A poem of 38 stanzas by the same, beginning·
A Domhnaill deglam fa sidh *denusa aic*ned *indrig*
ni maith sidh acht *co sub*ach *na bidh flaith co frichnumach.*
Supra, p. 130.

14 *b.* A poem of 54 stanzas ascribed to Tuathal mac Taidc Í Uicind. Begins:
Dimghach Eiri d'fuil Conuill *coir estecht a huroghaill*
bec taila fan dimgaidh dib *gabla d'fidb*aid *na n-airdrigh.*

15 *a*. A poem of 42 stanzas by Gofraid Mac-an-Baird, beginning.
Minec frith Eri a hEamain *a dil celi fa comhair*
an tsin ni fuil na adhaidh *gabaidh don fuil righ roghain.*

15 *b*. A poem of 48 stanzas attributed to Domnall mac Taidg Óicc Í Uigind:
Cia adeir nar melladh Maghnus *ni ceisd is ecail d'aidhnes*
si ar clodh ceilli fa clemhnus *mor derbus Ere a ainmhes.*

16 *a*. 57 stanzas ascribed to Seaan O Dalaig Breithfne. The last 7 stanzas are on 18 *a*. The leaf containing them has been misplaced. Begins:
Cia rer fuirghedh feis Teamra *ar claochlogh a cedmeadra*
mithid ri a tulaig an-trir *nir cubaid hi gan airdrigh.*

17 *a*. A poem of 33 stanzas by Giollabrighde Mac Conmidhe, beginning:
Caidhet cethri teallaig Temra *dhan toich Eri o thuind go tuinn* ?
don tsiol is saire rechteus *do sil raidhi cennchas Cuind*

17 *b*. A poem of 50 stanzas in a much later hand than the remainder of the poems. It is attributed to Cu-Uladh mac Concubair Ruaidh Mic-an-Baird. Begins:
Fuigheall formaid fuil Dalaigh *tnuth da mbúain na mbengánaibh*
do-chronaigh suil eigin ind *an tnudh ni heidir d'faichill.*

18 *a*. A poem of 38 stanzas ascribed to Gofraidh Mac-an-Baird. Begins:
Anois aithnighim m'uabhar *airighim ar gach n-aeinfer*
ler cuir sinn d'eol ar m'uabar *fuarad linn deor do deneam.*

18 *b*. A poem of 33 stanzas attributed to Giollabrighde Mac Conmidhe. Unlike the rest of the book this page is not easy to read in consequence of rubbing. The piece begins:
Ceidtreabh Erend Inis Baimher *ar selbh dilend dia do rús*
ni daim ochtair do fuair Banbha *ar rochtain thuaidh tarla ar tús.*

II

The Contents of Gaelic MS., Advocates' Library No. LXIV.

A very dilapidated paper MS., now consisting of 37 leaves. The contents are almost entirely religious poems.

1 *a*. Half of the first leaf is torn away. Gives the end of a poem, the last stanza of which contains the words:
gcreidir mar is coir damh *cumacht Muire* . . . . . .

Ibid. A poem, beginning *Triur righ tainic* = Macgregor, No. II. Cp. *Abbott's Cat.*, p. 363. 10 stanzas.

Ibid. A poem, beginning:
Mairg dan budh chara an ogh *anam elithe moghuin.*
Extends to foot of 1 *b* (?).

2 *a*. A poem of 60 (?) stanzas, beginning:

Deirbhthsiur don egna an eigsi.

Extends to foot of 3 *a*. See *Abbott's Cat*, Index.

3 *b*. A poem, beginning:

Gach maith a moradh aluind cerd o craobh ó rath
nona sery a snuadh mar sin buan gach *cerd 7 coiridh*

5 *b*. A poem of 46 stanzas on the Legend of the Holy Rood, beginning: *Marthuind duit a croch an choimdedh* (= Macgregor, No. V).

6 *b*. A poem of 43 stanzas on the Nativity of the Virgin and the Infancy of Christ. Begins *Fuigeall bennacht brugh Muire.* Printed by K. Meyer from the Book of Hy Mane in *Archiv f. celt. Lex.*, iii, p. 244 = Macgregor, No. VIII.

8 *a*. *Duan anso o fpilip mac Cuinn Crosaigh ann a daispentar tuarusgbhai uathm(ar) laithe an braich agus an modh ar a dtiocfa Criosd docum an bhretheamnais agus na briathra adera ann . . . grasa nach diongna fa dheredh.* 54 stanzas, beginning:

Tuar feirge foighide Dhe.

Cp. *Abbott's Cat.*, p. 362. There is another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

9 *a*. Poem by Tadhg Óg. 29 stanzas, beginning:

Ataid tri comraig am chind.

Macgregor, No. III. Cp. O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 363.

10 *a*. Poem by Tadhg Óg. 19 stanzas, beginning:

Aithin me dod toide a Eoin.

Other copies: Y. B. L., 362ᵃ, 19; Book of the O'Conor Don.

10 *b*. Poem by Tadhg Óg. 28 stanzas, beginning:

Cia gabus m'anamain re ais.

Cp. Y. B. L., 364ᵃ, 12; Book of the O'Conor Don.

11 *a*. Poem by Tadhg Óg. 44 stanzas, beginning:

Bec nach tainic mo t(h)erma.

Other copies: Y. B. L., 364ᵇ, 27; Adv. XXIX; Book of the O'Conor Don.

12 *a*. Poem by Tadhg Óg. 30 stanzas, beginning:

Gab m'egnach a Eoin Baisdi.

Other copies: Y. B. L., 369ᵇ, 17; Adv. XXIX.

12 *b*. Poem by Tadhg Óg. 32 stanzas, beginning:

Cairt a sichana ag siol Adhamh.

Macgregor, No. IV. = Y. B. L., 363ᵃ, 31.

13 *b*. Poem of 34 stanzas by Tadhg Óg, beginning:

Ag so bragha det a Dhe.

Other copies: Y. B. L., 368ᵃ, 11; Adv. XXIX; Book of the O'Conor Don.

14 *b*. Poem of 36 stanzas by Tadhg Óg, beginning:
Mairg danab soirbh an saegal.
Other copies: Y. B. L., 366[b], 28; Book of the O'Conor Don.

15 *a*. Poem of 38 (?) stanzas, beginning:
Namadh da caraid clann Adhaim *egoir bid gan beth da roir*
ge ata fala Dé ar gach nduine *ise a gcara fire fein.*

16 *a*. Poem of 44 stanzas, beginning:
Gabham dechmadh ar ndana.
Cp. O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 345; *Archiv*, ii. 141.

17 *a*. Poem of 30 stanzas, beginning:
Gabam grem maith do Muire *minic sinn ga sirguidhe*
a cuid do duain De dligi *dochuaidh mé na muinigin.*

17 *b*. Poem of 32 stanzas attributed to Donnchad Mór, beginning:
Aithrige sunn duit a Dhé.

18 *b*. Poem of 41 stanzas attributed to Tadhg Óg, beginning:
Teine arna fadodh ferg De.
Other copies. Adv. XXIX, R.I.A. 23 G 23, F ii 3.

19 *b*. Poem of 37 stanzas, beginning:
Ceangal sodenta siogh De.

20 *a*. Poem of 38 stanzas attributed to Fpilip bocht [O hUiginn]. Begins:
Bennachd a mathar ar mac nDé.
Abbott's Cat., p. 362.

21 *a*. Poem of 30 stanzas by Fergal Og [Mac-an-Bhaird ?]. Begins:
Ben glas dom croidi a Choimghe.
The opening words are not repeated at the end.

22 *a*. Poem of 40 stanzas, beginning:
Fada mé ar merughad sligheadh

23 *a*. Three stanzas by Mac Con O Cleir*igh*. Begins.
Roim na bp[ecthach] (?) *ar thech nDé.*
Three (?) stanzas by Tadhg Dall. Begins:
. . . . . . *bpthach uaim* Padraig(?) *bec na saraidh uaim Letha*
port glanta anma o fpianaibh *glan Roim iarthar in betha.*

23 *b*. Poem of 44 stanzas by Pilib bocht. Begins:
Do gein[edh] ingen *on umla* *dar boide mianta mac De*
in mac ar a uaish dfaiosin *dar lat fuairsi anaisg*idh.
There is a further copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

24 *b*. Poem of 38 stanzas, beginning:
*Tri gluine gine*laigh *mic Dé.*
Abbott's Cat., p. 362.

25 *b*. Poem of 37 stanzas in rannaigecht mór, beginning:
Tri mic do Muire mic Dé *slat gon duine ag gleic re gnai.*
At the end the words *Tri gluin* are repeated. These belong to the preceding poem.

26 *b*. Poem of 27 stanzas, beginning:
Do chodail ar bfer faire.
See *Abbott's Cat.*, Index.

27 *a*. Poem of 15 stanzas, beginning:
Suntach sin a cholann criadh.

27 *b*. Poem of 10 stanzas attributed to Fergall Og [Mac-an-Bhaird]. Begins:
Na dena diomus a duine.
A copy in the O'Conor Don's Book is ascribed to Geoffrey Finn O'Daly.

Ibid. Poem of 4 stanzas by Fergall Og Mac-an-Bhaird. Begins:
S . r . . si a mhic an Duilimh.

Ibid. Poem of 3 stanzas by Solamh Mac Conmidha. Begins:
Cionta na colla is cuis truaighe.

28 *a*. Poem of 13 stanzas attributed to Tadg Dall Mac Mathgamna. Begins:
Teach lega leaba fPadraig.

Ibid. Poem of 30 (?) stanzas attributed to Fergal Og O hUiginn. Begins:
Linn fPadraig na bport solus.

29 *a*. Eight stanzas by Fergal Og Mac-an-Bhaird, beginning:
Slan uaim ag oilen Padraig.
Cp. *Abbott's Cat*, p. 366 (?).

Ibid. Poem of 13 stanzas attributed to Aongus mac Aodha Ruaidh I Uiginn. Begins:
Mo chen teid i dtegais fPadraig.
The opening words are not repeated at the close.

29 *b*. A poem of 13 stanzas beginning:
Loch Derg at Roim na hEirind.

Ibid. Poem of 16 stanzas, beginning:
Tugais damh a Dhé nime *onoir ar fad maimsire.*
The poet's name is given as Tuilecna and again in the upper margin above the preceding poem as Tuilecina mac Torna c̄c̄. It extends to 30 *a*.

From f. 30 on half of the page is torn away

30 *a*. Poem in 25 stanzas, beginning:
*Tug*adh *mo coiméd do coig*iur.
Another copy in the O'Conor Don's Book.

30 *b*. Twelve stanzas extending to 31 *a*.

31 *a*. Seven (?) stanzas, beginning:

Fada an suanso ar righ na ndul.

Thirty-five (?) stanzas, beginning:

Maelduin Maelduin o righa in teó.

32 *a*. Twelve stanzas, beginning:

Do mheall a saogal sibse   *a char brisde bar gcuinge.*

32 *b*. Fifteen stanzas by . . . *gide Buidhe.*

33 *a*. Poem of 45 stanzas by Donnchad Mor O Dalaigh. Begins:

Lochrann soillsi ac siol Aduim.

Two copies in the O'Conor Don's Book.

34 *a*. Poem, beginning:

Tainig bhur gcairde a clann Adham.

It may extend to 36 *a*.

36 *a*. Poem, beginning:

Coir foighidi re feirg nDé.

36 *b*. Poem, beginning:

[*Bean ar naitheirghe Éire*] = Macgregor, No. XIX. O'Grady, *Cat.*, p. 354.

Extends to 37 *b*.

37 *b*. . . . *ain* .1. *rí da choigedh Mumhoin agus airdescub Caisil* c̄c̄. Three stanzas beginning:

. . . . . . *fesda dom aimsir*   *beag nach tainig mo saogal.*

A poem, beginning:

. . . . . . *an trath sgarfus rem anmuin.*
cuir a dtalmuin ag . . . . . .

Extends to 38 *b* (?).

ADDENDA

P. 102. The Magauran Book was transcribed by Adam O'Cianan for Thomas Magauran who, according to the Four Masters, was slain in the year 1343. A stanza on p. 50 affords the only literary evidence with which I am acquainted, that the better known families maintained books in which eulogies of their race were entered. I give the verse according to a transcript made by Joseph O'Longan in 1869 which the O'Conor Don kindly deposited for me in the Cambridge University Library in February, 1913:

Ni hinann duchas dhuinde | 's du daimh ri flesg findbaille
seach dhan gach daime oile | lan dar ndaine a duanoire.

P. 103. Mr. Purton informs me that a book of poems addressed to the Dillon family is preserved in the Royal Irish Academy.

P. 124. At the outset I assumed that the later bards drew the material for their religious compositions directly from Latin. It still seems probable to me on other grounds that many, if not all of them, were acquainted with that language, but this cannot always be inferred from the devotional poems they composed. F. A. Patterson's work on the *Middle English Penitential Lyric* (New York, 1911) has convinced me that a large part of their ideas and phraseology was drawn from the liturgy which would be accessible to them in an Irish dress. The stories of saints were taken from the homiliaria, many of which are known to have been rendered into the vernacular, and with regard to the exempla Mr. Flower informs me that there is in existence an Irish translation of the *Gesta Romanorum*. In cases where Latin sermons and treatises are closely followed, further study will perhaps show whether such poems go directly back to the Latin original or are based upon an Irish prose intermediary. The O'Conor Don's Book appears to preserve several compositions of this nature. One beginning *Glac a chompáin comhairle* Miss Knott shows to be based upon St. Bernard's *Formula Honestae Vitae* (Migne, vol. clxxxiv, col. 1167).

SYLLABUS

*** References in the notes to *Letters* are made to *Letters to the Times upon war and neutrality* (1881–1909) *with some commentary.* (Longmans, Green and Co., 1909.)

PROPOSED CHANGES IN NAVAL PRIZE LAW

(THE PRIZE COURT CONVENTION AND THE DECLARATION OF LONDON)

BY

THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, K.C., D.C.L.

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read May 31, 1911.

THE fact that a topic has been widely, if not always according to knowledge, discussed at public meetings, in the newspapers, in pamphlets, and in preliminary Parliamentary skirmishes, is probably no reason why it should not be taken into consideration in the calmer atmosphere of our Academy.

The attack upon and defence of the Prize Court Convention and the Declaration of London have been hitherto of a somewhat desultory character; taking place, for the most part, with reference only to isolated points. It is, however, surely essential that the subject should be mapped out as a whole, and the interdependence of its several parts should be ascertained, before conclusions are drawn as to the acceptability, or otherwise, of the two documents, or either of them.

This is, at any rate, the task which I have set before myself, and I trust that the special attention which, for more than twenty years past, I have been called upon, officially and otherwise, to give to the difficult questions involved may be my sufficient excuse for the paper which I am about to address to you.[1]

I should like to preface what I have to say by an expression of admiration for the ability and ingenuity, in producing a fair-seeming agreement upon topics of the utmost complexity and delicacy, dis-

[1] See the writer's *Valedictory Retrospect*, 1910, pp. 13–15.

played by those responsible for the Declaration; especially by Lord Desart and M. Renault, with both of whom I have had the privilege of working in former years. Not less do I wish to pay tribute to the services rendered by Mr. Gibson Bowles, by Chambers of Commerce and Shipping, and by members of both Houses of Parliament, in preventing, so far, the over-hasty acts of legislation and ratification, in connection with the Convention and Declaration, which at one time seemed to be imminent.

As we all know, the Prize Courts of our own and of other countries have a long history, during which they have evolved, sometimes concurrently with action on the part of their respective Governments, bodies of rules, in the main similar, though in not a few respects discordant, with reference to maritime captures. These Courts have hitherto been Courts of enquiry, to which a belligerent Government entrusts the duty of ascertaining whether the captures made by its officers have been properly made, and with what results, according to the views of International Law entertained by that Government.

A wish long ago found expression, probably for the first time in Hübner's work, *De la saisie des bâtiments neutres*, published in 1759, that, in order to secure greater freedom from national bias in the application and development of these rules, and, in particular, to safeguard the interests of neutrals, when in conflict with those of a preponderantly powerful belligerent, questions of prize should be decided, not by national, but by international Courts.[1] In more recent times it has been urged that a change in this sense would have the additional merit of being likely to bring about a uniform system of prize-law. So it came to pass that the *Institut de Droit International* coupled with the suggested *Code des Prises Maritimes*, upon which it was engaged from 1875 to 1887, a plan for confiding the administration of the Code, at any rate in the last resort, to an international tribunal, rather than to the Courts of the captor.[2] This aspiration at length found diplomatic expression, when the Hague Conference of 1907 drafted a Convention, which still awaits ratification by the Powers, for the establishment of an international Court of final Appeal in cases of Prize. The Convention purports to transfer the ultimate decision, in

[1] Hübner proposed to confer jurisdiction in cases of neutral prize upon Courts composed of ministers, or Consuls, accredited by neutral Governments to the belligerents, together with Commissioners appointed by the Sovereign of the captors, or of the country to which the prize has been brought, as also, perhaps, "des personnes pleines de probité et de connoissance dans tout ce qui concerne les Loix des nations et les Traités des Puissances modernes." Cf. *Letters*, p. 160.

[2] *Annuaire*, ii, pp. 113, 121, 124; vi, pp. 12, 105, 174, 213–223; vii, pp. 188–190; ix, pp. 202–217. Cf. *Letters*, p. 154.

most cases,[1] as to the legitimacy, and the consequences, of captures, from the national to an international tribunal, composed of fifteen Judges, eight of whom are always to be respectively nominees of eight great Powers, the remaining seven to be nominated by the other Powers in rotation, subject to a provision for securing that a belligerent Power shall always be represented, in cases in which it is interested, by a Judge of its own.[2] Appeals are to be allowed alike on questions of law and of fact. Procedure is to be much at the discretion of the Court.

I. THE PRIZE COURT CONVENTION, signed at the Hague on October 18, 1907, suggests three large topics of enquiry.

(1) Is it desirable, in the abstract, that, when either of the parties interested in a question of maritime capture is dissatisfied with the way in which it has been finally adjudicated upon in the country of the captor, a further appeal should be open to that party to a mixed international tribunal? Hitherto the only remedy in such a case has been by way of diplomatic remonstrance by one Government to another. It would no doubt be in the interest of peace to avoid bringing two Governments thus face to face, as occurred, for instance, in the cases of the *Bundesrath* and the *Knight Commander*; even admitting that future progress toward assimilation of theories of prize-law, as also the growing habit of referring questions to arbitration, may tend to diminish the dangers thus arising. It would seem, therefore, that the answer to this abstract question must be in the affirmative. The two remaining questions will deal with concrete possibilities.

(2) As to the constitution of the proposed Court. Will its fifteen Judges, nominated from respected jurists, recognized as authorities on maritime international law, form a tribunal so free, not only from any undue leaning towards either belligerent or neutral interests, but also from national predilections, that Great Britain may safely rely upon its impartiality? It may be urged that while continental lawyers may find a difficulty in looking at questions from the Anglo-American point of view, judges with a continental bias would largely outnumber those representing this country and the United States. In reply, we are exhorted to look at the excellent decisions of "neutral courts",[3] by

[1] These are specified in art. 3.

[2] The Convention has already been modified, on the suggestion of the United States, by an additional protocol, signed at the Hague, by the plenipotentiaries of thirteen Powers, on Sept. 19, 1910.

[3] Lord Weardale, in the House of Lords, on March 9, 1911.

which expression those of the Hague Court are, no doubt, mainly intended. There is, however, little resemblance between the proposed Prize Court, consisting of a large number of pre-appointed Judges, and the Hague tribunal, constituted *ad hoc* by the litigant Powers themselves, each selecting, as a rule, two Judges, and the four thus nominated electing a fifth. It may be worth consideration whether courts constituted on something like the Hague model might not best serve the purpose of international Courts of Appeal in cases of Prize.[1]

(3) The third, and gravest, question suggested by the Convention relates to the law which is to be administered by the proposed Court. Supposing a tribunal to have been invented, the *personnel* of which would be above suspicion of any undue leanings toward either belligerent or neutral interests, or of any *arrière-pensée*, motived by national preferences, how is it to deal with the numerous cases for which International Law admittedly provides no rule, or as to which the litigant Powers hold discordant views as to the rule which is to be applied? The answer to this question, contained in art. 7 of the Convention, is to the effect that the Court is to give judgment "in accordance with the general principles of Justice and Equity". This solution, for which the British Government seems to have been originally responsible,[2] is recommended in the Report of M. Renault's Committee to the Conference, although confessed to be "hardie sans doute", as empowering the Judges "à faire le droit", while "les principes stricts du raisonnement juridique" would prescribe that the Court should follow the law of the country of the captor, merely correcting its misapplication; since, where there is no international

[1] The suggestion of the *Institut de Droit International* was that "au début de chaque guerre, *chacune* des parties belligérantes constitue un tribunal international d'appel en matière de prises maritimes. *Chacun de ces tribunaux* est composé de cinq membres, désignés comme suit. L'État belligérant nommera lui-même le Président et un membre. Il désignera en outre trois États neutres, qui choisiront chacun un des trois autres membres." *Tableau*, i, p. 217. The British Instructions of June 12, 1907, contemplate an adaptation of the Hague Court. *Miscell.* 1908, No. i, p. 13. Cf. the British draft, *Actes*, ii, p. 1076. The German proposal was for a Court of five members, two of them admirals, and three members of the Hague Tribunal. Within two weeks of the opening of hostilities, each belligerent was to nominate an admiral and request some neutral Power to nominate one of its representatives on the Hague Tribunal. The two neutral Powers were then to request some third neutral Power to nominate the fifth member from its representatives on that Tribunal. *Actes*, ii, p. 1071.

[2] See the *Actes* of 1907, t. ii, p. 1076, and the *Rapport de la Délégation de la République Française*, *Doc. Dipl. Deux. Conf. de la Paix*, Paris, 1908, p. 71.

rule, objection cannot be taken to rules which that country chooses to make for the guidance of its subjects.[1]

I, for one, lost no time in pointing out the danger of "letting the Court loose to make law".[2] This view soon obtained recognition. It was felt that it would never do, on the many points for which International Law provides no settled rule, to allow the Court to be a law to itself, deciding in accordance with what may appear to a majority of the Judges to be "the general principles of Justice and Equity". It was obviously necessary to ascertain, and enlarge, the body of generally accepted Prize Law which ought to be accessible to the Court. The British Government, accordingly, in a communication addressed on February 7, 1908, to nine other maritime Powers, stated that an impression had been gained that "the establishment of the International Court would not meet with general acceptance, so long as vagueness and uncertainty exist as to the principles which the Court, in dealing with appeals brought before it, would apply to questions of far-reaching importance"; and, further, "that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for H.M. Government to carry the legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention, unless they could assure both Houses of the British Parliament that some more definite understanding had been reached as to the rules by which the new tribunal should be governed." The despatch then proceeds to invite those Powers to a Conference, to be held in London, with a view to coming to some agreement as to the law to be administered by the proposed Court.

The invitation was accepted. The Conference met on December 4, 1908, and on February 26, 1909, signed the second of the two documents with which we are concerned, viz.:—

II. The Declaration of London. We have primarily to enquire whether this would answer its purpose, by equipping the International Prize Court, should it come into existence, with a body of Prize Law, sufficient for enabling it to decide the cases which may be brought before it, without resorting to those "general principles" which are so unlikely to commend themselves to losing litigants.

[1] *Miscell.* 1908, No. 4, p. 154.

[2] In letters to *The Times*, from February to November, 1907, *Letters*, pp 152, 154, 159; and in the *Law Quarterly Review* for January, 1908. The Conference itself showed some consciousness of the difficulty by recording a *vœu* that the preparation of a *Règlement* relating to the laws and customs of maritime warfare should be included in the programme of the next Conference.

The *Institut de Droit International* merely directs that the Court shall be guided by International Law, but this direction presupposes the adoption by international consent of the *Code des Prises*.

But, before entering upon this enquiry, we are confronted with the preliminary question, whether we have to deal with the Declaration *pure et simple*, or with that document as it is amplified and explained by another document, to be treated as of equal authority, viz. the covering Report of the Committee by which the Declaration was drafted. The latter view is taken by the Government, and has been suppored by so high an authority as my friend Professor Westlake.[1] The Foreign Office has laid down that "where the Report, in which the drafting Committee submits to the Conference the result of its labours, contains a reasoned Commentary, elucidating the provisions of such Conventions, it becomes, if formally adopted by the Conference, an authoritative interpretation of the instruments; and the Conventions must thereafter be construed by the signatory Powers with reference to the Commentary, where necessary".[2] The official view evidently rests upon a statement to be found in a paragraph of the Report addressed, on March 1, 1909, to Sir Edward Grey by the British Delegates to the London Conference.

I ventured to take the opposite view, and in a letter to *The Times* said: "It is desirable to know upon what authority this statement rests. I am aware of none." After mentioning the *dicta* of M. de Martens in 1899, and of M. Renault in 1909, as to the interpretative force to be attributed to the Report of a drafting Committee accompanying the drafted articles, after the Report, setting out, and commenting upon, the articles, has been "adopted" or "accepted" by the Conference to which it is addressed, I continued :—

"It would seem that in each of these cases the adoption of the Report, and even a suggestion or two for a change in its phraseology, amounted to nothing more than an expression of opinion on the part of the Delegates to the Conference that the Report contained explanations which had satisfied themselves, and might satisfy their Governments, that the Convention which they were about to forward to those Governments might safely be accepted. . . . So far as Governments are concerned, the adoption of a Report by their Delegates is *res inter alios acta*. An 'authentic interpretation' of a contract can be given only by the parties to it, who, in the case of a treaty, are the States concerned. If these States desire to give to the Report of a drafting Committee the force of an authentic interpretation of their contract, they can surely do so only by something amounting to a supplementary Convention. Writers upon International Law naturally throw but little light upon questions to which

[1] In *The Times* of January 3, 1911.

[2] F. O. to the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, *Miscell.* 1910, No. 4, p. 20.

the somewhat novel practice of argumentative drafting Reports has given rise; but I may cite Professor Ullmann, of Vienna (now of Munich), as saying:—

> Eine authentische Interpretation kann nur durch die Kontrahenten selbst, in einem gemeinschaftlichen, ihren Willen ausser Zweifel setzenden Acte (einem Nachtrags- oder Erlauterungs-Vertrage), erfolgen. (Volkerrecht, p. 282);

and Professor Fiore, of Naples, to the effect that what is called 'authentic interpretation' is not

> interpretazione propriamente detta, ma una dichiarazione di quello che fu già concordato, o un nuovo trattato (Diritto Internazionale, § 1,118); and that il trattato non può essere interpretato che delle stesse Parti (i. e. Stati) contrahenti; e per la validità dell' atto è indispensabile che la relativa convenzione di interpretazione abbia gli stessi requisiti . . . di ogni altra convenzione tra Stato e Stato. (Il Dir. Int. Codif, § 816)."[1]

Although members of the Government continue to repeat, without giving reasons, that the Report must be taken to be an authentic interpretation of the Declaration,[2] there are signs that this view fails to find general acceptance; and hesitating admirers of the Declaration, e. g. Mr. Arthur Cohen,[3] have accordingly suggested that the Powers should be invited to enter into a Convention giving binding authority to the Report, and to be ratified simultaneously with the Declaration itself. Without such a Convention, Mr. Cohen would not approve of an unconditional ratification of the Declaration; and with this view Professor Westlake now seems to agree.[4] I venture to repeat what I have already written in deprecation of the adoption of the course suggested: "It would be calamitous should a practice be introduced of attempting to cure the imperfect expression of a treaty by tacking on to it an equally authoritative reasoned commentary, likely, as in the present case, to be enormously longer than the text to which it relates. . . . The result would be *obscurum per obscurius*, a remedy worse than the disease."[5]

I assume, therefore, that the document with which we have to deal

[1] *The Times* of February 20, 1911

[2] Notably in the House of Lords on March 9, 1911.

[3] Letter to *Times* of March 1, 1911.

[4] Ib. of March 2.

[5] Ib. of February 20 and March 2, 1911. It may be added that contradictions have been pointed out, as was mentioned by Lord Alverstone in the House of Lords on March 13, 1911, between different portions of the Report; and so far from its having been, as was stated on the same occasion by Lord Courtney, "read over clause by clause," it was, on the two occasions on which it was presented to the Conference, accepted without debate, and apparently before the members had any opportunity of reading it as finally drafted. See *Miscell.* 1909, No. 5, pp. 215, 344.

is the Declaration of London, *pure et simple*; which we may observe, in passing, is not what our Government originally meant it to be. The British proposal was that "two instruments should be negotiated, one a Declaration of existing law, the other a Convention, ancillary thereto, and supplementing its provisions by additional rules, accepted as operative between the parties". Other Powers preferred a statement of law, in which no distinction should be made between rules already generally accepted, and rules now first agreed upon between the signatories.[1] The latter view prevailed; and the Declaration, as it stands, is a heterogeneous assemblage of old and new rules, which its preamble, nevertheless, somewhat audaciously asserts to "correspond, in substance, with the generally recognized principles of International Law". The pages of the Report of the British Delegates in which this assertion is made contain, I venture to think, singular specimens of involved and inconclusive reasoning.[2]

The problem which presses for solution is whether we find, within the four corners of the Declaration, a Code of Prize Law, such as, if loyally followed by the proposed International Court, would render its decisions unimpeachable, at any rate by the signatories of the document in question, and reasonably in accordance with British interests, more especially with our national safety when belligerent. This enquiry demands answers to two large questions. First, does the Declaration sufficiently cover the ground; so that on no important points would the Court find itself without guidance? In the second place, on the points for which the Declaration supplies rules, are those rules satisfactory? In other words, is any serious fault to be found with the document, for sins either of omission, or of commission?

i. It is beyond controversy that on three points the Declaration will afford no guidance to a Court which, from its composition, would, if unguided, be almost certain to decide them adversely to British views.

(1) The first of these relates to what is known as the "Rule of the War of 1756", which recognizes the right of a belligerent to capture neutral vessels engaged in carrying on for the other belligerent the coasting trade, or trade with his colonies, which in time of peace is open only to his subjects. It is by no means the case that increased freedom of navigation has wholly deprived such capture of its value as a belligerent weapon.

[1] *Miscell.* 1909, No. 4, pp. 1, 21, 22, 33; cf. Ib. No. 5, p. 343.
[2] Ib. No. 4, p. 102; cf. Ib. No. 5, p. 57.

(2) A second point upon which the Declaration is silent is as to the criterion of the belligerent or neutral character of owners of cargoes. Is it, according to continental views, the nationality, or, according to Anglo-American views, the commercial domicil, of the owner? M. Renault's Report, with reference to art. 58, explains that agreement on this point was found to be impossible.

(3) The third point upon which the Declaration supplies no guidance is of vastly greater importance than those already mentioned. The seventh of the Hague Conventions of 1907 recognizes, and to a certain extent regulates, the right of belligerents to commission their merchant vessels as auxiliary ships of war; leaving it, however, an open question whether the change of character may take place while the vessel is on the High Seas: "La question du lieu de transformation reste hors de cause, et n'est nullement visée par les règles ci-dessous."[1] This question is also left open by the Declaration; the differences between national views having proved irreconcileable.[2]

It would be superfluous, after all that has been written upon the subject, to enlarge upon the increased risks which would have to be run, alike by belligerent and by neutral trading vessels, were it permissible for a ship belonging to the auxiliary navy of any Power to leave its own waters under the mercantile flag, and, after perhaps renewing her stores at a neutral port, to reveal her true character by hoisting the war pendant when out at sea, and then to proceed to prey upon defenceless traders. It has even been maintained that such a ship may oscillate between her two characters, putting into neutral ports as a trader, and resuming her work as a commissioned ship of war when again on the High Seas. For all that appears in the Declaration, such a course of conduct would be perfectly legitimate, and, in cases where neutral property is in question, might be held so to be by the International Prize Court.

These three omissions, though they might not be in themselves fatal to the acceptance of the Declaration as a step towards the codification of the law of Prize, may well be thought to disqualify it from

[1] Preamble to the Seventh Convention.

[2] See *Miscell.* 1908, No. 1, p. 14, Ib. No. 4, p. 183, Ib. No. 6, p. 74; *Miscell.* 1909, No. 4, pp. 10, 31, 101, Ib. No 5, pp xvii, 108–111, 166, 189, 204, 209, 263–368, 340, 344.

Great Britain and five other Powers wished to prohibit altogether change of character on the High Seas, Germany and other Powers would only prohibit resumption of war character, France and Russia favoured no restriction.

is the Declaration of London, *pure et simple*; which we may observe, in passing, is not what our Government originally meant it to be. The British proposal was that "two instruments should be negotiated, one a Declaration of existing law, the other a Convention, ancillary thereto, and supplementing its provisions by additional rules, accepted as operative between the parties". Other Powers preferred a statement of law, in which no distinction should be made between rules already generally accepted, and rules now first agreed upon between the signatories.[1] The latter view prevailed; and the Declaration, as it stands, is a heterogeneous assemblage of old and new rules, which its preamble, nevertheless, somewhat audaciously asserts to "correspond, in substance, with the generally recognized principles of International Law". The pages of the Report of the British Delegates in which this assertion is made contain, I venture to think, singular specimens of involved and inconclusive reasoning.[2]

The problem which presses for solution is whether we find, within the four corners of the Declaration, a Code of Prize Law, such as, if loyally followed by the proposed International Court, would render its decisions unimpeachable, at any rate by the signatories of the document in question, and reasonably in accordance with British interests, more especially with our national safety when belligerent. This enquiry demands answers to two large questions. First, does the Declaration sufficiently cover the ground; so that on no important points would the Court find itself without guidance? In the second place, on the points for which the Declaration supplies rules, are those rules satisfactory? In other words, is any serious fault to be found with the document, for sins either of omission, or of commission?

i. It is beyond controversy that on three points the Declaration will afford no guidance to a Court which, from its composition, would, if unguided, be almost certain to decide them adversely to British views.

(1) The first of these relates to what is known as the "Rule of the War of 1756", which recognizes the right of a belligerent to capture neutral vessels engaged in carrying on for the other belligerent the coasting trade, or trade with his colonies, which in time of peace is open only to his subjects. It is by no means the case that increased freedom of navigation has wholly deprived such capture of its value as a belligerent weapon.

[1] *Miscell.* 1909, No. 4, pp. 1, 21, 22, 33; cf. Ib. No. 5, p. 343.
[2] Ib. No. 4, p. 102; cf. Ib No. 5, p. 57.

(2) A second point upon which the Declaration is silent is as to the criterion of the belligerent or neutral character of owners of cargoes. Is it, according to continental views, the nationality, or, according to Anglo-American views, the commercial domicil, of the owner? M. Renault's Report, with reference to art. 58, explains that agreement on this point was found to be impossible.

(3) The third point upon which the Declaration supplies no guidance is of vastly greater importance than those already mentioned. The seventh of the Hague Conventions of 1907 recognizes, and to a certain extent regulates, the right of belligerents to commission their merchant vessels as auxiliary ships of war; leaving it, however, an open question whether the change of character may take place while the vessel is on the High Seas: "La question du lieu de transformation reste hors de cause, et n'est nullement visée par les règles ci-dessous."[1] This question is also left open by the Declaration; the differences between national views having proved irreconcileable.[2]

It would be superfluous, after all that has been written upon the subject, to enlarge upon the increased risks which would have to be run, alike by belligerent and by neutral trading vessels, were it permissible for a ship belonging to the auxiliary navy of any Power to leave its own waters under the mercantile flag, and, after perhaps renewing her stores at a neutral port, to reveal her true character by hoisting the war pendant when out at sea, and then to proceed to prey upon defenceless traders. It has even been maintained that such a ship may oscillate between her two characters, putting into neutral ports as a trader, and resuming her work as a commissioned ship of war when again on the High Seas. For all that appears in the Declaration, such a course of conduct would be perfectly legitimate, and, in cases where neutral property is in question, might be held so to be by the International Prize Court.

These three omissions, though they might not be in themselves fatal to the acceptance of the Declaration as a step towards the codification of the law of Prize, may well be thought to disqualify it from

[1] Preamble to the Seventh Convention.

[2] See *Miscell* 1908, No. 1, p. 14, Ib. No. 4, p. 183, Ib. No. 6, p. 74; *Miscell.* 1909, No 4, pp. 10, 31, 101, Ib. No. 5, pp. xvii, 108–111, 166, 189, 204, 209, 263–368, 340, 344.

Great Britain and five other Powers wished to prohibit altogether change of character on the High Seas, Germany and other Powers would only prohibit resumption of war character, France and Russia favoured no restriction.

furnishing to the proposed International Court a body of Prize Law, without possibility of access to which that Court ought not to be called into existence.

ii. We have next to ask, whether we are satisfied with what the Declaration does contain; or whether we find in it what may be described as sins of commission? Irrespectively of introductory and final clauses, it consists of nine chapters, of greatly varying importance. Two of them I wish at once to dismiss from consideration, as merely registering existing law. This is obviously the case with ch. viii, dealing with the consequences of resistance to visit; but all will not be prepared to admit that ch. iv, dealing with the destruction of neutral prizes, should be placed in the same category. It will be remembered how the sinking of the *Knight Commander* was officially stigmatized in both Houses of Parliament as "a gross breach of International Law". I lost no time in asserting this to be a mistake,[1] pointing out that, so far from there being any *consensus gentium* condemnatory of such sinking, it is enjoined in the naval instructions of several great Powers, while the more indulgent British instructions, dictated doubtless by enlightened self-interest, are not demanded by any rule of even British Prize Law which can be legitimately extracted from such of Lord Stowell's cases as have been supposed to bear upon the question.[2] I must also pass lightly over chapters iii, v, vi, and ix, although almost all of them vary received British doctrines, merely calling attention to the new test of the nationality of a ship, contained in chapter vi,[3] and to the deliberate abandonment by Great Britain, in chapter vii, of her long maintained attitude as to Convoy.[4] I hasten to deal with the two chapters round which controversy has chiefly raged, as being, beyond question, the most important of all.

Chapter i, treating in twenty-one articles of the law of Blockade, has been alleged to be almost unexceptionable from the British point of view. Arts. 1–14 do, indeed, call for little remark, varying, as they do, but little from established rules. As much may be said for arts. 16, 18, and 21. Art. 19 negatives the application, never univer-

[1] In letters to *The Times* of August 1, 1904, and subsequently. See *Letters*, pp. 140–150. Cf. my paper for the Food Commission Report, vol. iii, pp. 263, 264, and evidence, Ib. vol. ii, p. 238.

[2] *Actaeon*, 2 Dods., *Felicity*, ib. 381. Cf. *Leucade*, Spinks, 221.

[3] Art. 57. It was found necessary, in order to secure unanimity, to omit the words *en premier lieu*, with which it had been intended to qualify the test. *Miscell.* 1909, No. 5, pp. 167, 369.

[4] See Lord Desart's *Exposé*, *Miscell.* 1909, No. 5, p. 261.

sally conceded, of the doctrine of "continuous voyage" to blockade.[1] In art. 15 a concession is, no doubt, made to British views by the surrender, on the part of certain Continental Powers, of the requirement of individual warning in the case of "blockades by notification", but it must be observed that the reasons for such a requirement, resistance to which seems never to have given rise to much controversy, have been much weakened by acceleration in the means of communication, and had already ceased to be insisted on by France, formerly its most strenuous supporter.[2] The variation in art. 16 from the British rule as to notoriety in blockade outwards, is probably of no great importance, but the serious departures from old law are those made in arts. 17 and 20, which permit the capture of a blockade-runner only within the *rayon d'action* (whatever that may mean) of the blockading squadron, and only while chased by a ship of that squadron; whereas capture may take place, according to British rules, at any point of the blockade-runner's voyage, out and home, and by means of any enemy cruiser. So great a restriction upon the employment of a weapon of considerable importance to Great Britain when belligerent, while it can inflict little harm upon her when in the hands of an enemy, ought surely not to be conceded without more technical consideration than the subject seems yet to have received, and, probably, not without the receipt of some more genuine equivalent than the alleged concession contained in art. 15.[3]

It is, however, against Chapter ii, dealing, in twenty-two articles, with Contraband of War, that criticism has been chiefly, and in my view justly, directed. Goods to be treated as contraband must, of course, in the first place, possess certain characteristics, and, in the second place, have a hostile destination. Both of these requirements have given rise to endless controversies, and on both the Declaration attempts to supply rules which shall be generally acceptable, while the Report has been, improperly, as I venture to think, prayed in aid of its obscurities of expression.

With reference to the characteristics of contraband goods, the Declaration, adopting, more fully than it has hitherto been universally adopted, the Grotian distinction between things useful only in war,

[1] Given up even by the United States, its inventor, *Miscell* 1909, No 5, p. 195.

[2] The French Memorandum, *Miscell.* 1909, p. 18, makes no mention of it.

[3] In defence of the change, it is alleged that of the cases on blockade to be found in the Reports, not one relates to a capture made otherwise than in the neighbourhood of the blockading squadron. Even if this can be shown, it would not prove that no such captures had taken place, or that the mere existence of the rule had not checked blockade-running.

things useful both in war and in peace, and things useless for war, proceeds for the first time to provide, by arts. 22, 24, 28, hard-and-fast lists of goods included in each of these three classes, to the first and second of which belligerents are, however, by arts. 23 and 25, allowed to add by notification things similar in character to those included in each of them. It is claimed for these lists that they will supply useful guidance to neutral shippers, while lessening the likelihood of friction between neutral and belligerent Governments. It may no doubt be convenient to have these lists, which, as far as they go, are unobjectionable, in black and white; although they really add little to what has already received, or is in process of receiving, general assent; while it would be a distinct gain thus to bring about a more general recognition than has as yet been accorded to it of a class of goods which are only "conditionally" contraband. It is, however, most unlikely that such recognition would be refused in the future, irrespectively of the Declaration. It is inconceivable that powerful neutrals would tolerate the assimilation of, e.g., provisions, to the carriage of absolute contraband.

The second fact needed to render goods susceptible of being treated as contraband, viz. a hostile destination, is dealt with in arts. 30–37, which have been subjected to more criticism than all the rest of the Declaration. The doctrine of "continuous voyage" is admitted with reference to "absolute", but not with reference to "conditional" contraband, by arts. 30 and 35. One is somewhat surprised to find that in both cases the ship's papers are, except in one event, to be conclusive as to her destination; but the Report confesses that this cannot be taken literally, and that "le croiseur apprécie librement les circonstances".[1] It is in relation to "conditional contraband" that Great Britain is chiefly interested in the question of destination, and more especially with reference to her food supplies. The list of articles which cannot be treated as even "conditional" contraband would no doubt relieve her of some anxiety as to imports of raw material, but a stoppage of such imports would produce little immediate effect upon her belligerent capacity. Little objection can be taken to the description given in art. 33 of the sort of destination which brings things *ancipitis usus* into the category of "conditional contraband", namely, "that they are shown to be intended for the use of the armed forces, or the government departments, of the enemy State." This description is, however, dangerously enlarged, though the contrary has been confidently asserted, by the presumptions of hostile destination created by the German suggestions[2] now embodied in art. 34, viz. (1) if the

[1] *Miscell.* 1909, No. 5, p. 250. [2] *Miscell.* 1909, No. 5, p. 66.

goods are addressed to the enemy authorities; (2) if they are addressed to a trader(*commerçant*) established in the enemy country, who notoriously supplies "the enemy" with articles and materials of this kind; (3) if they are directed to a fortified place belonging to the enemy; (4) if to any other place which serves as a base to the enemy's armed forces. Objection has been naturally raised to the second and fourth of these distinctions. Even admitting, without reference to the *Rapport*, that "the enemy" who is notoriously supplied by the trader means, as it probably does, "the enemy Government," the question of "notoriety" is surely not one to be readily and fairly disposed of by the probably over-zealous commander of a cruiser; nor would such an officer be a satisfactory judge of the question whether or no a given port serves in any sense as "a base to the armed forces" of his enemy.

The possibly disastrous bearing of this article upon the neutral-borne food supplies of this country (the amount of which in proportion to British-borne is sure to be largely increased when Great Britain is belligerent) has been sufficiently pointed out in Parliament as well as in the Press. But we are exhorted to accept in compensation the rule contained in art. 35, which provides that a ship carrying conditional contraband cannot be interfered with though on her way to enemy territory, if the goods in question purport to be intended for discharge at some intervening neutral port. Neutral corn-ships, we are told, have only to put in to Antwerp or Havre (Belgium or France being neutral), whence their cargos, by transhipment or otherwise,[1] could be easily run across to London or Southampton. Apart from the difficulty and expense attending such a device to lessen the risk of capture, it may be remarked that the commander of a cruiser would hardly, in such a case, incline to the belief that the real intent was not to carry the goods, should it prove practicable, direct to the enemy. No commander would yield the implicit credence to ships' papers demanded by arts. 32 and 35.[2] The rules laid down as to hostile destination would therefore appear to be, as they stand, unsatisfactory, especially in their bearing upon the supply of food to this country, when belligerent. On the other hand, the recognition of a class of "conditional contraband" can hardly fail shortly to become, apart from the Declaration, universal.

[1] Cf. Lord Ritchie's phrase in the House of Lords debate: "All that is necessary is to turn the ship round, and send her across the Channel. I know of no objection to that."

[2] As is, indeed, admitted in the passage in the drafting Report, quoted *supra*, at p. 156. See also art. 37, under which contraband of either kind may be seized, although there be an intention of touching at a neutral *port d'escale* before going on to the enemy territory.

No real doubt was thrown upon it by the action of France in 1885 or of Russia in 1904.[1]

Under the head of "Contraband", I will only further mention that British doctrines are negatived, in art. 40, as to the liability of the ship, and, in art. 44, as to seizure of contraband goods without capture of the ship carrying them.

I have endeavoured to show that both the Convention and the Declaration involve questions of such complexity, and also of such vital importance to our national safety, as to demand, before either of them is ratified, far more consideration than they have yet received. Let us see what provision for the re-examination of either document is contemplated by the Government.

A Naval Prize Consolidation Bill, originally suggested and drafted by myself, which, though it has been twice mentioned in a King's Speech, and has several times passed through all its stages in the House of Lords, has, so far, not made much progress in the House of Commons, was last year withdrawn from its pigeon-hole and reintroduced, after a large piece of new cloth, with some smaller patches, had been incongruously sewn into the old garment, in the shape of a series of seven new articles, supplemented by sporadic variations in other articles, intended to give effect to the Prize Court Convention. Not a word is said in the Bill about the Declaration, which it was at first, for all that appears, proposed to ratify *sub silentio*.[2] The intention of Government was, and still is, that the definitive Parliamentary discussion of the Convention and Declaration should take place upon the Second Reading of the Bill in the House of Commons. This has been from time to time deferred, in consequence doubtless of protests arriving from all quarters against precipitate action in the matter; and is now not to take place till the Imperial Conference has had an opportunity of expressing its views upon the subject. An undertaking has also been given that the Declaration will not be ratified in the event of the opinion of the House of Commons proving to be adverse to it.

The proposed *modus operandi* is, I submit, most unfortunate, if the object in view is to place the questions at issue fairly before Parliament, and to obtain its instructed judgment upon them. I would strongly

[1] See my paper in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Supply of Food, &c., vol. iii, pp. 258–62, and *Letters*, pp. 145, 155: also Holtzendorff, *Encyclopädie*, iv, p. 723.

[2] Both could, of course, be ratified by the Crown on the advice of Ministers, without Parliamentary sanction; although it is admitted that legislation would be necessary to give practical effect to the Convention, at any rate.

urge that the Naval Prize Bill, which seems to have been selected as an innocent-looking vehicle for the new, and highly contentious, alien matter with which it is now encumbered, should be immediately withdrawn. As I wrote some time since, "If the Convention and Declaration are to be effectively discussed in Parliament, they should be disentangled from the Bill, into which the Convention and, by implication, the Declaration have been incongruously thrust."[1] Such discussion of the two documents as is to take place in the Imperial Conference, and eventually in Parliament, should be otherwise brought about: for the last-named purpose, probably by the introduction of a Bill dealing exclusively with the documents in question. But the time is far from being ripe for the consideration of any such Bill. Parliament and the country have a right first to be supplied with clearly and impartially stated information upon a subject with which but few are familiar,[2] and to learn the deliberately formed opinion of a body of purely British experts as to the compatibility with British interests of the conclusions arrived at by groups of Delegates of mixed nationalities. Such a body, it ought hardly to be necessary to observe, would be well aware that it is not a British interest needlessly to run counter to foreign views, and that it is not possible, at the present day, to insist upon the application of every doctrine laid down by Lord Stowell.

Feeling strongly that the vitally important questions of theory and practice raised by the Convention and the Declaration need calmer and better instructed discussion than they have yet received, I threw out a suggestion, in February last, that they should be "referred to a Royal Commission, on which should be placed representatives of the Navy and Merchant service, of the corn trade, and of the Colonies, together with international lawyers in touch with the views of their continental colleagues".[3] The suggestion led to an interesting three nights' debate in the House of Lords,[4] which has doubtless produced its effect upon public opinion, although the motion, "that it is desirable that a Royal Commission be appointed to report upon the

[1] See *The Times* of July 8, and December 31, 1910.

[2] The complexity of the topic, as to which so many persons are necessarily ignorant, was well described by Lord Morley, when in the House of Lords on March 13 last he said, "You do not pick up all the threads of this enormous web without a really serious and rather troublesome exercise of mind. It is complex because it concerns our rights as a belligerent, it concerns our rights as a neutral, it concerns the rights of other Powers both as belligerents and as neutrals, and you have to be constantly studying the papers and the proposals in the Declaration, to be constantly changing your angle of vision, and putting yourself in different places and taking up new points of view."

[3] See *The Times* of February 20 and March 2, 1911.

[4] On March 8, 9, and 13, 1911

advisability of this country agreeing to the terms of the Declaration of London,"[1] set down by Lord Lamington, and, in his unavoidable absence, ably taken in charge by Lord Desborough, was not pressed to a division. Reference to a Commission must, of course, delay decision as to ratification; but this is surely no subject of regret, when it is proposed light-heartedly to innovate upon a system of law which is the fruit of experience extending over many centuries. The objection that, should we eventually decline to ratify the instruments, we should discourage future attempts at international legislation, or even "incur a serious loss of prestige", is to me unintelligible. By inviting a group of nations to endeavour to come to an agreement on certain questions, and even by allowing its own Delegates to sign an agreement so arrived at, as embodying the best bargain which they were able to obtain, our Government incurs no obligation whatever to advise the Sovereign to accept the agreement as binding upon the country.

On the whole matter, the conclusions which I would ask you to accept would be the following:—

1. That the questions involved should be definitely dissociated from the Naval Prize Bill, and should be forthwith referred for examination and report to a Royal Commission.

2. That, even apart from minor points, needing further consideration, the Prize Court Convention ought not to be ratified till the proposed Court has been provided with such a body of generally accepted Prize law as will enable it to work satisfactorily.

3. That the Declaration of London, by which it has been attempted to supply this want, must be interpreted without reference to the covering Report of the Committee by which it was drafted.

4. That the Declaration, alike by what it does not, and by what it does, contain, fails to supply such a body of law as is required to justify the creation of the proposed Court.

5. That the Declaration, which must, by art. 65, be accepted as a whole or not at all, apart from any question as to its sufficiency for the needs of an International Court, is, from obscurities of expression as well as from defects of substance, unfit for ratification even as an instalment of a revised system of Prize law.

6. That the future efforts of the Powers should be directed, in the first place, towards the gradual improvement and assimilation of the rules of Prize law; and, only after considerable progress has been made in that direction, towards the establishment of an International Court by which that law would have to be administered.

[1] Admitted even by Lord Morley to "deserve serious consideration".

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

THE EARLIEST COINS OF GREECE PROPER

SUMMARY

I. The first question which arises is whether the earliest coins of Hellas were of electrum. Electrum coins have been attributed to Thrace, Aegina, and Euboea; but in every case the attribution is improbable, and an Asiatic origin more likely.

II. The tradition ascribing the first issue of coins at Aegina to Pheidon must be considered. The date of Pheidon may be fixed to the eighth century B. C. But this is too early for the issue of coins. nor did Aegina belong to Pheidon. Pheidon regulated the weights and measures of Peloponnese: these are of doubtful, possibly Mycenaean, origin. It was on the standard of Pheidon that the Aeginetans first issued silver coins as substitutes for the bars of bronze and iron which had made up the earlier currency of Peloponnesus. These bars were dedicated at Argos, and some survive. The proportions of value were probably, iron 1, bronze 5, silver 600, so that a silver obol of 16 grains was equivalent to 20 drachms of bronze or a mina of iron. The obol, the drachm, and the talent made up a system proper to Greece the mina of 100 drachms was interpolated. Origin of the didrachm, and the double talent.

III. The cities of Euboea issued money in the seventh century on the gold standard of Babylon, which they divided according to the scheme of Pheidon. Their coins were uniform with those of Athens, and perhaps of Megara, bearing one type only.

IV. The Corinthians began the issue of coin as early as the time of Cypselus. Often restruck in Italy. They divided the Euboic stater into 3, a fact which gives us valuable data in regard to the spread of Corinthian commerce.

V. The earliest coins of Athens bore as types the owl or the amphora. They were introduced by Solon. Accounts by Aristotle and by Androtion of Solon's legislation. Their reconcilement. Solon's alteration of measures, and cutting down of debts, both of which were done from democratic motives. Solon adopted the Euboic standard for coin, which was raised to the level later called Attic by Peisistratus, who first struck the tetradrachms with the head of Athena. His motives. The result the foundation of Athenian commerce, and the victory of the Athenian silver coinage, to the weight of which Corinth, Eretria, and other cities were obliged to conform. Wide circulation of Athenian coin: the barbarous copies.

THE EARLIEST COINS OF GREECE PROPER

By PERCY GARDNER

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read June 7, 1911

I. SUPPOSED EUROPEAN COINS IN ELECTRUM

THERE can be no question but that Asia Minor preceded European Greece in the introduction and use of coins; and down to late in the seventh century the monetary issues of Asia Minor were of electrum only. Therefore, in inquiring what are the earliest coins of Hellas, we are bound first to consider certain electrum coins possibly issued on the European side of the Aegean, and having some claim to be regarded as outgrowths of the Ionian electrum coinage. Did the coinage of Europe, like that of Asia, begin with electrum? We must consider electrum coins which have been given to Thrace, Aegina, Euboea and Athens.

An electrum coin attributed to Thrace bears on the obverse the type of a centaur carrying away a woman; on the reverse a square incuse roughly divided into four (Pl No. 1). It is a stater of Phocaean weight.[1] The assignment to Thrace, however, rests on no solid basis. The reason for it is that on early silver coins of the people of the Pangaean range, the Orrescii, Zaeelii and Letaei, we have a not dissimilar type of a centaur carrying a woman in his arms. But a comparison of the electrum with the silver coins shows at once differences far more striking than the general likeness. On all the Thracian silver coins the Centaur kneels and bears the woman lying at length in both arms so that her head is in front of him. On the electrum coin he is walking, and turns round to greet the woman, who is seated on his back. The motive is thus quite different. The incuse of the reverse also is quite different from the flat millsail-like incuse of the Thracian silver coins, which are, in fact, quite a century later than the electrum coin. M. Babelon regards the coin as of Ionic provenance.[2] Whether it was actually struck in Ionia or Thrace, it

[1] Grains 252·5 (16·35 grammes). *Br. Mus. Cat. Ionia*, p. 9, Pl. ii. 2. It contains some 64 per cent. of pure gold.

[2] *Traité des Monn. Gr. et Rom.* ii. 134. Cited below as *Traite*.

belongs, beyond doubt, to the Phocaean, or North Asia Minor circle of influence; and has no relation to the coins of Greece proper. Thrace, indeed, at that time was more exposed to the influence of Asia than to that of Europe. This is clearly indicated by the fact that when the cities of Thasos and Lete began striking silver coin, they struck it on a different standard from those of Aegina and of Corinth.

We turn next to the electrum coin attributed to Aegina. It is an unique electrum stater weighing 207 grains (13·45 grammes) at Paris. The type of the obverse is a tortoise: on the reverse are two deep oblong incuses side by side (Pl. No. 2). This particular form of incuse is rare: I know it only for Calymna, Cos, Rhodes, and other Carian mints, in the sixth century. This electrum coin has been regarded as the earliest coin of Aegina, and indeed as remains of the bridge by which coinage passed from Asia to Greece. But the type is not the sea-turtle as on the earliest Aeginetan money, but a land-tortoise, and neither the incuse nor the weight is Aeginetan. Its attribution is therefore very doubtful: it may be of Asia Minor: it is more probable that it is Asiatic than that it is European.

Other electrum coins of the Euboic standard have been given to cities of Greece[1]:—

1. Owl to l. (Pl. No. 3).	Rev. incuse.	wt. 21·	grains	(1·36 grammes)
2. Eagle devouring hare (Pl. No. 4).	,,	44·4	,,	(2·87 ,,)
3. Eagle flying	,,	22·1	,,	(1·43 ,,)
4. Wheel of four spokes (Pl. No. 5).	,,	21·8	,,	(1·41 ,,)

The reverse device of No. 1 is remarkable, consisting of two rectangles and three triangles. These coins have sometimes been set aside as modern forgeries. U. Koehler, however, has maintained their genuineness.[2] He mentions several examples, one of which was found in the bed of the Ilissus, one at Piraeus, others at Athens. If we grant the genuineness of these coins, we must regard them as an attempt to introduce into Athens the electrum coinage of the Ionian coast. The coins are sixths of the Euboic stater of 130 grains; they thus follow the Asiatic system of division by thirds and sixths, and not the European system of division by halves and quarters. They have not the appearance of being very early: certainly they are not as archaic as the earliest silver of Aegina. They stand apart

[1] Head, *Hist. Num.*, ed. 2, p. 358.

[2] *Athen. Mittheil.* 1884, 359

from the silver coinage of Athens, and seem to have exercised no influence upon it.

The other coins were by Mr. Head given to Chalcis in Euboea, mainly on account of silver coins of Chalcis:—Eagle flying, with serpent in beak = ΨΑʟ (ΧΑΛ) wheel. Tetradrachms, tetrobols.[1] But more recently he has retracted that attribution,[2] observing that they are found in Asia Minor, No. 2, for example, at Priene. The recent discovery of a hoard of electrum coins at Ephesus[3] with a great variety of types has decidedly increased our disinclination to regard type in early electrum coins as a satisfactory indication of mint. It is therefore far more probable that these eagle and wheel coins belong to Asia than to Europe. Thus it seems that any electrum issue in Europe is more than doubtful, or if any such took place (at Athens for example) it was rather in the way of a tentative issue for special purposes than as a regular state currency. It was certainly not on a bridge of electrum that coinage passed from Asia to Europe; but the coins of Europe were from the first of silver.

II. Pheidon and the Coins of Aegina

The problem as to which king or which city of Hellas first issued coin was much discussed in antiquity. Before considering the evidence offered by extant coins, which is of course by far our most valuable source of knowledge, we must consider the testimony bequeathed to us on the subject by ancient historians, and such historic documents as the Parian Chronicle.

The grammarian Julius Pollux, though he wrote in the reign of Commodus, and can have had no direct knowledge of early Greek coins and weights, is yet of value to us, because he had access to a considerable range of literature, much of which has disappeared. He retails[4] to us a number of ancient views as to the earliest Greek coins. I have elsewhere[5] discussed the origin of the electrum coins of Asia, which were much earlier in date than the silver coins of Hellas. Only such of Pollux's statements as refer to coins of Greece Proper concern us here. He mentions an opinion that coins were first struck at Athens by Erichthonius and Lycus. It is, however, the universal opinion of modern numismatists that coins did not make their appearance at Athens until the sixth century, and that the

[1] *B M. Cat. Central Greece*, p. lii, *Num. Chron.*, *N.S.* xv, Pl. viii. 16-18. Cf. Babelon, *Traité*, ii. 1, p. 670.

[2] *B.M. Cat. Ionia*, p xxvi.

[3] *Brit. Mus. Excavations at Ephesus*, p. 74 (Head).

[4] *Onomast.* ix. 83.

[5] *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1908.

money of various other cities is earlier in fabric. And, indeed, the very fact that two mythical heroes like Erichthonius and Lycus were credited with the first issue of coins appears to be in itself a proof that there was no tradition connecting the earliest issue of coins in Greece with historic persons at Athens. We are told by Plutarch that Theseus issued money with the type of a bull: but here again we are in mythic surroundings. The laws of Draco mention oxen as the measure of value in case of fines, which clearly shows that in his time (620 B. C.) the Athenians did not ordinarily use coins, though at that time they were certainly in use at Aegina and Corinth. Pollux also tells us that Aglosthenes ascribed the earliest issue of coins to Naxos, of which island the writer was probably an inhabitant. Early coins of Naxos are known to us; but they appear to be imitations of those of Aegina, and less archaic. Both of these attributions are probably due to patriotic feeling, which often induced Greek writers to attribute to their own city the origin of great inventions.

A more serious claim to the origination of a coinage in Europe is put forward on behalf of Pheidon of Argos. The whole question of the position of Pheidon in early Greek history and of the nature of his policy is a difficult one. Here we need only consider his date, and his connexion with early weights, measures, and coins.

In reviewing the statements of ancient writers in regard to this matter, I propose first to mention them in historic order, and afterwards to examine them critically, to judge of their respective value and their truth.[1] Herodotus, our earliest authority in point of time, makes two statements. He says that Pheidon established the measures (τὰ μέτρα ποιήσας) of Peloponnese[2]; and that his son Leocedes was one of the suitors of Agariste, daughter of Cleisthenes of Sicyon (about 595 B. C.). The next authority in order of date is Ephorus, who is quoted in this connexion by Strabo.[3] He says that Pheidon of Argos, who was tenth in descent from Temenus, invented the measures called Pheidonian, and the weights, and struck coins, both silver and other, that is, presumably, gold or electrum.

In another place[4] Strabo cites Ephorus as authority for the statement that silver was first issued by Pheidon at Aegina. The *Etymologicum Magnum*[5] makes the same assertion, and adds that Pheidon dedicated in the Argive Heraeum the spits (of iron or bronze) which

[1] This has already been done by M. Théodore Reinach (*L'Histoire par les Monnaies*, p. 35: *Revue Numismatique*, 1894) and others. I have preferred to make an independent investigation; but my results are much like those of M. Reinach.

[2] Hdt. vi. 127.

[3] P. 358.

[4] P. 376.

[5] *s. v.* ὀβελίσκος; cf. Orion, *s. v.* ὀβελός.

had hitherto served as a currency, but were now demonetized. Pausanias gives us a valuable statement as to the date of Pheidon when he says that that tyrant in conjunction with the people of Pisa celebrated at Olympia the eighth occasion of the festival: 748 B. C. The Parian Chronicle says that Pheidon was the eleventh in descent from Herakles, whereas Ephorus makes him the tenth from Temenus, and so the fourteenth from Herakles. The Parian Chronicle would thus date him to about the middle of the ninth century, according to the ordinary Greek way of reckoning by generations, Ephorus to the middle of the eighth century. Thus various authorities place Pheidon in the middle of the ninth, the middle of the eighth, and the end of the seventh centuries.

Confused by these conflicting authorities, modern historians have given very various dates to Pheidon. Some, following Weissenborn and Curtius, have assigned him to the twenty-eighth Olympiad (668 B.C.) rather than the eighth. Others have accepted the date of Herodotus,[1] as determined by the appearance of Pheidon's son among the wooers of Agariste. But the date of Weissenborn is an unsatisfactory compromise, a mere correction of the text of Pausanias, and the whole story told by Herodotus of the wooing of Agariste has the air of fable rather than of fact.[2] It is not at all difficult to suppose that Herodotus may have missed out a few generations, or confused an earlier with a later Pheidon. On the other hand, the date given by Pausanias, 748 B.C., is consistent with that given by Ephorus, which works out as 757 B. C. And it is almost certain that Pausanias had seen at Olympia some documentary authority for his date; though no doubt the records of the early Olympiads were of no great historic value.[3] On these grounds we may regard it as at least very probable that Pheidon belongs to the middle of the eighth century B.C. And it is even more probable that he had to do with a reform or regulation of the measures of Peloponnese. Not only Ephorus, but Aristotle[4] and the Parian Chronicle speak of certain measures as fixed by and named after Pheidon. So much then we may regard as historic fact. That he regulated weights as well as measures is extremely probable, since there is a close connexion between the two. We are justified in ascribing to him the weights used in commerce for a long time not only in Peloponnesus, but in Athens also, which are known to us by many extant examples,[5]

[1] So formerly did I. See *Types of Greek Coins*, p 7.

[2] Compare the note of E. Abbott on Hdt. vi. 127.

[3] See especially Mahaffy in *Journ. Hell. Stud.* ii. 164.

[4] In Pollux, x. 179.

[5] Smith, *Dict. of Antiq.*, art. *Pondera*, p. 452.

following the so-called Aeginetan standard. The phrase of the Parian Chronicle is ἐδήμευσε τὰ μέτρα . . . καὶ ἀνεσκεύασε. This regulation would naturally take the form of making weights and liquid measures consistent one with the other; that is to say, equating his standard of weight with a certain cubic measure of water. This sounds a somewhat complicated proceeding for so early a time, but it is the readiest way of producing a system of weights and measures: and it was probably by doing this that Pheidon attained his fame in Greece. It is probable that he merely regularized existing measures and weights, not inventing them, but making them systematic and consistent.

These Pheidonian weights are in all probability the same that were used in Greek commerce, until the time of Alexander the Great and later, in Northern Greece and Peloponnesus. Several specimens have reached us from Athens. And they were no doubt used by Pheidon for bronze and iron, as for other commodities. According to them were regulated the old oboli in those metals which circulated in Greece before the invention of silver coin. And when silver coin came into existence it went by the same standard, though probably with new denominations. This standard is that which we are accustomed to call Aeginetan, because it is made familiar to us through its adoption by the people of Aegina.

The assertion that Pheidon issued coins at Aegina is a statement which we cannot accept. In the first place, no coins of Greece proper seem to be so early as the eighth century; and in the second place, Pheidon never had any authority in Aegina. Probably the Aeginetans were the first people in Greece to strike money; and their money was on the Pheidonian standard: hence a natural confusion. It was the weights, not the coinage of Greece, which were due to Pheidon.

We turn next from the literary to the archaeological evidence. It is at once clear that the compiler of the *Etymologicum Magnum* would scarcely have asserted that dedicated oboli were preserved in the Heraeum of Argos, unless one of his authorities had seen them there. The Heraeum, as we know, was burned in 423 B. C., when there is a probability that dedications of bronze would be melted and disappear, in which case the oboli preserved in the later temple could scarcely be genuine, but rather restorations. However that may be, it is certain that the recent excavations conducted by the American School of Athens on the site of the Heraeum have brought to light a great quantity of votive bronzes of early date. Many of these were spits, and many pins or nails for the hair or garments.[1]

[1] *The Argive Heraeum*, i. 61; ii. 330.

Dr. Waldstein suggests that these were the original bronze currency: but as there is no record of their weights the theory is hard to verify. On the other hand, a mass of iron was discovered, which was found to consist of numerous rounded bars of metal coming to a point, and which was held together at either end by an iron coil tightly twisted round. It is hard to regard these iron spits as anything but oboli dedicated after being demonetized. This discovery would seem to refute the suggestion of T. Reinach,[1] that the obols exhibited in the temple were really standard-weights kept in the temple for reference. Mr. Svoronos has made diligent search for these iron spits in the Museum at Athens, and discovered them.[2] They are much broken and decayed, so that their present weight gives us little information. It is, however, desirable to record that in Mr. Svoronos' opinion the length of the spits was about 1·20 metres (four feet); and the weight 495–302 grammes (7,650–4,675 grains), a Pheidonian mina being about 622 grammes (9,600 grains). Supposing that these iron bars were a remnant of early currency, that currency, being dedicated in the Heraeum of Argos, would naturally be not Aeginetan but Argive. If I have rightly assigned the date of Pheidon, their dedication would be later than his time. For it appears that until the seventh century, and even later, the currency of Peloponnesus consisted of literal oboli or bars of metal. These were of bronze or of iron: the iron of course being heavier and less valuable. This currency was everywhere except at Sparta replaced later by the Aeginetan coins, at all events in large payments. The dedication therefore, must belong to the seventh or sixth century.

The Aeginetan standard as known to us from extant weights and coins is as follows:—

Talent	37,320 grammes	576,000 grains.
Mina	622 ,,	9,600 ,,
Drachm	6·22 ,,	96 ,,
Obol	1·03 ,,	16 ,,

But while this is certainly the standard which passed in later times as Pheidonian, and must have been connected with Pheidon, it is a system based upon the weight of the silver drachm. In discussing its origin, we had best take our start, not from the perplexing traditions as to Pheidon, but from the known facts as to the earliest coins.

At a far earlier date even than that of Pheidon, regular systems of weights and measures had been in use in the great empires of the

[1] *L'Histoire par les Monnaies*, p. 38.
[2] *Journ. Internat. de Numism.* ix, p. 196.

East, Babylon, Assyria, and Egypt. That they were in use also in prehistoric times in Crete and Mycenae is in itself very probable, and seems to be established by Sir A. Evans in a paper contributed to *Corolla Numismatica*.[1] He shows that talent and shekel weights were in use at Cnossos, and that in every case the standard used was taken from Egypt, though in some cases it may be traced beyond Egypt to Babylon. That a system approximating to the light Babylonic gold standard was in use in Egypt, in Crete, and in Argolis in the second millennium B.C. seems to be clearly made out. The use of a standard corresponding to that of Aegina is, however, not proved for prehistoric times. What Evans has called the heavy Egyptian gold standard is certainly followed in Crete in the case of several weights which bear marks of value, showing an unit of 12·30 to 13·98 grammes (188 to 215 grains). At first sight this may seem a probable source for the weight known as Aeginetan, with a drachm of 96 grains (6·22 grammes), and a didrachm of 192 grains (12·44 grammes). But it is very doubtful whether there is here any line of connexion. In the first place, the weights generally are much nearer to the higher than to the lower limit, and so are not at all close to the Aeginetan standard. And in the second place, the break between Mycenaean and historic Greece is so complete; it is so clear that a period of barbarism and poverty separates one from the other; that we may well doubt whether so civilized an institution as a weight-standard would survive.

Mr. Head[2] is disposed to regard a group of weights found at Naucratis, which seems to follow the Aeginetan standard, as indicating that that standard may have come from Egypt. But Naucratis was not of very early foundation; and there is no reason for thinking that the weights in question are earlier than the date of Pheidon, or even than the first issue of coins at Aegina.

Talents and minas of gold and silver and electrum, together with the stater of electrum, which was a fraction of the mina, and its divisions $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{6}$, $\frac{1}{12}$, $\frac{1}{24}$, had long been known in Asia, and used by the Ionians of the coast of Asia Minor. But the comparatively rude inhabitants of Peloponnesus had been content with a currency of bronze pieces, sometimes round, in the shape of a πέλανορ, but more often long, in the form of a bar or spit (ὀβελός). A handful (six) of these bars made up a drachm (δραχμή).[3] In larger payments bronze was probably weighed out, as was the *aes rude* of Italy.

[1] *Minoan Weights and Currency*, pp. 336–367.
[2] *Hist. Num.*, 2nd edition, xliv; cf. Petrie, *Naukratis*, i, p. 78.
[3] So *Etym. Magn.*, *s. v.* δραχμή and ὀβελίσκος.

It was this rude currency which Pheidon regulated, without, so far as we can judge, superseding it. But later, in the seventh century, this primitive system was out of date. Probably the bars of bronze were very irregular in shape, and perhaps in weight. They were not suited to the growing commerce of the Greek islands. The people of Aegina, at that time in the front ranks of commerce, must have known all about the electrum coins of Ionia. Electrum, however, was not native to Greece. Silver, on the other hand, was procurable from Spain, Thrace, and elsewhere. The Aeginetans decided to strike in silver coins which should represent the bronze oboli which were current. The silver obol would stand for one such bar; the silver drachm for a handful of such bars, that is for six; the silver didrachm would stand for twelve.

Setting aside the notion that Pheidon was connected with the earliest coinage of Aegina, we may claim for Aegina the precedence in European coinage, on the ground of the extremely rude and primitive character of the oldest examples of Aeginetan coinage, and because they seem to have served as models for all the coins of the islands of the Aegean. In the noteworthy find at Santorin, in 1821, 760 early coins of the Greek coast and islands were found, and of these 541 were of Aegina, while many other coins showed in fabric and type signs of an attempt to conform to the Aeginetan pattern.[1] To this find we will presently return.

Though the question of the origin of the standard used at Aegina for silver coin has been a subject of much discussion, the discussion has not been fruitful, mainly because it has not proceeded on scientific lines. It has been carried on by numismatists solely in relation to coins: the inquiry has been why the Aeginetans struck coins weighing 192 or 194 grains, when no people used that standard for money before. The question, however, is really a much wider one, including the whole question of the origin of currency in Peloponnesus.

We may begin by dismissing the current views as to the origin of the silver weight of Aegina. One view[2] is that it is the weight of the South Ionian stater (224 grains), somewhat reduced. And in support of this theory the fact has been brought forward that one of the very early Aeginetan silver coins weighs as much as 211 grains. This coin, however, stands quite by itself, and as Mr. Head suggests, may be a mere accident. No reason for the degradation of weight-

[1] *Num. Chron* 1884, pp. 269–280 (Wroth)

[2] So Head, *Hist. Num*, p xxxviii. In the second edition of his great work, however, Mr. Head takes another view.

standard by thirty grains has been given, nor any reason why the South Ionian standard should have been adopted at Aegina, when it was not adopted at any other European mint. It is a mere guess, without any evidence to justify it. The same may be said of Prof. Ridgeway's view that the object in issuing coins of the Aeginetan weight was that ten of them should be of the value of a Homeric talent or Euboic gold coin of 130 grains. He suggests that 130 grains of gold, at the rate of 15 to 1, would be equivalent to ten silver coins weighing 195 grains. This view is based upon two assumptions, both of which not merely are arbitrary, but can be definitely disproved. It is assumed that the standard of value in Aegina was a gold coin or talent. This was not the case; the standard of value was, according to our authorities, a bar of bronze or of iron. And it is assumed that gold and silver passed in the proportion of 15 to 1. This was not the case. When the Athenians needed gold for the Parthenos statue of Pheidias, they bought it with silver at the rate of 14 to 1: but this is the highest rate of exchange of which we hear in Greece Proper: the rate usual in the Persian Empire was 13 or 13⅓ to 1.[1] Passing these baseless conjectures, let us consider the real circumstances of the case.

In adjusting the new silver currency to the existing currency of bronze, two courses were possible. The Aeginetans either could strike coins of such a weight that a round number of the bronze oboli, say ten or twenty, would go for one of them. In that case they might have originated a new standard of weight for coinage, other than the Pheidonian. Or they could strike silver coin on the Pheidonian standard, leaving the question of the number of bronze bars which would go for each to settle itself.

We know that other States when they issued coins in a fresh metal, say in silver or in gold, sometimes, like the kings of Lydia and Persia, used different standards for the two metals, in order that a round number, ten or twenty, of the silver coins should pass for one of the gold. And sometimes, like the Athenians and like Alexander the Great, they used one standard for the two metals.

It was the latter of these systems which was adopted by the people of Aegina. They issued their silver money on the already familiar Pheidonian standard (Pl. No. 6). The weight of these early silver staters is well known to us. The didrachm weighed about 192 grains (grammes 12·44), the drachm 96 grains (grammes 6·22), the obol, which was the sixth of the drachm, 16 grains (grammes 1·03). These

[1] See T. Reinach's paper in *L'Hist. par les Monnaies*, pp. 41–73.

weights correspond with the standard of numerous weights of Pheidonian type which have come down to us.

At the same time the Aeginetans fitted the new coins into the old currency by equating the new obol of silver with the old obolus or spit of bronze. In primitive societies it is easy and usual to find some simple proportion between various objects used as measures of value; for example, a slave may be equated with three oxen, an ox with ten sheep, and so on. We have reason to think that the relation established between the values of silver and bronze at Aegina was 120 to 1. We have an indication of this in the facts of the regular currency of Sparta. At Sparta the current oboli were not of bronze; the currency consisted of iron bars, which were of the weight of an Aeginetan mina.[1] According to Plutarch and Hesychius these minae of iron were worth only half an obol of silver. In that case iron would be in relation to silver only as 1 to 1200. Hultsch, however, gives reasons for thinking that the normal value of these bars was an obol, giving a relation of 1 to 600. Now bronze was in Greece about five times as valuable as iron. Haeberlin[2] has given reasons for thinking that in Italy in the third century the relations of value between silver and bronze were 120 to 1. If the same proportion held in Greece, the silver obol of 16 grains would be equivalent to an obol of bronze weighing 1,920 grains (124 grammes), or twenty Aeginetan drachms. This corresponds to the reason and probability of the matter. The bronze bars would in that case have weighed about a quarter of a pound; a drachm or handful of six of them would weigh about 1⅝ pounds, somewhat less than a kilogram.

The early currency of Peloponnesus seems to have consisted of bars both of bronze and iron, bronze for larger, and iron for smaller payments. At Sparta iron only was allowed. But it would appear that this regulation was not a primitive one, but introduced in the course of Spartan history: for in the Homeric age, as we know, iron was very valuable; and its value could not have become despicable until well on in the iron age. At Byzantium, and in Peloponnesus iron bars or coins were retained for small payments until the fourth century B.C.

The Aeginetan talent, consisting of 60 minae, or 6,000 drachms, or 48,000 obols, must have reference to minae, drachms, and obols of silver, not of bronze. For $48,000 \times 16$ grains weighs about eighty pounds, or forty kilograms, which would be about what a man might

[1] Hultsch, *Metrologie*, p. 535.

[2] *Systematik des ält. röm. Munzwesens* (1905).

easily lift. If a talent had been formed from the bronze obolus of 1,920 grains, it would be a weight 120 times as great, which would be quite out of proportion to a man's capacity for lifting. So the drachm which was in weight the hundredth of a mina, and the obol which was in weight the sixth of a drachm only came into existence when silver began to be coined. The drachm and the obol as coins appear to have been invented by the Aeginetans. They were borrowed by all the systems of silver coinage which came into use in Hellas. This is abundantly proved by the marks of value which the coins of Peloponnese bear in the fifth century.[1] And even in Asia it became usual to strike drachms or obols of Persian or Phoenician standard. But originally, as the Aeginetans from the first went by the drachm and the obol, so the Ionians of Asia used the stater and its parts.

A difficulty remains. Why in that case should the Aeginetans have struck at first, not the drachm of 96 grains, but the didrachm of 192 grains? The answer I think is ultimately this, that man has two hands and not one only. A didrachm is the equivalent of the bars of bronze which a man carries when he has both his hands full of bars, six in each. It stands for a man, while a drachm represents only half a man.

We may observe a parallel phenomenon in regard to the talent. Students of metrology are puzzled at finding that the various talents in use in Asia, and even in Europe, have two forms, light and heavy; and the heavy is of exactly double the weight of the light. Now a talent, usually weighing some 60 or 80 of our pounds, is what a man can lift: the root of the word is τλα: τλάω meaning I bear. But a man can lift in two hands double as much as he can lift in one. What a man can carry in one hand is a light talent: what he can carry in two hands is a heavy talent.

At Aegina the mina is an arbitrary division, $\frac{1}{60}$ of the talent, or 100 silver drachms. The name shows it to be of Asiatic origin: it is a stepping-stone in European systems of weight between talent and drachm. But the talent is a natural weight, almost as natural as a weight, as the foot and the fathom are as measures of length. And like them it varies in various countries between certain limits, following the local notion as to what a man can be expected to lift. As the yard represents the length of the King's arm, measured from the breast-bone, so the royal talents of Assyria represented what the King could comfortably lift in one hand or in two. In a sense the drachm also is a natural measure, for given the usual

[1] *Br. Mus. Cat. Peloponnesus*, p. xvii.

size of a bar of metal, it would not be convenient to carry more than a certain number of them in the hand: the bars of Peloponnese were of such a size that six could be carried.

III. Coins of Euboea

The cities of Chalcis, Eretria, and Cyme in Euboea were among the great colonizing cities of Greece at the beginning of the Olympiads. Cumae in Italy was a foundation of the people of Chalcis and Cyme,[1] and the earliest of all Greek settlements in Italy; and Italy, Sicily, and Chalcidice in Macedon were dotted with Euboean colonies. The Euboeans would not be likely to be far behind the Aeginetans in the issue of coin. And being more detached from the Greek mainland, and in closer relations with the people of Ionia where Cyme in Aeolis was a colony of Euboea, it is probable that their earliest issues would have a closer resemblance to those of Asia Minor.

The standard which was derived from Babylon and was largely used for gold coins in Asia, was known to the Greeks, including Herodotus, as the Euboic standard. This does not, of course imply that the Babylonic standard was adopted from Euboea. The opposite line of derivation is the only one probable or indeed possible. It does, however, prove that it was through Euboea that the Greeks gained knowledge of the standard of Babylon.

The issue of silver coins on a gold standard is a remarkable phenomenon. In Asia, gold and silver were in the sixth century, and probably earlier, minted on different standards, in order that a round number of the silver coins should exchange against one or two of the gold coins. The issues of Croesus and of the Persian kings, for example, are so arranged that twenty of the silver pieces pass for one of the gold pieces. And this custom has generally prevailed, down to our days. The Euboeans took another line, which was later adopted by the Athenians and by Alexander the Great. They issued silver money of the same weight as the gold which was current. Not much gold would pass in Greece, but such as there was would no doubt pass by the Babylonic weight, which indeed had struck such deep roots that no gold coins (with insignificant exceptions) were struck on any other standard than the Euboic and its Attic variant down to Roman times. The price of the gold stater in silver coins of the same weight was left to be determined, not by any authority, but by the demand, and the circumstances of the time.

[1] Modern historians are generally agreed that it was Euboean Cyme, and not Cyme in Aeolis, which took part in this settlement.

It is a characteristic difference between Asia, where the will of kings regulated all things, and Europe, with its free cities.

This is a point of some importance, because some archaeologists have been disposed to see in the frequent changes at some cities of the standard used by them for silver coins, a series or succession of attempts to adjust the silver coinage to the gold, when the proportionate value of the two metals changed. It is in this direction that Professor Ridgeway has looked for the origin of some silver standards, notably the Aeginetan.[1] And Mr. Head[2] is disposed to see in the somewhat notable changes of the silver standards used in the fifth and fourth centuries at Abdera in Thrace, a series of adjustments of the silver coinage to a constantly rising value of silver in proportion to gold. I cannot in this place fully consider Mr. Head's theory. It will be sufficient to point out two preliminary objections to it. In the first place we can scarcely suppose Abdera to have adopted quite a different system of coinage, the bimetallic, when all the other cities of Thrace were monometallic. And in the second place, the standard of value in Abdera, in the fifth and fourth centuries, was not, as Mr. Head's theory assumes, the daric or gold stater, but the silver coins of Athens.

But though the Euboeans accepted the Babylonic weight for their stater, they did not divide it, on the Asiatic plan, into thirds and sixths and twelfths, but into halves and twelfths, drachms and obols. This was the Pheidonian system of division. Herein, as we shall see, they differed from the Corinthians.[3] And they succeeded in making their coinage thoroughly European and national.

This is the simplest, and I think the true, view of the origin of the Euboic weight. It is not, however, wholly free from difficulty. That it was bronze, not gold, which was the standard of value in Greece I have insisted in speaking of the early coins of Aegina. And the Aeginetans adapted their issues of silver to a bronze and not to a gold currency. Why should the Euboeans have taken another course? Dr. Lehmann-Haupt[4] has maintained that the Euboeans also adapted their silver to bronze: but in my opinion he does not prove this satisfactorily. He supposes that Chalcis, being as its name implies a city abounding in copper, and commanding copper mines,[4] was able to force copper to a higher comparative value than it had

[1] See above, p. 172. [2] *Hist. Num.*, ed. 2, p. xlii.

[3] In the trinal divisions of the silver coins of Chalcidice, I should see not Euboean influence, as Dr. Imhoof-Blumer, but Corinthian. See below, p. 185.

[4] Copper and bronze are not clearly distinguished. *Hermes*, 1892, p. 549; *Zeitschr. f. Numism.*, 27,125.

elsewhere. The ordinary relation between copper and silver in the Levant being 120 to 1, a mina of silver would ordinarily pass, where the Babylonic silver weight was used, for two talents (120 minae) of copper. But if the Chalcidians were able to force copper up to a value of 1 to 96 in comparison with silver, then these two talents of copper would be equivalent only to $\frac{96}{120}$ or $\frac{4}{5}$ of a Babylonic mina of silver. Now $\frac{4}{5}$ of a Babylonic mina of silver is nearly a Euboic mina of 436·6 grammes (6,750 grains).[1] Thus the writer supposes that the greater value given to copper resulted in the invention of a new and lighter standard for silver. But Dr. Lehmann Haupt's arithmetical calculation seems to be out of gear, in fact inverted; and he makes the astonishing assumption that when you have a greater quantity of goods to dispose of, you can raise the price of the goods, which is entirely contrary to economic fact. Of course, if Chalcis had a monopoly of copper, it would be somewhat different: but even then, why should the people who bought copper at a high price in Euboea sell it at a lower price in Asia Minor? Moreover, Chalcis had no monopoly: but only valuable mines. The theory in question therefore is utterly baseless and inacceptable. Only one plausible argument can be urged in its favour, that at Athens the χαλκοῦς was one ninety-sixth of the didrachm, since eight chalci went to the obol and six obols to the drachm. But this argument has no weight. The chalcus was probably a late-invented fraction of the obolus: in some places six went to the obol, in other places eight: there is no indication that at Chalcis it was originally of the weight of a didrachm, as the theory requires.

Mr. Head[2] is disposed to think that the Euboic standard came to Euboea from Samos, where it had already been used in early times for electrum; and the use for electrum would be a natural stage on the way for its use in silver. The chief objection to this view is that the early electrum coins in question, attributed by Mr. Head to Samos, are not really struck on the Babylonic gold standard, but on a somewhat heavier standard, stater 135 or 270 grains, 17·50 or 8·75 grammes, which was later in use at Cyrene and was introduced at Athens by Peisistratus. This standard I regard as of Egyptian origin: I consider it later, under *Athens*. Thus a Babylonic origin of the Euboic standard is by far the most probable.

I have already discussed, and dismissed, the view that the earliest coins of Euboea were struck in electrum.

[1] This is a false value for the Euboic mina, which really weighed 421 grammes (6,500 grains).

[2] *Hist. Num.*, ed. 2, p xlvi.

The earliest silver coins which can be attributed with certainty to Chalcis are the tetradrachms, didrachms, and smaller divisions bearing as type on one side a flying eagle, on the other a wheel in a triangular incuse.[1] The weight of the tetradrachm is 258·7 grains (16·76 grm.): that of the didrachm just half this. The attribution of these coins to Chalcis is guaranteed by the appearance on them of the letters (V A Ⴤ) (X A Λ) in some later examples.

These later examples, however, can scarcely be given to an earlier date than the middle of the sixth century; and the uninscribed coins, some of which may perhaps belong to Chalcis, must begin at least half a century earlier.

The earliest coins which can with certainty be attributed to Eretria are tetradrachms and lesser coins bearing on one side a cow scratching her head with a hind foot and the letter E; on the other side a cuttle-fish in an incuse. The weight of the tetradrachms varies from 260 to 267 grains (16·84–17·27 grm.): their date would begin probably when Eretria was rebuilt after the Persian destruction of 490 B.C., say about 485 B.C.[2] These coins show the raising of the standard which is so general in Greek cities about the middle of the sixth century[3]; that raising cannot be so clearly traced at Chalcis.

It is, however, almost certain that the coins which I have mentioned were not the earliest issues of Eretria. A large and varied series of uninscribed silver coins was first attributed to the cities of Euboea by F. Imhoof-Blumer and E. Curtius.[4] It consists of what have been called in Germany *Wappenmünzen*, didrachms of Euboic weight (130 grains, 8·42 grammes), bearing on one side a very simple type, often enclosed in a linear circle, on the other side an incuse square divided into four triangles by crossing lines.

The types are as follows:—[5]

1. Gorgon-head—Didrachm, obol, tetartemorion.
2. Ox-head, facing—Didrachm, hemiobol.
3. Owl to l.—Didrachm, obol.
4. Horse, standing, unbridled—Didrachm.
5. Forepart of bridled horse r. or l.—Didrachm.
6. Hinder part of horse to r.—Didrachm, drachm.
7. Amphora—Didrachm, obol.

[1] Babelon, *Traité*, p. 667.

[2] As Mr. Head points out, *Cat. Central Greece*, Introd. p. lviii, Eretria must have been speedily rebuilt, as Eretrian ships were present at the battle of Artemisium, 480 B.C.

[3] See below, p. 199.

[4] *Hermes*, x. 215; *Monatsber. der Pr. Akad.* 1831.

[5] Babelon, *Traité*, ii. 1, pp. 674–723, Pls. xxxi–iii.

8. Astragalus—Didrachm.

9. Wheel. Sometimes of archaic type, one transverse crossed by two supports: sometimes with four spokes, with or without supports—Didrachm, drachm, obol.

10. Triskele of human legs—Didrachm, drachm, triobol.

11. Scarabaeus—Didrachm, obol.

12. Frog—Obol.

These types are by Mr. Head conjecturally assigned as follows to the cities of Euboea:—[1]

Chalcis—Wheel, triskele.
Eretria—Gorgon-head, bull's head.
Cyme—Horse; fore- or hind-part of horse.
Athenae Diades—Owl, astragalus.
Histiaea—Amphora.

These attributions, however, are anything but certain; and the whole question must be seriously considered.

We begin by identifying the coins of Eretria, which form the most important class of early Euboean money. They form a series thus:—[2]

Didrachms.

Gorgon-head = incuse (in one case, lion's head in incuse).
Bull's head = incuse.

Tetradrachms.

Gorgon-head = Bull's head.
,, = face and forepaws of panther.

Later Coinage, after Persian wars.

Cow scratching herself = Sepia in incuse square.

As regards this later coinage, it can be given with confidence to Eretria, as we have seen. But the earlier series, between which and the later there is no point of direct contact, presents more difficulty. It stretches over a considerable period of time, the style showing gradual development, and the incuse giving way to a second type. Only two attributions are suggested for the series, Athens and Eretria. And the conclusive reason for assigning them to Eretria rather than to Athens is that many of them are certainly later than the earliest coins bearing the head of Athena and certainly of Athenian origin, and that it is not to be supposed that two sets of coins of quite

[1] *Br. Mus. Cat. Central Greece*, p. xlix.
[2] *Br. Mus. Cat. Central Greece*, Introduction.

different types and fabric would be issued contemporaneously from the Athenian mint.

This argument may be enforced and made more definite by a careful consideration of the weights of the coins. The earliest didrachms above mentioned seldom exceed 130 grains in weight. The specimens in the British Museum average 129·5 grains (8·39 grammes). The later tetradrachms bearing the Gorgon-head and another type, the head of a panther, are heavier, the average of six examples being 2 × 130·6, or if we omit one abnormal example, 2 × 131·4; these latter, then, constitute the coinage of Eretria contemporary with the early Athena types at Athens.

In treating of the coins of Athens I shall try to show that these two-type pieces are first struck in the time of Peisistratus, who raised the monetary standard from the Euboic level (130 grains for the didrachm) to the Attic level (135 × 2 grains for the tetradrachm). If that view be correct, it will follow that the tetradrachms at Eretria are later than the middle of the sixth century, and the didrachms which preceded them presumably earlier than that date. We shall find in dealing with the coins of Corinth that in the middle of the sixth century Attic influence in that city also appreciably raised the weight of the coins. Thus the Peisistratid issue of tetradrachms turns out to be of great value as evidence for the arranging and dating of the coins of Greece Proper.

On some of the tetradrachms given to Eretria there are two globules in the field.[1] These can scarcely be taken for anything but marks of value. M. Six and M. Babelon regard their presence as proving that the coins in question were issued as didrachms—double, that is to say, of the drachm of 130 grains which they regard as used at Athens between the time of Solon and that of Hippias. M. Six draws the further conclusion that they were struck at Athens, there being no evidence for the existence of so heavy a drachm elsewhere. In my opinion, however, there is no satisfactory evidence for the currency, even at Athens, of a drachm of the weight mentioned. I regard the globules on the Eretrian coins as merely shewing that they were of double the value of the coins which had up to that time circulated at Eretria, and which were without doubt Euboic didrachms. The people of Eretria in the archaic period, just like the people of Aegina,[2] thought not in drachms, but in staters or didrachms. At Delphi, at a much later date, and at other places, expenses were ordinarily reckoned in staters.

[1] *Br. Mus. Cat. Central Greece*, p. 121; Babelon, *Traité*, Pl. xxxi. 174.
[2] See above, p. 174.

Another series, that of the owl, has been attributed, not without reason, to Athens. As M. Babelon has well observed, if a numismatist were asked what coinage would naturally at Athens precede the Athena-type, the only reply he could make, remembering the analogy of other series, would be, a coinage with owl for type.[1] Examples have been found both in Attica and Euboea. The amphora type would also be very appropriate to Athens. On the later issues of the city the owl stands on an amphora; and the amphora naturally would represent the oil which was the great gift which Athena had bestowed upon men. The olive-spray marks the Athenian coinage almost throughout, and the amphora would have the same significance. The astragalus occurs frequently on the well-known weights and tesserae of Athens.

M. Babelon tries to show the appropriateness to Athens of some of the other types. He would connect the horse-type and the wheel, as shorthand for a chariot, with the legend which narrated that Erechtheus was the inventor of chariots. It might have been better to seek in the types some allusion to the great festival of Athena, with its processions of chariots. But in any case, little weight can be assigned to what may be called literary or mythical arguments. If a type is actually used on Athenian monuments, as are the owl and the amphora, there is some reason to expect them on the early coins. But the mere fact that a type has a legendary connexion with the city goes for very little. I would therefore regard the horse coins as rather Euboean than Attic.

The wheel series has been given by Mr. Svoronos to Megara.[2] For this also there is some show of reason. The type of Mesembria, a Megarian colony in Thrace, is a radiate wheel, apparently a symbol of the sun-god. The types at Megara would certainly be Apolline; on the coins of the fourth century they are the head of Apollo and the lyre: but it is possible that the wheel may have been an earlier type at Megara. It is scarcely to be supposed that Megara, the outpost of the Dorians against Athens, and a great colonizing city in the seventh century B.C., should have been without coins when Aegina, Corinth, and Athens, her three neighbours, were all issuing them.

In view of the occurrence of the wheel on coins given with certainty to Chalcis one might be disposed to give these wheel coins to that city. But they are not earlier than the coins of Chalcis of which I have spoken: and it is improbable that the city would issue at the same time two dissimilar sets of coins.

[1] Babelon, *Traité*, ii. 1, p. 705.
[2] *Journ. int. d'archéol. numism.* 1898, p. 273.

It is doubtful whether in the case of these series, just as in the case of the early electrum of Asia, we are justified in regarding the types as regular civic stamps. Indeed, the variety of types is so considerable, and the similarity of fabric so great, that Beulé declared they must all of them, or none, come from the mint of Athens. They seem from the evidence of finds to have circulated together with the regular early tetradrachms of Athens and Euboea. For example, a hoard found at Eleusis[1] consisted of an early triobol of Athens, a didrachm and triobol of Eretria, three obols bearing the wheel, one the Gorgon-head, and a half obol bearing the bull's head. A hoard found near Cyme in Euboea consisted of tetradrachms and lesser coins of Eretria, many archaic tetradrachms of Athens, and the following *Wappenmünzen*, wheel (1), owl (1), hind-part of horse (1), fore-part of horse (1), standing horse (1), Gorgon-head (2). Another hoard found at Eretria contained tetradrachms and didrachms of Eretria, early Athenian tetradrachms, a tetradrachm with Gorgon-head, and several examples of *Wappenmünzen* (types not stated).[2]

It is thus clear that these coins had a wide and general circulation; and it seems almost certain that they belong to a monetary convention of some kind. In the sixth century Athens and Eretria were closely associated. But on the other hand there was hostility between Athens and Megara.

To Euboea and Athens therefore I would attribute the series, though certainty is impossible. We can separate one class as Euboean, and another as probably Attic; but such types as the horse, the wheel, the frog must remain of doubtful attribution.

IV. Coins of Corinth and Corcyra

That the coinage of Corinth began very early is sufficiently proved by its extremely archaic art and fabric. It is easy to prove that it began at an earlier time than that of Athens. For the earliest tetradrachms of Athens are almost on the same level of art as the coins of Corinth on which the head of Athena appears on the reverse, and these are preceded by at least two regular series of coins, stretching over a considerable space of time, as is shown by their variety and abundance.

Now these coins of Athens can be dated with reasonable certainty

[1] Köhler, *Athen. Mitth.* 1884, p 357.

[2] Köhler, l.c. It is noteworthy that in these hoards there were found no coins of Chalcis. Eretria and Athens stood together: Chalcis stood apart from them, with Corinth.

to the middle of the sixth century. The coins of Corinth then must reach back to the early part of the seventh century, certainly to the reign of Cypselus. They can scarcely, however, be so early as the time of the foundation of Corcyra, or the Corcyrean coin would have probably started under their influence.

Mr. Head's assignment of the early coins of Corinth is as follows:—

Time of Cypselus, 657–625 B.C.

1. ϙ Pegasus with curled wing = incuse square, of similar pattern to that on coins of Aegina. Stater (130 grains, 8·42 grammes). (Pl. No. 9.)

Time of Periander and later, 625–500 B.C.

2. ϙ As last = incuse developing into the croix gammée pattern. Stater and drachm (43 grains; 2·78 grammes). (Pl. No. 10.)

On the hemidrachm of this class, a half Pegasus occurs, on the obols a Pegasus, on the hemiobol, the head of Pegasus.

After 500 B.C.

3. An archaic head of Athena appears on the reverse of the staters; an archaic head of Aphrodite on the drachm. The diobol bears the mark of value Δ, the trihemiobol the letters TPIH, the hemiobol H. (Pl. No. 11.)

It appears to me that as Mr. Head has placed the archaic coins of Athens bearing the head of Athena too early, so he has placed the earliest staters of Corinth bearing the same head too late. Von Fritze[1] has well pointed out, that there cannot be much difference in date between the two series, as the style of art is closely similar. We cannot place the Athenian series earlier than, nor the Corinthian series much later than, the middle of the sixth century.

Some of the earliest flat coins of Metapontum (*Br. Mus. Cat. Italy*, p. 239) are restruck on coins of Corinth of the second type. These Metapontine coins belong to the second half of the sixth century. Somewhat later coins of Metapontum of thicker fabric and belonging to the early years of the fifth century are restruck on coins of Corinth of the third type, bearing the head of Athena.[2] This evidence is however indefinite; it only shows the coins of Corinth in each case to be older than the Metapontine restriking; but does not tell us how much older.

[1] Von Fritze, *Zeitschr. f. Numism.* xx. 143.
[2] Babelon, *Traité*, ii 1, p. 1405.

I should modify Mr. Head's dates, which in any case are too precise, in the following way:—

Class		Date
Class 1	(about)	650–600 B.C.
2	"	600–550 "
3	"	550– "

As we have no reason for connecting a change of fabric with any special events in the history of Corinth, any attempt at great accuracy cannot be successful.

There is however one indication, that of weight, which Mr. Head does not seem to have used. If we compare the coins of Class 2 with those of Class 3 we shall find that the latter are distinctly the heavier. From the collection in the British Museum, which contains only coins in good condition, we reach the following results.

Of 21 staters of Class II, the average weight is 127 grains.

Of 28 staters of Class III, the average weight is 132 grains.

That proves that at about the time when Class III came in, the standard of the stater was raised by about five grains. A precisely similar rise in the standard from 130 grains to 135 × 2 grains, took place at Athens in the time of Peisistratus, as I shall presently try to prove. I conjecture that the occasion of raising the standard at Athens was the acquisition by Peisistratus of the silver mines on the Strymon and at Laurium. Corinth seems to have followed the lead of Athens, probably because she could not help herself. This little investigation of weights strongly confirms the fixing of the middle of the sixth century at Corinth as the time of the introduction of the head of Athena as reverse type. One may even suspect that the type itself was borrowed from the fine coinage of Peisistratus.

To go back. It is safe to attribute the origin of coinage at Corinth to Cypselus. Generally speaking, we find the wealthy and art-loving tyrants of Greece responsible for such innovations. We have next to consider the monetary standard, and the reason for selecting it.

The Corinthian stater of 130 grains is of the weight of the Daric or gold shekel of Persia, and of pre-Persian times. Like the people of Euboea, those of Corinth transferred a gold standard directly to silver, as the people of Phocaea had transferred it to electrum. But they did so with a difference. The Euboeans, as we have seen, took the stater as a didrachm, and divided it into two drachms of sixty-five grains or twelve obols of eleven grains. They thus completely Europeanized it, following the system of Pheidon. The Corinthians retained the Asiatic system of division by three. They divided their stater into three drachms of forty-three grains,

and eighteen obols of seven grains. This fact was already known from the statements of ancient metrologists, and received final confirmation when inscriptions on the coins were read as marks of value,[1] Δ or ΔΙΟ standing for diobol, TPIH for trihemiobol, and H for hemiobol. As the weights of these diobols, trihemiobols, and hemiobols are just what they should be when the drachm weighs forty-three grains, the proof that this was the standard is beyond doubt.

If we seek a reason for this combined system, one may easily be found. The object of Cypselus seems to have been to make terms with the two systems of weight in use in Greece, the Euboic[2] and the Aeginetan. The Corinthian stater of 130 grains would pass not only as an Euboic stater, but as two-thirds of the Aeginetan stater of 196 grains. The Corinthian drachm of forty-three grains would be equivalent to two-thirds of the Euboic drachm of sixty-five grains, and four-ninths of the Aeginetan drachm of ninety-six grains. Mr. Head[3] has suggested that the Corinthian drachms may have been regarded as practically the equivalent of an Aeginetan hemidrachm of forty-eight grains. It is, however, difficult to believe that the drachm when equated with Aeginetan currency would pass at a higher rate than the stater or tridrachm; and this is implied in Mr. Head's view. It is, however, quite probable that in some places in later periods of Greek history, the Corinthian drachm and the Aeginetan hemidrachm were equated. The fact is that we know very little indeed as to the way in which Greek coins of various systems were related in value on the tables of the money-changers: there may have been a fixed convention in the matter, or there may have been continual fluctuations according to demand and supply. This is a matter for further investigation.

The trinal division of the Corinthian stater is valuable to the numismatist, as it enables him to discern, in the Greek colonies of Italy, Sicily, and Chalcidice in Macedonia, the influence of Corinthian commerce. There is a natural presumption that when cities which adhere to the Attic standard divide their stater of 135 grains by two they belong to the sphere of Euboean or Athenian commerce; when they divide it by three, they seem rather to be under Corinthian influence. This reasonable view, however, has not been accepted by Dr. Imhoof-Blumer, who sees in the trinal division of the stater in Chalcidice a trace of Asiatic influence. The point is a fine one, but

[1] First by myself, in *Num. Chron.* 1871.

[2] The coins of Cypselus seem to be earlier than any extant coins of Euboea: but we may well suppose the Euboic standard to have been already in existence.

[3] *Hist. Num.*, ed. 2, p. 399.

not unimportant. I prefer to consider the actual facts of exchange and commerce as more important to the people of Chalcidice than mere traditions of Asiatic procedure. That some of the cities of Chalcidice and of South Italy use a drachm of 43–45 grains is therefore an important fact in the history of commerce. This investigation, however, cannot be carried further in this place, as it is remote from our immediate object.

Corcyra.

In the case of Corcyra also there is an interesting clashing between the Aeginetan, the Corinthian, and the Euboic systems. We might naturally have expected the city, when it first issued coins, to take as its model the Corinthian coinage, which was certainly then in existence. But the relations of Corcyra to the mother-city were never from the first cordial: and the first issue of coin probably took place at the time when the people of Corcyra asserted their independence about 585 B.C., after the death of Periander. The type of the obverse, a cow suckling a calf, seems to refer to the early settlement of the island from Euboea, that being an ordinary type of Carystus, and referring probably to the worship of the Mother-Goddess.[1] The reverse type, a stellar pattern, is unlike anything in Greece Proper, and bears a nearer likeness to devices used in Ionia. The weight is the Aeginetic, but somewhat light; probably through the influence of the Corinthian standard, which was in use at Anactorium and about the mouth of the Corinthian gulf. The Corinthian drachm, it must be remembered, 43–45 grains, is distinctly lighter than the Aeginetan hemidrachm of forty-eight grains. The coins of Corcyra do not from the beginning exceed 180 grains (grm. 11·66) for the stater, and 90 grains (grm. 5·83) for the drachm. If the above conjecture is correct, these would pass as four and two drachms of Corinth.[2] As the coinage of Corinth was closely copied by the cities of Acarnania, Anactorium, Leucas, and the rest, so the cities founded by Corcyra in the north, on the coast of the Adriatic, notably Dyrrhachium and Apollonia, closely copied the coins of Corcyra, from which their money only differs in virtue of the inscriptions which it bears. The coins give us a vivid impression of the clear geographical line which separated the commercial sphere of Corcyra from that of Corinth. That the Corcyrean standard had no influence in Italy or Sicily, but only in the Adriatic is an important fact, indicating that the course of Corcyrean trade ran northwards only.

[1] *Br. Mus. Cat. Thessaly to Aetolia*, p. xlvii.

[2] In *Hist. Num.*, ed. 2, p. xlix, Mr. Head has come to the same conclusion.

It has been suggested [1] that the coin-standard of Corcyra might not be connected with that of Aegina, but directly derived from some of the cities of Asia, such as Miletus or Camirus. But all likelihood is taken from this conjecture by the fact that it does not correspond with any Asiatic standard. It is too heavy for the official standard of Persia; too light for that of Miletus. It is therefore better to derive it from the Pheidonian standard which had course in all Greece Proper, from Thessaly to Sparta.

V. Early Coins of Athens

There is no subject in Greek Numismatics which has been so fully discussed as the earliest coinage of Athens; and there are few subjects in which a greater variety of opinion prevails. The discussion has not been confined to numismatists, but has been taken up by philologists and historians. Without going into all the by-ways of the subject, I shall try briefly to portray its main features.

1. *The earliest coinage.*

There are three views as to what were the earliest coins of Athens. If we could settle this question, which is a purely numismatic one, we could with more confidence approach the other questions, philological, economic and historic, which are involved.

The first claimants are certain coins of electrum, small pieces of the weight of about twenty-one grains, having on one side an owl, and on the other side an incuse. These we have already discussed and shown that they lie outside the regular Athenian coinage.

The next claimant is the silver coins of various types, the so-called *Wappenmunzen*, of the weight of 130 grains, which are found in Euboea, Attica and Boeotia. I have spoken of them already under Euboea, and claimed them mostly for Chalcis, Eretria, and other cities of that island. But it is probable that some of them may belong to Athens, and that Athens, early in the sixth century may have issued coin closely like that of the cities of Euboea.

As we have seen, the coins of this class which can best claim Athenian parentage are those of the type of the owl. M. Babelon mentions [2] the following examples:—

Didrachms 124·1 grains (8·04 grammes) British Museum. (Pl. No. 7.)
130·8 ,, (8·47 ,,) De Luynes
130· ,, (8·42 ,,) ,,
Obols 11–9·6 grains (·72 to ·60 grammes) Several examples.

[1] *Hist. Num.*, ed 2, p. 326.
[2] *Traité*, ii. 1, p. 701.

The best indication what early uninscribed coins belong to a city is to be found by comparing the types with those of the later and recognized coins of that city. As the acknowledged coins of Athens are stamped with an owl, we may claim the uninscribed coins with that type for Athenian. As the later tetradrachms of Athens have an amphora, on which the owl stands, for type, and many weights have an amphora as type, we may fairly claim for Athens also the uninscribed coins stamped with an amphora. (Pl. No. 8.)

While we may attribute the owl coins, and the amphora coins to Athens, I should stop there. I think M. Babelon's[1] attempts to find mythological justification for the assignment of such types as the horse and the wheel to Athens are fanciful. The bull's head type, which some writers would assign to Athens is so closely connected with the Gorgon-head, which almost certainly belongs to Eretria, that we must refuse it to Athens.

Some numismatists attach value to the statement of Plutarch that Theseus struck coins bearing the type of a bull. Pollux[2] also says that the didrachm was of old the coin of the Athenians, and was called a bull, because it had a bull stamped on it. In consequence of these statements those coins have been attributed to Athens which have as type a bull's head. It is however very probable that the statements arose from a misunderstanding of the laws of Draco, in which fines are stated in oxen. Later writers fancied that by oxen Draco must have meant some kind of coin, knowing that the coins of Aegina were called tortoises, those of Corinth horses, and those of Athens owls. But we know that Draco was speaking of real oxen. And it may be added that the head of an ox is a very different thing from an ox.

The earliest coins, then, of Athens, appear to be silver didrachms of Euboic weight, bearing as type the owl, or the amphora. These may be safely given to the time of Solon, and connected with his reforms. The tetradrachms bearing the head of Athena were almost certainly, as I shall try to show, first issued in the time of Peisistratus. Thus the coinage of Athens, during the first half of the sixth century, seems to exhibit the city as closely related to Eretria in Euboea, and a member of a monetary union including a group of cities in the region. The fact is not uninstructive. In the time of Solon Athens was still struggling with Megara for the possession of Salamis, and dreams of the headship of Hellas, whether in letters, in commerce, or in arms, had not yet risen above the horizon. It was the legislation

[1] *Traité*, ii. 1, p. 707.

[2] ix. 60.

of Solon, and still more the ambition of Peisistratus, which turned Athens from a small city into a great one.

II. *The Reforms of Solon.*

The question of the Solonic reform of the Athenian coinage is one which has aroused more controversy than any other in Greek numismatic history. Numismatists used to think that they had a satisfactory account of the matter in a passage of Androtion (probably from his Ἀτθίς) quoted by Plutarch in his *Life of Solon* (xv). But certain statements in Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, since brought to light, have been held to be quite irreconcilable with those of Androtion. Some writers, such as W. Christ,[1] still regard Androtion as the preferable authority, thinking an archaeologist more likely to be accurate in such matters than a philosopher. But the great majority of the commentators on the work of Aristotle[2] maintain that his authority is final. In my opinion it is possible to reconcile the statements of the two authorities, except in one or two points. This I shall proceed to do.

The text of Plutarch runs as follows: *Καίτοι τινὲς ἔγραψαν, ὧν ἐστιν Ἀνδροτίων, οὐκ ἀποκοπῇ χρεῶν, ἀλλὰ τόκων μετριότητι κουφισθέντας ἀγαπῆσαι τοὺς πένητας, καὶ σεισάχθειαν ὀνομάσαι τὸ φιλανθρώπευμα τοῦτο, καὶ τὴν ἅμα τούτῳ γενομένην τῶν τε μέτρων ἐπαύξησιν καὶ τοῦ νομίσματος τιμήν. Ἑκατὸν γὰρ ἐποίησε δραχμῶν τὴν μνᾶν, πρότερον ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ τριῶν οὖσαν· ὥστ' ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἴσον, δυνάμει δ' ἔλαττον ἀποδιδόντων ὠφελεῖσθαι μὲν τοὺς ἐκτίνοντας μεγάλα, μηδὲν δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τοὺς κομιζομένους.*

According to Androtion, then, the alteration in the coinage was part of Solon's *Seisachtheia* or relief of debtors. Solon, says Androtion, did not cancel the debts but moderated the interest. He caused the mina which before had been of the weight of 73 drachms to be equivalent to 100, so that debtors paid the same number of drachms which they had borrowed, but in drachms of less weight; thus those who had sums to pay were gainers while those who received them were no losers. It was this operation which gained for Solon and his friends the name of χρεωκοπίδαι or debt-cutters. Androtion, however, adds that at the same time Solon made an increase of measures, that is, no doubt, measures of capacity. Apart from this phrase, to which we will return later, the passage seems quite clear. As the proportion of 73 to 100 is just the proportion in weight between the

[1] *Munchener Sitzungsber.* 1900, 118.

[2] The literature of the subject, which is extensive, is given in Head's *Historia Numorum*, ed. 2, p. 365.

mina and drachm of the Athenian coinage and those of Aegina, numismatists naturally concluded that the Aeginetan standard was before Solon's time in use at Athens, and that he lowered the standard from Aeginetan to what may be called Solonic or Attic level, in order that debtors should save 27 per cent. in their repayments. To say that the creditors would lose nothing is of course absurd: whatever the debtors would gain they would lose: but it is very natural that Solon should not have realized this fact. M. Babelon has no difficulty in showing that the measure attributed to Solon was financially unsound;[1] but that is scarcely to the point. It is quite certain that, all through the course of history, coinage has been debased in order to accommodate debtors or to relieve the financial straits of governments; and we have no reason to think that Solon would be too wise to attempt such things.

We must next turn to the passage bearing on the question in the recently discovered work by Aristotle on *The Constitution of Athens*.

The text of Aristotle, as determined by Blass and Kenyon, runs[2]: Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς νόμοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ θεῖναι δημοτικά, πρὸ δὲ τῆς νομοθεσίας ποιῆσα[ι] τὴν τῶν χ[ρ]εῶ[ν ἀπο]κοπήν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τήν τε τῶν μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν, καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος αὔξησιν. ἐπ' ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ τὰ μέτρα μείζω τῶν Φειδωνείων καὶ ἡ μνᾶ πρότερον [ἄγο]υσα στα[θμ]ὸν ἑβδομήκοντα δραχμὰς ἀνεπληρώθη ταῖς ἑκατόν. ἦν δ' ὁ ἀρχαῖος χαρακτὴρ δίδραχμον. ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ σταθμὰ πρὸς τ[ὸ] νόμισμα τ[ρ]εῖς καὶ ἑξήκοντα μνᾶς τὸ τάλαντον ἀγούσας, καὶ ἐπιδιενεμήθησαν [αἱ τ]ρεῖς μναῖ τῷ στατῆρι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σταθμοῖς.

The only serious question as to the reading arises over the phrase beginning *τήν τε τῶν μέτρων* with the repetition of the article *τήν* before *τοῦ νομίσματος*. Hill had already remarked on the oddness of the phrase, and suggested as a possible emendation *τήν τε τῶν μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν ⟨αὔξησιν⟩, καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος ⟨μείωσιν⟩*. This may be the original reading: but in any case the word *αὔξησις* if applied to coin need not mean its increase in weight, but may, as some commentators have pointed out, only imply a greater abundance. I shall presently, however, suggest a better explanation, namely that Aristotle somewhat misread his authority.

Let me, however, give a paraphrase to show how I would interpret the passage:—

Such were the democratic features of his lawgiving; before which

[1] *Journ. Intern. de Numism.* vii. 228.

[2] Quoted from Hill in *Num Chron.* 1897, 285, Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 10. I have not thought it necessary to mark the editors' restorations where they are certain.

he arranged (1) the cutting-down[1] of the debts; and after it (2) the increase in weights and measures and the multiplication[2] of the coins. For under him the measures became greater than those of Pheidon; (3) and the mina which formerly weighed seventy drachms was filled up with the hundred drachms. (4) The early stater was a didrachm. (5) He made also weights to go with the coinage, a talent weighing 63 minae, which extra three minae were distributed over the stater and other weights.

I am not at all convinced that Aristotle means to say anything very different from what Androtion says. If we put the two sets of statements in parallel columns there will appear a remarkable likeness between them.

Androtion.	*Aristotle.*
(1) He favoured the poor and lightened their burden, not by cutting down the debts, but by moderating the interest: this benevolence they called *Seisachtheia.*	He arranged the cutting down of the debts;
(2) It was accompanied by an increase of the measures, and a change in the value of the coins.	after that, an increase in weights and measures, and increase (?) of coin, the measures becoming greater than those of Pheidon.
(3) He made the mina which before had contained 73 drachms consist of 100 drachms,	The mina which formerly weighed 70 drachms, was filled up with the hundred drachms.
so that, when men repaid coins equal in number but less in weight, they were greatly advantaged, while those who received were not injured.	
(4)	The early stater was a didrachm.
(5)	He also made weights to go with the coinage, a talent weighing 63 minae, which extra 3 minae were distributed over the stater and other weights.

In passage (1) no doubt there seems a formal contradiction between the authorities: but it is not deep, since the proceeding of Solon

[1] ἀποκοπή means mutilation rather than destruction.

[2] Or decrease, μείωσιν, as above suggested.

might be regarded equally well in either aspect, as a diminution of the debt, or as a lightening of the interest. A reduction in the value of the coin would serve both purposes, since interest as well as principal would be paid in the reduced coinage. (2) Here both authorities are confused. Both are clear that the measures of capacity were increased, so as to become, as Aristotle says, larger than those of Pheidon, but as to what happened to the coin they are less explicit. The phrase in Plutarch is γενομένην τῶν τε μέτρων ἐπαύξησιν καὶ τοῦ νομίσματος τιμήν. The phrase in Aristotle is τήν τε τῶν μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος αὔξησιν. The phrases sound as if the writers were following the same authority, but did not understand precisely what happened to the coins. But Plutarch (or Androtion) goes on to show clearly what he supposed to have taken place, and we have no reason for thinking that Aristotle would have rejected his explanation, which obviously implies that the value of the coins was lessened. (3) Commentators have commonly supposed that here there is no real conflict of the two authorities, but that while Aristotle uses the round number 70, Plutarch gives the more precise figure of 73. But the difference is in my view important. The proportion between 70 and 100 is nearly that between the *Euboic* mina and the Aeginetan; the proportion between 73 and 100 is nearly that between the *Attic* mina and the Aeginetan.[1] Metrologists have not usually distinguished between the Euboic and the Attic mina, calling it the Euboic-Attic. But if we discriminate between the two, as I think we are bound by undeniable facts to do, then we must consider Aristotle's statement as the more correct. It is very natural that Plutarch's authority, writing at a time when the Attic standard was in universal use, should have supposed that it was that which was introduced by Solon. But we have in Aristotle a valuable record of the real facts of the case: if we may believe him, it was not the later Attic standard which Solon introduced, but the real Euboic, which was appreciably lighter. The coins bear out this view, and not the other.

Turning to the coins themselves, as the only safe test where authorities differ, we are justified in saying that there were at Athens none at all before the time of Solon. The fines in the laws of Draco are given in oxen; and as in the time of Draco the coins of Aegina

[1] As we have seen above (p. 180) the Euboic drachm weighed 65 grains (4·21 grammes): the Attic 67·5 grains (4·37 grammes). The difference between them is 3·6 per cent. Taking the Aeginetan drachm at 94 grains (6·09 grammes), a mina weighing 70 such drachms would give 100 drachms weighing 65·8 grains, and a mina weighing 73 such drachms 100 drachms of 68·6 grains.

were widely circulated, we may be sure that Athens was dilatory in the introduction of coinage. As we are expressly told that the measures which Solon introduced superseded the Pheidonian, we may fairly assume the same in regard to the coins, and conclude that the Aeginetan mina and drachm were in use at Athens in 600 B.C. For the current didrachms of Aegina, Solon substituted coins weighing 130 grains, that is staters of the Euboic standard, which was already accepted at Chalcis and Eretria, and (with a different system of division) at Corinth. The whole question then narrows itself down to this, were these staters, as Androtion asserted, didrachms intended to pass in place of the heavier Aeginetan didrachms, or were they drachms, as Aristotle is supposed by some recent authorities, such as Six, Head, Hill, Babelon, and others to assert? They suppose that for some reason Solon introduced a mina not of the Euboic weight, but of double that weight, which mina was again lowered by the half by Hippias. They allow that at the end of the sixth century a coin of 130 or 135 grains was a didrachm, but they think that for the first three-quarters of that century it was called a drachm.

Their reasons are twofold. In the first place they insist on interpreting the word αὔξησις as implying an addition to the weight of the coins. In the second place they appeal to the testimony of extant Athenian weights.[1] They cite one of archaic style, bearing the inscription ἥμισυ ἱερὸν δημόσιον 'Αθηναίων, weighing 426·6 grammes (6,585 grains) which yields a mina of 13,170 grains and a drachm of 131 grains, and another inscribed δεκαστάτηρον, weighing 177·52 grammes (2,738 grains) yielding a stater (or didrachm?) of 273 grains. The second of these, however, proves little, as the familiar tetradrachm of Athens of the usual type, and weighing 270 grains, might well be called a stater. And the first in fact only confirms what we knew before, that there was in use at Athens for some unknown purposes, a mina and drachm of double the weight of those ordinarily used for coins. But the use of this double mina was by no means confined to the period between Solon and Hippias, as it should be to give it any value in the present connexion. On the contrary, it was used contemporaneously with the ordinary Solonic weights in the fifth and fourth centuries.[2] It can, therefore, have had nothing to do with the Solonic reform of the coinage.

There is then no argument to be drawn from existing coins or

[1] *Num. Chron* 1895, 177; 1897, 288; Pernice, *Griech. Gewichte*, pp. 81, 82.

[2] Murray, *Greek Weights* in *Num. Chron.* 1868, 68, 69; cf. Article *Pondera* in Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*.

weights to overthrow the view which I read in our ancient authorities. Let us next turn to the historic probabilities of the case.

These seem to me entirely on the side of the reduction of weight. Solon was essentially a moderate, wishing to destroy neither rich nor poor, but to find for them a way of living together. But the poor were overwhelmed with debt, and had largely mortgaged their land. In such a case, to reduce the debt without abolishing it would be the natural plan for a mediator. And although Solon was, doubtless, a very great and wise man, I cannot see why he should not have thought that he could most fairly accomplish this by reducing the weight of the coinage. It is a process which has been resorted to by financial reformers in all ages, until the English pound of silver weighs a third of a pound, while the French *livre* weighs but a fraction of an ounce. We have no reason to think that Solon's wisdom lifted him above all the ways of thought of the time.

On the other hand it is hard to imagine any reason which Solon could have had for raising the standard of the coin. The only suggestion I find as to a motive is given by M. Babelon, who observes [1] that he would by this means give an advantage to Athenian coin, and promote its circulation. This will scarcely stand. In the first place, in the time of Solon the Athenians had not discovered the mines of Laurium, which were first worked in the time of Peisistratus, and so had no particular motive for pushing their coin. In the second place, if the Athenians were prepared to exchange their own coin of 130 grains for the Aeginetan drachm of 96 grains they must have been very bad men of business. A slight addition to the weight of the drachm would bring the coinage of Athens into request; but an addition of 40 per cent. would not have had this effect at all. It would be simply introducing a new monetary standard without any visible reason.

We come now to statement No. 4, that the old standard coin was a didrachm. I have translated χαρακτήρ by 'standard coin'; for though the word properly means the type stamped on a coin, it may also stand for the coin which bore the type. Six, Babelon, and Hill have taken the phrase as proving that the early Athenian tetradrachms really passed as didrachms. But if in Solon's time, as I have maintained, only didrachms of the ordinary Euboic weight of 130 grains were issued, then Aristotle's assertion exactly corresponds with the fact. Indeed, it entirely confirms my contention.

We return to paragraph No. 2, in which we have again a valuable

[1] *Journ. Int. de Num.* vii. 226.

historic record which modern commentators have misunderstood. We can scarcely suppose the statement of Aristotle that Solon increased the measures and weights of Pheidon to be quite baseless. This is in itself unlikely, and is rendered less so by the fact that even Androtion also speaks of an enlargement of measures, at the same time that he speaks of the lightening of the coinage. Aristotle calls the enlargement of the measures a democratic measure, and it is clear that from the point of view of the man in the street the enlargement of measures was as much in his favour as the depreciation of the coin, in which he had to pay for such measures.[1]

The measures and weights of Pheidon being in use at Athens at the time, it would seem that Solon somewhat augmented them at the same time that he lowered the weight of the coins. That Pheidonian weights for goods were in use in later times we already knew: but Solon, perhaps temporarily, raised them in a small degree.

The probable nature of his proceeding is made clear by comparison with an Attic decree of some centuries later (*C. I. G.* i. 123, *I. G.* ii. 476) which runs as follows: 'The mina of commerce shall weigh 138 drachms of the Stephanephoros' (i. e. Attic drachms, and so be of the Pheidonian standard) 'and there shall be added (thrown in) 12 drachms.' It goes on to say that in every 5 minae, one mina shall be thrown in in like manner, and in every talent 5 minae. Thus in case of the talent, by this extraordinary decree, every seller was bound to add $\frac{1}{12}$, in case of 5 minae $\frac{1}{5}$, in case of a mina $\frac{1}{12}$. The date of the decree is the second or first century B.C.

Though it is difficult to understand the procedure in case of the 5 mina weight, which seems exceptional, it is impossible to regard this decree as anything but a deliberate attempt to make the sellers in the market give more than full weight. Probably a custom had arisen of adding a little beyond the exact weight, as indeed often happens among ourselves, and this is made compulsory, by a really democratic law, a law which would have satisfied Shakespeare's Jack Cade. Of course it was futile; but the mere fact that it was passed throws a remarkable light on the nature of the later democracy of Athens. If such laws could be made in the Hellenistic age, after centuries of successful Athenian trading, we can scarcely be surprised that in the simple and unpractised sixth century B.C., even a wise lawgiver who wished to conciliate the people should legislate to a similar effect, and ordain that the seller should give the buyer full weight and a little more.

[1] This has already been pointed out by Prof. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen*, i, p. 43.

And this may explain a fact which I have elsewhere[1] noted, that it is quite usual in the case of Greek weights, and especially in the case of the numerous Athenian weights which have come down to us, that they should be appreciably heavier than the standard. A people so fond of bargaining as the Greeks, whether ancient or modern, would greatly appreciate a liberal measure; and by using such weights and measures a dealer in the market would be sure to increase his *clientèle*. We must not hastily apply modern scientific notions on such subjects in the case of the ancient world.

All through the course of history the tendency of coins is to deteriorate in weight and quality, unless when some fully organized State with a commercial instinct makes it a part of its policy to keep up the standard, and in so doing perhaps to keep up the standard of its neighbours. But the tendency in weights and measures is quite different; competition keeps them up or even raises them. This may explain how it was that Solon, while he increased the measures and the commercial weights, lowered the standard of the coin. Formerly I supposed that his standard was slightly heavier than the Euboic, 67·5 grains for the drachm, in place of 65. But I am now convinced that this slight increase in the weight came in the time, not of Solon, but of Peisistratus, as shall be presently shown.

Paragraph (5) is made somewhat obscure by the addition of the phrase πρὸς τὸ νόμισμα. Apart from that, we might naturally have supposed that it gives one the exact percentage by which the Pheidonian weights were increased, namely three minae to the talent, or five per cent. And this must, in spite of the additional words, be what is meant. We must therefore take the phrase πρὸς τὸ νόμισμα to imply not that the coin-weights were raised, which is clearly not the fact, but that the weight of commodities which were bought and sold for money was raised. It seems to me that these interpretations give us for the first time a reasonable and probable view of the monetary reform of Solon.

III. *The Coinage of Peisistratus.*

The date of the first issue of the well-known tetradrachms of Athens, which bear on one side the head of Athena, on the other an owl and an olive-twig, has been much disputed. The opinion of Mr. Head, an opinion always entitled to great weight, assigns this issue to the early years of the sixth century, and to the reform of Solon. He observes that[2] 'among them are the oldest and rudest

[1] Article *Pondera*, in Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*.
[2] *Hist. Num.*, ed. 2, p. 369.

examples of a human head on any ancient coins . . . and I take these to be quite the earliest Greek coins which were struck with both obverse and reverse types.'

On the other hand Dr. Imhoof-Blumer and M. J. P. Six regard it as impossible that coins with two types on obverse and reverse, should make their appearance so early. These excellent authorities think that the coinage did not arise until the time of Hippias 520–514 B.C. The coins which appear to Head so rude, and which are indeed of very careless and primitive style, are regarded by them as barbarous copies, or coins issued at a time of stress, and not really very archaic. Imhoof regards them as struck during the democracy which followed the fall of Hippias: Six prefers to suppose that they were struck when Hippias was besieged in the Acropolis.

I have no hesitation in a partial acceptance of this view. It seems to me clear that a great proportion of the extant early tetradrachms is really of barbarous and imitative character. Such coins are Babelon pl. xxxiv, nos. 2–11 and *Brit. Mus. Cat.* pl. i, 3, 5, 6 (our Pl. Nos. 14, 15). These must be distinguished from the really fine archaic coins of Athens, which certainly preceded them. The fabric of the two classes of coins is very different; in the one case we have fine and careful work, in the other great carelessness and irregularity.

It is to be observed that the theta with crossed bar ⊕, which is a really archaic form, is found, so far as I am aware, only on coins of the finer and more careful type,[1] which I regard as struck at Athens itself. The other form of ⊙ is found invariably on the ruder coins, which may be barbarous copies. Although archaic forms of letters often reappear at a time when one would suppose them obsolete, and so are not a very trustworthy guide in the assignment of dates by inscriptions, yet the facts which I have noted fall in rather with the theory that these rude coins are late in date than with the view that they belong to the time of Solon.

The barbarous class may very possibly have been struck by the Persian army when in Greece. The troops of Xerxes would need silver money as well as the gold darics to pay for such necessaries as they could not procure without payment. And this view is actually confirmed by the discovery of coins of the class in the canal of Xerxes by Mount Athos,[2] and on the Acropolis itself.[3] This

[1] Such as *Brit. Mus. Cat.*, Pl. ii. 5–7; Babelon, *Traité*, Pl. xxxiv. 15–17. This ⊕ is found in the very early inscriptions of Athens, down to the time of Euphronius. See Droysen, *Preuss. Akad. der Wiss.*, *Sitzungsber.* 1882, p. 8.

[2] Babelon, *Traité*, ii. 1, p 765.

[3] Babelon, pl. xxxiv. 2–8, 10, 11.

theory had already occurred to Beulé and F. Lenormant. Such coins as I am considering may then fairly be given to the end of the sixth or the beginning of the fifth century.

But what is the date of the really earliest coins of Athena type, those pieces of fine archaic type the style of which is so distinctive that we can venture with confidence to give them a date? I refer to such coins as Babelon pl. xxxiv. 14–18; xxv. 1, 2; *Brit. Mus. Cat.* pl. i. 11, pl. ii. 2, 7 (our Pl. Nos. 12, 13). We must briefly consider their fabric and style. In regard to fabric the most noteworthy fact is that they have a reverse—as well as an obverse—type. This is a rare phenomenon in the sixth century, east of the Adriatic. But two types were in use in Italy at the middle of the sixth century; and some coins of Samos, which must be given to the same date, have a reverse type enclosed in an incuse square.[1] But we know of no coins earlier than about 550 B.C. which have two types. In regard to style we have a great range of Athenian sculpture in the sixth century for comparison. The coins do not exhibit the so-called island style, notable in the case of the dedicated Corae; but they may well be set beside the head of Athena from the pedimental Gigantomachy, which may date from about 530–520 B.C., the head of the Calf-bearer, and the heads of the bronze statuettes of Athena from the *Perserschutt.*

I therefore accept the view of several authorities, perhaps best defended by von Fritze,[2] that the earliest tetradrachms of Athens belong to the middle of the sixth century. Von Fritze shows that the head of Athena on them is about contemporary with that on the coins of Corinth of 550–500 B.C.[3] There can I think be little doubt that this coinage was initiated by Peisistratus. That Tyrant had, as every one knows, a special cult of Athena. He obtained possession of extensive mines of silver, both at Laurium, and in the valley of the Strymon,[4] and required large issues of silver for the payment of his mercenaries. He filled Athens with artists, brought from Ionia and the Islands, and employed them on great works. He made the Panathenaic festival more splendid. In short, he was precisely the man to initiate a great coinage. It is possible that a great celebration of the Panathenaea by Peisistratus was the occasion of its first appearance.

The Athena coinage of Athens, from its first appearance, is regulated by a standard somewhat heavier than the Euboic—drachm

[1] Gardner, *Samos*, pl. i. 8–12.

[2] *Zeitschr. f. Num.* xx. 143. So also Perrot and Lermann.

[3] See above, p. 184.

[4] Hdt. i. 64.

67·5 grains (grammes 4·37), instead of 65 grains (grammes 4·20). This is easily explicable if they were issued by a tyrant of magnificent ideas, anxious to make his city, his temple, his coins, the best in the world. The coins were of fine silver, almost without alloy; and they very speedily gained a reputation which they never lost. They seem to have given rise, almost at once, to barbarous imitations; and barbarous imitations abounded until Hellenistic times, when the mint of Athens took careful measures to exclude such. Indeed they were remarkably easy to copy; and there was no reason why they should not be copied by any tyrant or state which wished to put silver into circulation.

The raising of the monetary standard by Peisistratus is one of the land-marks of the early coinage of Hellas. We have seen, in dealing with coins of Euboea, Corinth, and other cities that the action of Athens compelled them also to raise the weight of their coins, which otherwise would have stood in an unfavourable position in the neutral markets. And thus we are furnished with a date in arranging the early series of coins which is as valuable for the money of the sixth century as is the introduction of the Rhodian standard for the classification of the money of the early fourth century. Numismatists generally have missed this clue, because they have identified the Euboic and Attic standards, whereas the evidence of the coins themselves proves them to have been perceptibly different.

The standard introduced by Peisistratus was used in the earliest times of coinage, the sixth or even the seventh century, at Samos or some neighbouring city, for electrum and for silver.[1] It was also used at Cyrene for silver from 600 B.C. It appears to have been derived from Egypt, where a *kat* of the weight of 135–140 grains (grammes 8·74–9·07) was in use in the Delta. Through Naucratis this weight spread in one direction to Cyrene, in another to Samos. Peisistratus adopted it partly perhaps with a view to trade in Egypt. It is a suggestive fact that large numbers of early Athenian coins have been found in Egypt, on the site of Naucratis and elsewhere.

Another explanation of the raising of the standard by Peisistratus may be found in the fact of his working mines of silver in Thrace. We see in examining the coins of Thasos and the neighbouring coast, that the stater in ordinary use there in the sixth century weighed from 140 grains (9·07 grammes) upwards. Whence this standard was derived is uncertain; but the source may very possibly be Egyptian.

Whencesoever Peisistratus derived his coin-standard, it is certain that its adoption at Athens was the beginning and foundation of

[1] Head, *Num. Chron.* 1875, 273; *Cat. Ionia*, pp. xxiii, xli.

Attic commercial supremacy. Thenceforward the Attic silver coin dominated more and more the trade of the Aegean. The pure and heavy coins of Athens tended to drive out inferior issues. When the reign of the Tyrants at Athens gave way to that of the democracy, the determination of the people to force the circulation of their money grew stronger. Recently published inscriptions have proved to what a degree the Athenian Demos hindered and prohibited the issue of coins by the subject allies in the time of the Delian League.[1] In a well-known passage in the *Frogs* (405 B.C.) Aristophanes speaks of the Athenian coinage as everywhere dominant, received both by Greeks and barbarians. Even after the political fall of Athens, Xenophon could write[2] that foreign merchants who carried away from Athens not goods but the silver owls did a good business, for they could anywhere part with them at a premium.

The roots of the flourishing Athenian Empire were fed largely by the silver of Laurium. The Peisistratid coinage presents a striking contrast to the modest issues of Solon, scarcely to be distinguished from those of Euboea. It marks what Shakespeare calls 'the tide in the affairs of men, which taken at the flood leads on to fortune.' None of the triumphs of the Athenian tetradrachms was greater than that which they won when the powerful tyrants of Sicily, Gelon and Hieron and Theron accepted their lead and initiated the splendid coinage of Sicily.

In the time of the tyrant Hippias (527–511 B.C.) a fresh crisis took place in the Athenian coinage, if we may trust an obscure passage in the *Oeconomica* attributed to Aristotle, which runs 'he made the current money of Athens no longer legal tender, and fixing a rate of purchase ordered the people to bring it in to him, but when they were assembled in expectation of the issue of a new type he gave back the same money.'[3]

The natural way of taking this passage is as a statement that Hippias called in the current money, valuing it at a certain rate of discount, and crediting at that rate those who brought it in: but afterwards he paid these persons not in a new and full-weighted coinage, but in the old currency. This of course is a procedure the first part of which has been followed from time to time in all countries, when a coinage has become outworn or debased, though more usually

[1] Weil, in *Zeitschr. f. Numism.*, xxv, p. 52. [2] *De Vectigal.* iii. 2.

[3] τό τε νόμισμα τὸ ὂν Ἀθηναίοις ἀδόκιμον ἐποίησε, τάξας δὲ τιμὴν ἐκέλευσε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνακομίζειν· συνελθόντων δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ κόψαι ἕτερον χαρακτῆρα, ἐξέδωκε τὸ αὐτὸ ἀργύριον. *Oecon.* ii. 4. A similar story is told of Dionysius of Syracuse.

[4] *Num. Chron.* 1895, p. 178; cf. *Num. Chron.* 1897, p. 292. So M. Babelon, *Traité*, p. 742.

in modern times it is the state and not the individual which bears the loss. But there are difficulties in supposing that this is the meaning of the writer, or at all events in supposing that this really took place at Athens For the early money of Athens is of full weight and great purity, so that there could be no excuse for calling it in as debased, and it is difficult to see what could have been the motive of the tyrant.

M. Six, followed by Mr. Hill, has supposed that though Hippias gave back the same coin, he did not give it back at the same rate; but that he reduced the standard of the drachm from the earlier level of 135 grains to the later level of 67·5 grains, thus halving its weight; and while he had accepted the ordinary Athena and owl coins as didrachms he returned them as tetradrachms, thus making a gain of 50 per cent. We have however seen that there is no valid reason for supposing the drachm between the times of Solon and Hippias to have been of double the weight of the later Athenian drachm. The view of M. Six therefore lacks foundation.

Mr. Head has suggested [1] that Hippias may have improved and modernized the types of the coinage; although to the people who were expecting something quite different it might well seem the same coin over again. Perhaps this suggestion is the best. If we are to accept the statement of the *Oeconomica* as historic, the best plan is to take it quite literally and simply. Hippias, on some pretext, called in the money of the Athenians at a discount, and then, instead of issuing an entirely fresh coinage, gave out coins of the old types at full value. A possibility which occurs to us is that his object may have been to exclude from the coinage the barbarous imitations which seem to have been so abundant. In any case the extant coins sufficiently prove that no great change took place at that time in the Athenian issues.

[1] *Num. Chron.* 1893, p. 249.

LÉOPOLD DELISLE

1826–1910

BY

REGINALD L. POOLE

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read June 7, 1911

THOUGH it has not been the custom for the British Academy to commemorate Corresponding Fellows who have passed from us, the rule may without blame be broken in order that we may do honour to the pre-eminent merit of the man who was the master of all Europe in the science of manuscripts, whether in books or records. Ludwig Traube had indeed a greater palaeographical genius, but his life was cut short when he had reached little more than half the age to which Léopold Delisle attained; and it was Delisle's wonderful fortune that he enjoyed such health and strength that he was able to continue his strenuous labours without a break until the moment of death came. Hence, while Traube stands out as the leader of the younger school of palaeographers and his work is of the rarest quality for a portion of the whole field of study, Delisle left his mark on every part of it: he opened new lines both in palaeography and in diplomatic; he did valuable work on *incunabula*; he was a vigilant head of one of the greatest libraries in the world; and he did more than any man to promote the interests of an institution which for many years stood alone as a training ground for palaeographers, diplomatic scholars, and librarians, the École des Chartes.

Delisle owed less than most Frenchmen to the methodical system of education which we associate with his country. Born in 1826 in the little Norman town of Valognes in the Cotentin, he attended a school kept by a society of Catholic brethren, where what he learned was confined within a modest circle. He was taught but little Greek, and all his life through he never made himself at home in English or German. In 1845 he removed to Paris and became a student at the École des Chartes; but there, too, except in the first elementary year, he received only an intermittent training, for at the end of 1846 it was ordered that the school should be reorganized. Before that time the classes of instruction had been divided between the Royal Library and the Archives; now it was decided to give the

school three rooms and a library of its own within the building of the Archives of the Kingdom. Consequently the work of the school could not begin until the middle of May, and in the ordinary course it ended at the beginning of August: the work of nine months had to be got through somehow in not much more than as many weeks. In the autumn the school reassembled as usual, but it was broken up in February, 1848, by the Revolution, and all work was suspended until August.[1] Thus as a boy and as a young man Delisle was left very much to himself, and he learned more from his own energy and from the stimulus of friends than from any systematic teaching. There was one friend above all who gave Delisle the impulse which he needed, and that impulse came long before he entered the École des Chartes. There was an old gentleman living at Valognes who was a keen antiquarian. Charles Duhérissier de Gerville had been an *émigré* and had been a French teacher in England during the years of trouble. When he went back to France he devoted himself for many years to exploring the antiquities of his neighbourhood. He had indeed considerable influence on the development of archaeological studies in Normandy during the period of the Restoration, and his merits were recognized in his election as Correspondent of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres. He would ride from village to village asking questions of the parish priests, the mayors, and every one whom he could find, and buying up medals and antiquities of all sorts. He was specially interested in tracing the fortunes of the manuscripts and charters which had belonged to the suppressed monasteries. It was this interest which he communicated to Delisle. Gerville soon discovered that the boy did not care very much about coins or ancient monuments, but he found him keenly attracted by charters. Delisle has more than once told us how much he owed to the guidance of the old antiquary.[2] Week after week, every Thursday in fact, from 1843 on he went to Gerville's house and examined the store of manuscripts he had acquired or borrowed; and it was through Gerville that he was first introduced to the study of documents.

It so happened that the muniments of the monasteries in the department of the Manche, while they had not been destroyed during the Revolution, were in very lax keeping. The government had no doubt ordered that all these archives should be centralized in the

[1] *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, lxx. (1909) 212 f.

[2] See his 'Souvenirs de Jeunesse' prefixed to *Recherches sur la Librairie de Charles V* (1907) and the preface to the *Rouleau mortuaire du B. Vital, Abbé de Savigni* (1909).

chief town of each department, where there was an expert archivist to look after them. But these orders were only irregularly carried out, and all sorts of manuscripts remained under the charge of the *sous-préfets*, who had no place to keep them in and who stacked them in piles in lofts. This was the state in which Gerville found a great accumulation of manuscripts at Mortain. They proved to form a large part of the muniments of the great abbey of Savigni, running back to the twelfth century and possessing seals in most cases in perfect preservation. Among them was a curious narrow roll written in a variety of strange hands, which Gerville had not time to examine but which he took to be a roll of affiliation of the monasteries dependent on Savigni. I mention this now because this roll engaged almost the beginning and almost the end of Delisle's occupation upon manuscripts. The importance of the Mortain collection was made known at Paris in 1835 by Léchaudy d'Anisy, who is honourably remembered by us for his transcripts of Norman documents for the Record Commission; and in 1839 the Minister of the Interior, who at that time had general charge of the Archives, ordered—much to Gerville's chagrin—that all the Mortain documents should be removed to Paris and placed among the Archives of the Kingdom. Accordingly, when Delisle passed from Valognes to Paris at the end of 1845, he was enjoined by his old friend to keep his eyes open for the mysterious roll of Savigni. He obtained access to it in the following year, and found that it was the Mortuary Roll of Vitalis, the founder and first abbot of Savigni, who died in 1122; that is, it was a roll announcing the abbot's death and inviting prayers for his repose, sent out through 208 monasteries of France and England and bearing the autograph replies of each of them. These *tituli*, as they are called, are in various forms: beginning with the name of the house and with a prayer for the departed abbot, usually ornamented with a set of verses in his honour, the brethren or sisters recite the names of their own deceased members and benefactors and ask for prayers on their behalf. The entries were written no doubt by the best penman of the community, in many cases with elaborate and highly complicated decoration, and they form an absolutely unique representation of the handwriting of a very great number of schools of calligraphy, scattered over a wide range of country, at a definite date. The roll was sent through half France, and seems to have passed twice into England, where it received entries from no fewer than seventy-two monasteries. It is not perhaps possible to trace the exact itinerary, for I have remarked that the original roll had ample space left between the entries, and that some of these intervals appear to have been used

for insertions later on.[1] One of these insertions is significant. When the roll reached St. Alban's the monks of the abbey, as I conjecture, unwilling that the honour of the protomartyr of Britain should be disparaged, would not write their entry in the middle of the English notices. They found a gap higher up, among the monasteries of the diocese of Châlons, and there they inserted a brief two lines for St. Alban's between the churches of Saint-Sauveur and Notre-Dame at Vertus.[2] The whole roll must have been completed within a year or so of Abbot Vitalis' death.

Delisle made a copy of it and wrote a paper, *Des monuments paléographiques concernant l'usage de prier pour les morts*, which was published in the *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* in July, 1847.[3] In 1866 he printed the complete text of the roll in a volume containing editions of, or extracts from, eighty-seven mortuary rolls from the ninth to the fifteenth century.[4] That of Savigni is the only early specimen which is preserved in the original,[5] and its interest was so unique that more than forty years afterwards Delisle decided to publish the whole in a series of photographic facsimiles. This fine volume, the *Rouleau mortuaire du B. Vital, Abbé de Savigni*, appeared in 1909; and to it was prefixed with some necessary corrections the paper which the editor had originally printed sixty-two years before. But I must return to his early work among archives.

The interruptions in the teaching at the École des Chartes left Delisle plenty of time to pursue his studies among the records preserved at Paris and in Normandy, and he went on with this work for three years longer. From 1847, in fact, he had been working at Rouen at the earlier ecclesiastical documents in the departmental

[1] This feature was not observed by Delisle.

[2] The English monasteries, with the exception of St. Alban's, fall into two series. One passes from Corbigni in the diocese of Autun to Gloucester (No. 83) and goes up to York, returning by the east and ending with Lewes (No. 107). Then come thirty-three French entries, and then the English houses are resumed, Cerne and Sherborne, then two French monasteries; three more English, then three French; and finally forty-one English. Whether these French entries, among which is no less an abbey than Fleury, are insertions may be a subject for examination. I have not succeeded in forming an opinion.

[3] Tome iii of the second series, pp. 361–411. The title-page bears the date 1846.

[4] *Rouleaux des Morts du IX^e au XV^e Siècle*, issued by the Société de l'Histoire de France.

[5] The extremely interesting roll of Matilda, abbess of the Holy Trinity at Caen, daughter of William the Conqueror, who died in 1113, contained no fewer than 253 *tituli*, but of the last thirty only the headings are preserved. It is printed in the *Rouleaux*, pp. 177–279. The lost original was more than twice as long as the Savigni roll, and measured 20·50 as compared with 9·50 mètres.

collection. 'The archives of the Lower Seine,' he says,[1] 'as might be expected from the extent and importance of the department, hold one of the first places among our departmental archives; they have inherited the parchments and papers of many ancient churches, as well as of the great political and administrative institutions of former times; they have not suffered the enormous losses which have had to be deplored elsewhere, whether from revolutionary reforms or through the apathetic negligence which characterized the administrations of the first forty years of the nineteenth century. They were in a relatively satisfactory condition when I went to work at them at different spells from 1847, principally during three months of the summer of 1849.[2] I was introduced there by Achille Deville, to whom we owe the best books which had been published down to that time on the history and archaeology of Rouen and Upper Normandy; he enabled me to profit by the experience which he had acquired in exploring and transcribing Anglo-Norman documents in connexion with the great enterprises of the Record Office of London. Thanks to the help and suggestions of a guide such as he was, I was permitted every day, during sittings of nine hours, to devote myself with the freedom of an official archivist to the examination of the ancient ecclesiastical collections.'

Delisle's interest at this stage of his life was strictly limited to the documentary materials for the history of Normandy. Besides, in 1849 he received his diploma as *archiviste paléographe*, and he was naturally looking out for employment. His ambition was to become archivist of one of the departments of his native province, of the Lower Seine or of the Calvados. Auguste Le Prévost, the editor of Ordericus Vitalis, actively promoted his wishes, and the post at Rouen was in fact virtually offered to him; but on consulting his old master, Benjamin Guérard, under whom he had sat at the École des Chartes in 1846, he was firmly bidden to stay in Paris. Soon afterwards, in 1852, Guérard became head of the department of manuscripts in the Imperial Library, and Delisle was at the same time made an assistant in the same department. Henceforward, for fifty-three years, Delisle's profession was that of a librarian; he was made head of his department in 1871, and administrator-general of the entire Library three years later. Of his official work in the Library it is sufficient to say here that to him we owe the printed Inventories of Manuscripts from the time when the old catalogues

[1] *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, lxx. (1909) 215.

[2] A good deal of the improvement was due to the measures set on foot by Duchâtel, the last Minister of the Interior under Louis Philippe.

stopped in 1744 down to 1891, and that it was he who set on foot the publication of a general catalogue of the printed books which had never been contemplated before. Nor should it be forgotten that it was his critical researches that led to the restoration to France of 166 manuscripts which had been stolen by the notorious Libri and had passed into the possession of the late Earl of Ashburnham.

At length, in 1905, he was summarily removed from his post, and to add to his distress his wife, who had shared his interests and assisted in his work for forty-eight years, died on the very day that his retirement took effect. That Delisle was old for a great administrative position is no doubt true. It may be that he had become a little wanting in initiative and was reluctant to make changes which other people thought imperative. Still it is agreed that he was open to persuasion, and when convinced that a thing had to be done would set about it with all his former energy. His sudden dismissal caused dismay among French scholars, and it was openly asserted that the order was determined by political considerations.[1] Delisle bravely bore up under the twofold blow, and retired to Chantilly, where he was one of the two keepers of the Condé Museum, only to devote himself with the more freedom to his old studies. But he never lost his love for the Library over which he had reigned so long; and he bequeathed to it all his own books and collections, excepting a small number of volumes which he reserved for Chantilly.

When Delisle was first established at the Imperial Library the collection was in a bad state.[2] Manuscripts were unclassified and often bore no mark of identification. Some were not catalogued because they were supposed to be of little interest; others, because they were carefully put away in reserved presses on account of their importance. Documents were sometimes sold to the professors of the École des Chartes for use in teaching. To bring order into such a collection was a laborious undertaking. Guérard impressed upon Delisle the need for caution in carrying out a re-arrangement. 'It was necessary' (I quote Delisle's statement of the instructions he received) 'to give an exact account of the manner in which the collections were formed and in which they had been treated before and after their arrival at the library. It was absolutely necessary to know the history of the place well and to be able to distinguish the writing and the marks of the first owners of the manuscripts, particularly the writing and cyphers of the old librarians. One must be careful to

[1] *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes*, lxvi. 180 f.

[2] See *Recherches sur la Librairie de Charles V*, i, pp. xvi seqq.

discriminate the copies of documents made by ordinary copyists from the transcripts, the extracts, the *précis*, even the mere jottings of scholars such as the brothers Dupuy, Du Cange, Gagnières, Baluze, Clairambault, Anselme Le Michel, Mabillon, Martène, &c.'

Such are among the hints which Delisle tells us were impressed upon him on his entering the Library, and it is evident that they were the seed of which the harvest was gathered up in what is in bulk his largest, and has been deemed by a judge of the highest competence [1] his chief work, the *Cabinet des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale* (after the first volume, *Nationale*). For this task he was engaged by the Society for the History of Paris, and he loyally recognized his obligations to the Prefect of the Seine, the well-known Baron Haussmann, for the vigour with which he forwarded the undertaking. The *Cabinet des Manuscrits* appeared in three quarto volumes between 1869 and 1881.[2] Its plan was to trace the history of the formation of the Library by means of the investigation of the previous owners of its manuscripts. But the first volume suffered greatly in method from the patriotic auspices under which it was brought out. It was necessary to start with the manuscripts which had belonged to Charlemagne and his successors, although these had no organic connexion with the future Library of Paris. In the case of the great Charles, who is only known to have passed through Paris once in his life and then only in the course of a journey, the admission of his books into the series is difficult to excuse. Even the famous library of Charles V was dispersed at his death and became the property of John, Duke of Bedford. It is not until we reach the reign of Charles VIII that a continuous history of the Royal Library begins; and this stage is only reached far on in Delisle's first volume. The meagre reliques of a library which had not had time to form itself again were after a while augmented to an important collection from a different source. Louis XII inherited the fine library of the Dukes of Orleans at Blois, but at Blois it remained. He added to it the plunder of the Duke of Milan's library at Pavia in 1499-1500. All the books were removed to Fontainebleau by Francis I in 1544, and Charles IX took them to Paris, where they were placed in the College of Clermont.

Meanwhile the Royal Library was receiving fresh accessions, and Delisle had no difficulty, apart from the mass of the material to be dealt with, in describing the various collections which came to give it its unique importance; above all the library of Colbert, and then in

[1] Traube, *Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen*, ii. (1911) 16.

[2] A supplementary volume of plates was also published in 1881.

the time of the Revolution the libraries of the Sorbonne and of the Abbeys of St.-Germain-des-Prés and of St. Victor. All this history Delisle related with a sureness of touch and a refinement of judgement which others who attempt to describe manuscripts can only admire from afar. In this work he was unsurpassed. He saw at once what was important to mention, and he said what it was necessary to say with inimitable clearness and precision. His eye was as alert to the artistic features of a manuscript, its miniatures and calligraphy, as his mind was to the critical questions arising from its *provenance* and its relations to other copies of the same work. The *Cabinet des Manuscrits*, in spite of the drawback with which it began, remains a storehouse of learning which no one who studies Western manuscripts whether at Paris or elsewhere can afford to neglect. Every time he consults it he will be the more impressed with the masterly powers of the author. Delisle completed the book with a series of early catalogues of libraries and a supplementary volume of facsimiles, which are useful even now, when lithography for such purposes has been superseded by photography.

That, however, his scrupulous mind was dissatisfied by the work as a whole is shown by the words which he prefixed to a book which he published many years later. In this he took out from the *Cabinet* the whole part relating to the library of Charles V, remodelled it with very large additions, and published it by itself in two volumes as an offering to the Academy of Inscriptions on his jubilee as a member in 1907.[1] Meanwhile, long before, his labours among the Paris manuscripts had led him to the conviction that for their scientific study it was necessary to push the analysis a stage further. There are, in fact, two things to be distinguished: the history of a collection of manuscripts, a Library; and the history of individual manuscripts or classes of manuscripts.

To write the history of a library the only practical method is to describe each collection as a thing by itself, and to include it in the history at the date at which it reached the library. This is the method which has been adopted with admirable fidelity by Mr. Madan in his *Summary Catalogue* of the Bodleian manuscripts. He takes each collection as a whole and under each individual manuscript explains what is known of its history before it was acquired by the collector from whom it passed into the Library. But it is clear that, when our interest is transferred from the Library to the individual manuscript, the later ownership is of the least importance. We want, if we can, to find out when and in what conditions the manuscript was actually

[1] *Recherches sur la Librairie de Charles V.*

written. To take a well-known example, it does not help our knowledge of the famous seventh-century manuscript of the Acts of the Apostles in the Bodleian to be told that it was presented by Archbishop Laud, a princely benefactor of the library. It is of greater interest to find reason to believe that he bought the manuscript at Würzburg. Würzburg had many links with Anglo-Saxon England, and it is generally agreed that the book was once in the hands of the Venerable Bede. But it was not written in Northumberland. There is writing in it which proves that it was previously in Sardinia. But again it was probably not written there. The handwriting seems to carry it to Southern Italy. Soon after it was written it passed for a time to Sardinia, and then, I believe, returned to Italy. It came to England in the company of Archbishop Theodore or not long afterwards. One may even be tempted to read the name of Gebmund, whom Theodore consecrated Bishop of Rochester, scratched on a flyleaf. Then in some unknown way the book travelled to Jarrow, and afterwards some English monk carried it to Würzburg, where it remained until the confusion of the Thirty Years' War, which gave the Palatine Library at Heidelberg to the Pope and many Würzburg manuscripts to Oxford.

That is the probable, if partly conjectural, history of a single manuscript. Unfortunately we cannot name with certainty the place where it was written. Still every stage in the history is of interest. When we can definitely fix the place of writing the interest is much enhanced, and when we can group together a number of manuscripts as proceeding from a particular place we are enabled to establish the existence of a school of writing and to determine its special characteristics. This is what Delisle did with regard to the school of Tours.

In a famous paper read before the Academy of Inscriptions in 1884 he went through a series of twenty-five manuscripts of the ninth century scattered through a variety of libraries in France England, Holland, Germany, and Switzerland, all of which could be proved to have been written at Tours, though only one of them is now actually preserved in the library of that place. Had he composed his memoir now he would have been able nearly to double the number.[1] All these manuscripts display a family likeness. In their titles and chapter headings and text they alternate between capitals, uncials, half-uncials, and minuscules. All these features are remarkable, but the minuscule and half-uncial are the most characteristic. 'The minuscule,' says Delisle, 'is the type which the

[1] Note to Traube's *Vorlesungen*, ii. 17.

Italian copyists of the Renaissance sought to reproduce. The half-uncial furnishes a sure means of recognizing the manuscripts which are to be attributed to the school of Tours. The uncial is distinguished by an elaboration, a regularity of design, and a sort of heaviness which prevents it being confounded with the uncial of manuscripts nearer the classical period. But as for the capital it must be admitted that the Carlovingian calligraphers have pushed the imitation of very ancient manuscripts very far. The reformers of writing in the time of Charlemagne were evidently inspired from ancient manuscripts. They have completely broken with the habits of the last times of the Merovingian epoch; and the Irish or Saxon influence, which is of great importance for appreciating the ornamentation of certain Carlovingian books, was almost non-existent so far as the calligraphy properly speaking was concerned.'[1]

If Delisle's description of the Tours manuscripts is without fault, it would not be true to say that his account of their derivation has been universally accepted. His great achievement was to indicate precisely the characteristics of the school and to reduce the importance of Alcuin's share in its formation to due proportions. Alcuin was only abbot of St. Martin's for eight years, and it has not been definitely proved that any of the productions of the school were written quite so early as 804, when he died. It has also been pointed out by Traube[2] that Alcuin, as an Englishman born and bred, must himself have used an insular handwriting. To eliminate this hand from the Tours style was a great service; but whether the models from which its scribes derived their half-uncial and minuscule were native or foreign remains a matter of dispute. Delisle thought that they came from Roman antiquity: 'All the features or elements of the minuscule or half-uncial alphabet which was adopted in the schools of Alcuin are found in the manuscripts or fragments of manuscripts which have preserved to us the most ancient models of half-uncial and of a sort of running sloping uncial used for the copying and annotating of books.' In like manner Theodor von Sickel some years earlier had traced the style of the Caroline minuscule back to Rome. Traube, on the other hand, believed that it was developed in Merovingian Gaul.

It was not only at Tours that Delisle discovered the existence of a characteristic school of writing. Among manuscripts traceable to St. Vedast's at Arras he found a singular combination of the Caroline

[1] *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, xxxii (1) 49.

[2] *Neues Archiv*, xxvii. (1902) 281.

minuscule with Anglo-Saxon ornamentation;[1] this school of Arras has since been found to have ramifications in other parts of the provinces of Sens and Rheims, and its centre has been located by Janitschek at St. Denis. The pioneer work of Delisle has in fact led to a reconstruction and precise localization of the scriptoria of Carolingian Gaul. He laid a sure basis for the work, even though not all the developments made by others are free from the element of conjecture.

The same volume of the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions which contains the paper on the school of writing at Tours includes a much larger work which in its aim is broadly contrasted with it. This is the memoir on certain ancient Sacramentaries, which occupies 367 quarto pages. Whereas in the one paper he brought together a large number of manuscripts of various books from various libraries and sought to find for them a common home, in the other he enumerated and described 127 copies of a book designed for the one service of the Mass. They represent indeed different types and different stages of development; but the purpose for which they all were written was the same. Delisle, however, expressly declined to treat them as a liturgiologist; that was not his business. He would not consider them from the point of view of structure. His object was to arrange, as far as possible in chronological order, all the chief Sacramentaries he could find from the seventh down to the end of the eleventh century; and he did it in the interest of palaeography and of the history of art. At the outset he emphasized the importance of the school of miniature which he discovered in the North of France in the ninth century. Still, if his design was purely palaeographical, none the less did he perform an immense service for students of the liturgy. The conspectus he gave of all the Sacramentaries which were known twenty-five years ago has remained the standard work on the subject, and is all the more prized by scholars because the author has no theory to promote. He simply describes the books as a professed student of writing and decoration.

These two palmary treatises of 1886 stand in the first rank among Delisle's works. In spite of the incessant labours of the Library, he found time to pour forth a multitude of texts and studies year by year. Down to 1902 his bibliographer, M. Paul Lacombe, enumerated 1,889 distinct publications,[2] and the fertility of his last eight years probably

[1] *L'Évangéliaire de Saint-Vaast d'Arras*, pp 17 f., 1888.

[2] *Bibliographie des Travaux de M. Léopold Delisle*, 1902 This list may be supplemented by the article 'Delisle' in the *Catalogue général des Livres imprimés de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, Auteurs, xxxviii. (1909).

raised the total above 2,000. Many of them of course are short notes on manuscripts and reviews of books, but they include such considerable undertakings as his contributions to the great collection of French historians, the twenty-fourth volume of which was entirely edited by him. And if during all those years of librarianship his work on archives necessarily fell into a subordinate position, still no insignificant part of M. Lacombe's bibliography is taken up by notes and papers relating to the subject of his first choice.

I said at the outset that he began life as a student of charters; had not circumstances placed him in the larger world of the Paris library he might have lived and died a provincial archivist. It was in consequence of these youthful studies that his largest contributions to diplomatic belong to a date nearly thirty years earlier than the treatises of 1886 of which I have just spoken, with the exception of his work on our Henry II, which occupied him during the closing years of his life after he had left the Library. At the last as at the first his interest was in the history of Normandy. It was in 1856 that he completed his Catalogue of the Acts of Philip Augustus[1] and a year later his Memoir on the Acts of Innocent III, which was in fact a pendant on the other. At that time he aspired to write a great book on the history of Philip's reign, so vitally important for the history of the French monarchy and so revolutionary for that of his own Normandy; but the duties of a librarian compelled him to restrain his ambition and use his powers to other ends.

The two works, on King Philip and Pope Innocent, have not been superseded through the lapse of more than half a century. While they are connected in point of time and have a common basis in the exhaustive study of all obtainable documents of each ruler, they differ both in the scale on which they are composed and in the nature of the chronological apparatus to which they lead up. The book on Philip[2] is nearly eight times as long as the memoir on Innocent. The catalogue of the King's acts is an orderly register of all the documents issued from his chancery that Delisle could discover; they number 2,236. The memoir on Innocent III contained no register, but instead an itinerary of the Pope drawn up from 4,300 documents.[3] Both were invaluable pieces of pioneer work, and both were elucidated by masterly expositions of the necessary diplomatic. The book on Philip Augustus contains a long and important introduction on the Registers and other materials for the

[1] *Catalogue des Actes de Philippe-Auguste*, 1856.
[2] It contains 655 pages with 127 pages of introduction.
[3] *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes*, 4th ser. iii. (1857) 500–534.

catalogue of his documents and on the whole system of his chancery. The memoir[1] on the Pope is not only one of the most charming specimens of Delisle's method, but also, as I believe, almost the first original contribution to the study of the documents of the papal chancery since the Benedictines produced their New Treatise on Diplomatic in the middle of the eighteenth century. In the intervening time I can hardly point to anything except Marius Marini's *Diplomatica pontificia* of 1841, and Merkel's small collection of materials relating to the notaries and officials of the Curia (1847). Delisle began by describing the organization of the chancery as it was in the time of the great Pope. He then examined in detail the Registers of the pontificate. Now it is to be expressly remarked that he had never had access to the Registers preserved in the Vatican Archives; I do not know that he had ever visited Rome. And yet when Denifle wrote on the same subject nearly thirty years later he found practically nothing to correct in the work of 'the great master' (as he calls him) who preceded him.[2] Naturally Denifle, who was for many years in charge of the Vatican archives and also a man of immense erudition, had much to add, but his main argument was directed to the establishment of what Delisle had modestly put forward as an hypothesis; namely, that the Registers of Innocent III were not the original Registers. That is, they were not the books in which the Pope's letters were entered one by one or in batches before they were dispatched; but they were copies of such Registers written out a short time afterwards in a more stately form for permanent preservation.

From this subject Delisle passed to the classification of the documents themselves and brought out the distinctive features of Great and Little Bulls (or, as he prefers to call them, Privileges and Letters) with a concise lucidity which cannot be surpassed. Among other things he described a rare specimen of Innocent's letters close.[3] Delisle next examined the rules for writing papal documents, as laid down in a manuscript nearly a century later, and showed that most of the details of writing could be verified in the original bulls of Innocent III and could serve as tests of genuineness. There is no better textbook for the forms of little bulls. Those which are sealed on silk (for dispensations and the like) must have the pope's name written in capitals with open spaces showing in the initial; those sealed on hemp (mandates) must have only the initial

[1] *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes*, 4th Ser., iv. (1858) 1–68.

[2] *Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, ii. (1886) 55–64.

[3] The earliest known specimen is believed to be one of Eugenius III, 1152.

letter in capitals. In the former type *st* and *ct* must be separated with a curving line joining them above; and there are other features to distinguish the ornamental character of a letter conferring a favour from the more abrupt and businesslike writing of one containing a judgement or command.

Then from the materials he had collected Delisle gave an index of all the cardinals whose subscriptions were found on Innocent's bulls, with the dates of place and time, an essential aid for the criticism of any document which might for any reason be open to suspicion. Finally he came to the leaden seal, the *bulla* itself; and here he brought out some new and curious facts. Innocent III once declared a document which professed to be his to be a forgery 'because it lacked one point'. This was noted by Mabillon[1] as an example of over-refinement, but it really was a mark of scrupulous care. The bull, as we all know, contained on one side the heads of the apostles Peter and Paul. There were dots all round the circumference and dots framing each of the heads. Moreover, the hair and beard of St. Peter were composed entirely of dots. Now these dots on the bulls of a particular pope were of a definite number, and were counted. There were on Innocent's bulls seventy-three round the circumference; twenty-five round St. Paul, twenty-six round St. Peter; twenty-five made up St. Peter's hair and twenty-eight his beard. Later in the thirteenth century the number of dots round the heads was one less; but a genuine bull of Innocent III must have the exact number I have mentioned.[2] Evidently therefore the deficiency of a single dot was as good evidence that the impression was taken from a false matrix as if the entire design was different. It only shows what elaborate precaution was taken in the papal chancery for the protection of the documents which issued from it, that not only the design of the bull was known but even the exact number of dots on each part of it was carefully recorded.

Delisle has valuable remarks on the manner in which papal documents were dated. It is frequently found that there are discrepancies in the dates in the Registers and in other transcripts. Even in originals it is probably true that there are errors both in the indiction and in the year of the incarnation. But Delisle points out that 'the only date to which a real importance was attached was that of the pontificate. It was never omitted, and it was written in full letters, whereas the other dates were only expressed by numerals'. If therefore a discrepancy appears, it may be assumed that the error is not in the pontifical year but in the indiction or in the year of the

[1] *De Re Diplomatica*, p. 624. [2] Delisle, p. 48. [3] Ibid., 59 f.

incarnation. A transcriber can hardly misread *sexto* written in full for *tertio*; but he can easily misread *ui* for *iii*.

But it was the itinerary which furnished Delisle with the most abundant evidence for ascertaining which of the documents assigned to Innocent III were really his. For this purpose he drew up a list of all the places from which documents were dated during his pontificate in chronological order. He collected these from 4,300 documents bearing more than 2,100 different dates. As Innocent was Pope for eighteen years and a half, this gives an average of nearly ten dates a month; and after the elimination of a few suspicious dates, it became possible to state with precision that a document dated at a certain place at a given time must be wrongly dated, because Innocent could be proved to have been in a different place on the day in question. In this way Delisle was able to show that a number of documents issued by Innocent III are really those of Innocent IV, and *vice versa*. Some of these false attributions are due to pure carelessness. For example, it is very well known that Innocent III never left Italy during the whole of his pontificate,—indeed he never went further north than Perugia or further south than San Germano;—and yet we may find in Rymer's *Foedera* and other collections a series of letters assigned to him which bear date at Lyons at various times from the third to the eighth year of his pontificate. These belong unquestionably to Innocent IV. Other dates are not so easy to check; but Delisle was able to show that six documents printed as those of Innocent IV really proceeded from Innocent III.

There is much more to say, but I have already lingered too long upon a single monograph and on small points of detail. It is, however, these minutiae which demand the most patient study and criticism; and they are the only sure foundation for the establishment of larger matters. One illustration must suffice. Delisle had found a document of Innocent's which on three main grounds was open to suspicion; but he only knew it from a printed copy and could not therefore do more than express a doubt. In 1896 the original was discovered in private hands and was purchased for the Bibliothèque Nationale. It then appeared that two of Delisle's criticisms were based on blunders of the transcriber, but the third—a fatal fault—was justified by the original. A further examination of the document elicited six other points in which it deviated from the rules of Innocent's chancery, and the suspicion raised by the printed text was turned into the definite exposure of an early and cleverly written forgery.[1]

[1] *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes*, lvii. (1896) 517-528.

From Innocent III I pass to Henry II of England. When Delisle left the National Library in 1905 he reopened his portfolios of transcripts of charters of Henry II. These transcripts he had made in Normandy and Anjou between 1845 and 1852. He now proceeded to collate them on the spot and to procure photographs of originals. Having thus collected his texts, he began arranging them in chronological order, a task which is especially difficult for the time of Henry II because hardly any of his charters bear any indication of date. While engaged in this work he printed in 1906 and 1907 two introductory papers on the subject in the *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*. He began by commenting on the extraordinary regularity which characterized the productions of the chancery of Henry II, the uniformity of their structure, the symmetry of their form, and the precision of their style. But what struck him most was the immense extent to which the issues of the chancery were multiplied during his reign. Maitland has dwelt upon the importance of the judicial writs which were introduced by Henry and formed the leading characteristic of English mediaeval law.[1] Delisle thought rather of the writ as an instrument of general administration and in particular for financial purposes. To show the profusion with which writs were issued he quoted two examples. The Pipe Roll of 1175 gives evidence of thirty writs for Hampshire alone; the Roll of the Norman Exchequer for 1180 mentions twenty-three writs to the viscount of Rouen. The total number of charters of Henry II now in existence does not much exceed 2,000, and this, Delisle thought, was not one-hundredth of the documents which passed his seal.[2] Still a body of 2,070 charters furnished a good foundation. But how many of them are preserved in originals? Delisle collected 143 in France; then he procured photographs of seventy-four from the British Museum and the Public Record Office; finally, through the skilful help of Mr. Herbert Salter, he added a hundred more from the muniment rooms of English cathedrals and colleges: making a total of about 320 originals. But hardly any of them bear any date of year.

Now it had long been known that in his earlier time Henry II called himself simply *rex Anglorum* with the necessary additions for Normandy, Aquitaine, and Anjou; and that later on he inserted *Dei gratia*. Delisle determined to ascertain from a critical examination of the materials he had assembled whether this change could be assigned to a definite date. He therefore went through his whole

[1] *Equity*, p. 297; *History of English Law*, i. 129.
[2] *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes*, lxvii. (1906) 370.

collection, and found that in rather more than half of the charters the *Dei gratia* was absent. In the great majority of these cases the names of the witnesses proved that the documents belonged to the earlier part of the reign, and it could be shown that the simple title continued until May, 1172. The formula *Dei gratia* appears for the first time in February, 1173, and thenceforward is used consistently. In his first paper on the subject Delisle to some extent neglected to carry out his principle of basing his conclusions rigorously upon originals, and the result was that his table of amended dates was open to a good deal of criticism. Still he had in fact established a principle which will not be seriously controverted, only it cannot be applied with confidence to copies. Henry II's adoption of the formula *Dei gratia* in his royal style stands in close association with his absolution at Avranches from the guilt of the murder of St. Thomas on May 21, 1172, or with the solemn public ratification of the act on September 27,[1] though we cannot say for certain that the change was carried out immediately.

But Delisle soon found out that even originals were not decisive, unless they were the actual products of the King's chancery. He proceeded therefore to examine the anomalous specimens, and applied to the documents of Henry II a principle of criticism which Theodor von Sickel had used with remarkable effect in analysing the diplomas of the German Emperors; that is, he controlled diplomatic by palaeography. It appeared that it was not unusual for a religious house which desired a confirmation of its possessions to have the necessary charter drawn up on the spot and then presented to the king for authentication by the addition of witnesses and the seal. In such cases the scribe might easily introduce the formulae of the French chancery; he might write the King's name *Henricus* instead of the simple initial *H.*; or he might dignify the whole title, after the manner of papal documents, by capital letters. If the document was a reproduction of one of Henry I's he might copy this with no further change than the mention of Normandy, Aquitaine, and Anjou in the title. Documents of this type are not infrequent: they are perfectly genuine, but they cannot be used as evidence of the employment of a particular formula in the royal chancery.

An illustration of the way in which documents were from necessity irregularly drawn up may be taken from the history of Frederick Barbarossa. From the time of his siege of Alessandria in November, 1175, until July 29, 1176, when he was at Pavia, there were until recently no documents of his known to be preserved. But in 1899

[1] Cf. *Quarterly Review*, ccxiv. (1911) 481.

Scheffer-Boichorst discovered that a charter to the hospice of the Great St. Bernard, previously printed without date, belonged to January 5, 1176, and was passed at Turin.[1] Since then F. Güterbock found the original of this charter, and pointed out that it lacked the invocation, the Emperor's subscription, and the chancery attestation,[2] and also presented several indications that the chancery staff had no hand in it. He then examined a document, without date, *actum Yporegie in castro predicti imperatoris*, which is likewise marked by formal irregularity, and argued with reason that it was drawn up at Ivrea not long before or after the time when the Emperor was at Turin. In both charters Frederick was endeavouring to attach the religious orders to himself in view of his impending campaign against the Lombard league.[3] But both charters, if they were supposed to be drawn up in his chancery, would be unquestionably spurious. They are to be accepted as genuine for the simple reason that during the months of warfare the Emperor had not his chancery with him; he had to use what materials were available.

I add another illustration which is of interest because no one, I believe, has observed its peculiarity. When Richard I was at Acre he granted a charter to the Pisans resident in the town, which opens with an invocation and a solemn preamble, quite contrary to the practice of Richard's chancery. Moreover it is dated October 13, 1192, in the tenth Indiction.[4] Now it is certain that the King was not there at that time: he had sailed homewards three days earlier, on October 10. But in the preceding year there is evidence that he was at Acre from the 8th to about the 20th of the month.[5] The tenth Indiction, whether Constantinopolitan or 'Imperial', agrees with this year. But why is the document dated 1192? The explanation is simply that it was drawn up by a Pisan notary and presented to Richard for authorization. For the Pisans began their year on the 25th March before, instead of after, Christmas: their reckoning was therefore one year in advance of that which was becoming customary in England; and the year which they called 1192 included nine months of what we should call 1191.

[1] *Neues Archiv* xxiv. (1899) 141. [2] Ibid., xxvii. (1902) 245 f.

[3] Ibid., p. 247.

[4] Giuseppe Muller, *Documenti sulle Relazioni delle Città Toscane coll' Oriente*, pp. 58 f. (Florence, 1879). It is also printed without the invocation and preamble by Bonaini, *Diplomi Pisani*, in the *Archivio Storico Italiano*, vi. 2, suppl. i, p. 118 (1848–1889).

[5] From the 17th of Ramadān to nearly the end of the month, A. H. 587: Behāeddīn, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades*, Historiens orientaux, iii. 271, 273, 276, Paris, 1884.

The discussion started by Delisle thus led to the establishment of two facts in the system of Henry II's documents: first, that if an original in a chancery hand contains the formula *Dei gratia* it cannot be earlier than May, 1172; and secondly, that deviations from the rule can always be accounted for by a palaeographical study of the originals.[1] Where transcripts are concerned it is manifest that the clerk would often, from force of habit, unconsciously insert formulae of later usage with which he was familiar. These lines of inquiry are of great promise for the future study of English and Norman documents from William the Conqueror to Richard I.

At length Delisle finished his accumulation of material and in 1909 brought out a volume of 589 pages, quarto, introductory to his Norman Acts of Henry II. In this he incorporated the papers of which I have spoken, and added a large apparatus of evidence for the chancellors and chancery system of the time, with critical notes on suspicious documents and a biographical dictionary of all identified witnesses. The second volume, containing the texts of the charters, he did not live to publish, but it is understood to have been left substantially ready for the press.

If his latest writings show some signs of wear, they show none the less that his mind was as ready as ever to take in new ideas. If he made a few slips, they did not affect the solidity of his results; and his great powers of application seem not to have been sensibly affected. The prodigious amount that he produced from first to last might lead one to suppose that he was a rapid writer. Nothing could be further from the truth. He spoke and he wrote slowly; but he had that gift of concentration which enabled him to arrange all the facts before him clearly in his mind, and then he wrote quietly and without effort. The clear thought led naturally to clear expression. There was an entire absence of excitement about all he wrote. Even when he was rudely attacked on some point of criticism, his tranquillity remained unmoved. He courteously thanked his assailant for correcting any mistakes he had made; but when he believed the attack to have failed he calmly maintained his ground. If he struck out many new lines of inquiry, he always did it with the caution of a true scholar. The simplicity and modest dignity of his writings reflected the serene character of the man who stood to generations of students as their wisest and most generous counsellor and friend.

[1] One anomalous case I have attempted to explain in the *English Historical Review*, xxiii. (1908) 83.

FIRST ANNUAL SHAKESPEARE LECTURE

'WHAT TO EXPECT OF SHAKESPEARE'

By J. J. JUSSERAND

Read July 5, 1911

It was the custom in former days that any one who addressed the French Academy for the first time should praise the great Cardinal, founder of that august body, and should compliment the king.

If similar customs prevailed in the British Academy, nothing would be easier for me than to comply with them. I should have to praise, I believe, as the 'begetter' of this new and already famous Assembly, the Royal Society, and to praise it as it deserves, it is enough to recall that it numbered among its Fellows, in its early days Newton, in its latter days Darwin.

No less easy and no less congenial would it be for me to compliment that Sailor-Prince, who reverently walked, a few days ago, to the foot of the altar in the Abbey where so many of his ancestors sleep their last sleep, and their great shades still keep watch over the nation. To him, the worthy inheritor of their best examples, have been handed down, with the crown, the traditions of a father whose ideal was peace with honour and with justice, and of a grandmother to whom it was given to break one of the oldest historical traditions of the British realm: the tradition that there could be no long English reign without a war with France. Hers was the first exception in eight centuries. May a foreign visitor be permitted to express the wish that the new reign, lasting as long as any that has gone before, shall transform the exception into the rule.

Addressing Queen Elizabeth in a year that is now famous, the year 1564, in which Shakespeare was born, Ronsard, speaking in the name of his then storm-ridden country, expressed that faith in its

future which, at no period, has any French heart ever lost, adding that if it were possible to once join in a firm amity,

'Vostre Angleterre avecques nostre France,'

the Golden Age would return. If the Golden Age has not quite returned up to now, the cause is perhaps that the experiment has not yet been continued long enough. May it be long continued!

The theme assigned me by you is one which not even the boldest minds, the best informed, the most accessible to poetical beauty, dare approach without awe. Encouragement may, however, be taken from no less ardent a worshipper of the Shakespearian fame than Swinburne. 'For two hundred years at least,' did he write, 'have students of every kind put forth in every sort of boat, on a longer or a shorter voyage of research across the waters of that unsounded sea (the works of Shakespeare). From the paltriest fishing craft to such majestic galleys as were steered by Coleridge and by Goethe, each division of the fleet has done or has essayed its turn of work.'

For an occasion like the present no galley could be too great or too majestic. If it pleased you to select the merest fishing craft, the reason must be that, to come to you, it had to cross the ocean, and this doubtless humoured the fancy of a sporting nation. As soon, however, as your invitation reached me, I accepted it, thinking that the best courtesy was not to discuss but to obey, and considering that, for lack of better motives, my coming from the lands further away than 'vexed Bermoothes' was an homage I could offer which was not within the reach of many of my betters.

I

When Ronsard died at St. Cosme, near Tours, in December, 1585, Shakespeare being then twenty-one, all France went into mourning; besides the ceremonies at St. Cosme, solemn obsequies were celebrated at Paris, orations were delivered in French and in Latin by Cardinal Duperron and others, the crowd was such that princes and magnates had to be denied admission for lack of space; not one poet of note failed to express his sorrow for the national loss; these elegies were collected under the title of *Le Tombeau de Ronsard*.

On April 25, 1616, the bell of Holy Trinity Church at Stratford tolled, as we read in the register, for 'William Shakespeare, Gentleman', one of the chief men of the town, wealthy, good humoured,

benevolent, known to have been somebody in the capital, and to have written very successful plays. A monument was raised to him with a florid inscription, such as is often granted to provincial celebrities. It was in fact a local event. 'No longer mourn for me,' the poet had written, 'when I am dead,'

> Then you shall hear the surly sullen bell
> Give warning to the world that I am fled
> From this vile world.

But the world knew nothing of it; the British capital paid no attention to it; not one line was written on the occasion, no poet mourned the event. 'At the passing of the greatest Elizabethan the Muse shed not one tear.'[1] When his plays were collected seven years after his death, they were preceded by a few eulogies, the authors whereof extolled his merits, but they went much beyond what they really thought, for they had to conform to the rules of the *genre*. The friends and fellow players of the author, who had edited the collection, apologetically offered 'these trifles' to two noblemen who had been pleased to think them 'something heretofore'. A second edition was only wanted nine years after the first, and a third only thirty-one years after the second.

What we see now needs no description. With the single exception of the Bible, no book has been in the same space of time the subject of such close studies and such ardent comments as the collection of 'trifles' first given to the world by Heminge and Condell in 1623. During the first five years of the present century twenty-seven new editions of Shakespeare's works were published; princes have played in his tragedies the part of princes, kings have tried their hands at translating his works. Some of his dramas have been played in Japanese; his *Julius Caesar* has been performed in the Roman theatre at Orange. His ideas, his sayings, the personages to whom he has given life, the scenes he has depicted, have become familiar to all; men born at the Antipodes will catch an allusion to a scene, a character, a word of Shakespeare's. By the middle of the last century the British Museum counted some three hundred entries under the word Shakespeare; it counts now more than five thousand.

A responsibility uncourted and unexpected by him weighs now on the poet. Books, like their authors, have their biography. They live their own lives. Some behave like honourable citizens of the world of thought, do good, propagate sound views, strengthen heart and courage, assuage, console, improve those men to whose hearths they

[1] Munro, *The Shakspere Allusion Book*, I xiv.

have been invited. Others corrupt or debase, or else turn minds towards empty frivolities. In proportion to their fame, and to the degree of their pereniality is the good or evil that they do from century to century, eternal benefactors of mankind or deathless malefactors. Posted on the road followed by humanity, they help or destroy the passers-by; they deserve gratitude eternal, or levy the toll of some of our life's blood, leaving us weaker; highwaymen or good Samaritans. Some make themselves heard at once and continue to be listened to for ever, others fill the ears for one or two generations, and then begin an endless sleep; or, on the contrary, long silent or misunderstood, they awake from their torpor, and astonished mankind discovers with surprise long-concealed treasures like those trodden upon by the unwary visitor of unexplored ruins. No works are so familiar to the nations of the world as those of Shakespeare to-day. In their continued and increasing existence what sort of life are they leading?

In the course of ages, while praise and admiration were becoming boundless, an anxious note has been sounded from time to time, the more striking that it came from admirers. Two examples will be enough to make the point clear. While stating that 'the stream of time, which is continually washing the dissoluble fabrics of other poets, passes without injury by the adamant of Shakespeare', Dr. Johnson, who wanted his very dictionary to be morally useful through the examples selected by him for each word, stated that Shakespeare's 'first defect is that to which may be imputed most of the evils in books or in men. He sacrifices virtue to convenience, and is so much more careful to please than to instruct that he seems to write without any moral purpose . . . It is always a writer's duty to make the world better.'

Nearer our time, another, no enemy like Tolstoi, but a passionate admirer, Emerson, for whom Shakespeare was not *a* poet, but *the* poet, the 'representative' poet, wrote: 'And now, how stands the account of man with this bard and benefactor, when in solitude, shutting our ears to the reverberations of his fame, we seek to strike the balance? Solitude has austere lessons. . . . He converted the elements, which waited on his command, into entertainments. He was master of the revels to mankind. . . . As long as the question is of talent and mental power, the world of men has not his equal to show. But when the question is to life, and its materials, and its auxiliaries, how does it profit me? What does it signify? It is but a Twelfth Night, or Midsummer-Night's Dream, or a Winter Evening's Tale: what signifies another picture more or less?'

So spoke Emerson in one of those Essays which Matthew Arnold went so far as to describe as 'the most important work done in English prose in his century'.

What is it then that we possess? What can we expect of Shakespeare? Is the treasure in this bewitching garden of Hesperides mere glitter, or is it real gold? Do we listen to the seer that can solve our problems, answer our doubts, instruct our ignorance, soften our hearts, brace our courage? Or does the great book whose fame fills the world offer us mere revels, vain dreams and tales, no moral purpose, virtue sacrificed to convenience, such evanescent food as was served on Prospero's table for the unworthy?

II

Shortly after he had reached his majority Shakespeare came to London, very poor, having received but a grammar-school education, upheld by no protectors. The son of a tradesman, he reached the huge capital where one of his Stratford compatriots was established as a grocer, another as a printer. For some years he disappears, and when we hear of him again he is beginning to be known as an author. Having come to the city with no trade of his own, he had obviously soon discovered that he was better fitted to write plays than to sell groceries, and to compose books than to print them. He was apparently still in Stratford in 1585–6; six years later London dramatists are feeling jealous of the new play-mender or maker, five years after that he is a wealthy man, and purchases New Place, the finest house in Stratford, built by its most famous citizen, a former Lord Mayor of London. He was then thirty-three. Promptitude is the salient trait of such a career. When he died Shakespeare left thirty-seven plays; Racine only twelve.

Literary invention has been the subject in our days of minute research on the part of philosophers. Paulhan has shown what different roads lead to that supreme result, a memorable book of lasting fame. One road passes through the Elysian fields, another crosses the region made doleful by Tantalus, Ixion, and Sisyphus's ceaseless groans. For that modern dramatist Dumas *fils* the labour of literary composition was accompanied, according to Binet and Passy, by 'a great feeling of pleasure. While he writes he is in a better humour, he eats, drinks, and sleeps more; he feels a kind of

physical enjoyment through the exercising of a physical function . . . Page after page in his manuscripts is without any erasure.'[1] Others, like Rousseau, or Flaubert, had a different tale to tell: 'My ideas,' wrote Rousseau, 'group themselves in my head with the most incredible difficulty: they move about obscurely, they ferment to the extent of upsetting me and giving me heart-beats, and in the midst of all that emotion I see nothing clearly; I could not write a single word, I must wait.' The same with Flaubert: 'I am in a rage without knowing why: my novel, maybe, is the cause. It does not come, all goes wrong; I am more tired than if I had mountains to bear; at times I could weep. . . . I have spent four hours without being able to write a phrase. . . . Oh, Art, Art, what is that mad chimera that bites our heart, and why?'

To the latter group most decidedly belongs Shakespeare's great rival, Ben Jonson One must 'labour', said he sententiously; one must be 'laboured'; facility is the most dangerous of the Will-o'-the-wisps; it leads to bogs and marshes; do not follow Jack-o'-lanterns, bright as may be the lanterns; retrace your steps, 'The safest is to return to our judgement and handle over again those things the easiness of which might make them justly suspected.'

To the first class undoubtedly belonged Shakespeare. The number of his plays and the brief interval between the composition of each, two or three plays a year being his average production during the first eight years of his authorship, show that he must have written with the 'fine frenzy' attributed by his own Theseus to the gifted ones, flying 'an eagle flight, bold and forth on', like the poet in his own *Timon*. 'My manuscripts,' said Rousseau, 'are scratched, blotted, besmeared, illegible, testifying to the trouble they have given me.' Of Shakespeare, as is well known, his fellow players, who had seen him at work, said: 'What he thought he uttered with that easiness that we have scarce received from him a blot in his papers.' 'He never blotted out a line,' grumbled Jonson; 'would he had blotted a thousand!'

But he had other ways, and rather followed, to quote him again, his own 'free drift'. Why take so much trouble, when what he himself expected of his own plays could be reached without any of those Ixion-like agonies described by Rousseau and the others? For what he expected was simple enough, plain enough, and near at hand. What he expected he did actually attain, and his life was a successful life. His eye was on Stratford, not on posterity. His

[1] *Année Psychologique*, 1894, I. 79, 80.

dream was to end his days a well-to-do, respected citizen in his native town, and that dream was fulfilled. The idea of his being held later the Merlin of unborn times, the revealer of the unknown, the leader of men of thought and feeling, the life-giver, the pride of his country, never occurred to him, and would probably have made him laugh. His allusions to literary immortality in the *Sonnets* were only a way of speaking, which he had in common with the merest sonnet scribblers, as was well shown by Sir Sidney Lee; and since he never printed his, he cannot have cared much for an everlasting fame to be secured through them. For his poems proper he took some trouble; he published them; they were works of art; for his plays, a secondary *genre* in the common estimation, and in his, he took none; they were things of no import. He never printed any; a garbled text of some of the best was given, he did not care; silly plays were published under his name, he did not protest; he left no authentic text in view of a posterity which had never been in his thoughts; no books are mentioned in his will.

III

Literary fame as a dramatist troubled him not; but present necessities could not be forgotten; chief among them the necessity of pleasing his public. His average public, the one he had chiefly in view, whose average heart and mind he had to touch and delight, was that of the Globe, a large, much-frequented house which drew popular audiences, and where accidentally some Ambassador might appear; but the fate of the play would depend not upon the Ambassador's applause or some learned critic's blame, but on the impression of the crowd: a boisterous crowd, warm-hearted, full-blooded, of unbounded patriotism, a lover of extremes, now relishing the sight of tortures, now moved at the death of a fly, a lover of the improbable, of unexpected changes, of coarse buffooneries, quibbles, common witticisms easy to understand, of loud noises of any sort, bells, trumpets, cannon; men, all of them, of an encyclopaedic ignorance.

The part of such a public, as a contributor to Shakespeare's plays, can scarcely be over-estimated—a real contributor to whom it seems at times as if Shakespeare had passed on the pen to scribble as it pleased, or the chalk to draw sketches on the wall. What such people would like, and what they would tolerate, is what gave those plays which he never thought of after the performance, the unique, the marvellous,

the portentous shape in which we find them. Great is the *de facto* responsibility of such a public; great that of Shakespeare too for having never denied it anything; great rather would that have been if he had not purposely intended to please only those living men, assembled in his theatre, on whom his own fortune depended; 'For we,' even Dr. Johnson had to acknowledge,

For we that live to please, must please to live.

From the writing of his plays, however, Shakespeare expected not one thing but two; first, immediate success with his public, and all that depended on it; second, the pleasant, happy, delightful satisfaction of a function of his brain duly exercised. This for us is the chief thing, what saved him in spite of himself: to the coarse food his groundlings wanted he added the ethereal food which has been for ages the relish of the greatest in mankind, while it had proved quite acceptable to his groundlings too. He added this as a supererogatory element because it was in him to do so, because it gave him no more trouble than to put in quibbles, jokes, or massacres, and because experience had shown him that, while it was not at all necessary to success, it did not hurt, and was received with a good grace. It was for him the exercise of a natural function, as it is for a good tree to produce good fruit.

Hence the strange nature of that work, touching all extremes, the model of all that should be aimed at, and of much that should be avoided; of actual use both ways. Prompt writing, as he had no choice (he had to live), the courting of a public whose acceptance of his work was indispensable, explain, with his prodigious, heaven-bestowed genius, how the best and the worst go together hand in hand in his plays, those flashes of a light that will never fade, and those concessions to the popular taste (indecencies, brutalities, mystifications, tortures, coarse jokes, over-well-explained complications), or the advantage so often taken by him of the fact that the public will not know, will not remember, will not mind. 'He omits,' says Dr. Johnson, 'opportunities of instructing or delighting which the train of his story seems to force upon him': the reason being that, in some cases, such opportunities did not occur to him at once and that he had little time for reconsidering; given his public, that would do. Hence also his anachronisms, his faulty geography, his indifference to real facts, so complete that he would not have stretched out his hand to take a book and verify the place of a city or the date of an event, nor would he have asked his future son-in-law whether a human being that has been smothered can still speak. He offers to his groundlings, and not to this learned

age of which he never thought and which has no right to complain, a reign of King John without 'Magna Charta', but with plenty of gunpowder and with a Duke of Austria who was dead before the play begins. He adopts, for convenience sake, two rules to which none of his hearers could be tempted to object; one is, that all antique personages having lived in antiquity are, generally speaking, contemporaries and can quote one another, so Hector quotes Aristotle, Menenius talks of Alexander and of Galen, Titus Lartius compares Coriolanus to Cato. The other rule is that all distant towns are by the seaside. Rome, Florence, Milan, Mantua, Padua, Verona (to say nothing of Bohemia) are by the seaside. His personages go by sea from Padua to Pisa, from Verona to Milan; about to start from Verona they wait for the tide. Why take trouble? He wrote only for men who neither knew nor cared, composing plays not meant to survive and which had two authors, Shakespeare and the motley crew at the Globe.

IV

They have survived, however; their hold on the world increases as years pass, they are famous in regions the very name of which was unknown to their author. In the calm of our study, in the corner of a railway carriage, on the deck of a ship, we open the book and read the first scene of any play: Prospero's magic works on us; we are his, ready to follow him anywhere, to feel and believe as he tells us. The sight once seen, the words once heard, so impress themselves on our mind that the mere name of the place, of the man, woman, or child cannot be pronounced henceforth without the grand and lovely landscape, the loving, hating, laughing, weeping personage from the plays, and with him all that pertains to him, his family, his enemy, his friend, his house, his dog, appearing to us in as vivid a light as if he were here alive again, and we were pacing with him the terraces at Elsinore, the moonlit garden of the Capulets, the storm-ridden, witch-haunted heath of *Lear* or *Macbeth*, the woods near Athens, the forum at Rome, the enchanted park for an enchantress at Belmont, or the real battlefields where, in bloody conflict, France and England were shaping their destinies. So much life, such an intensity of realization are in the plays, that it is difficult to visit, in actual life, any of those places which Shakespeare sometimes merely named and

did not describe, without the Shakespearian hero first appearing to us, before even we think of the real men famous there in times past. Grand or sweet figures, lovers whom death will sweep away, or leaders of armies, anxious Hamlet, scornful Coriolanus, loving Romeo, pensive Brutus, irrepressible Falstaff, and those daffodils of man's eternal spring—Portia, Rosalind, Ophelia, Juliet, Desdemona—rise bewitching, terrible, or laughable, at the mere sound of the words Elsinore, Eastcheap, Arden, Verona, Cyprus, So long as the mirage lasts our lives seem merged into theirs. Between the true artist and the product of his brain the phenomenon is a frequent one, but between the product of his brain and the readers of the book it much more rarely happens: 'A delightful thing it is,' said Flaubert in one of his rare happy moods, 'to write, to be no longer oneself, but to move through the whole creation one has called forth. To-day, for example, man and woman together, lover and mistress at the same time, I have ridden in a forest, during an autumnal afternoon, under yellow leaves; and I was the horses, the leaves, the wind, the words that were said, and the red sun that caused them to half close their eyelids bathed in love.' This privilege of the author, Shakespeare, for better, for worse, imparts to his listener or reader.

For better or for worse? Some of his worshippers, thereby courting protest and inviting injustice of an opposite sort, have dogmatized on his perfections, his omniscience, his prescience, the safe guidance he offers in every possible trouble, and the unimpeachable solution he propounds for every difficulty.

Wiser it is perhaps to acknowledge at once, with due deference to the purest intentions, that it is not exactly so. More than one of the gravest questions that, from the beginning, have troubled mankind would be put in vain to the poet, for to them he has no answer. What he does is to place the problem before us with such force that he obliges us to think seriously of those serious questions; hence of use, though of a different use than is sometimes said.

Concerning religions he does not take sides; as is evidenced by the fact that discussions are still renewed now and then (though there is little room for doubt) as to what faith he belonged to. The lesson he gives us is, however, a great one; it was a rare one in his day; and it is summed up in the word 'toleration'.

No problem is put oftener and more vividly before his audience than that of death and of the hereafter. To this he has no answer. In their calmest moods his personages hope for sleep: 'Our little life is rounded with a sleep.' Oftener he and they (he in the sonnets they in the plays) pore over the prospect of physical dissolution, when

the time shall come to leave 'this vile world, with vilest worms to dwell'. It seems as if for him as an author the apologue of the sparrow, told to King Eadwine by one of his Northumbrian chiefs, had been told in vain. We still 'go we know not where', and no Isabella, be she almost a nun, and bound by her part in the play to act as a consoler, has any word to clear her brother's doubts or ours. The attitude of Shakespeare, the writer, is that of the awe-inspiring genius whom Saint-Gaudens seated in Rock Creek cemetery, not of the one who carries upwards, from earth to heaven, the sacred flame of life in Bartholomé's monument.

As a patriot his teachings are mixed ones. Patriotism has two sides: it concerns our own country considered in itself, then our country considered in relation to others. The first kind of duty, the most natural and easiest, is admirably fulfilled by the warm-hearted, the sound, and thorough Englishman that the poet was, justly proud of the great deeds of glorious ancestors. His love is expressed in admirable lines for this 'dear, dear land':—

> This precious stone set in the silver sea,
> . . . .
> . . . that pale, that white-fac'd shore
> Whose foot spurns back the ocean's roaring,
> And coops from other lands her islanders.

As to the other side of patriotism, Shakespeare writes not only as a man of his day, but as a man who had to echo his public's feelings: an echo can make no change. To understand that, to picture the vanquished as a huge crew of cowards, traitors, and scoundrels, afraid of their own shadow, was *not* to increase the glory of a victory, proved beyond the reasoning capacity of the crowd at the Globe. The poet allows them to have their own way, to hold his pen, and write in his plays their own views of what an enemy must have been. They were his only care; unborn posterity and exacting critics that would come to life long after the plays were dead, as he thought, could have on him no influence.

On those great social problems which, in this modern world of ours, fill so much space in the thoughts of all, Shakespeare again expresses himself with the force and pregnancy of a man of incomparable genius; but he speaks as a man of his time and of his *milieu*, not as a man above them. The foibles of the masses, their credulity, their fickleness, their alternate fits of enthusiasm and depression, their aptitude to cruelty, their inability to understand, are depicted with the stern accuracy of a clear-eyed, unfriendly observer. The

counterpart of such vices, or the extenuating circumstances resulting from involuntary ignorance, hardship, and misery are scarcely visible anywhere. The people, throughout the plays, are the same people, with the same faults, be they the Romans of *Coriolanus* or of *Caesar*, or the English of Jack Cade, or even the Danes of *Hamlet* (with their selection of Laertes for a king); they are the people. Shakespeare no more hesitates to offer them to the laugh and scorn of their brethren in the pit, than to-day's playwrights hesitate to ask a middle-class audience to laugh at the faults and folly of middle-class personages. The poet's lesson may be of use to statesmen, scarcely to the people themselves, since for a useful castigation the most valuable factor is love.

On one more question of keen, though less general, interest, we would appeal in vain to Shakespeare the playwright; that is for information about himself. Few men (I know that contrary views have been eloquently defended) have allowed less of their personality to appear in works dealing so directly with the human passions. Shakespeare's personality was of the least obtrusive; except in Stratford where he wanted to be, and succeeded in being, a personage, his natural disposition was to *keep aloof*. This general tendency is revealed by all we know about him. In an age and a *milieu* of quarrels, fights, literary and other disputes, he avoids all chances of coming to the front. 'His works,' said Dr. Johnson, 'support no opinion with argument, nor supply any faction with invectives.' The exceedingly curious discoveries of Prof. Wallace show us Shakespeare unwittingly thrown by events into a quarrel; his efforts to minimize his rôle and to withdraw and disappear are the most conspicuous trait in the new-found documents. The very reverse of his friend Jonson, who courted quarrels and shouted his opinion on all problems and all people, he carefully avoided every cause of trouble. As we know, he neither printed his dramas nor claimed or denied the authorship of any play; no writer in his day published his poems without laudatory lines from his friends; Shakespeare, keeping apart, never gave or requested any.

On rare occasions his persistence in expressing again and again certain views or feelings, or the casual inappropriateness of his personages' saying what they say, leave us no doubt that he adored music, loved the land of his birth, did not trust the mob, knew what a classical play was, objected to child-players, &c. These are exceptional occasions. The change we notice in the tone of his plays, as years pass, rather follows the curve of human life, of a life that might be almost any man's, than reveals individual peculiarities in their

author. One of his chief characteristics (and merits) is, on the contrary, the free play he allows to his heroes' personality, and his care not to encumber them with his own. They go forth, fill the stage, fill the drama with their explanations and apologies, so freely, so unimpeded by the author, who seems simply to listen, that the spectator will at times remain in doubt which to believe and which to love. They pay no heed to Shakespeare, and they expound or contradict their maker's opinion without even knowing which. They are created independent and alive; they continue so to-day, the very reverse of so many characters in Hugo's dramas, mere spokesmen of the poet who wanted to imitate Shakespeare, but forgot to conceal, as his model had done, his own figure behind the scenes.

The *Sonnets* confirm these views; there alone Shakespeare's personality is, in a large measure, bared to the eye. But there the personage whose turn had come to speak was William Shakespeare, who used the same freedom that he had allowed to Shylock, Hamlet, Henry V, or Richard III. For him it was a kind of safety-valve, giving vent to sentiments which would have been out of place anywhere else; but it was enough for him to have put them down in writing; he did not go the length of sending the sonnets to the press.

V

Far above any of those single questions rises the one of general import, propounded by Dr. Johnson, Emerson, and others: that of the moral effect of the plays on listeners or readers.

During the whole period to which Shakespeare belongs, and before his day too and long after, in his country and out of it, most men agreed that plays must moralize and improve mankind. They have other *raisons d'être*, but this is the chief one. Tragedy and comedy, said Ronsard, are above all, 'didascaliques et enseignantes.' Sir Philip Sidney was of the same opinion. The true poet, said Ben Jonson, must be 'able to inform young men to all good discipline, inflame grown men to all great virtues, keep old men in their best and supreme state', and he deplored the debasement of that sacred rôle among his contemporaries, especially in dramatic poetry. According to Corneille the chief point is to paint virtue and vice just as they are; 'and then,' said he, with his austere optimism, 'virtue is sure to win all hearts even in misery, and vice is sure to be hated even triumphant.' 'The stage,' said Racine, 'should be a school where virtue would be taught no less than in the schools of philosophy.'

Samuel Johnson wrote his ill-fated *Irene* to show (but it turned out that no one wanted to see) 'how heaven supports the virtuous mind . . . what anguish racks the guilty breasts', and 'that peace from innocence must flow'; while Voltaire, for reasons of his own it is true, placed, in his *Babouc*, the moralizing influence of tragedies far above that of sermons.

The only shackles Shakespeare was loaded with were the needs and tastes of his public. They were heavy enough, but they were the only ones. The absence of others is so complete and so unique that this characteristic is among the most singular offered to our wonder by his works. Barring this single exception, no poet cast on the wide world a freer and clearer gaze. He wrote unhampered by traditions, rules, religious systems. He gave himself the pleasure of showing once that he knew dramatic rules existed, but he left them alone because they were 'caviare to the general', and he depended on 'the general'. They were probably, besides, not so very sweet to him either. The final result is that, strange as it may seem, he stands much nearer Aristotle than many of Aristotle's learned followers. The great philosopher did nothing but sum up the teachings of good sense and adapt them to Greek manners. The great poet did nothing but follow the same teachings, as given him by his own sound nature, and adapt them to English wants. As both were men of genius and both were excellent observers, the one taught and the other acted in similar fashion.

On the question of morality, Aristotle makes it quite evident that his own ideal is a drama in which vice is punished or even has no place; but he clearly states also that the rational end of dramatic poetry is not to moralize but to give pleasure (πρὸς ἡδονήν).

On the same question, as on that of 'rules' (mere suggestions, not 'rules' in Aristotle's intentions), Shakespeare's attitude was the same. He would not go out of his way either to secure or to avoid an ethical conclusion or conformity to rules. His plays were truly written 'without any moral purpose', that is, instruction was not their object. But to conclude that they do not therefore instruct at all is to wander from truth. First, in some plays the events represented are, as in real life, so full of meaning that the moral is no less obvious than in any classical tragedy with a confidant or a chorus to tell us what to think; and even, at times, the hero tells us that. No one can escape the lesson to be drawn from the fate of Macbeth, of Coriolanus, of Antony, of poor Falstaff and his wild companions. Augustus in *Cinna* does not moralize with greater effect on his past than does Macbeth:

> Better be with the dead
> Whom we, to gain our place, have sent to peace,
> Than on the torture of the mind to lie
> In restless ecstasy.

In many cases, however, it seems as if the evil power so often at play in Greek tragedies, and in real life too, were leading the innocent to their destruction: Othello, Desdemona, Hamlet, as worthy of pity as Oedipus; fatality imposing on them tasks for which nature has not armed them, or offering them temptations to which they would not have yielded had they been less generous. Are those plays of no moral use, or is their use limited to those maxims and pregnant sayings which Corneille considered one of the chief causes of a tragedy's usefulness, and which abound in Shakespeare—

> 'Tis time to fear when tyrants seem to kiss.

> Great men may jest with Saints; 'tis wit in them,
> But in the less, foul profanation—

and others so well known that one scarcely dares to quote them?

One instinct, and only one, appears in man at his birth, that of conservation. The child eats, sleeps, does what care for his growth commands, and can no more think of anything else than a tree can think of whether its roots absorb sap that ought to have gone to the next tree. What happens later is of immense interest: if too much of that native instinct persists and more than is strictly necessary for preservation survives, then the misshapen being solidifies into a low, mean, dry-hearted egoist. To call him with Stirner an 'egotheist' (*Homo sibi Deus*), to deify the monster, is only to make him more monstrous, and go back to the time when stones were deities. Hearts must open. 'The aim,' Lord Morley has written with truth, 'both in public and private life, is to secure to the utmost possible extent the victory of the social feeling over self-love, or Altruism over Egoism.' The chief influences will be inherited tendencies, family tuition, early examples. Next to that will be what and whom the growing man sees, hears, reads, associates with.

For compelling hearts to expand, and making us feel for others than ourselves, for breaking the crust of inborn egoism, Shakespeare has, among playwrights, no equal. Here works that supreme power of his: to bestow life, full and real life, on whomsoever he pleases, to delineate character with so great a perfection that such people as he presents to us we know thoroughly, and what happens to them strikes us the more since they are of our acquaintance; not

a passing acquaintance, casually made, soon forgotten, but that of men who will accompany us through life, ever reappearing on the slightest occasion or merest allusion, in tears or smiles, moving us at the remembrance of a happiness and of disasters in which we take part though they be not ours. The action on the heart is the more telling that, with his wide sympathies, the poet discovers the sacred 'touch of nature' not only in great heroes, but in the humblest ones; not only in ideal heroines, but in a Shylock whom we pity, at times, to the point of not liking so completely the 'learned Doctor from Padua'; even in 'the poor beetle that we tread upon', and we get thinking of its pangs 'as great as when a giant dies'.

The fate of a Hamlet, an Ophelia, a Desdemona, an Othello, carries, to be sure, no concrete moral with it; the noblest, the purest, the most generous, sink into the dark abyss after agonizing tortures, and one can scarcely imagine what, being human, they should have avoided to escape their misery. Their story was undoubtedly written 'without any moral purpose', but not without any moral effect. It obliges human hearts to melt, it teaches them pity.

VI

Five thousand two hundred and sixteen entries to-day in the British Museum under the word Shakespeare (more than double the amount for Homer), against three hundred and seven in 1855; all the world reading Shakespeare: moral cannot be the only attraction, nor even the chief one. It is, in fact, as things of beauty that the works of the poet have reached their immense fame. That they are things of beauty is now admitted by all; with enthusiasm by most people, unwittingly by the rare others. Such a great writer as Tolstoi denies any merit, even of the lowest order, to Shakespeare, but having to define, in his book *On Art*, the tests by which 'real art' is to be distinguished from 'vain imitations', those he selects fit the works of Shakespeare so perfectly that, if this poet had been the typical one he had in view, he could scarcely have written otherwise.

Shakespeare's plays are things of beauty, works of art; the product of an art, it is true, which cannot be learned in books—the higher for that. What is then the use of a thing of beauty, an *As You Like It*, a *Midsummer Night's Dream*, full of smiles? and all that gaiety, and all that beauty, and all those passions, and that force, and that wit, and that eloquence, and that wisdom scattered through the immense

field of the thirty-seven plays? 'What does it signify?' What should we expect of a thing of beauty?

No problem has been, for over a hundred years, more passionately discussed. Can art be profitable at all? Should it be profitable? Should it profit the few or the many? Is real art of a supra-terrestrial nature or not, and must it be kept above the reach and even the gaze of the lowly?

On these questions most critics have known no doubts, and they have answered without hesitation; but some have said, Certainly yes, and others, Certainly no. 'Woe,' wrote d'Alembert, 'to the artistic productions whose beauty is only for artists.' 'Here,' observed the Goncourt brothers, 'is one of the silliest things that was ever said.' The problem continues debated and debatable, and was quite recently the subject of a remarkable essay by one of the best Shakespearian critics: *Poetry for Poetry's Sake,* by Professor Bradley.

In the course of the last century the quarrel was at its height, and it was a fierce one. For a time no vocabulary had words strong enough to express the contempt, the hatred, the indignation of artists towards those unspeakable *bourgeois* who could imagine that art might be enjoyed by any but a select few, and could be of any use: 'Everything that is of any use is ugly,' Théophile Gautier had decreed. The true artist must live apart, meditate, never teach, never act: action might spoil the fineness of his perceptions. He belongs to a world different from everybody else's, the world of art.

But while literary wars and revolutions were going on, other wars and other revolutions were taking place in the world and deeply influencing art theories. The revolution of 1848 made of Baudelaire, that staunch champion of 'art for art', a convert to the opposite doctrine: 'Art is henceforth inseparable from usefulness and morality,' said he, burning what he had adored. The storm of 1870 thinned yet more the ranks of the erstwhile triumphant partisans of supra-terrestrial art. No doubt was possible, Browning was right,

> The world and life's too big to pass for a dream.

Since the din and dust of the fight have abated one can get a clearer vision of the facts; and as is often the case in human quarrels, one now discovers valuable truths, though in different proportions, in the doctrine of the contending parties.

The day of the pure dilettanti saying to the world, 'I am too much above thee to care for thee,'[1] is decidedly on the wane. Boutroux, with his usual acumen and sanity, has shown that their views, attitude,

[1] Cassagne, *L'Art pour l'art,* p. 143.

and success had never been a sign of progress, but of decay: 'In the epochs usually called epochs of decadence or dissolution, art disdainfully dissociates itself from any other object but beauty, considering that the latter displays its full power only when free from all accessory ends such as utility, truth, honesty, and is placed alone in its supreme independence and dignity.' Art is, in fact, an offspring of nature; it is of course in close alliance with beauty, but it must not be cut loose from the soil under pretence of mere beauty: 'Each time art has risen again from decay or has been born to a new life, it has begun by casting off vain ornaments and assigning to itself a serious and real end, closely connected with the conditions of contemporary life.'

But there is something true also in the theory of 'art for art'. If it cannot be maintained with Hegel, that art purifies all it touches, and that any kind of art is morally beneficial to mankind, it must be acknowledged to-day that art, when not wilfully perverse, is useful simply because it produces things of beauty. 'All that is great,' Goethe said, 'contributes to our education.' A tragedy, a picture, a statue; *Othello*, Rembrandt's philosopher, the Victory of Samothrace, raise us above ourselves. We cannot enjoy works of art, Paul Gaultier has observed, without 'a preliminary forgetting of our habitual preoccupations, and of the interested views which form, so to say, the woof of our lives. . . . They free us from the tyranny of interest. . . . The emotion caused by works of art acts like a preface to moral activity.' The same author adds with great truth: 'The morality of a work is not to be measured by the morality of the things represented, but by that of the sentiment in which they have been represented.'

The influence thus exerted will be powerful and beneficial, in proportion to the perfection of the work, the depth of the emotion, and the sincerity of the artist who takes his starting-point on our real earth, allowing himself to be prompted by our real lives and our real doubts and hopes. The influence will be broad in proportion to the accessibility of the beauty represented. Without those characteristics the kind of art that may grow will be short-lived, cold, and dry, the cult will not spread—few will worship nowadays a wooden idol.

Of the former sort is Shakespeare's influence on mankind. The world is full of beauty, but with our eyes drawn to the daily task most of it escapes us. We want the poet, the musician, the artist, to touch us with his wand and to say to us, Look. Then we see and admire what we had looked at a hundred times before, and never seen, owing to our 'muddy vesture of decay'.

A sunset may pass unobserved by the vulgar; it will less easily pass unobserved when arrested in its evanescence and fixed on his canvas by Claude Lorrain. For to the landscape is superadded Claude Lorrain; we have the landscape plus he; the artist changes nothing in what he sees, but he is present there with us, just to say, Look. The same with Shakespeare.

No sensible man visits that temple devoted to artistic beauty, with its innumerable recesses and shrines, where all epochs and all countries are represented, the Louvre in Paris, without leaving it a better man. The added worth may be an infinitesimal worth, it may be a considerable one; in all cases some worth will be acquired. Dormant springs of disinterested emotion will have been made to flow again, a fatigued brain will have been rested; sleepy thoughts will have been roused, brought back to life and made to engender others. The same after a visit to Shakespeare.

Private benefactors, or the State, offer to studious youths the means of making a stay in Rome or Athens, or of journeying around the world. The belief is that they will return stronger, better armed for life, having had unusual occasions to think and consider, to store their mind. Such journeys are offered us by Shakespeare, around that microcosm, so full of wonders, and which has no secret for him, man's soul and character.

His hold both on artists and on the masses will certainly continue; on artists on account of the example given by him of taking one's stand in realities, of looking at things straight, of observing nature rather than conforming to accepted traditions. This he does in absolute simplicity, without any touch of the pedantry of either the learned writer who worships rules because they are accepted, or the rebel who rejects them altogether, and on all occasions, because they are rules.

In Claude Lorrain's canvases we have nature, plus Claude Lorrain; in Shakespeare's plays we have nature, plus Shakespeare, plus his public. Discarding what is not his but has been contributed by his public, we find that what he adds to nature does not consist in any undue intrusion of his personality, but, on the contrary, in artistically selecting from real life what is characteristic of the individual he represents. One might follow, step by step, a Hamlet, a nurse, a Falstaff in real life and note every word they say, every attitude they take; and the portrait would be less life-like than the one drawn by Shakespeare. There are moments when we do not look like ourselves: such moments are often selected by photographers, for which cause so many photographs made after us are not like us. The true artist

is more discerning; he not only keeps his own personality apart from that of his personages, but in that of his personages he knows how to bring out what makes of them distinct individuals. That is his way of saying, Look. Boswell's portrait of Dr. Johnson is immortal simply because it was drawn in that manner.

As a trammel-breaker, Shakespeare, who played a unique rôle in that French romantic movement, the chief result of which was the awakening of French lyricism—Shakespeare who was, said Emerson, 'the father of German literature'—will continue to help and inspire future generations of artists. Every successful new attempt usually degenerates into a school: to imitate the successful is ever held by the many as the shortest road to success. Old rules are periodically scorned and discarded; then, after a brief moment of independence, the new attempt (invariably made in the name of nature) is systematized, and new rules, new shackles, replace the former ones; barnacles retard the movement of the ship.

To look directly at nature; to see how Shakespeare looks at nature, to understand the amplitude of his realism, which does not, under pretence that nettles are real, discard roses; to read the parts of his plays which are really his, and study, for example, some of his wonderful first scenes (*Romeo*, *Othello*, *Hamlet*, *Tempest*, &c.), will be, on such occasions, the best of cures. Human nature will have to change before the great trammel-breaker ceases to fulfil his mission.

With the masses an increase of Shakespeare's influence is to be foreseen. His plays, in their *ensemble*, were ever accessible to the many, since it was for them especially that he wrote, but the higher beauties in his works, those which he put in simply because he could not help it, because they were commanded by his nature and not because they were required by that of his hearers, will be more and more understood and enjoyed.

The change in our own days has been striking; it will be greater hereafter, when owing to discoveries, to the improvement of machinery, to a change in the conditions of life, the many will at last enjoy that chief one among the great causes of content in life, which the few now possess and the masses do not—leisure hours. For the many, as for the privileged of previous times, life will be less encumbered with matter; there will be, in their day's twenty-four hours, time for rest, for study, for a friendly book, for thoughts. Instruction and education, kindly given as it will be (else of little advantage), will prepare them for the best use to be made of the new treasure with highest enjoyment and profit. Many, of course, as is often the case with the possessors of treasure, will squander theirs, but some will not, and

their number will probably go on increasing. One of those highest enjoyments will be a better understanding of beauty, whether natural or artistic, a real sunset or a painted one.

Signs are not lacking that the influence for good of things of beauty, as such, will grow, and be more and more generally taken into account. A recent incident in far-off Colorado may be quoted as symptomatic. A commercial company there wanted, last year, to divert to its uses a stream which formed a cascade further down; it pleaded that it had, according to the Constitution, 'the right to divert waters of any natural stream unappropriated to beneficial uses.' Just as if it had taken its cue from Portia, the United States Circuit Court decided that 'The world delights in scenic beauty. . . . It is therefore held that the maintenance of the vegetation in Cascade Canyon by the flow and seepage and mist and spray of the stream and its falls, as it passes through the canyon, is a beneficial use of such waters within the meaning of the Constitution.' Thus, with the full support of public opinion, the stream was saved as being a thing of beauty, an honest one, and therefore beneficial.

The Palace at Versailles has been transformed, as you know, into a Museum dedicated 'A toutes les gloires de la France'. A visit there is for us what a reading of *Henry V* is for you. On Sundays the crowd is such that it is difficult to move: a crowd of the same sort that filled Shakespeare's theatre: artisans, shopkeepers, soldiers, sailors, servants, peasants come to town, and there too, now and then, a stray Ambassador. Such people are the best public, the most sincere, the one that does not look for occasions to blame and sneer, but occasions to admire, and few things are more beneficial than disinterested admiration for great deeds and noble sights. Leaving the palace once, at the hour of closure, I stood near a couple of obviously very poor and very tired people. They had been looking for hours, and they were gazing still. 'Now you must go,' repeated the Keeper for the second time. I wish I could render the tone and expression with which they answered: 'Must we now? What a pity. It was all so beautiful.' Like every man leaving with regret Shakespeare's works after having admired what is highest and truest in them, those two surely went home better people.

Let us not expect from Shakespeare what he cannot give, what he can is enough, and is of peerless value. Having come young to town, hard pressed by necessity, writing with very practical ends in view, never thinking of posterity, bound to please his public, the means of success

he employed were in a way forced upon him by circumstances. He knew what ingredients his public liked, and never felt it his duty to grudge them their pleasure; he could write, and had to write, with extreme rapidity, without any preparatory study or verifying; and he did so without scruple. But no less fully did he allow free play to that unparalleled genius of his, the extent of which was unsuspected by his contemporaries and by himself.

By the problems he obliges us to consider, the concrete moral of some of his plays, their general healthy tone, the sympathies he awakens in our hearts, the amount of beauty he offers to our gaze, as varied as the world itself—by all this he renders us the one great service of drawing us out of our paltry selves, of busying us, not superficially, but intensely, with something other than our own interests. He raises us above the plane of everyday thoughts, he improves us by fighting in us the ever-recurring danger of our native *egoism*.

'How does it profit me?' Emerson had said; 'what does it signify? It is but a Twelfth Night, or Midsummer-Night's Dream, or a Winter Evening's Tale?' Let Emerson answer Emerson, for the same thinker had said elsewhere: 'All high beauty has a moral element in it.'

WARTON LECTURE ON ENGLISH POETRY

II

THE CONNEXION BETWEEN ANCIENT AND MODERN ROMANCE

By W. J. COURTHOPE, C.B.

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read October 25, 1911.

THE besetting sin of the Classical Renaissance was the sacrifice of the spirit of imaginative matter to the mechanism of literary form. It was reasonable that the Humanists, in their enthusiasm for the rediscovered masterpieces of Greek and Roman literature, should recoil from the barbarous diction of the late Mediaeval Schoolmen. But, when they prescribed the revived classic forms as the only legitimate moulds of expression for all kinds of modern thought, they forgot, on the one hand, that the great monuments of ancient literature were the product of a spirit which, having passed away from the world, could never reappear exactly in its former body, and, on the other, that the despised mediaeval forms, however lifeless they might now seem, were once instinct with vital meaning. The external Classical Form was to them an idol of style, initiating, as Mr. Ker told us in his inaugural lecture, a movement of Culture which tended to become stilted and artificial, while it also encouraged the Humanist critic to regard his own perceptions as the final and absolute standard of judgement. Hence such arrogant pronouncements as that cited by Mr. Ker from Lowell on the Poetry of the Provençals, and the comprehensive sneer of M. Taine at mediaeval literature as a whole, noticed in the Preface to my *History of English Poetry.*

Thomas Warton deserves all the praise that has been awarded to him as a pioneer of the reaction against this literary intolerance. The generous recognition extended by him to the work of the older English poets was of the greatest value in widening the area of

national taste, and his industry in collecting the remains of mediaeval antiquity did much to counteract the tendency of his age to proscribe all the productions of European imagination before the Classical Revival. The only thing wanting to make him stand forth as a bright example of the beneficial results arising from an alliance between literary and antiquarian criticism was historic appreciation of mediaeval form as well as of mediaeval matter. Unfortunately, as his correspondence with Gray shows, he restricted his historical aim to antiquarian collection, and, though he was an excellent Humanist critic, he was only a second-rate antiquary. A typical scholar of the Renaissance, he was inclined to judge every characteristic work of the Middle Ages, from a superior point of view, as the product of a barbarous author. '*We*,' he says, speaking of *The Divine Comedy*, 'are surprised that a poet should write one hundred cantos on hell, paradise, and purgatory.'[1] And the apology he offers to the reader for Dante's procedure is instinct with the condescension of the Classical Humanist: 'This prolixity is partly owing to the want of art and method, and is common to all early compositions, in which everything is related circumstantially without rejection, and not in the general terms which are used by modern writers.'[1] Had Warton regarded *The Divine Comedy*, not simply as an antiquarian curiosity, but with historic sympathy, he must have seen that, so far from the mode of its composition being 'surprising', the marvel would have been if such an artist as Dante had treated his materials otherwise than he did; the Humanist critic would, in fact, have found the form of the poem, from a historical point of view, not less worthy of his study than the matter.

Precisely the same defect may be noted in the criticism of the mediaeval Romances by the leading literary historians at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. All of these critics were men of taste and refinement; but, as they did not take the trouble to realize historically the spirit of the Romance-writers, they neglected the lesson to be learned from the form of their compositions, and so contrived to convey to the reader a wrong impression about the subject-matter.

Thomas Warton, for instance, says of the origin of Romantic Fiction:—

'*That peculiar and arbitrary species of Fiction*, which we commonly call Romantic, was entirely unknown to the writers of Greece and Rome. It appears to have been imported into Europe by a people

[1] Thomas Warton on Dante. Cited by Mr. Ker, in his Inaugural Warton Lecture, November 16, 1910.

whose modes of thinking and habits of invention are not natural to that country. It is generally supposed to have been borrowed from the Arabians.' [1]

Thomas Percy, who had treated the subject of the Romances before Warton, took an entirely different view of their origin, but, like him, thought of Romance as a 'peculiar and arbitrary species of Fiction'.[2] John Colin Dunlop, in his *History of Fiction*, recognized that the origin of Romance was far more complex than had been supposed by either Percy or Warton, but agreed with them in thinking that the term essentially involved what he called 'those wild and improbable *fictions*, those supernatural ornaments which form the machinery of Romance and which alone should be termed Romantic Fiction'.[3] Nevertheless, he classed as 'Romantic Fiction' the Greek Novels, the machinery of which is scarcely at all dependent on the presence of 'supernatural ornaments'. And, though his enumeration of the works of 'that peculiar and arbitrary species of Fiction, which we call Romantic', was far more elaborate and exhaustive than what was attempted by his predecessors, Dunlop arranged his materials without any reference to their sequence in order of time, thus ignoring the gradual modifications which successive generations of mediaeval Romance-writers introduced into their compositions. He gives the following reason for making his account of the Romances as exhaustive as possible:—

'Even the dulness of the fictions of Chivalry is, in some degree, instructive, as acquainting us with the monotonous mode of life which prevailed during the periods that gave them birth, while at the same time, by a comparison of the intellectual powers exhibited in romance with the exertions of the same age in law, theology, and other pursuits, we are enabled to form an estimate of the employment of genius in those distant periods, and to behold in what arts and sciences it was most successfully displayed.' [4]

The 'dulness of the fictions of Chivalry' was in fact regarded by the Humanist critic as a sufficient excuse for his omission to examine their literary form, and Dunlop makes no attempt to account for the difference of spirit displayed respectively in the *Roman de Brut* and the Romance of *Amadis of Gaul*. Yet the difference is fundamental.

The term 'Roman' in the beginning, so far from implying conscious fiction, signified *history* orally recited in the Romance language,

[1] Dissertation 1 in Warton's *History of English Poetry*.

[2] Percy, *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*, vol. iii, p. 3.

[3] Dunlop, *History of Fiction* (1888), vol. i, p. 116.

[4] Ibid., vol. i, p. 351.

as opposed to history written in Latin. The *Roman de Brut* and the *Roman de Troie* were new versions, in the vulgar tongue, of the *Historia Regum Britanniae* of Geoffrey of Monmouth and the *De Excidio Trojae Historia* of Dares Phrygius. Wace and Benoît de Ste. More added the metrical style of the Norman minstrel to the supposed history of the ecclesiastical chronicler and the pseudo-Trojan forger. Their history was indeed of a very different kind from the narrative of a Thucydides, a Livy, or a Tacitus; but carrying with it the authority of a Latin original, it offered a sufficient warrant to unsophisticated audiences that they were not wasting their time in listening to idle fictions, but were improving their minds with solid knowledge. On the other hand, the Norman 'trouvère' naturally imported into the new and authoritative historical matter the free spirit and manner of the minstrel, so that, in the earliest 'romans', fabulous genealogy and national legend form, as they did in the 'Chansons de Geste', leading features of the composition.

But about the middle and end of the twelfth century, and midway into the thirteenth, the 'romans' of Chrestien de Troyes, followed, as they were, by tales like *Flore et Blanchefleur* and the lays of Marie de France, exhibit a radical change of form. They resemble indeed the 'romans' of Wace and Benoît de Ste. More in their octosyllabic verse and in their continued claim to be the vehicles of true history. As regards the latter point, Chrestien de Troyes says, in the beginning of his *Roman de Cliget*: 'This history I found written in one of the books of the library of Monsignor Paul at Beauvais, which is witness to the truth of the history and makes it worthy of belief.'[1] Marie of France, in one of her 'lays', says that she had at first intended to make a good history, and translate it from Latin into Romance. But, finding this path too much trodden, she resolved to make a new departure in the language of Romance from the Breton lays, which she, or at least her audience, regarded as historical, and she declared that the fidelity of her reproduction might be verified by reference to MSS. preserved in a Monastery at Caerleon.[2] Nevertheless, her poems and the tales of Chrestien, instead of being histories like those of Wace—that is to say, narratives of battles between rival races and opposing chieftains—relate the adventures of individuals, which depend for their main interest on complications caused by love.

How are we to account for this remarkable revolution in romantic form? The antiquarian critic replies at once: 'By the influence of the Celtic element in the composition'; and he naturally applies all

[1] *Histoire littéraire de France*, vol. xv, 'Chrestien de Troyes.'

[2] *Poésies de Marie de France* (Roquefort), vol. i, p. 543.

his industry to discover the existence of the original authorities referred to by Chrestien and Marie de France. His answer is, I think, obviously inadequate. I fully believe, indeed, that many of the materials employed by these poets were derived from Celtic sources. Chrestien and his successors doubtless found in existence, in Celtic folk-lore, some kind of embryonic legends of the 'chanson de geste' order, which provided them with a foundation for their tales about the Round Table: the names of the knights, for example, and the magical episodes which enliven their narratives, have an evidently Celtic character. But no connected story of adventure, whether of love or war, has yet been discovered among the really ancient remains of Celtic poetry. On the other hand, many of the complications in the 'romans' arise out of conditions which are peculiar to the feudal society contemporaneous with the appearance of the poem in the Romance tongue, and have little significance in the society of the primitive Celtic age. The refined casuistry of love, which provides so much of the machinery in the romances of the Round Table, speaks of itself to the influence of the 'Cours d'Amour'; and the relations of Tristram and Lancelot to the wives of their sovereigns are illustrations of particular offences, *lèse-majesté* and *lèse-féodalité*, involved in the law of feudalism, as it existed in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries.

The natural inference from these facts is, I think, that, from whatever source the materials in the new class of 'roman' may be derived, the free handling of them is due to the invention of the 'trouvère', and their general character to the taste of the contemporaneous Anglo-Norman or French Society. When Chrestien de Troyes and Marie de France speak as if they were reproducing in the Romance language some historical tale which may be found written in Latin or Celtic, we may conclude that they are merely employing a device similar to the fiction of Chaucer in a later age, who pretends that his story of *Troilus and Criseyde* is based on the authority of a Latin historian named Lollius, though we know that whatever in the poem was not of his own invention was mostly derived from Boccaccio's *Filostrato*. In other words, through all the metrical 'romans' of the second period, the inventive spirit of the Northern minstrel is seen to be prevailing over the professed matter of fact of the ecclesiastical historian.

This accounts for the character of the second class of 'roman' on the *historical* side, but it leaves the revolution in *poetical* form still unexplained. So abrupt a change from the style of the old 'chanson de geste' as appears in the Romances of Chrestien and

Marie de France could hardly have been achieved without a suggestion at least from some pre-existing model. Warton supposes that the poetical ornaments of the romances were borrowed ready-made from the Arabians, and thinks that the features they present have no analogy to any form of fiction known to the Greeks and Romans. But the supernatural machinery of Romance in its final development—giants, enchanters, and the like—scarcely enters into the structure of Chrestien's 'romans'. Nor are the most marked features in some of his tales—the adventures of a pair of faithful but unfortunate lovers—specially characteristic of Arabian fiction. On the other hand, such adventures constitute the essence of the interest in the tales of the Greek Novelists.

The Greek novel was still being produced for the entertainment of the Eastern world, while the Crusades were attracting the chivalry of the West. Eustathius' story, *Hysminias and Hysmine*, for instance, is believed to have been written in the twelfth century, during the reign of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus.[1] Why then should the errant 'trouvères' of the Crusades have shown less enterprise in learning enough Greek to provide them with hints for the plots of their 'romans' than the modern British playwright shows in borrowing ideas for his dramas from the French? Chrestien himself—a retainer of Philip, Count of Flanders, killed at the siege of Acre in 1191—in seeking fresh suggestions for his minstrelsy, would have had before him such tales as the *Habrocomas and Anthia* of Xenophon of Ephesus; the *Ethiopica* of Heliodorus, sometimes called *Theagenes and Chariclea*; the *Cleitophon and Leucippe* of Achilles Tatius; and the *Daphnis and Chloe*, usually assigned to a writer called Longus. These prose fictions are the last stage in the decadence of Greek literature. They are the remote and degenerate offspring of the Attic drama, after dramatic interest had passed from the moral didacticism of the Chorus to the mechanical evolution of the plot; and the attention paid by the novelists to the imaginative surprises involved in the adventures of the *dramatis personae*—in ἀναγνώρισις (or recognition) for example, and in περιπέτεια (or reversal of Fortune)—shows that the taste of the Greek reader, even at this late period, was determined by the same kind of critical principles as we find declared in the *Poetics* of Aristotle in regard to Tragedy and Epic Poetry. All of the stories are full of those 'moving accidents by flood and field' which entranced the imagination of Desdemona, and especially of misfortunes showing that 'the course of true love never did run smooth'.

[1] Dunlop, *History of Fiction*, vol. i, p. 77.

Poor as their art was, it was much in advance of any method of story-telling known to the 'trouvère'; and the influence of the Greek example begins to show itself even in the superficial structural features of the 'romans' of the twelfth century. The alteration of the titles of the tales from the *Roman de Troie* or *Roman de Brut* to *Enid and Eric*, *Ywain and Gawain*, *Flore et Blanchefleur*, &c., indicates in itself an imitation of *Theagenes and Chariclea*, *Cleitophon and Leucippe*, *Habrocomas and Anthia*, marking the transition from the ethnic 'chansons de geste' to the 'romance' of individual knights and lovers.

But we have many more direct proofs of the acquaintance of the 'trouvères' with the Greek Novels. The early metrical tale of *Flore et Blanchefleur* shows plain traces in its structure of the study of *Theagenes and Chariclea*; while *Habrocomas and Anthia* provided Chrestien de Troyes with several suggestions for the plot of his *Roman de Cliget*. The last-named 'roman' furnishes perhaps the best example of the results produced by the 'trouvère's' study of Greek fiction. We find that one of its most striking episodes is borrowed directly from the *Habrocomas and Anthia* of Xenophon. In that story the heroine, Anthia, to save herself from a marriage with Perilaus, governor of Cilicia, and to preserve her troth-plight to Habrocomas, procures from a travelling physician a soporific draught which produces the appearance of death and causes her to be buried alive.[1] Like Juliet, she revives in the tomb, but, unlike her, is at last happily restored to her lover. The same thing, *mutatis mutandis*, happens to Fenice, the heroine of the *Roman de Cliget*. Being in love with Cliget, but married against her will to the Emperor of the East, she procures a delay in the consummation of the marriage, and is afterwards buried alive in a tomb, animation being suspended by a sleeping draught.[2] An imitation of this kind tells its own story, and the source of the invention is revealed still more clearly by the identity of the leading motive in the minds of the Greek and French authors, namely, the preservation of fidelity to each other by two lovers separated by a thousand trials and misfortunes. When Anthia is finally restored to Habrocomas, she addresses him as follows:—

'My dear lord and husband, I have recovered you at last after long wanderings by land and sea, and, having escaped the threats of robbers, the treachery of pirates, the injuries of chains, tombs, poisons, and sepulchres, I return to you, my soul's life, my Habrocomas, just as I was when I left you at Tyre to be carried off into Syria. . . .

[1] Xenophon, *Ephesiacorum* lib. iii.

[2] *Histoire littéraire de France*, vol. xv, 'Chrestien de Troyes.'

I have invented all the arts that modesty allows in order to preserve my fidelity unimpaired for you. And you, my Habrocomas, have you kept the same honest counsel? Has any one seemed to you fairer than myself? Has no one sought to make you forget me and your plighted faith?'[1]

Precisely the same question is put by Fenice to Cliget when she has related to him the arts by which she had escaped the consummation of her marriage with the Emperor.[2] But, though Chrestien is indebted for many of his inventions to Greek predecessors, he shows himself to be no servile imitator. He feels rightly that the characters, manners, and sentiments of his Greek model are of an effeminate kind, quite unfitted to gratify the taste of his warlike western audience, and he is careful to invest his story in these respects with an atmosphere suited to feudal circumstances. No 'roman'-writer of the twelfth or thirteenth centuries seems to have tried to imitate *Daphnis and Chloe*; nor is this surprising in a rough and uncivilized age, not yet prepared to appreciate the pastoral sentimentalism which appealed so strongly to the sophisticated taste of later and more lettered epochs. Whether the passion of Love be used for the purpose of complicating adventurous action, as in the *Romance of Tristram*, or for enforcing ascetic doctrine, as in *The Quest of the Holy Grail*, the treatment of it by the mediaeval romance-writer necessarily differs profoundly from its treatment by the Greek novelist.

To reduce such metrical tales of love and chivalry to prose was an obvious improvement, which seemed to make them approach more closely at once to the vividness of Greek fiction and to the gravity of Latin history. Such is evidently the motive of the prose 'romans' of the Round Table, produced, from the end of the twelfth to the beginning of the fourteenth century, by Helie and Robert de Borron, Walter Map, Lucas de Gast, and Rusticien of Pisa.[3] In these compositions the element of poetic fiction becomes gross and palpable. Nevertheless, the strength of the historic tradition manifests itself in the constant reiteration, by the authors, of the fable that they are translating from Latin originals. Thus, in the opening of *Gyron le Courtois*, the writer, addressing his readers, says:—

'Know you truly that this book was translated from the book of

[1] Xenophon, *Ephesiacorum* lib. v.

[2] *Histoire littéraire de France*, vol. xv, 'Chrestien de Troyes.'

[3] I am aware that some scholars believe the earlier romances in prose to have been composed before those in metre, but, in the absence of all positive evidence on the subject, I do not think that the view I have put forward need be affected by a theory which is in itself improbable.

Monsignor Edward, king of England, at that time when he passed beyond the sea, in the service of our Lord, to gain possession of the Holy Sepulchre. And master Rusticien of Pisa compiled this Romaunt, for from that book of King Edward of England he translated all the marvellous adventures that are in this book.'[1]

After a narrative full of the most extravagant descriptions and incidents, Rusticien leaves his heroes and heroines in sorry plight, but with the alleviating announcement:—

'How they were delivered I make no mention, inasmuch as the Latin book ends their adventures at this point, but the Romaunt of King Meliadus of Lyonnesse tells the manner in which they were delivered and by whom.'[2]

So long as a 'Latin Book' could be cited, no limits needed to be set to the invention of the prose romance-writer. The Greater *Romance of the Grail*, for example, was a recast of an earlier and shorter 'roman' with the same title, in which apparently the 'trouvère' was thought not to have availed himself sufficiently of his opportunities for introducing supernatural incident; and as there was authority for many of the episodes in the apocryphal *Gospel of Nicodemus*, the revised and longer fairy-tale was received with general satisfaction.[3] Sometimes, indeed, the Latin text of the Chronicle itself provided the required matter of marvel and mystery. The Chronicle ascribed to Charlemagne's contemporary, Turpin, Archbishop of Rheims—a work in reality of some monastic writer in the twelfth century—furnished the veracious authority for those daemonic and angelic agencies in the adventures of the Emperor and his peers which so greatly delighted the humour of the Italian poets of the Renaissance.[4] As late as the age of Caxton, the record of the wonderful feats of Arthur and his knights was regarded as mainly worthy of perusal, because the prose romances of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were held by Society to be true history.[5]

By insensible stages we thus arrive at the last class of 'roman' which answers completely to the description of Warton and Dunlop, namely, an 'arbitrary species of fiction', consisting mainly of stories about 'giants, dragons, and enchanted castles, which form the seasoning of the adventures of chivalry'. These are the romances which turned the brain of Don Quixote and excited the wrath of

[1] Dunlop, *History of Fiction*, vol. i, p. 233.
[2] Ibid., vol. i, p. 237.
[3] Ibid., vol. i, pp. 159–72 (1888. Addition by Mr. Henry Wilson, the Editor).
[4] Ibid. (1888), vol. i, pp. 274–5.
[5] Caxton's Preface to Malory's *King Arthur*.

Cervantes. They were mostly produced, or at least found the most appreciative readers, in the Spanish peninsula during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and all of them proceed on the method of composition initiated by *Amadis of Gaul*. The element of fiction in them entirely overpowers the element of history and the imitation of contemporary manners. No profession is made that the events related are recorded even in the legends of the country. The characters are purely ideal. The knight-heroes, as a rule, are illegitimate, and have been exposed at their birth. Their names—Felixmarte, Esplandian, and the like—are plainly the invention of the authors; the countries through which they wander are often unrecognized by geography; the enemies whom they encounter are giants, dragons, and magicians; and the ladies who fall in love with them are Eastern princesses, fairies, and enchantresses. Tribal genealogies disappear from the story; but, by way of compensation, the family descent of the fictitious heroes is traced through an endless series of generations, so that the family of Amadis or Palmerin never seems to fail in producing a hero capable of fascinating the world with his impossible perfections. In fact, the invention of the oral minstrel—the direct product of tribal tradition—has given place to the art of the professional novelist—the literary purveyor for the amusement of civil society—and, while the characters presented to the reader show an ideal consistency much in advance of the Romances of the Round Table, only a boundless credulity can accept them as images of men and women who have once moved on the earth's surface. Yet even in these 'arbitrary fictions' the titles maintain a faint pretence of history, which indicates the metrical 'roman' as the remote source of their being. One famous Romance destroyed by the Barber and Curate, Don Quixote's rationalizing friends, was called *The* Chronicle *of the famous Knight Lisuarte of Greece, son of Esplandian, and of Perion, son of Amadis of Gaul.* The alternative title of the Tenth Book of *Amadis of Gaul* is *The* Chronicle *of Don Florisel de Niquea, son of Amadis of Greece.*

To sum up what has been said—If the method of classification I have employed be correct, it follows that Warton's view of the origin of Romantic Fiction is wrong in three points—(1) in describing Mediaeval Romance as an 'arbitrary species of *fiction*'; (2) in supposing this species of fiction to have been imported ready-made into Europe by the Arabians; (3) in assuming the form of the Romances to have been free of all influence from Greek and Roman literature. In point of fact, Mediaeval Romance was the result of a gradual process of evolution, being an imitation, from age to age, of the contemporary

manners of feudal society, veiled under the garb of supposed history. It was, at the outset, the work partly of the Norman or French minstrel, partly of the monkish chronicler, the latter of whom furnished in Latin the historical matter which the former moulded into such poetical form as the Romance language of the time admitted. Very soon the poetical genius of the 'trouvère' prevailed over the chronicler's profession of historical truth, and the 'roman' assumed many of those features of the Greek fictions which excited the admiration of the minstrel. The historical element continued to decay, the fictitious to increase, until at last what was once generally regarded as a species of veracious history came to be recognized as a mere imaginative entertainment, and Ancient Romance in its original sense expired.

Modern Romance proceeds in an ascending scale from a base exactly opposite to the old 'Roman'—in other words, whereas mediaeval Romance presupposes certain real objects and events, the outlines of which gradually dissolve into conscious fiction, modern Romance employs conscious fiction to decorate or disguise the outlines of real objects. It is inseparably connected with mediaeval Romance; but the stream of connexion, like a river which has disappeared underground, can be identified only by comparing the essential qualities of the new fiction, at the point of reappearance, with those of the old 'roman'. Mediaeval Romance died from the effects of two sets of causes, one social, the other technical. The social cause was the disappearance of the Feudal system, partly through its own internal decay, partly through its transformation by the reviving influence of Roman civil and municipal law, which produced a new life and order in society, but left no external object of imitation so pleasing to the imagination as the old institutions of chivalry. The technical cause was the replacement of the minstrel's song by the written or printed book. Being in immediate touch with his audience, the imaginative success of the oral minstrel depended on the life-like imitation of external objects as familiar to the body of his hearers as to himself; whereas the book, being the product of, and appealing to, solitary meditation, reflects only the individual perceptions of the author's mind. Hence ancient Romance embodied in an ideal form the manners and sentiments of mediaeval society at large, while modern Romance tends rather to reflect the ideas of Nature and Man formed by a multiplicity of differing imaginations.

The adjective 'romantic' may be used in three different senses. It may be applied either to that imaginative temper which is

readily credulous of the marvels and improbabilities of fiction; or to that class of fiction which deals with the mysterious and supernatural as opposed to novels imitating actual life and manners; or, lastly, to a set of artistic principles which form the natural antithesis to the principles usually described by the term 'classic'. In each case the word 'romantic' possesses some analogy to that 'arbitrary species of fiction' described by Warton and Dunlop as peculiar to the tales of chivalry; but just as the character of the mediaeval 'romans' was constantly modified to suit the altering conditions of feudal ages, so has modern Romance adapted itself to the changes of spirit which transform the structure of civil society.

1. The best illustration of historic change in 'romantic' temper is perhaps to be found in a comparison of Cervantes' account of the character of Don Quixote with Walter Scott's representation of the romanticism of the hero of *Waverley*. Don Quixote's 'fancy', says Cervantes, 'grew full of what he used to read about in his books, enchantments, battles, challenges, wounds, wooings, loves, agonies, and all sorts of impossible nonsense; and it so possessed his mind that the whole fabric of invention and fancy he read of was true that to him no history in the world had more reality in it.'[1] Edward Waverley's character is also represented as being formed by his imaginative reading; but in his case the rationalizing spirit of the Renaissance has intervened; civil institutions have been established; the belief in the supernatural has waned; and Waverley's quixotic conduct is explained by the miscellaneous confusion of his literary studies, unchecked by knowledge of the actual world. 'My intention,' says Scott, 'is not to follow the steps of the inimitable Cervantes in describing such total perversion of intellect as misconstrues the objects actually presented to the senses, but that more common aberration from sound judgment, which apprehends occurrences indeed in their reality, but communicates to them a tincture of its own romantic tone and colouring.'

'Waverley'—so his character is described—'had read, and stored in a memory of uncommon tenacity, much curious though ill-arranged and miscellaneous information. In English literature he was master of Shakespeare and Milton; of our earlier dramatic authors; of many picturesque and interesting passages from our old historical chronicles; and was particularly well acquainted with Spenser, Drayton, and other poets who have exercised themselves on romantic fiction, of all themes the most fascinating to a youthful imagination before the passions have roused themselves, and demand poetry of a more sentimental description. In this respect his acquaintance with Italian opened him yet

[1] *Don Quixote* (Ormsby's translation), Part I, chap. i.

a wider range. He had perused the numerous poems which from the shad of Pulci have been a favourite exercise for the wits of Italy; and day sought gratification in the numerous collections of "novelle", which were brought forth by the genius of that elegant though luxurious nation in emulation of the *Decameron*. In classical literature Waverley had made the usual progress, and read the usual authors; and the French had afforded him an almost exhaustless collection of memoirs scarcely more faithful than romances, and of romances so well written as hardly to be distinguished from memoirs. The splendid pages of Froissart, with his heart-stirring and eye-dazzling descriptions of war and tournaments, were among his chief favourites; and from those of Brantome and De la Noue he learned to compare the wild and loose yet superstitious character of the Nobles of the League with the stern, rigid, and sometimes turbulent disposition of the Huguenot party. The Spanish had contributed to his stock of chivalrous and romantic lore. The earlier literature of the northern nations did not escape the study of one who read rather to awaken the imagination than to benefit the understanding. And yet, knowing much that is known but to few, Edward Waverley might justly be considered as ignorant, since he knew little of what adds dignity to man and qualifies him to support and adorn an elevated position in society.'[1]

2. As the internal change in the constitution of European society transformed from age to age the romantic temper of the individual imagination, so did it gradually modify the form of the fictions by which that imagination was gratified. Though the institutions of chivalry decayed in every nation, the memory of them was still preserved at every Court; but their fictitious image was deprived of the incredible attributes with which it had been invested in the stories of Amadis or Palmerin. In Sidney's *Arcadia* there is no supernatural machinery: the void is filled with pastoral imagery. Pastoralism too is adopted, a generation later, as a device for decorating Court manners, in the *Astrée* of D'Urfé; and for this purpose the *Daphnis and Chloe* of Longus is frequently referred to as a model. As time goes on the style of romantic fiction becomes in France increasingly literary, and by the Scudérys Greek history is ransacked to find parallels for the aristocratic heroes of the Fronde. The French Heroic Romance is in fashion at the same time as the English Heroic Play, and furnishes suggestions for the composition of *Parthenissa* and *Oroonoko* to the Earl of Orrery and Mrs. Aphra Behn. Then, as the flood of romanticism bursts the barriers of the Court, and overflows middle-class society, the figures of knights and shepherds are replaced in the English romances of the eighteenth century by gentlemen of impeccable perfection, like Sir Charles

[1] *Waverley*, chap. iii.

Grandison, or cottagers of stainless virtue, like Pamela Andrews. These are the direct and lineal descendants of the Amadises and Orianas of Chivalrous Romance; but, at the same time, the influence of the Renaissance is seen in the popularity of the 'picaresque' novel, the remote offspring of the mediaeval 'fabliau'. *Gil Blas*, *Tom Jones*, and *Roderick Random*, in their imitation of actual manners and character, form the natural counterpoise to the romanticism of Richardson. The diversified imagination of society, in fact, demands both forms of fiction, and especially craves to be transported beyond the limits of its own experience; at length, after many vain attempts by different authors to create an imaginative illusion, Scott discovers how to enlarge the bounds of 'probability' in fiction, by uniting the principle of the 'roman' with that of the 'fabliau'.

3. Extended into a yet larger sphere of art, and exhibited in a more complex form, the same conflict of imaginative principles appears in the opposition of the two schools of criticism known as 'Classic' and 'Romantic'. Madame de Stael was, I think, the first to popularize the use of these terms in her book *De l'Allemagne*, descriptive of life and character in Germany. 'The word "classic",' she says, 'is sometimes used as synonymous with perfection. I use it here in a different sense, and regard classic poetry as that of the ancients, and romantic poetry as that which in some way is connected with the traditions of chivalry. This division relates equally to two eras of the world; that which preceded the establishment of Christianity, and that which followed it.'[1] Madame de Staël's account of the two schools consists substantially of a contrast between the French school of poetry, as representing the classic principle, and the German, as the type of the romantic. Her method of judgement is sound, for, as she says, France, 'the most cultivated of the Latin nations, inclines to the classic form, imitated from the Greeks and Romans,'[2] while Germany has preserved in her institutions more of the mediaeval spirit than any other nation in Europe. Madame de Stael regards the opposite features of the classic and romantic styles as springing mainly from contrasted qualities in the French and German races; but I think the whole question may be treated at once more universally and more precisely, if the classic form be considered as mainly the product of the modern Revival of Letters, and the romantic of mediaeval Feudalism. For both those two great social movements operated, not only in France and Germany, but in

[1] *De l'Allemagne* (Madame de Staël), chap. xi.

[2] Ibid., chap. xi.

every country of Europe which came into any kind of relation with the Empire of Charlemagne, or which was affected by its institutions and their decline.

Romanticism is in effect a self-conscious temper in the European imagination, produced by that ancient conflict between the principles of Paganism and Christianity which has resulted in the decay of the mediaeval and the establishment of the modern civil order. From the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth centuries, in the two countries where the conflict prevailed with the greatest acuteness, France and Germany, a kind of inward and spiritual warfare distracted men's minds, from the perception in France that Absolutism was crushing all freedom of individual thought, and in Germany that the multiplicity of free individual thought was destroying all capacity for national action. The French genius expressed its agony in works like Rousseau's *Confessions* and *Nouvelle Héloïse* ; the German, sometimes in plays like *The Robbers* of Schiller or the *Goetz von Berlichingen* of Goethe, sometimes in novels like *The Sorrows of Young Werther*. Goethe, in his *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, expresses vividly the distracted feeling produced in the imaginative German mind by the sense of its incapacity to create objectively, so long as society, torn asunder by the strife between these two extreme principles, wanted an outlet of political action. 'I learned,' he says, 'to value more and more the importance of subject-matter and conciseness of treatment; without, however, being able to make it clear to myself whether the former was to be looked for or the latter attained. For what with the great narrowness of my situation, what with the indifference of my companions, the reserve of the professors, the exclusiveness of cultivated society, and the perfect insignificance of all natural objects, I was compelled to seek for everything within myself.'[1] Under such a *régime*, while many Germans tried to escape from the dilemma by surrendering their liberties to the Absolutist order, as established by the French both in politics and art, many others rushed into the opposite extreme, and, in pursuit of individual liberty, revolted from the restraint of every kind of rule. Protesting against the existing civil order of things, and reviving in their imaginations the idea of a past Golden Feudal Age, they found themselves in a situation somewhat resembling that of Don Quixote, and, as the motives of Love, Liberty, and Adventure, which they advocated, were the leading features in the latest development of mediaeval 'romans', they naturally assumed the name of 'Romantics' in opposition

[1] Goethe, *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, Book VII.

to antagonists representing the 'pig-tail' school (as they called it) which upheld the principles of French classicalism.

It is far from my intention to enter into the merits of the quarrel between these rival schools. The purpose of my lecture has rather been to show that, from first to last, there has been a continuous stream of thought flowing through the imaginative literature of Christian Europe. The progress of ancient romance was from the chronicling of supposed reality to the invention of extravagant fiction; the tendency of modern fiction is to invest the romantic conceptions of the individual mind with an air of reality. I desire to support Mr. Ker's appeal to the student that all literary antagonisms may be examined historically. Beside the linguistic studies recommended by Mr. Ker, it appears to me that nothing is to-day more desirable than a scientific investigation (as far as that is possible) of the spirit animating the great authors of poetry and fiction who have left a permanent inheritance to their countrymen and to the human race. If the early Humanists and their followers were too narrow and exclusive in the spirit of their criticism, we have to guard against an equally dangerous tendency in our own times of considering bygone ages from a merely archaeological point of view. The noblest kind of Humanism, in my opinion, is that which is animated by the spirit of Erasmus and Sir Thomas More, who regarded what they considered best in the past 'as contributing to the meaning and value of the day'.[1] We cannot sever our life from the life of our ancestors, and the more clearly we understand the temper in which they viewed the intellectual and social difficulties that are the lot of humanity, the more practical will be the remedies we ourselves may be able to offer for the spiritual diseases from which we suffer.

[1] Mr. Ker in his Inaugural Lecture

THE CELTIC INSCRIPTIONS OF GAUL
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS

By SIR JOHN RHYS

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read November 22, 1911.

THIS paper is miscellaneous: it begins with a recently discovered group of inscriptions, which have not yet been edited with special regard to their philological characteristics, and it ends by returning to the Coligny Calendar. Our Celtic inscriptions are so scarce and therefore so enigmatic in their formulæ, that there is little hope of extracting their meaning except by attacking them repeatedly, and the greater the number of scholars who do so the greater the hope of tenable results. I flatter myself that I have made some progress, but I claim the right of further revision, whether as the result of the spade exposing new finds to the light of day or of philologists making fruitful suggestions leading to better ways of treating the material already in hand. It is needless to say that this process of revising and re-revising, one scholar improving on another's conclusions, is not agreeable to a certain class of minds; but I do not believe that an Academy so young as ours counts many Fellows who have a blank wall of finality before their eyes. When we cease revising the results obtained by ourselves and others, we may take it that we have ceased learning.

I

I have before me an offprint of a paper in the *Revue du Midi* containing an account of an important discovery in June, 1909, of five Celtic inscriptions near Cavaillon, the ancient Cabellio, in the Department of Vaucluse. It is from the pen of M. Mazauric, the able and courteous keeper of the Archæological Museums of Nîmes, and to his notes he has appended a useful plate bearing date October 14, 1909. He describes the circumstances of the finding of the stones, showing that there were a score or more together, but only five

with inscriptions on them, though four others appear to have once been inscribed with letters rendered illegible by the wear and tear of their surfaces: those I have not seen He has come to the conclusion that they had all been used to mend a road after one of the frequent floods of the local stream called the Coulon. He thinks that as monuments they stood alongside an ancient Roman road near where it issued from the old Cabellio, and that they were not carried to the spot where they have been found (about four kilometres from that town) till the fourth or fifth century of our era, a conclusion which he appears to have drawn from his finding on two of the stones 'le monogramme du Christ gravé à la façon des *graffiti*'—the reference is to the second stone and the third in the following list.

I should have said, that the five stones are now in the space enclosed in front of the old hospital, a building which has been bought, with great public spirit, by M. Michel Jouve and his brother and sister, in order to fit it up as a public museum. There, with their assistance, I examined the stones. Since then they have been good enough to superintend the photographing of the inscriptions. See photographs 1–5, which they have generously presented to me for the following notes:—

1. M. Mazauric gives the height of this stone as about 2 metres including the piece protruding at the bottom (0m 21) as tenon for insertion into the pedestal: the side measure at the bottom he gives as 0m 46 and that at the top 0m 40. He restores it in his sketch and speaks of it thus:—'Nous avons dit que cette superbe tombe était complète. L'ensemble de la plinthe, de la stèle et de la pyramide mesure environ 2m 54 de haut.' The reading is:—

ϵΛΟΥΙCCΑ
ΜΑΓΟΥΡϵΙ
ΓΙΑΟΥΑ

The last vowel but one of the second line is rounded, ϵ not Ε; but the one at the beginning is so damaged that nothing is left except the three extremities. Even harder to read is the first letter of the third line: it is impossible to be certain whether it was Γ or Τ. On the whole it seems to me somewhat more likely to have been the former than the latter. Lastly, the second line is so close to the first that the top of the Γ covers a portion of the lower part of the Ο above it.

Holder in his *Altceltischer Sprachschatz* cites the name *Elvissa*, together with *Elvisius*, from Mariasaal in Carinthia: see the Berlin *Corpus Inscr. Latinarum*, III. 4909; also *Elvisso*, genitive *Elvissonis*, ibid., III. 5523. ΜΑΓΟΥΡϵΙ (with ΜΑ ligatured) appears to be the genitive of *Magureos*, a name which would seem to mean 'related

to, or having to do with, *Maguros'*, possibly 'son of *Maguros'*. *Magureos* may perhaps be treated as a variant of *Magurios*, cited by Holder as *Magurius* (fem. *Maguria*), from Rosendorf in Carinthia *C. I. L.*, III. 4962, Linz III. 6010. 128, Padua V. 2787, Trent V. 5034, Rome VI. 5750. The occurrence of these names as far east as Carinthia suggests questions which I am not prepared to discuss, but the fact should be noted.

What is to be made of *Giava* or *Giaụa* is very uncertain, and before facing that difficulty let us see how the epitaph is to be construed. Two ways occur to me; (1) one of them is that which I suggested in my former paper on *The Celtic Inscr. of France and Italy* (p. 21) in the case of the column from L'Isle-sur-Sorgue, now in the Musée Calvet at Avignon. This I should now read—

ΑΔΓЄΝΝΟΡΙΓΙ
ΟΥЄΡЄΤЄ[Ι] ΜΑΡЄ[ΟΟ]ΥΙ

'To *or* for Adgennorix Mareus [son] of Vereteos,' after the model of Roman inscriptions like *Devilliae Catulini fil. Titiolae*, 'Of Devillia Titiola, daughter of Catulinus.' So in the present instance one might translate—'Elvissa Giava, daughter of Magureos.' (2) The other rendering would be as follows:—'Elvissa, the *Giava* of Magureos.' The only objection to this syntax is that the usual position of the genitive is not before but after the noun governing it; but in the early stages of Celtic when the case endings were intact, such a construction had probably not become the rule. Indeed, Celtic poetry still offers plenty of exceptions: for one Irish instance see *Dé Mog*, 'God's Slave,' on page 265 below. Setting this aside, we have 'Magureos's Giava', suggesting some such translation as Magureos's wife, sister, daughter-in-law, cousin, or niece. The word for *daughter* is excluded by the fact that the word for son or daughter seems never to have been inserted in such inscriptions. If we treat *Giava* as a word expressing family relationship the only hope of identifying that relationship must rest on the probable etymology of the word. The following occurs to me:—There is a common Welsh word *gïau*, older spelling *gieu*, 'sinews, muscles,' singular *gewyn* (for *gịéw-yn*), Cornish *geiow*, 'sinews,' singular *geien*: I have not detected any form of the word in Irish. If we look at 'sinew' as meaning a kind of cord or string, we may compare Latin *nurus* (for **snusus*) and German *Schnur* in the sense of 'string, or tie', and *Schnur* 'a daughter-in-law': for the chief cognates see Walde's *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, s. v. *nurus*. *Giava* may have meant any one of the relationships which I have suggested; but it is natural to regard it as synonymous with such Indo-European words as *Schnur*, *nurus*, and Greek *νυός*. The render-

ing of the epitaph in that case would be 'Elvissa, daughter-in-law of Magureos'.

In Stokes's *Urkeltischer Sprachschatz*, translated into German and edited (as the 2nd part of Fick's *Vergleichendes Worterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen*) by Bezzenberger, p. 117, a stem *gjá* is given, meaning 'a sinew, tendon, chord, string': it is illustrated by a Welsh *gi*, '*nervus*,' plural *giau*, and further by the Sanskrit *jyá*, fem. 'a bowstring', Greek *βιός*, 'a bow,' Lithuanian *gijà*, 'a thread or string.' I have never met with Welsh *gi* except in Dr. Pughe's dictionary, nor do I believe that *gieu* was originally a plural, but the use of the isolating derivative *giewyn* tended to give it the force of a plural as in other cases of the kind. Further, the accentuation of the cognate forms convinces me that the starting-point was not *gjá* but rather *guja* or *guiá*. That is to say our *giava* was *giáua*, but for an earlier *guiáua*. This was lightened of the *u* just as *giéwyn* in modern Welsh has dropped the *i* in becoming *géwyn*, which is the actual form. Otherwise *gjá* over against *βιός* would remain without a parallel: see Pedersen's *Vergleichende Grammatik*, I. 108. In other words both *βι-ός* and *gi-áva* come from *gui-* meaning sinew, tendon, string, or bond of connexion, so that the derivative *giavā* would mean a woman who stood in the position of being a bond of relationship between two families, such as a daughter-in-law.

We may possibly have the word for consort, yoke-fellow, wife, formed with the aid of the preposition *du* (in English '*to*') imbedded in the names *Dugius* and *Dugiu*, *Dugiavus* and *Dugiava*, much as if we met with *Conjugalis* as a cognomen in Latin. They occur chiefly in Latin inscriptions in the neighbourhood of Brescia and Lake Garda in North Italy: see Holder, s.vv. *Dugius*,[1] *Dugiava*. A good parallel is supplied by a Celtic compound *Comiogia*, which occurs in an inscription beginning with *Enica Comiogia Nevi f(ilia)* found in the neighbourhood of Saluzzo in Piedmont (*C.I.L.*, V. 7641). *Comiogia* might also be rendered by *Conjugalis*, as *Com-iog-*[2] exactly

[1] He gives sometimes a spelling with *c* instead of *g*. This is due partly perhaps to the confusing of names of different origins by his authorities and partly to misreading on their part, which is hard to avoid in the case of G and C in ancient inscriptions in the Latin alphabet. Of the feminine the *Revue Celtique*, III. 166, has the spelling *Dugiavva*, from Brescia, on the authority of Muratori, MCCLXXIII. 6.

[2] The ancient combination *og* was liable in Brythonic to be modified into *ou* or *ow*, which in North Wales became successively *ew*, *eu*, *au*: thus *iau* (pronounced *iau*) is the book Welsh for 'yoke, *jugum*'. But in most of South Wales *ou* or *ow* was only changed into *ou*, which to my hearing is sounded *oi* or something very near *oi*. Thus what is called in Mid-Wales and North Wales *iau* is in the South *iou*: it was

covers the *con-iug-* of *con-iug-s* = *conjux*, genitive *con-jug-is*. Putting aside the prefix *com* = Latin *con*, the rest of the word is formed like Greek ζυγία which is applied to Hera, Juno Jugalis, as patroness of marriage, σύ-ζυγιος, συ-ζυγία, 'joined, united, joining.'

2. This is a fragment of a column measuring 0m 38 each side, with the present height of 0m 60. It reads :—

ΒΑΛΑΥΔΟ
ΥΙΜΑΚΚΑΡΙΟ
ΥΙ

The lower part of the last ΥΙ has disappeared with the lost piece of the stone. But none of the letters are subject to doubt. The inscription makes the two names Βαλαυδουι Μακκαριουι, and they would seem at first sight to be both of them datives of the *u* declension with ουι as in Γρασελουι and Ειυουι. But after reading Dr. O. A. Danielsson, *Zu den Venetischen und Lepontischen Inschriften* (Leipzig, O. Harrassowitz), I am forced to regard the datives in -ουι as belonging to the *o* declension. The analogy of the other Cavaillon epitaphs would have led one, it is true, to expect a nominative here, but a dative -ουι sounds more natural than a nominative *Balaudui*, and probably represents an older stage of the more usual dative in *ū* of the *o* declension. So I transcribe the epitaph into Latin spelling as *Balaudui Maccarivi*, meaning 'To Balaudos (son) of Maccarivos'. With *Balaudui* compare *Latumarui*, p. 270 below.

By *Maccarivi* one is reminded in the first place of *Macarus* and *Macarius* which Holder describes as partly Greek and partly Celtic; but if we may trust the spelling we seem to have a vocable more

written so also in Old Cornish : see the *Phil. Soc. Transactions*, 1860-1, p. 241. When, however, *ou* was immediately followed by *i* (or *y*) it was not changed into *eu* on account of the difficulty which we find in pronouncing *u* and *i* together. So though we have *cyfieu-ad*, 'a yoking or joining together ; conjunction ; conjugation,' we have an archaic adjective with *-in*, which takes the form of *cyfiew-in*, 'equal, like, similar ; even' (Silvan Evans's *Geiriadur*, s.v.), as it were under the same yoke as a means of colligating or joining together. This is often disregarded in book Welsh, as for instance in *llysieu-yn*, 'a herb,' from *llysieu*, *llysiew-*, 'herbs' ; but the genuine form, still in use in colloquial Welsh, is *llysiew-yn*, or *llysew-yn* : compare *giew-yn* already mentioned Among other instances in point may be mentioned Welsh *meu-dwy*, '*servus Dei*,' with *meu* corresponding to Irish *mug*, *mog*, genitive *moga*, 'a slave,' whence Irish *Dé mog* (Stokes's *Oengus*, pp. 4, 10) for *Mug Dé*, 'servus Dei' ; and *Lleu* to Irish *Lug*, genitive *Logo*. The commoner form of *Lleu*, however, is *Llew*, while the old compound *Lugu-ber* makes Welsh *Lleufer*, 'a luminary, a light,' literally, 'a light-bringer' see Holder, s.v. *Locuber*. Take also *Ogmios*, probably pronounced in Gaulish *Ogmijo-s*, and making in Welsh *Euvid*, the name of one of the Sons of Dôn : see the *Cymmrodor*, XXI. 4-7, 62.

closely akin in the widely spread name of the potter *Maccarus*, in *Maccius*, *Macco*, *Macconus*, *Maccus*. Perhaps we may compare the Welsh *mach*, 'a surety, a bail, a bond or pledge.' In that case the second name may be treated as a compound *Macca-rivos*, genitive *Macca-rivi*, and interpreted as the 'surety or pledge of Rivos' or perhaps as 'one pledged or dedicated to Rivos, the bondsman of Rivos', the divinity meant being the god who figures in the month of August in the Coligny Calendar. The spelling with *kk*, *cc*, leads me to think that the names of this group are not derived from the Greek word μάκαρ, 'beatus.'

This is one of the stones on which M. Mazauric found the monogram: his note reads thus:—'La face latérale gauche offre des traces de graffiti gravés après coup. L'un d'eux reproduit incontestablement le monogramme du Christ que l'on retrouve si fréquemment sur les sarcophages des ivᵉ et vᵉ siècles. Faut-il voir là une sorte de christianisation de la pierre?'

3. This stone is 1ᵐ 30 in height and each of the sides 0ᵐ 38 at the bottom and 0ᵐ 32 at the top, near which the inscription is placed, as follows:—

KABIPOCOYI
NΔIAKOC

That is Καβιρος Ουινδιακος; the I at the end of the first line is a little bit faint and the P is damaged; so is the Λ in the second line. The I before the Λ joins it. The syntax of this epitaph is clear enough. *Vindiaco-s* is an adjective qualifying *Cabiros* and meaning 'related to *Vindios*, connected with *Vindios*', but in what way exactly we have no means of deciding. It might possibly mean in the sense of being son of *Vindios* or in some way associated with *Vindios*. Compare *Anvalonnacos*, derived from the god's name *Anvalos*: see my *Celtic Inscriptions*, v, also other instances in xiii, xv, xvii. *Vindios* is derived from the adjective *vindo-s*, *vindā*, 'white,' Irish *find*, Welsh *gwyn*, fem. *gwen*, 'white.'

The name Καβιρος is found elsewhere, to wit, on a stone discovered at Cologne, which reads *Gato Cabiri f(ilio) civi Viromanduo* (*C. I. L.*, XIII. 8342: see also 8341). The *Veromandui* gave their name to Vermandois, the district, roughly speaking, around the town of St. Quentin. Holder cites also a CABIRIACVS derived from *Cabiros* and yielding the modern place-name *Chabrac*, near Tulle, in the Dep. of Corrèze, and a Merovingian coin of the seventh century reading CABIRIACO VIC from Belfort. He also cites *Cabrus* from York, from Castel near Mainz, and from other places: it is probably a shortened form of Καβιρος, *Cabirus*, from which he derives a name *Cabrianecum*

which derives immediately from *Cabrian-*: this reminds me of *Chabran*, the name of a street at Cavaillon. Thus we have traces of the existence in the past of the name Καβιρος, *Cabirus*, in places so far apart in France as Cavaillon and St. Quentin, Tulle and Belfort.

The meaning and derivation of the name offer considerable difficulties, which, as far as I can recall, have never been discussed. Celtic philology throws no certain light upon Καβιρος, and one cannot help thinking that it is the singular of the Greek Κάβειροι or Κάβιροι. The home of the cult of the Κάβιροι was Samothrace and Lemnos. The question then is how the name spread in Gaul; in this connexion it should be noted, that from an early date in the cult of the Cabiri in Samothrace and Lemnos they were popularly associated with the Dioscuri. In time that association led to their being identified with one another. On these points we need only consult Daremberg and Saglio's *Dict. des antiquités grecques et romaines* under the words 'Cabires' and 'Dioscures'. In the identifying or confounding of the Cabiri with the Dioscuri, the characteristics of the latter were probably the more conspicuous in the cult as practised in Gaul. This I take to be indicated by one of the Notre-Dame altars, now to be seen at the Musée de l'Hôtel de Cluny in Paris. I refer to that which has on its four sides representations of the horned god Cernunnos, Pollux, Castor, and Smertullo. Compare *Dioscorus* as a man's name at Nîmes, for which see *C. I. L.*, XII. 3508, also 4550. The cult of the Cabiri and Dioscuri probably reached Gaul through the same Roman channels as the cult of Cybele, Mithras, and other eastern divinities. Statues of the Dioscuri are by no means rare in France, and one of the last discovered was on Mont-Auxois: it has been described in the periodical *Pro Alesia* (Armand Colin, Paris), 1906, p. 40, plate ix.

Lastly, there are near the foot of this stone certain symbols on the meaning of which M. Mazauric declines to pronounce an opinion. All that I remember about them is that I detected there a roughly sketched fish's head. He adds—'Je dirai simplement que ces signes sont certainement contemporains de l'inscription qui est au-dessus.'

4. This stone is 1^{m} 22 high: the sides are uniform, measuring each 0^{m} 42. The inscription consists of four lines at the top, which has been damaged, the upper portion of most of the letters in the first line having been carried away, together with the beginning of all the lines. The following are the details of the reading:—

The first letter is a straggling M the first limb of which I could not find, but the photograph (No. 4) shows exactly where it was. Its last limb is joined by an I or rather the end of it is cut through vertically by that letter. We then read TIEC, and if you scrutinize the photo-

graph you will see by the side of the imperfect C a faint, well-formed I, which I did not succeed in detecting when looking at the stone; for the next thing I read was a shallow stop. Then comes what I misread as an incomplete A which the photograph shows to be another straggling M with its last limb produced upwards to make an I. We then have the greater part of a T with room for nothing more, the reading of the whole line being MITIECI MIT. Most of the second line is occupied by the letters MAΓOY, which are quite clear in spite of bits of the surface having disappeared in the MA and between the Y and the A in the line below. The length of the top of the Γ will be noticed, the non-circular shape of the O in contrast to the O in the last line, and the sprawling appearance of the Y which is repeated in this same line. Now before the M I found a stop, and before that stop the photograph shows the top of a C together with a trace of its lower end. Behind the C there can have been no big letter, nothing larger than an I, and the photograph shows enough of the groove of that letter to indicate exactly where it was in the damaged part at the edge The whole line thus reads IC · MAΓOY. The third line begins with a T cut further from the edge than the initials of the other lines. It is followed by an I, to which a breakage gives something of the appearance of a triangle upside down. Then comes what I took to be another stop followed by an O of a more unusual form than the one in the second line; but it seems partly due to a bit of the surface being damaged low down towards the reader's left hand. As it is, it looks as if the inscriber had begun cutting the upper part of a big A. After the O come NNA, of which the second N is badly formed, and the A has an accidental scratch reaching from its shoulder to the top of the Y above it. The fourth and last line begins with an imperfect K, the back of which is gone, leaving the arms sticking out: the lower arm ends in a fine line formed by the slipping of the workman's tool. The letter is needlessly large and the next one is a fairly well shaped O placed too far away from the K as if escaping from the latter's outstretched arms to shelter itself near the YI which finish the epitaph. A breakage which affects the top of the Y spreads back to the circumference of the O. Putting all this together the epitaph reads as follows:—

MITIECI · MIT
IC · MAΓOY
TI · ONNA
KOYI

You will have noticed that we have here two kinds of T: the first is the capital with its perpendicular groove worn shallow towards the

bottom. The other tends to a minuscule form with the top stroke greatly produced backwards. The stops I should not have detected in the photograph; on the other hand until M. Jouve sent me the photograph I had not discovered the final I of Μιτιεσι or read correctly the following MI; these failures prevented the possibility of my construing the epitaph. As it now stands the reading may be regarded as certain, although at the first glance it looked desperate.

With the words separated it reads Μιτιεσι · Μιτις · Μαγουτι · Οννακουι, which I propose to render thus · Mitiesis (and) Mitis (children) of Magutios and Onna. This suggests several questions, such as whether the two first names refer to two persons or one. Now *Mitiesi*, presumably for a fuller form *Mitiesis*, is clearly a derivative from the shorter *Mitis*. This makes it somewhat more natural to treat them as two names, those, let us say, of a sister and a brother (or sister), rather than to regard *Mitis* as an epithet or surname: it looks more like a proper name than an ordinary adjective. To what origin it must be assigned, it is hard to say. Holder cites *Mitiacum* (? *Miciacum*) and *Mitiganna* (? *Meliganna*), besides a larger variety beginning with *met-*, including *Metela*, *Metilius*, *Metillius* which is, perhaps, to be explained as *Meddill-ius*. The Neo-Celtic words which suggest themselves are such as Irish *air-med*, 'measure,' from an early *metiō-r* of the same meaning and origin as Latin *metior*, 'I measure,' and Welsh *medi*, 'the act of reaping,' from an early *metō* of the same origin as Latin *meto*, 'I reap or mow': see Stokes-Bezz., pp. 203, 206. There are some personal names which may perhaps limit the etymological possibilities a little, such as Medieval Welsh *Mydan* where the *d* may = *t* subjected to the usual lenition and so in *Myd-naw*, *Myd-no* ('Iolo MSS.', pp. 102, 109, 139) made in Modern Welsh into *Bydno*, the name of a small tributary of the Wye, near Pant Mawr above Llangurig, in Montgomeryshire. It is possible that *Mydno* equates with the Irish name *Mid-gnu*, *Mid-nu* (Book of Leinster, f. 369[c], 372[a]). Stokes gives in his *Oengus* a 'mac Midna mic Meite' (p. 100). The difficulty as to the Irish names with *mid-* is that some of them doubtless involve the word for the ancient drink *mid*, 'mead.' Perhaps this does not apply to the name *Mithigen* (Book of Leinster, f. 317[c1], 340[a]), which Prof. Kuno Meyer's 'Rawlinson B. 502' gives as *Mithigén* and *Mithigeán* (129[b], 151[b]), but the name is obscure. The termination in *Mitiesis* reminds one of the form of such river names as *Atesis* and *Tamesis* (also *Tamesa*), but we cannot be sure that the pronunciation was not *Mitiessis*, which might be associated with names collected by Holder to illustrate the affix

-ess- as in *Antessius*, *Revessio*, and especially *Lucressis*, by the side of which he has *Lucressa*.

We now come to *Maguti*: the nominative to which it is to be referred was probably *Magutios*, with the same *magu* as in *Magurei*, already mentioned: Holder gives such instances (s. v. *-ūt-io-*) as *Ammutius*, *Cillutius*, and *Taranutius*, and he has parallel formations under *-itio-*, *-atio-*. Similar derivatives occur also in Irish, as for instance in the Ogmic genitive *Lugutti*, written also *Lugudi*, a name found in Adamnan's *Life of St. Columba* (Reeves, 74, 236) as *Lugudius*: the base is the *Lugu-* of the god Lugus's name, in Irish *Lug*, genitive *Logo* (later *Loga*). Another is *Curcitti*, derived from an ancient form of the name *Corc*, genitive *Cuirc*. In later Irish the derivative was spelt *Corcthe*: see the Book of Leinster, fol. 325[f].

The English rendering which I have just given has shown you that I treat -κουι, *-qui*, as a Celtic equivalent of Latin *-que*, 'and,' also that I regard Onna here as a genitive. More precisely I should write it *Onnā*, for an older *Onnās*, to be compared with such old Latin genitives as *viās*, *fortunās*, *familiās*, and Greek χώρᾱς, θεᾶς. This genitive survives in Irish in the form *mná* (= *mnā*) '*mulieris*', and *inna*, *na*, 'of the' (fem.). This *ā*(*s*) appears to have been the early termination: see Brugmann[ii], II. ii. i. 152, 284, 361, who goes so far as to suggest that the usual *e* of Irish genitives feminine like *tuaithe*, 'of a tribe,' has only been adopted from another declension (ibid. 154). The conjunction -κουι or *-qui* seems to me to have belonged elsewhere to the language of the inscriber of the rejected version of the Todi bilingual. He was the better cutter of letters on stone, but his Latin was faulty, and, among other blunders, he perpetrated *statuitqui* for *statuitque*. I am inclined to explain his doing so on the supposition that the conjunction was *-qui*, not *-que*, in his own language: see my *Celtic Inscriptions*, p. 71. In an inscription in a Gaulish dialect on a vessel found at Ornavasso, on the Toce, near Lago Maggiore in North Italy, our *-qui* = Latin *-que* is represented by *-pe*. The vessel reads *Latumarui* : *Sapsutaipe* : *uinom* : *naśom*, meaning 'For Latumaros and Sapsuta[1] . . . wine'. See Danielsson, loc. cit., pp. 17–19. His reasoning convinces me that the inscriptions known as Lepontic are Celtic, and I hope to find an opportunity to see them.

I have said nothing as to the etymology and meaning of Onna for the sufficient reason that they elude me. Possibly, however, we have this vocable in the Ονε- of Ονερεστ- on a stone from St. Saturnin-

[1] The dative *Sapsutai* recalls Εσκεγγαι, Αιουνιαι, and Βλανδοουικουνιαι (*Celtic Inscr.*, pp. 20, 76).

d'Apt. The other element here may be derived from the name which gives the genitive RESTI on an Arles stone to be seen in the Musée Calvet at Avignon: see my *Celtic Inscriptions*, No. viii; also No. xvi[a], where M. Romyeu's MS. is mentioned as recording an inscription reading ON ΘΟΥΟΠΟ ΔΙΟΥΙ · ΒΡΑΤΟΥ (not BRATOY). The stone came from the ruins of Glanum and should be at St. Remy, but it cannot be found. The Cavaillon inscription to be mentioned next, with O and C ornamented with a central point, suggests the legend ONOOYOΠO ΔΙΟΥΙ · ΒΡΑΤΟΥ[ΔЄ ΚΑΝΤЄΝ], 'Onovopos (gave) firstfruits to the goddess according to her command.' Here the Π may mean *p* or else ΓΙ or ΤΙ.[1] That, however, must remain uncertain at present.

5. This stone measures 1[m] 44 high, and the sides are uniform, measuring each 0[m] 44. The reading is as follows:—

MICCO
YKΘC
ЄΙΛΟΥ
ΚΝΘЄ

That is Μισσουκος Σιλουκνος, which should mean Missucos, son of Silus. Holder quotes *Sīlus*, fem. *Sīla*, from Latin authors and inscriptions. The first syllable of *Missucos* is probably to be equated with that of *Missillus*, cited by Holder, together with other spellings *Medsillus*, *Međđillus*,[2] and a feminine *Messilla*. Here *Missucos* and

[1] With ΓΙ the name would be Ονο-ουογιο with a second element which could be identified with the *uogi* of the compound *Vogi-toutus* in an inscription near Greifenberg in Carinthia, reading according to the *Corpus*, III. 4724:—'Atestati Bricconis f(ilio) patri Devvae Atiougon. f(iliae) matri C. Antest(ius) C. f(ilius) Lutumarus M. Antest(ius) C. f(ilius) Vogitoutus Antestia C. f(ilia) Banona'; and another (No. 4908) reading 'Daphino G(ai) Juli Vogitouti l(iberto).' The former is remarkable among other things for containing as a woman's name *Devvae*, dative of Devva, that is *Dēvva* or *Dēva*, the feminine of *dēvos*, the Celtic word for god, which occurs in the Coligny Calendar (p. 92) as a dative DEVO. In other words Atiougo's daughter was called *Devva* or Goddess; but there was another Celtic word for goddess which we have in the vocative as *devia* in one of the Rom *defixiones*, and we have it here in M. Romyeu's copy as ΔΙΟΥΙ, that is *diui*, and the inscription falls readily into the Bratude group as Ονοουογιο Διουι . βρατου[δε καντεν]: see my *Celtic Inscriptions*, pp. 33, 84. *Vogi-tout-* and Ονο-ουογι- remind one somewhat of such Greek names as Ἐχέ-πολις, Ἐχέ-δημος, with εχε for ϝεχε, and Ἀστύ-οχος, Ἡνί-οχος with ὄχος for ϝοχος.

[2] The *đđ* appears to represent a lisping pronunciation common in Gaul of *ss* where apparently that was derived from *ns*, and there seems to have been an intermediate spelling with *ds*, for besides Holder's *Medsillus* and *Messila* we have such instances as *Ressatus* or *Redsatus*, *Ressi-marus* or *Redso-marus* cited by him from Carinthia (*C. I. L.*, III. 4727). As a variant of the spelling with *ds* we may regard *dx* in the nominative *midx*, 'month,' in the Coligny

Missillus or *Međđillus* are probably reduced forms of some such compounds as *Messi-gnatos* or *Međđi-gnatos*: Holder gives the derivative *Međđignatius* from Brambach's *Corpus Inscr. Rhenanarum*, 1336. Possibly the element *missu* may be of the same origin as Latin *mens-* in *mensus*,[1] *mensor*, *mensura*, *mensa*: see Walde's Dictionary.

*** We must not leave Cavaillon without mentioning the inscription discovered a few years ago by M. Michel Jouve on the right bank of the river Durance. I reached Cavaillon from Avignon in the afternoon; M. Jouve took me at once over various archaeological sites near the town, and we climbed to the hill of Saint-Jacques, which lies between the town and the Durance, and presents a highly precipitous side to the river. On the top are the remains of a very ancient

Calendar; it is of the same origin as Latin *mensis*, and is represented in the Neo-Celtic languages by Irish *mí*, genitive *mís*, Welsh *mis*, Cornish *mis*, Breton *miz*. Such forms as *Velocassės* and *Velocaþis* seem to imply a word *cansa* or *canso-* which in the Teutonic languages yielded the Gothic word *hansa*, 'a band or cohort,' German *hanse*, A.-Saxon *hôs*, 'a society or guild.' In the Neo-Celtic languages I trace it in the Cornish *casgoord* glossing *satellites*, 'attendants, escort, train, retinue,' in later Cornish *cosgor*, *cosgar*, 'a retinue.' *Casgoord* occurs in the Bodleian MS. 572, fol. 43b: see Zeuss, *Gram. Celtica*ii, p. 1062, and Stokes, *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1860–1, p. 243. The *oo* in *casgoord* probably means that the word was accented *casgórđ*: the Breton form is given in the Catholicon as *coscor*, 'famille, mesgnie,' Latin 'familia'. Dr. Davies in his dictionary gives the Welsh as *cosgordd* and *gosgordd*, a corrupt form, which is the only one used in Modern Welsh. But *cosgordd* is not actually the oldest spelling, for the MS. of the Nennian Genealogies has in pedigree xii *Eleuther. cas cord. maur*, that is, *E. cascord maur*, 'E. of the great retinue': see the *Cymmrodor*, IX. 175. *Casgoord*, *cascord* analyses itself into *cas-gorđ* from an early compound *cansa-cor̄o-* with the *cor̄o-* which we have in the Irish *cuire* or *coire*, 'a band or troop,' in Gothic *harjis*, 'a host, legion,' A.-Saxon *here*, German *heer*, 'an army.' So Welsh *cas-corđ* or *cos-gorđ* would mean the host or band of the village or community, just as *trefgorđ* = *treba-cor̄o-*, 'the people of the *tref* or homestead': see Owen's *Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales*, I. 258, where it is spelt *trefcort*. We have *corđ* not only in *corđlan*, 'the village pen or fold,' now *corlan*, mostly 'a sheep pen', but possibly also in the nickname Iđawc Corđ Prydein, which would in that case mean 'Iđawc of the retinue of Picts': see 'Rhonabwy's Dream' in the Oxford *Mabinogion*, p. 147.

[1] This *mens-* is represented in the Irish *mess*, 'judicium' (Zeussii, 787), Mod. Irish *meas*, 'estimation, award, appraisement' (O'Donovan); there is also a compound *coimhmheas* meaning 'a comparison, contest'. Both occur in a passage in Keating's *History of Ireland* (Dinneen, vol. II, p. 198), where one reads that, after Conall Cernach had slain Meisceadhra in single combat, his rivals Laogaire and Cúchulainn ceased to contest the champion's morsel with him. The words are:—*do lég Laoghaire is Cú Chulainn da gcoimhmheas ré Conall, ar n-a mheas nach dearna ceachtar díobh féin a chomhmor soin do ghníomh goile na gaisgid riamh*, 'Laoghaire and Cúchulainn ceased measuring themselves with Conall, as they reckoned that neither of them had ever performed so great a deed of bravery or valour.'

stronghold, still showing a piece of walling made up of big stones overlooking a deep hollow leading down to the backwaters of the Durance. The land on which the ancient fortress stood has been purchased by M. Jouve in order to prevent the destruction of the old wall there. From this high ground we could see over against us, in the distance across the river, the site of the ancient town of Glanum, while higher up the river he pointed out to me the promontory of Orgon, and the neighbourhood where the Vebrumaros inscription was found. With some trouble we descended into the hollow which I have mentioned, at the mouth of which M. Jouve thought early traders exposed their wares for sale to the inhabitants of the hill fort. Finally, we came to a halt on a sloping rock near a deep pool which had probably been at one time part of the channel of the Durance: the river now flows on the other side of its bed some distance away. On the sloping part of the rock M. Jouve called my attention to a number of footholds cut in it. I tried some of them and found them quite safe. Evidently it had been a landing-place when the volume of the river flowed on the Saint-Jacques side. A little below the places cut for the foot, where the rock became more nearly horizontal, was the spot where M. Jouve found the inscription. This was when a great overflow of the Durance had swept away all the soil which had accumulated over the footholds and the inscription.

The inscription has been read by M. Maruéjol and his friends as follows (*Celtic Inscriptions*, p. 23):—

ΟΥΕΛΡΟΥ
ΦΗΚΙΚΟϹ

I did not feel sure as to the first Υ: at any rate, there is room for it. My suggestion (after seeing the cast at the Musée Calvet) that one should read Δ instead of Λ is not corroborated in the present condition of the inscription. Lastly, at the end of the second line I failed to trace the letters ΟϹ, and to some extent I had to take the Φ on trust. For unfortunately we arrived on the spot rather too late in the day: the rays of the sun had already left the part of the rock for which we wanted a good light.[1]

The first difficulty we have to face is the uncertainty whether we are to read Δ or Λ in the first line. Now if we take the latter

[1] On a visit paid by M. Jouve and M. Maruéjol to the inscription soon after its discovery there was no lack of strong sunlight, as is amply proved by a photograph taken on the occasion. I have to thank the former gentleman for a copy (Photo. 6), which shows not the inscription but the area cleared of earth by the flood of the Durance; there was too strong a glare for the inscription to be reproduced, but it shows M. Maruéjol with his finger on the first letter.

there is little hope of discovering a name that would fit, whereas if we take the former we seem to arrive at a nominative Ουεδρου for an earlier Ουεδρους or *Uedru-s* of the same origin perhaps as Ptolemy's Ουεδρα or *Uedra*, a name which survives in English as *Wear*, borne by a river in the North of England; not to mention that Wearmouth is supposed to be the *Caer Weir* of the Book of Taliessin: see Skene's *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, II. 200, 201, and Rhys's *Celtic Britain*[iii], p. 119. In Welsh the *d* before *r* might become *i* as in *cadeir* from *cat[h]edra*, 'a chair' (*Celtic Folklore*, p. 282). On these lines the Welsh equivalent of *Uedrus* would be *Gweir* (in lenition *Weir*), modern *Gwair* (*Wair*), as in *Llwyn Gwair*, 'Gwair's Grove,' near Nevern in Cardiganshire, and in *Ynys Weir*, understood to be the Welsh name of Lundy Island in the Bristol Channel. Gwair was a mythic hero figuring in Welsh poetry: see my *Celtic Folklore*, p. 678, *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 248, the Oxford *Mabinogion*, p. 306. Holder under *-vedro-n* would connect with Ptolemy's *Vir-vedrum* in North Britain the O. Slavonic *vedrŭ*, 'clear, bright, cheerful.'

The other vocable Φηκικος begins with the sound of ϕ or *f*, which was always rare in early Celtic, as it is derived from the combination *sp'h* or *sp*. Both in Goidelic and Brythonic it seems to have been reduced into *f*, which Brythonic has retained (written *ff*), while Goidelic has further changed initial *f* into *s*, as for instance in the Latin loanwords *srian*, 'a bridle,' Welsh *ffrwyn*, the former probably from *frēnum* and the latter from the plural *frēna*. So with *súist*, 'a flail,' Welsh *ffust*, both from Latin *fustis*.[1] Now φηκικος appears to be an adjective in -κο-ς serving as an epithet to the name in the first line. It should mean 'resembling, having to do with, or related in some way to, what was indicated by the previous part of the word, φηκι-'. According to the phonological suggestions already made, φηκι- should be treated as standing for an earlier σφηκι-, which may, perhaps, be compared with such words as Latin *spīca*, *spīcus*, 'an ear of corn,' *spīculum*, 'a sharp point, a javelin, an arrow.' In that case φηκικος might mean 'in the habit of using a javelin'.

The uncertainty as to the etymology of φηκικος is to be regretted. The word is nevertheless of considerable importance as showing that in the Celtic spoken on the banks of the Durance the rare combination *sp'r* or *spr* had been reduced to φρ or *fr*. We have another instance in the North of Gaul, that is in a Celtic language which was doubtless Gaulish. I allude to Ptolemy's Φρουδιος, which has been

[1] For some more instances see the *Cymmrodor*, vol. XXI, pp. 54, 55, where Irish *sust* should be corrected into *súist*. The consonantal changes here in question are treated otherwise in Thurneysen's *Handbuch*, pp. 80, 137, 521.

mostly supposed to be the Somme; but C. Müller in his edition of Ptolemy (I. 219) argues for a smaller river called the Bresle, which reaches the sea not far from the little town of Eu in the Department of the Seine-Inférieure. He prints the name with a δ, but Holder, s. v. *Frudis*, cites Gluck as correcting it into Φρουτιος, which was probably the genuine form. It is given in the genitive case, so that in the nominative it would have been Φρουτις or *Frūtis*, practically the same word as old Welsh *frut*, 'a stream,' whence in the *Book of Llan Dâv*, Cam*frut*, 'crooked stream,' Guen*frut*, 'White Stream,' and similar compound names still common in Wales, the modern spelling being *ffrwd*, Cam*ffrwd*, Gwen*ffrwd*, &c.: so in Breton *frut*, *frot*, in modern spelling *froud*. The kindred Irish word is *sruth*, genitive *srotho*, *srotha*, a masculine of the *u* declension, while the Welsh *ffrwd* is a feminine, which probably belonged to the *i* declension like Φρουτις. Still it is, etymologically speaking, impossible to sever *sruth* and *ffrwd*.[1]

At first I regarded the rock inscription as not Celtic, but I hope that I have now made it probable that the previous guess was wrong. Speaking more precisely I should say that the language of it may be taken to have been the same as that of the five Cavaillon tombstones; and this, with its test particle -κουι, I regard as the same as that of the votive inscriptions of the district distinguished by the βρατουδε formula: see my *Celtic Inscriptions*, pp. 78-81. The language of the whole group, as thus expanded, is probably to be regarded as the kind of Celtic in which the Coligny Calendar was drawn up. For want of

[1] I mention this as it is usual to refer these words to a root *sreu*, whence Greek ῥέω, 'I flow,' ῥυτός, 'flowing,' Sanskrit *sruta*, 'flowing,' Lithuanian *srovė*, 'a river current,' Old Bulgarian *struja*, '*flumen*.' Similarly the kindred words in the Teutonic languages mostly begin with *str* as in English *stream*, German *strom*. It is seen that there was some freedom of choice in this instance as between *sr* and *str*; but neither will directly fit *ffrwd*. For to make *sreu*, *srut-*, the immediate antecedent to the Celtic words as is usually done, would require one to suppose the *s* to have become *f* in Welsh, a change which nobody, as far as I know, has ever detected in that language. What *ffrwd* postulates is an initial combination *sp'r* or *spr*: that is *frutis*, *ffrwd* and *sruth*, starting from *sp'rut-*, which was reduced to *frut-*. This last was retained in Brythonic, while in Goidelic it underwent the later change which made the *f* into *s*. We seem to have a parallel in the German *sprudel*, 'a bubbling well, a hot spring,' *sprudeln*, 'to bubble, to gush, to flow.' Whether we are dealing here with a single root *sreu*, liable to be euphonized into *streu* and *spreu*, or with several parallel roots, is of no special importance for our argument, which warrants our tracing the river name *Ffraw* in Anglesey, and Asser's *Frauu*, the Welsh name of the Dorset river *Froom*, to the same origin as the English word *stream*, German *strom*, Lettish *straume*. See Fick[iv], III. 502, and Stevenson's *Asser's Life of K. Alfred*, pp. 37, 248, 249.

a name I have sometimes called it Celtican, but I have no objection to its being called Ligurian, provided the term be used to mean the earliest Celtic speech in use in ancient Gaul.

⁂ Before leaving the Department of Vaucluse I wish to discuss No. xi in my *Celtic Inscriptions*. It comes from the neighbourhood of Apt, and is in the Calvet Museum. It has always been a great puzzle to me; but I pored over it in August, 1910, with the result that I have, I think, made some progress, involving my giving up some of my previous guesses. Thus my reading of the last word as VALE will not stand: the Editor of the *Corpus* was perfectly right in reading the broken letter as Δ and not Λ. In this inscription the sigma is written Ϲ, a form possibly derived from Σ rather than from the minuscule Greek C. Moreover, the first letter I was now able to make out in the first line was a rather small Ϲ, and after it I seemed to read OYI. Then comes what I ventured to consider a form of Latin R, but I think now that it was meant for a Greek K, and in this I am confirmed by its similarity to the kappa in ΒΑΑΝΔΟΟΥΙΚΟΥΝΙΑΙ on the Gargas palimpsest stone in the court outside. The whole name will then read ΚΑΙΡΝΙΤΟΥϹ, *Clirnitus*. In that case we have the K again in the second line, namely, following NA, so that a part at least of that line would read ΝΑΚΝΟϹ, but I am puzzled what to read before the NA: the symmetry of the inscription seems to require some lettering there. I thought once that I could faintly trace the leading features of ΛΑΝΑΚΝΟC or perhaps of ΜΑΝΑΚΝΟC with AN ligatured. What I have now made out would approximately read thus:—

. . . . ϹΟΥΙ · ΚΑΙΡΝΙΤΟΥϹ
[ΛΑ]ΝΑΚΝΟϹ•
•ΙΑΔΕ

Treated thus, the inscription ceases to be an exceptional mixture of Greek and Latin letters, as no distinctive Latin letters appear in this version. The nominative seems to have been an obscure Κλιρνιτους, with an epithet or let us say a patronymic in *-ακνος* parallel to *-ικνος* and *-ουκνος* as in Αυουωτικνος (pp. 297–9 below) and Ϲιλουκνος already given. If we were to read Ουνα into the second line we should have Ουνακνος, possibly meaning 'son of a mother Ουνα'; but though metronymic names might pass muster in ancient Ireland, I cannot tell whether this would apply to Gaul. In any case we need not consider that question here, as Celtic, like Latin and Greek, is found to have had proper names in *ā* which were not confined to women. See Stokes's *Celtic Declension*, pp. 17, 92, and compare Thurneysen's *Handbuch*, p. 176. Among the Irish instances suggested

Photo 1

PHOTO 3

Photo. 5

by Stokes occurs a genitive *Láne*, *Láine*. The nominative should accordingly be *Lán* (for an early *Lānā*), whence the name of an old tribe, Macu Láne, in the south of Ireland (Stokes's *Félire*, Dec. 6, and p. clxxx). By accident that name would seem to fit here, where Λανακνος would mean 'son of Lānā'. It will serve well enough to indicate how the second line should probably be treated, though I need hardly say that I am not convinced that I have hit on the right reading or that our late colleague was right in regarding Lán as a man and not a woman.

As regards ΙΑΔΕ I can say nothing, but only note the fact that its final syllable recalls *βρατουδε*. Possibly, therefore, it may have meant thankfully (*merito*), willingly (*libens*), or else dutifully (*pie*). There then remains -σουι, which looks like the ending of a name in the dative case, such as Ειυουι and Γρασελουι. The nominative corresponding should end in -σους, that is . . . σ-ους, better . . . σ-ος. As the inscription does not suggest βρατουδε or καντεν, I am inclined to regard it as an epitaph, a view which is perhaps favoured by the fact that the stone is part of a rude pillar. In that case I should construe it thus:—'To . . . . sos: Clirnitus . . . . lacnos dutifully (put it up).'

II

The Archæological Museum at Nîmes contains various inscriptions which I saw in 1909 and 1910, though I have not described them. Some of them reached the Museum subsequently to the writing, in 1905, and to the publishing, in 1906, of my paper on the *Celtic Inscriptions of France and Italy*; and some which were there even then, I must have overlooked. There are also errors in my account of some of those which I noticed in that paper. Such are my reasons, good and bad, for reverting here to inscriptions at Nîmes.

1. The first to be mentioned is on a rude block of reddish stone found in the ancient necropolis discovered in the Saint-Baudile quarter of Nîmes: it is described by M. Mazauric in his account of the acquisitions by the Museum in the years 1906 and 1907. See his *Musées archéologiques de Nîmes: Recherches et Acquisitions* (Chastanier, Nîmes, 1908), p. 16. The stone is 0^m 75 high by 0^m 27 wide: the lower part is rough and untrimmed, while the upper part was rounded except where on both sides a level area was provided for the writing. As you face it the side near your left hand may be called No. 1,

and that opposite your right hand No. 2. They read thus[1] respectively :—

1.	2.
ΑΔΓЄ	ΑΔΓЄΝ
ΝΟΥΙΔ	ΟΟΥΔ
ЄΔЄΒΡ	

The third line of No. 1, which is situated at the bottom of the levelled space, is very uncertain, especially the Є in both instances. On face No. 2 the levelled space does not extend so far down, so it has only two lines of writing. The inscriber here failed to make the letter Є to scale: he began it too small, so it stands almost above the line. Otherwise the letters of this line are by no means badly shaped. The reading of the second line is uncertain except that of the first Ο and that of a big Δ ending the line and beginning ΔЄΔЄ. I looked for an Ι before the Δ, but I could not trace it or find room for it.

No. 1 seems to divide itself thus: Αδγενουι δεδε βρ . . . . ., meaning possibly 'Adgenui gave according to order' to such and such a divinity the kind of offering termed καντεν or καντενα, 'first-fruits,' in other inscriptions of that part of Gaul. I shall have something to say presently concerning βρατουδε, otherwise this is the construction to be expected after the analogy of the other inscriptions of the kind collected on pp. 78, 79 of my previous paper; but these two inscriptions were never finished. Moreover Αδγενουι was a form of the dative like Ειυουι, Γρασελουι, and . . . σουι (pp. 265, 270, 277 above).

I look at all the writing on this stone as the outcome of a mason's practising his hand or merely amusing himself by ignorantly imitating inscriptions which he had seen. In No. 2 he equated with his Αδγενουι another form, Αδγενοου, which we know to have been a dative of the *u* declension. It could not be nominative: witness Ταρανοου in the Vebrumaros inscription (*Celtic Inscr.*, vii). It is highly improbable that he had ever seen either Αδγενουι or Αδγενοου as anything but a dative: at any rate the forms given by Holder are *Adgennus* and *Adgennius*, *Adgennia*, all from Nîmes, and Αδγεννο-ριξ from L'Isle-sur-Sorgue in the Department of Vaucluse (*Celt. Inscr.*, x); not to mention *Adgennonius* from the neighbourhood of Novara in N. Italy. Now *Adgennus* occurring in a Latin inscription may represent a Celtic

[1] The reading is very difficult, and M. Mazauric differs from me in detecting an Ν in No. 1 at the end of line 1 (ΑΔΓЄΝ), and in No. 2 another Ν beginning line 2 (ΝΟΟΥΔ). He may be right in both, and also in not suggesting a third line at all.

Adgenno-s or *Adgennu-s*, and it is right to say that considerable latitude in the matter of declension appears to have been allowed in the case of Celtic proper names. Witness the instances collected in the *Corpus*, XIII, part iii, p. 119, where we find cited such nominatives as *Bucco*, *Buccus*, *Buccio* and *Buccius*, *Cot*[*t*]*o*, *Cot*[*t*]*us*, *Cot*[*t*]*io*, and others.

The etymological spelling requires *nn*, and the name *Ad-gennu-s* or *Ad-genno-s* seems to have meant 'gainer, winner, one who makes acquisitions': compare *Con-genno-*, p. 289 below.

2. From Montmirat (Gard) comes a fragment of a Gallo-Roman altar, presented to the Museum in 1907. M. Mazuric, loc. cit., pp. 71–3, gives a careful description of the locality and the antiquities found there. The fragment in question bears the letters BPATOYT . . . . The last letter is incomplete owing to a breakage: I tried to read BPATOYΔ in the hope that it represented an original βρατουδε, but it is impossible, and the T seems certain. Besides, it is hard to see how that vocable could have begun the inscription. The probable explanation is that it is part of a proper name BPATOY-T . . . . where the second element began with the consonant *t*, say of *-toutios*; but it is right to state that the only compound of *Bratu* which Holder has found is the place-name *Bratuspantium*.

3. In the same year, 1907, M. Mazauric, while on a walk to the part of Nîmes called Saint-Césaire, detected an inscribed stone in a ditch near the Café de Font Jaïsse. It is now in the Museum, where it attracted my attention. It is a very rough stone, and, according to him (*Recherches et Acquisitions*, p. 73), it measures 0^m 72 as its greatest length by 0^m 32 high by 0^m 45 thick. The face bearing the inscription had not been very carefully levelled, and the letters are tall and irregular, reading as below:—

PITOY

M. Maruéjol, who has carefully studied it, thinks that *Ritu* is the dative of *Ritum*, the Celtic *riton* meaning a ford, and that it was the name of a local divinity, in fact that of the spring called Jaïsse, and he adduces among others that of *Ritona* from Montaren near Uzès in the Department of Gard. I must confess to some difficulty in applying a word meaning a ford to a well or spring, and I am more inclined to treat it as a man's name, say that of the mason who placed the stone in its position. In that case I should regard Ριτου as a nominative for Ριτους of the *u* declension, and equate it with *Ritus* on pottery bearing the stamp RITVS F(*ecit*) found in various towns in the Valley of the Rhine (*C. I. L.*, XIII. iii. 10010. 1643). Holder cites also RIITVS. F. F. from Le Châtelet, near Charleroi, in

Belgium. The name may have meant 'Runner', being possibly derived from the root *rit*, 'to run,' as in Irish *rithim*, 'I run,' Welsh *rhed-eg*, for early *retua*, 'the act of running.' It is doubtless a simplification of compounds like *Ritu-maros* and *Ritu-galos*. see Holder, s. vv. *Ritumara* and *Ritukalos*.

4. Celtic also, in all probability, is the inscription in this Museum from Uzès (Gard), reading as follows.—

CENIKIOC ∴ ABPΩ . . . .

The stone appears to have been found at a well, and it is broken off close to the omega; so close in fact that the right side of that letter is imperfect. How much exactly there was of this line it is impossible to say; not to mention that the stone may have been deeper, providing room for a line or two more beneath the one partly remaining. The names *Senicius* or *Senecius*, and *Senicia* or *Senecia*, appear according to Holder to have been common in Carinthia, Carniola, and North Italy, not to mention the related form *Senecio* in N. Italy, Nîmes, Vienne, and Mainz. They are derived from a stem *senec*, which we also have in the Latin *senex* (= *senec-s*) and *senec-tus*. The still simpler form in Celtic is represented in Irish by *sen-*, 'old,' Welsh *hen-* and *hên* of the same meaning, Greek ἕνος, 'old.' The epithet may have been ABPΩNIOC, ABPΩNIKNOC, or the like. The β in *Abr-* may be either original or stand for an earlier μ, as in COBREXT- (in the Coligny Calendar) for *comrecht*, Welsh *cyfreith*, *cyfraith*, 'law.' That is probably the case here, as our αβρω- seems to be related to the Irish adjective *amhra*, which Dinneen explains as 'good, great, noble, prosperous, lucky', while in Stokes's *Oengus* both *amrae* and *ad-amrae* are rendered 'wondrous'. Compare the following gloss cited from the Wurzburg Codex 15ᵈ in the *Grammatica Celtica*[ii], p. 916, *imforlinged mór n-amri de* ('factum inde multum miraculi'). *Amrae*, *Amra*, genitive *amri*, belong to an adjective *amr-io-*, *amr-iā*, and we have the stem as *amar-*, *amir-*, in the name *Amar-gen*, *Amirgen-us* (*Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus*, II. 262, 316), later spelling, *Amhairghen*, 'Wonder-child,' in Welsh *Abr-gen*, which occurs in the *Book of Llan Dâv*, where we have also *Emrdil* (for earlier *Amr-dil*), *Ebrdil* (fem.), later *Efrdil*, *Euyrdil*, *Erdil* (?), pp. 76, 78–80, 192, 348, 358, 359, 364.

5. The next inscription I wish to mention is that which I read at first Ματιακο . . Κουνουβρ . . . . I think I can now do it greater justice than I did in 1905, and in any case I must correct my statement (*Celt. Inscr.*, p. 38) that it was found at Nîmes; by what error I arrived at that conclusion I cannot now discover. In any case there is no

doubt that it is the identical stone given in *C. I. L.*, XII, p. 332, as reading . . . ΑΑΠΑΟ . . . | . . . ΚΟλλΟΥΡΓ . . . . The editor gives a reference to Allmer's *Revue Épigraphique*, II. 82, 83, whence he copied this reading. Allmer's account of the stone is that it was found near Collorgues, in the neighbourhood of Uzès, in clearing and digging some land about the year 1869, and that it was immediately broken into fragments, of which the one with the above lettering was saved by a well-known antiquary, M. Lombard-Dumas, who deposited it at a place of his at Garrigues. When and how it found its way into the museum at Nîmes I do not know, but it was subsequently to Allmer's writing about it. He describes it as measuring in height 0^m 16 and in length at the bottom 0^m 30 and at the top 0^m 25; but it is best to produce his description in his own words:—'Fragment détaché d'une pierre de mollasse lacustre, présentant primitivement la moitié supérieure d'un sphéroide à sommet tronqué et creusé en la forme d'une profonde cuvette circulaire.' The lettering was on the circumference of the dish at the top, but the surface is so worn away that the upper ends of the letters of the first line are gone. I read the first letter as Λ (not A, which Allmer preferred), but it may be the latter half of an M, and what he gives as Π I took to be TI or ΓI. The A following is fairly clear, but its end curved outwards, which helped to suggest a C. In fact, on the cast accompanying the original, somebody has indicated in paint or pencil a tall, neat, open C by using the curve of the lower part of the A and producing it above on a surface which is gone in the original. It is needless to say that Allmer's evidence completely disposes of it, for the next trace of writing after the A he took to be a small O. There he was mistaken; for in the first place one does not expect the small O to be placed on the level of the bottom of the other letters, but nearer the top, where in this instance the original surface is broken off; and in the next place I find, on careful examination, that it cannot be an O at all. It can only be the lower half of a B or rather less than the half, as the breakage leaves the top of the lower half open. On the other hand, it has the interior angle at the foot of the B intact. Next, the AB suggests an O to complete the dative plural of some designation of the Mother Goddesses, such as *Andounn*ABO or *Namausik*ABO.

In the second line I read NN for ΓΓ, and not λλ, and the last letter but one is B not P, while the last letter is P not Γ; the top is formed into a little triangle often characteristic of that letter. The lower part of the perpendicular limb of the letter is somewhat indistinct, but Allmer would seem to have detected it, since he read

the whole as Γ. The possible readings, with conjectural extensions, may be represented as follows.—

Ματρεβο $\frac{\Lambda}{M}$A$\frac{T}{\Gamma}$IABo

KONNOY BPατουδε

Κοννου is probably a nominative of the *u* declension for earlier Κοννους, or Κουννους, and we seem to have a derivative in the *Cunu-* of CVNVANOS, the name of a prince of the Arverni, cited by Holder from coins of that ancient people; not to mention a related form CONNO, which he produces from coins of the Lemovices, and treats as of the *o* declension. In that case we may have it perpetuated in the Irish *Conn*, genitive *Cuinn*, 'Quin'; but as he gives *Conno* no final *s* in any of his instances, the name may have been of the consonantal declension making a genitive *Connonos*, not *Conni*.

Having detected a dative and a nominative, we may look at the inscription as a whole; and the first point to be noticed is that it probably never had a verb: the dative sufficed to convey the sense that Connus had given to the Mother Goddesses of the locality something it was not necessary to name, to wit, the hollowed stone on which the dedication was written. This stone dish, which the vandals who found it forthwith broke into pieces, was a vessel required possibly in the cult of the Mother Goddesses. What their exact name was it has been found impossible to say: the dative may have been *Latiabo* or *Lagiabo*, *Matiabo* or *Magiabo*, not to mention *Lapabo* or *Mapabo*. Of these guesses I should prefer *Matiabo*, from the adjective *matis*, 'good.'[1] The whole would then mean 'To the Good Mothers Connus (gives this) at their bidding'. But Ματρεβο, though the word lends a certain symmetry to the inscription, does not seem essential to the sense here suggested; for instead of calling them Good Mothers it may have sufficed to call them the 'Good' ones in the feminine, as if in Greek the feminine ἀγαθαῖς had been applied to them.

[1] Dr. Stokes in his Fick volume gives the old Celtic word for 'good' the two forms *mati-s* and *mato-s* (p 199), and to the words connected with *mati-s* would belong our adjective in *-ιαβο*, while others are derived from *mato-s*. The former is exemplified in the Irish word *maith*, 'good,' in Manx *mie*, while the Scotch Gaelic is *math*, not to be traced to *mati-s*. On the other hand the Coligny Calendar has only *matu-s*, which seems to be of the *u* declension. All this would seem to imply no less than three declensions in the case of the one adjective, but I take it that *mato-s* is not original, but produced by the encroachment of the *o* declension on the more restricted *u* declension, as when Latin *magistratus* was given a genitive *magistrati*. The Welsh word was *mat*, now *mad*, with regard to which we only know for certain that it cannot be traced to *mati-s*, but to *mato-s* or *matu-s*.

Nothing has been said as to the probable use made of the deep stone dish; but if we could establish a parallel between the Mother Goddesses and the Fairy Godmothers of the Good People, the Fairy Tales of Wales might shed some light on the question. For one of the common requirements of the Welsh Fairies when they entered people's houses at night, when the inmates were asleep, was to have vessels provided for them full of clean water for washing and dressing their infants. If we may apply this to the case of the Good Mothers, the stone dish was a sort of font in nightly use for the washing of the babies, which an ancient altar at Cirencester associates with them, as I learn from our colleague Professor Haverfield. I may add that in Glamorgan, and other counties of South Wales, Fairy changelings are called *Bendith y Mamau*, 'the Mothers' Blessing.' In support of the view that the Mother Goddesses became the *Bonnes Dames*, the *Dames Blanches*, and similar Fairies of Medieval France, I may cite the authority of the late M. Florian Vallentin, in a paper contributed to the fourth volume of the *Revue Celtique*, pp. 27–36. Popular belief represented them as inhabiting rocks, grottoes, fountains, and the ruins of ancient castles, and engaging in the protection of the weak against the oppression of the strong, and, by their apparitions, frightening nocturnal spoilers and murderers from their evil purposes, while some of them crowned with a mysterious aureole the beginnings of great families and foretold their destinies. They sometimes take the poetic form of *Mélusine*, of the *Dame Blanche* of the Avenels, of the *Banshee* of the Fitz-Geralds, and the like (p. 29). To come back to the idea of ablutions, M. Vallentin states that the memory of the Mothers is perpetuated in a legend attached to a curious monument of nature situated a very short distance to the north of the Church of Saint-Romain-en-Gal, near Vienne. It is called *Puits des Fées* or *Fort des Fées*, and he quotes from a previous writer[1] the following description of it: 'Sur un petit rocher qui regarde le Rhône auprès de Saint-Romain sont trois creux ronds que la nature seule a formés, quoiqu'il semble d'abord que l'art y ait travaillé après elle. On dit qu'ils étaient autrefois fréquentés par les fées; qu'ils étaient remplis d'eau quand il leur plaisait et qu'elles y venaient prendre souvent le plaisir du bain; car on feint que toutes ces fées n'avaient pas de plus charmante volupté que celle-là' (p. 33).

6. The Collias inscription in the Nîmes Museum was guessed in my *Celtic Inscriptions*, pp. 39–41, to read Εκιννος Ριουμανιος Ανδοουν-

[1] Chorier, *Recherches sur les antiquités de la ville de Vienne*, p 183.

ναβο δεδε βρατουδε καντεν and to mean 'Iccinnos son of Rinmanos gave firstfruits to the Andounnas by their decree'; but I fear that I must give up my reading of the first name. I thought I had found a ligature standing for IN or NI which as I was led to believe occurred in an inscription at Dijon (*C. I. L.*, XIII. 5465), to wit, in a name which has been read DASILLINSO*IE*. *VX*, the Editor remarking that he did not know whether the nondescript character was N or NI or IXI or something else. In August, 1909, I had the curiosity to go to the Dijon Museum and look at the stone. I found the character in question to be more like MA ligatured, though it was not exactly that either. in any case it was not what I wanted. The inscription has been otherwise badly read: I made it DABILEI*MA*SO. The A and B are ligatured, and the next letter is either I or L, and there may have been VX at the end. The first name (written with B for V) is to be doubtless correlated as *Davile*, with the *Davilos* cited by Holder from a potter's stamp DAVILI M(*anu*) found at Vienne (*C.I.L.* XII. 5686. 301).

To return to the Collias inscription, I seize on this opportunity of offering a solution of the difficulty experienced in the interpretation of βρατουδε as a Celtic word ending with the preposition *de*, 'from,' made into a postposition. The late Celtic scholar, M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, was, I fancy, influenced chiefly by this when he undertook to argue that the group of inscriptions containing the *bratude* formula were not Celtic. I tried to deal with his arguments in my paper on the *Celtic Inscriptions of France and Italy*, pp. 19, 79-81, and suggested that possibly *bratude* had nothing at all to do with *de*, 'from,' whether Celtic or Latin, but that it had the meaning of *ex imperio, ex iussu*, by virtue of its being in the oblique case of a derivative *bratud* formed from *bratu*. This analysis has failed to lead me to any result, but since then a study of the formation of certain adverbial phrases in Irish has supplied me with a clue. Turning to the *Adverbia Hibernica* in the *Grammatica Celtica*[2], pp. 608, 609, I find that the first set of instances consists of the definite article prefixed to the neuter of an adjective, and the case in which the words are is called the dative: Zeuss says dative or ablative, but even that is too narrow, as the case meant covers also the senses of the locative and the instrumental. It would be somewhat less misleading to call it a dative-ablative case; but for the sake of brevity Irish grammarians are in the habit of calling it simply dative.

The first instance which Zeuss gives is *in biucc*, 'paulo, paulatim,' from *becc*, 'little, small.' The exact equivalent in Welsh is *yn fach*, the adverbial rendering of *bach*, 'little, small.' The next kind of

adverbial phrase in what is probably the same dative case is made in Irish to end in *-id* (sometimes written *-ith*). From among the instances given under this head the following may be chosen :—*Ind óindid*, glossing 'semel', or (spelt *ind óendaid*) glossing 'singulatim', where *ind* is the definite article in the dative, and *óinde* or *óenda* is an adjective derived from *óin*, *óen*, 'one,' Welsh *un*, Latin *ūnu-s*, for an older *oino-s*, 'one'; and *ind aicnetid*, gl. 'naturaliter', from *aicneta*, 'naturalis,' derived from *aicned*, 'natura.' We may also take participles ending in *-the* or *-tha*, such as that in *ní in tuasailcthid*, gl. 'non absolute' (*tuaslaicim*, 'I let loose or make loose'). To these and the like Thurneysen (*Handbuch*, p. 229) adds some instances of nouns, such as *in díglaid* (glossing 'ulciscenter'), from *digal*, O.Welsh *digal*, now *dial*, 'vengeance'; and *ind áirmith* (gl. 'summatim', otherwise explained by the word 'breviter'). The noun here is *árem*, *áram*,[1] 'number,' for an early *ad-rīmā*. It is a feminine of the *ā* declension, nominative *árem* or *áram*, genitive *áirme*, dative *árim*, accusative *árim-n*. My notion is that the final *d* represents a declensional element *-de* or *-di* appended to the dative in the instances in question. However, we cannot get that to fit with the Irish declension as we have it: one has to go back to the early Celtic form of that declension. It will be convenient here to follow Stokes in his *Celtic Declension*, p. 102, where he gives the declension of *rēda*, 'a chariot,' in what he has called Proto-Celtic. On that I proceed to project such cases as we want of the Irish word *áram*, *áireamh*, as follows :—

Stokes's Proto-Celtic.	Early Goidelic.	Historical Irish.
Nom. rēda	ad-rīmā	áram, árem, áireamh.
Gen. rēdēs	ad-rīmēs	áirme, áirmhe.
Dat. rēdē (rēdī ?)	ad-rīmē (ad-rīmī ?)	árim, árimh, áireamh.

Let us now append to the early dative *ad-rīmī* or *ad-rīmē* the syllable *de*; then *adrīmē-de*, subject to the rules as to Irish desinences, yields us *árimid*, *áirmid*, which is practically what we have in the adverbial expression *ind airmith*, 'summatim, breviter.' It may be asked why I select *-de*, but it would take too long to discuss vowel harmony in

[1] The Welsh equivalent both in meaning and derivation is *eirif*, as in *an-eirif*, 'numberless.' In *eirif* the first *i* stands for an earlier *d*, as in *cadeir*, *cadair*, 'a chair,' adapted from *cathedra* : see p. 274 above. The simpler words Irish *rím* and Welsh *rhif*, for older *rím*, also mean 'number', but they differ in gender, the Irish *rím* being feminine, while the Welsh *rhif* is masculine like the Teutonic cognates, such as the A.-Saxon *rīm* and O. H. German *rīm* It looks as if Irish *rím*, originally masculine, had been made feminine under the influence of *árem*. On the other hand *árem* in its modern form of *áireamh* is given as masculine by Dinneen; the gender of Welsh *eirif* has not been ascertained.

Irish: let it suffice to say that a broad vowel would not fit, so we are left to choose between *e* and *i*, and I have taken the former, that is I have supposed the element added to the dative to have been *-de*.[1]

When similar treatment is applied to βρατουδε we have perhaps to regard βρατου, *bratu*, as a dative, and not as the stem of a word of the *u* declension. We have such a dative in an inscription containing *Magalu*, 'to or for Magalos,' on a vase found in the neighbourhood of Bourges, and now preserved in the National Museum in the Château de Saint-Germain (*Celtic Inscriptions*, xxxii). But the dative in *u* belongs mostly to words of the *o* declension; so here the nominative implied would probably be *brato-s*, not *bratu-s*; but what can *brato-s* have been? Comparative philology supplies an answer The Latin words *grātes*, *grātia*, *grātus* are found to have had as their initial a consonant which in Celtic would have been *gu* liable to be simplified into *b*. Thus Latin *grātu-s* would have corresponding to it in Celtic *brāto-s*: see Walde's Dictionary, s.v. *grātēs*, and compare Thurneysen, p. 190.

Now comes the question of the meaning of *bratu-de*. Stokes in his *Celtic Declension*, p. 63, quoted from De Wal's *De Moedergodinnen* the following inscription: *Matronis Afliabus M. Marius Marcellus pro se et suis ex imperio ipsarum.* He drew from this and similar cases the conclusion that *ex imperio* would be the equivalent of βρατουδε. But *ex imperio* or *ex iussu* is by no means the most usual phrase in Latin *ex-votos*; and it is hard to believe that in none of the Celtic ones in question was the faithful donor allowed to let his co-religionists understand that he was acting of his own free will in the matter of offerings to the divinities whom he worshipped. Thus one may say that the *ex imperio* interpretation is not to be applied too frequently, even if one had no other to offer. That, however, is not the case, for if we may treat *brāto-s* as the etymological equivalent of Latin *grātus*, we may assume that the meanings were approximately the same. In that case βρατουδε might be rendered approximately by the Latin adverb *grāte*, 'with pleasure, agreeably, willingly, thankfully, gratefully.' In other words it was an expression of thanks, with much the same

[1] After writing this I happened to have my attention drawn to the *Gram. Celtica*, p. 231, where one reads: 'Abl. adj. propriae formae (cf. gallicum βρατουδε): indoraedid (gl. dolice),' &c. But here no hint of a suspicion occurs that the declensional element which helped to constitute the *propria forma* was etymologically one and the same in both. At the last moment I notice that Holder in his third volume, col. 926, quotes R. v. Planta as equating βρατου- with Latin *merito*. This also, should it prove tenable, would suit my view as to the -δε.

force as the Latin formula 'votum solvit libens merito', except that βρατουδε involved no express reference to a vow.

⁂ Before leaving Nîmes I wish to mention one or two Latin inscriptions of considerable Celtic interest. The first of them comes from an *oppidum* on the mountain of La Baume, near Belvezet (Gard): see M. Mazauric's report for 1908, p. 41, and also for 1906, p. 34. He gives it as reading:—

TERTIVS. TIN
CORIGIS F. SE
GOMANNAE
V. S. L. M.

The discovery of the name Tincorix interests me as helping us to the analysis of that of Tincommius, son of Commius; he is well known by his British coins, and his name is doubtless a shortening, for euphony's sake, of *Tinco-commius.* The goddess Segomanna's name is to be added to Holder's Σεγομανικος, occurring in a Nîmes inscription which he has pronounced suspect.

⁂ An inscription found at Nîmes in 1906 is given by M. Mazauric, p. 27, as reading:—

D · M
MESSINAE MESSINI
FILIAE
TASGIA · TITVLLA
POSVIT

Here Tasgia is to be placed by the side of Holder's masculine *Tasgius.* The spelling with *g* possibly indicates that the *s* was pronounced soft, that it was in fact *z*, and Holder seems right in deriving *tasgo-* from an earlier *tazgo-*, to which is related the Irish *Taidgg*, *Tadc*, later *Tadhg*, one of the commonest personal names in Ireland, at any rate until it began to have *Thaddaeus, Timothy*, and other New Testament names substituted for it.

7. While staying at Nîmes in August, 1910, we made an excursion to Montpellier, at the invitation of our friend Professor Babut, in order among other things to see the inscribed stone from Substantion. That place is about three kilometres to the east of Montpellier on the other side of the river Lez. My friend reminded me that it is a station mentioned in the *Itinerary* from Bordeaux to Jerusalem. The stone was discovered in 1840, and the portion of it found inscribed consists of two edges of a square table forming part of the top of a pillar, which he describes as 'un chapiteau dorique'. He adds that 'Les caractères sont gravés sur le tailloir comme l'inscription nîmoise ΜΑΤΡΕΒΟ ΝΑΜΑΥΣΙΚΑΒΟ'; see *C. I. L.*, XII,

p. 383, where the Editor terms the part of the stone inscribed 'capitulei marmorei abacus'. The sides of this square measure about 2 feet 4 inches, but only two sides are visible, for it has been cemented into a corner of a court of the University. It is believed, however, that the other two sides had been so damaged that no writing was left on them when the fragment was put into its present position. What can be now read stands as follows:—

. . . . . IΛ . . . . | INOYCIΔ . . . |

The lower ends of several letters occur before the Λ, the next before it was probably I, or else one of the letters Γ, T, or P. After the Λ comes Ⱡ, which might be an I joining the beginning of an A. The letters on the second side are all quite legible as far as they go, but the stone breaks off after the Δ. However, the C looks as if it had a point in its centre, a feature by no means unusual in other inscriptions, but M. Babut was decidedly of opinion that it is only a little excoriation of the stone, and the Editor of the *Inscriptions de Languedoc, Nîmes*, No. 107, appears not to reckon it a part of the lettering; see Holder, s. v., ... *inouci*, where a Latin c has no business, if one may trust the Λ, Y, Δ, which argue Greek values for all the letters. But whether one is to divide the words between the I and the Δ is not certain, for one cannot rely on the absence of a point there. Holder pronounces for Δ[EΔE] which would suggest the βρατουδε formula, and prevent our construing the whole as an epitaph. This is strongly corroborated by the position of the lettering and the general similarity of the whole to the Nîmes inscription in honour of the Nemausian Mothers. Possibly ινουσι was not the whole of the name. Holder has collected some names ending in *-uso-*, *-ussa-* (*At(t)ussa*, *Bergussa*, &c.), and *-ussio-*, *-ussia* (*Atussia*, *Cantussius*, *Cintussia*, &c.), but perhaps the ones most nearly in point are *Bergussa*, and the *Bergusia* to be mentioned presently as the name of a goddess (p. 294 below). The dative of *Bergus(s)a* and *Bergusia* might be *Bergusi* in both alike. So vice versa, . . . ινουσι might be the dative of the name of a goddess . . . ινουσα. The whole inscription might accordingly be: 'So-and-so to the goddess . . . inusa gratefully gave firstfruits.' This is a mere conjecture, but whatever the inscription was as a whole, the care with which the lettering was cut, and the place where it was cut, indicate that it was regarded as an important document. So much the greater the pity that it has been practically lost to Celtic epigraphy.

8. Before leaving the inscriptions of the South of France I may here mention one which I have not seen, to wit, the one given in *C. I. L.*,

XII. 5793, as belonging to the vicinity of Alleius (Bouches-du-Rhône). It reads as follows:

ΚΟΓΓΕΝΝ
ΟΛΙΤΑΝΟ
C ΚΑΡΘΙΛΙΤΑ
ΝΙΟC

This would mean 'Congennolitanos son of Carthilitanos' and *litano-* is represented exactly in Irish by *leathan* and in Welsh by *llydan*, 'wide, large.' But what did *Congenno-* mean? I can make nothing of it, unless it meant acquisition or possession, from the same origin as the *Gendill-i* of the Stainton bilingual in Pembrokeshire, and its Welsh derivative name *Gennillin*. Among the kindred words are Latin pre*hendo*, 'I lay hold of, seize, grasp, catch, take,' Greek χανδάνω, ἔχαδον, χείσομαι, 'I seize hold of,' English 'get, be*get*, for*get*'. The reduction of *nd* to *nn*, *n*, has parallels in such forms as *Esanekoti*, *Anokopokios*, for *Exandecotti*, *Andocombogios* in the Celtic inscription at Novara in N. Italy. The whole compound may, accordingly, have meant 'one who is large as to his possessions, one who acquires far and wide'. The *genn* in *Congenno-* is probably the same as in Ad-*gen*(*n*)- already discussed at p. 278 above, the predominant spelling doubles the *n* in that name likewise. The other name, Καρθιλιταν-, is still more obscure; but possibly the Θ stands for a lisped *s*, and Καρθι goes with the *carsi-* of such names as *Carsius* and *Carsia*, *Carsicios*, *Carsidius*, and *Carsidia* quoted by Holder. But these are too obscure to be of any present help, and it seems preferable here to give θ its normal sound of *th*. It is well known that in Brythonic *rt*, *rc*, *rp* are represented by *rth*, *rch*, *rff* or *rph*, while Goidelic retains the older consonants. The difference forms a far-reaching distinction between Goidelic and Brythonic. The modification would probably be mostly ignored for centuries in the orthography as a corruption. So there is very little chance of discovering when it came in; but it is possible that it took place both in Gaulish and Brythonic; that is to say, there was a tendency to this pronunciation even before Brythonic separated from Gaulish. In that case we could equate καρθι- with the first syllable of Καρταρος in the celebrated Nîmes *ex-voto* to the Ματρεβο Ναμαυσικαβο (*Celtic Inscr.*, p. 34), and with the *cart-i* of one of the Rom defixions (ibid., p. 95), also with the *cart-i* (for *carthi*) in *Cartimandus*, *Cartimandua*, a name familiar to the readers of Tacitus. The second element in them has been interpreted by M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Noms Gaulois*, pp. 127, 128) as 'one who thinks, reflects, meditates, minds', the origin being the same in fact as that of the Greek

verb μανθάνω, ἔμαθον, 'I have learnt'; one might doubtless add the English word *mind*, both noun and verb. What the meaning of καρθι, *carti*, may have been is not known, but my conjecture is that it signified 'strong, powerful, vigorous', as this would seem to fit the cases mentioned without any violence to the context where there is any. *Cartimandus* would accordingly mean 'one who thinks powerfully, one possessed of a strong or vigorous mind'. Similarly Καρθιλιτανος should mean 'one who is powerful or active far and wide'.

III

1. The number of inscriptions in Celtic found on Mont-Auxois and brought to Alise-Sainte-Reine near the Alisia of ancient Gaul, has materially grown since my paper on the *Celtic Inscriptions of France and Italy* was written. In fact at that time there was only one such, and my notes on that require to be revised in the light of an *ex-voto* in Latin to be mentioned presently. I read the former now as follows:—

MARTIALIS ❦ DANNOTALI
IEVRV ❦ VCVETE ❦ SOSIN
CELICNON ❦ ETIC
GOBEDBI ❦ DVGIIONTIIO
VCVETIN
❦ IN ... ALISIIA ❦

In that paper (p. 4) I had committed the mistake of placing the last leaf but one at the beginning of the last line but one: it really belongs to the last line of all. The gap I suggested filling by inserting DV, but I am now in doubt, since the D, had it been there, would still probably show a small portion of the bottom opposite the reader's left hand. I cannot suggest at present how the lacuna is to be filled. The Editor of the *C. I. L.* (vol. XIII. 2880) has suggested a leaf. In that case, the line originally read, ❦ IN ❦ ALISIIA ❦. If one can accept the three leaves, there is an end of the difficulty. A parallel, with a leaf placed between a preposition and its noun, occurs in a Bourges inscription, which reads *vissu* instead of the *iussu* to be expected:—

MARTI
RIGISAMO
TI. IVL. EVNVS
EX ❦ VISSV

See *C. I. L.*, XIII. 1190, and the *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires du Centre*, vol. XIII, p. 153, also Holder, s. v. *Rigi-samus*. The

Photo 7

Photo. 8

THE SAMOTALOS MONUMENT

Photo. 9 *b*

post-card photograph No. 7 will enable you to follow readily the points to which I have called attention.

Coming to the interpretation, we should first mention that we now know that the divinity in question was a god, not a goddess, and that the accusative *Ucuetin* implies a nominative *Ucuetis*. The dative *Ucuete* is not exactly what we should have expected, but rather *Ucueti*. I have explained in my previous paper, p. 6, that *Ucuet-* analyses itself into *Ud-guh-et-* for an earlier *Ud-gus-et-*; the meaning was probably 'chosen or selected', and in the case of a male divinity the selection was doubtless on the score of his excelling in feats of valour. Compare such Celtic names as Irish *Fergus*, Mod. Ir. *Fearghus*, Welsh *Gurgust*, *Grwst*, 'a choice man,' and Irish *Oingus*, *Oengus*, 'the one or unique choice,' Welsh *Unwst*.

The next vocable to call for attention is DVGIIONTIIO: the related forms have been discussed at p. 263 above. Had the same orthography been followed as in Γιαουα, *Giava*, *Dugius*, and *Dugiava*, we should have *dugiontio*. But it was not wholly a matter of spelling, as the development of *i* into *ii̯* in such a position was a characteristic of Gaulish including Brythonic. It took place, as far as we can understand, under the stress accent; we set out from *dugíi̯-*, and add a formative element *-ontíi̯o*, carrying the stress accent with it, so that the first part of the word was then probably reduced to *dugi̯*, the whole being pronounced *dugi̯ontíi̯o*. So the spelling of the word in the inscription would be as unphonetic as that of English *vineyard* after *vine* as a part of the compound had been reduced to *vĭn*, the pronunciation of the whole being *vinyard*.

Holder, in his *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, has brought together a number of words formed with *-ontio-*, *-ontiā*, and *-untio-*, *-untiā*, including among them *Gerontius*, *Gerontia*, of which the form in Welsh was *Gereint*, now *Geraint*, Cornish *Gerons*; and *Segontius*, *Segontia*, *Segontium*, which was in Old Welsh *Segeint*, as in Nennius's *Cair Segent*, later *Kaer Seint yn Arvon*[1] = Carnarvon, with *Seint* the name of the river on which it stands, now *Afon Saint*. The Latin parallels are such as *Cluentius*, *Cluentia*, the name of a Roman gens, and such abstract nouns as *sapientia*. For the vowels compare *Nodons*, genitive *Nodontos*, in Latin *Nodens*, gen. *Nodentis*. We

[1] See the Mabinogi of Branwen (Oxford *Mab.*, p. 34). *Afon Saint* is ambiguous in Modern Welsh as it suggests 'Saints' River'; and a local legend may be looked for to explain all about the saints. There is also another form of the same word, namely, *Seiont*, introduced much later, probably by an antiquary or somebody who was too learned to know how to reduce *Segontium* to its correct form in Welsh.

must probably regard *dug(i)iontiio* as standing for *dugiontiio-s* or *dugiontiio-n*, masculine or neuter: phonologically the former is, perhaps, the more probable.

I presume that the inscription referred to joining or uniting, but in what sense? Several seem possible, but the related forms would suggest conjugal union or marriage. In that case the whole inscription might be rendered thus:—

> Martial, Dannotal's son, made Ucuetis this tower;
> And may the marriage rejoice Ucuetis in Alisia.

The other two instances of Iǀ at the end of DVGIǀONTIǀO and ALISIǀA had, as suggested in the same paper (pp. 4, 5), the full force of *ĭi(o)* and *ĭi(ā)* as the antecedents of what would in Welsh be *-ydd* and *-edd*, masculine (or neuter) and feminine respectively. I lay no stress on the fact of the two perpendiculars differing in length; thus in the Coligny Calendar short I and long I imply no difference of sound. The difference of length was probably intended here to prevent the two perpendiculars being read E, seeing that Latin II was a way of writing E; unfortunately it did not always prove effective till Holder showed a better way. Now supposing that the letters used happened to be Greek, there would be no need to use Iǀ rather than II. When I wrote my paper I knew of no spelling parallel to that in the Alise inscription either in Latin letters or Greek: I do now, thanks to the courtesy and keen-sightedness of the learned French numismatist, M. Changarnier. In a letter to me dated Beaune, August 29, 1910, he asked what I should think of Celtic coins reading on the reverse in Greek letters: ✱ΛΑΒΡΟΔΙΙΟϹ. I saw at once that the word following the star was a shortened compound for an earlier *Λαμα-ροδίιος*, meaning, 'Him of the giving hand, an open-handed man, a bounteous giver.' In the same spelling a 'giving hand' would have been *Lāmā rodĭiā*, as the word for 'hand' was a feminine, *lāmā* (for an earlier *plāmā*), Irish *lám*, Welsh *llaw*, *llawf-*, *llof-*, Latin *palma*, A.-Sax. *folme*, Greek παλάμη, 'flat hand.' The rest of the name is of the same origin as Welsh *rhoddi*,[1] 'to put or place, to give,' *rhodd*, 'a gift,' *rhydd*, 'will give,'

[1] The derivation of the word *rhodd-i* is a puzzle, but I am inclined to treat it in the same way as Irish *bodhar*, Welsh *byddar*, 'deaf,' Sanskrit *badhirá*, 'deaf,' from a root which in that language takes the nasalized form of *bandh*, 'to bind, to obstruct,' and in English such forms as 'bind, band, bond' and their congeners in the other Teutonic languages: see my note on the ancient Ogam genitive *Cattu-butta(s)* (later *Cath-bodh*, *Cath-badh*), in the *Journal of the R. Soc. of Antiquaries of Ireland*, for 1908, pp. 201–4. The nasal form implied in the

imperative *rho, dy-ro*, 'give': the spoken language freely drops the soft dental in this group of words. But as a compound forming an epithet or name of a man, not of a woman, Gaulish gave it a masculine termination, thereby making it into *Lāma-rodīīo-s*, which would have yielded in Welsh *Llaw(f)-rodyd*, a form which is unknown; what we have was *Llaw(f)-roded*, representing an early *Lāma-rodīīā*. This treatment is well known in Irish proper names take, for instance, the feminine noun *gal*, 'passion, bravery,' genitive *gaile*; any masculine name ending with *gal* is declined like a feminine, as, for instance, in the case of *Con-gal*, gen. *Con-gaile*, and so in other cases. The literary tendency in Welsh seems to be to proceed on the same lines as Gaulish; thus we should probably write *aderyn du pigfelyn*, 'a yellow-beaked blackbird,' where *aderyn du* and *melyn* are masculine, while *pig* is feminine, so that 'a yellow beak' has to become *pig felen*. Nevertheless, as a child I learnt to say *'deryn du pigfelen* in North Cardiganshire, to which corresponds *'deryn du pigfelan*, current, as I am told, in the neighbourhood of Snowdon.

present instance has its kindred in the Letto-Slavic languages, for instance in Lithuanian *rinda* (fem.), 'order, arrangement,' and Old Bulgarian *rědŭ*, 'order.' Another Celtic word of the same origin retains the nasal with a different vowel: it is Irish *rann* (fem.) for early *randa*, Welsh *rhann*, now spelt *rhan*, 'a part, a share, one's portion in life as fixed by destiny.' We have probably a related form in Irish *rann* (mas.), 'a stanza, a quatrain,' i.e. an artistic arrangement of words: Irish *rind* (neuter), 'a star,' is not to be associated with this group of words but with Irish *rind*, 'a point,' Welsh *rhyn*, the same. For *nn* from *nd* compare the like reduction in Continental Celtic mentioned at p. 289 above. It also dates early in Irish, and is found represented in the *cob-ranar(i)* instanced at p. 336 below by a single *n*, as is always the case with *qena-*, *qen-*, whence the later Irish *cend, ceann*, Welsh *penn*, now spelt *pen*, 'the end of anything, the head,' a sequence of meanings suggested by a conjecture which I have read somewhere that *qenn-* is of the same origin as English *hind, hindmost*, &c. We possibly have the element *rod-* also in the name *Rŏdănos*, which in that case probably meant bounteous or liberally giving. But in Irish *rod-* is disguised as *rad-*, so that the equivalent of *Labrodīīos* and Welsh *Llawfroded* takes the form *Labraid*, genitive *Labrada* for early *Labrodi-s*, *Labrodī-os* of the *i* declension; and besides the famous Irish name *Labraid*, anglicized *Lowry*, there was a nasalized form *Labraind*, 'of the distributing hand,' to which Professor Kuno Meyer kindly calls my attention as occurring by way of personal epithet in the Bk. of Leinster, fo. 17[b], 18[a]. It is disguised also in various forms when prefixed to the verb which we have already met with reduplicated as *de-de*, 'gave, *dedit*.' Thus we should have *rod-de* making *rote*, and, with the *o* changed into *a*, we should have *rate, rati*, cut down in the perfect to *do-rat*, 'has given, *dedit*,' prototonic form *tarat*, '*dedit*.' A somewhat similar compound is *creitim*, 'I believe,' with a verb element equating, so to say, with Greek τίθημι, Sanskrit *dadhāmi*. See Rhŷs's *Lectures on Welsh Philology*, p. 73[iii]; Thurneysen's *Handbuch*, p. 87, also pp. 33, 322, 444.

To say the least of it, this agrees with the Irish treatment and with what would have been *Lāb-rodīīa*, *Llawf-rodeđ*[1]

We now come to the Latin inscription to which allusion has already been made. It is on a bronze vase found on Mont-Auxois in 1908, which was then kept at Alise in the house of M. Pernet, director of the excavations for the 'Société des Sciences Historiques et Naturelles de Semur'. He was good enough to let me see it in August, 1909: it is now in the new Museum of that Society there, and I examined it again last April. It reads as follows:—

DEO · VCVETI ET · BERGVSIAE REMVS[2] · PRIMI · FIL DONAVIT VSLM	To the god Ucuetis and to Bergusia Remus son of Primius made this gift. He pays his vow willingly and for good reason.

Here we have the name of a goddess *Bergusia*, though elsewhere it occurs as that of a town. There was one such in the land of the Ilergetes, and it is now called Balaguer, in the Spanish province of Lerida. Another Bergusia, now called *Bourgoin*, is in the French Department of Isère: see Holder, s. v. *Bergusia*. To explain the meaning of the name we must have recourse to its etymology, and I may mention that Stokes (p. 171) derives it from *bergo-*, which he renders

[1] The modern spelling is *Llawf-rodeđ* with a *d* to avoid the sequence *odeđ*, which took place all the more readily doubtless because all tradition about the bearer of the name seems to have been lost, and the medieval spelling left it an open question whether the first of the two dentals was sounded *d* or *đ*. The following are all the allusions in point which occur to me: (1) The Oxford *Mabinogion*, p. 159 ('Rhonabwy's Dream'), reads Ꝇaɓuroded uaryfaɓc, 'Ll. the bearded,' and p. 108 (Kulhwch and Olwen) Ꝇaɓnrodet uaruaɓc (with a *u* misread *n*) from a more ancient MS. with *t* regularly used to represent *d*. (2) The Horses Triads, printed in the *Myvyrian Archaiology*, II. 22, have appended to them a Kine Triad to the following effect: Three chief cows of the Isle of Prydain: Maelgwn Gwyneđ's Brindled Cow, Greyskin the cow of Olifer Gosgorđfawr's Sons, and Cornillo the cow of Llawfroded farfawc (or *farchawc*): see Evans's *Report on MSS. in the Welsh Language*, vol. I, part ii, 380, 381, where the reading of the MS., Peniarth 47, is given as *buwch laɓvroded varvaɓc*. (3) The third and late series (*Myvyr.*, p. 70, No. 85) has a triad applied to the three clan herdsmen of the Isle of Prydain, the third of whom is described as 'Ꝇawfrodeđ Farfawc, who herded the Cattle of Nuđ the Bounteous, son of Senyllt; and in that herd were 21,000 milch cows.' (4) Lastly Rice Rees in his *Essay on the Welsh Saints* (p. 298) introduces *Ꝇawfrodeđ* into a Saint's pedigree, thus: 'Idloes, the son of Gwyđnabi ab Ꝇawfrodeđ Farfog Coch.' Compare *The Lives of the Cambro-British Saints*, p. 268.

[2] The MV of REMVS are ligatured, and the I of FIL is not visible to me, having been worn away, while the foot of the L drops below the line. There is, I think, no doubt as to the reading of the whole.

by the German *Berg*, a mountain, associating with it *Bergomum*, now *Bergamo*, in North Italy. *Bergo-* is probably to be completed into *Bergo-s*, whence a *Bergus Mons*, from which Holder derives the name of the *Bois de Berg*, to the east of *Villeneuve-de-Berg*, in the Dep. of Ardèche. Now *Bergos* has its equivalent in the Welsh word *bera*, just as *bolgos* has yielded Welsh *bola*, 'sack or belly.' *Bera*, however, does not mean a mountain, but a rick or stack of corn or hay; Davies defines it as 'acervus segetis vel faeni'. This suggests that Bergusia was a harvest goddess wedded annually to a harvest god, whose name Ucuetis was perhaps like Rivos only an alias of the redoubtable harvest god Lugus.[1] There is, however, another possibility which is perhaps worth mentioning, for it is right to say that Dr. Pughe and Silvan Evans make the idea of a pyramid part and parcel of their definition of a *bera*, which the latter expresses thus: 'a pyramidal heap; a stack of corn or hay (in the form of a pyramid); a stack; a pyramid.' We should like to know whether the *Bergus Mons* was not so called from its fancied likeness at a distance to some object resembling a pyramid, and that the local divinity, Bergusia, simply took her name from that of a mountain called Bergus. The district is a remarkable one, and I asked my friend, Professor Babut, what he knew about the landscape. I explained to him the sense which I should attach to the name *Bergus*, and he replied as follows:—'J'ai trouvé un collègue qui connaît fort bien Villeneuve-de-Berg. Cette vieille petite ville est le centre d'un pays d'aspect désolé, où la roche volcanique apparaît, du pied de la montagne au faîte, entièrement nue. Vous trouverez facilement à Oxford "L'Histoire de France" de Lavisse, Tome I, 1, "Tableau de la Géographie de la France" par Vidal de la Blache. A la page 269, à droite en bas sur la carte, vous verrez la position de Villeneuve, au fond d'une dépression qu'entoure une ceinture de petits pitons volcaniques, des *puys* à proportions réduites. Il me semble que la vue de cette carte est très-propre à confirmer votre conjecture sur le sens de *Berg*.'

To return to the inscription in Gaulish; one cannot be expected to accept the conjecture that *dug[i]iontīio* meant marriage, without some parallel elsewhere by way of corroboration. As it happens, there is no lack: witness our colleague Dr. Frazer's discussion of

[1] For Lugus, Irish Lug, and his consort in Irish mythology, see my *Notes on the Coligny Calendar*, read to the British Academy, Jan. 26, 1910, pp 23-5, 27, 31, 35, 49. For the words 'at Carman, where Wexford now stands', pp. 16, 38, and elsewhere, one is requested to read 'at Carman on the Curragh of Kildare', and to see the reasons for the substitution given at length by Mr. Orpen in *The Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, for 1906, pp. 11-41, which I overlooked when my paper was written.

them in his *Lectures on the early History of the Kingship*, pp. 156-8, 169-79. The instances there passed in review, including among them the case of the King and Queen of May still known in this country, suggest that the wedding ceremony or the sham marriage may have been carried out in any one of the following ways: (1) The images of Ucuetis and Bergusia were married together, and afterwards placed in the *celicnon* or tower to repose side by side till the ensuing year. (2) A woman of rank was engaged to personate the goddess and to shut herself up in the *celicnon* to be visited by the god in person. (3) Both the god and the goddess were personated by a man and a woman who afterwards shut themselves up for a time in the *celicnon*. For the object of such ceremonies I venture to quote from the same work a few lines ending in a reference to Gaul (pp. 177, 178): 'The sacred marriage of Zeus and Hera had, as was natural, its counterpart in heathen times among the northern kinsfolk of the Greeks. In Sweden every year a life-size image of Frey, the god of fertility, both animal and vegetable, was drawn about the country in a waggon attended by a beautiful girl who was called the god's wife. She acted also as his priestess in his great temple at Upsala. Wherever the waggon came with the image of the god and his blooming young bride, the people crowded to meet them and offer sacrifices for a fruitful year. Similar ceremonies appear to have been observed by the peasantry of Gaul in antiquity; for Gregory of Tours,[1] writing in the sixth century of our era, says that at Autun the people used to carry about an image of a goddess in a waggon drawn by oxen. The intention of the ceremony was to ensure the safety of the crops and vines, and the rustics danced and sang in front of the image. The old historian identifies the goddess with Cybele, the great Mother Goddess of Phrygia, and the comparison, if not the identification, is just; for the rites of Cybele conformed closely to the type of the sacred marriage here discussed.'

This will suffice; and on the whole I am inclined to prefer the view that Bergusia was a harvest goddess with a part to play more or less like that played by the goddesses whom Dr. Frazer mentions. The *celicnon* or building presented to Ucuetis would thus seem to have been made with a view to the marriage of that god with Bergusia and to the housing therein of the pair until the ceremony should be repeated in the ensuing year.[2]

[1] Gregory of Tours, *De Gloria Confessorum*, 77 (Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, lxxi. col. 884). Dr. Frazer compares Sulpicius Severus, *Vita S. Martini*, 12.

[2] Since writing the above I find M. Vendryes in the *Revue Celtique*, XXXII. 119, 120, treating *gobedbi* as a dative plural—perhaps better dual—and *dugiiontiio* as a relative verb of the third person plural. He renders the whole approximately

2. An inscribed stone, forming a face of a square capital, was found in 1907 on Mont-Auxois at a spot called La Fanderolle, and it was bought for the Museum of Alise by the Mayor, Dr. Epery. I had received letters about the inscription from Commandant Espérandieu and M. Changarnier, whose names figure more than once in this paper. I examined it in August, 1909, when I found, as I had been told, that the end of the stone opposite the reader's left hand had been damaged of old, and that the fracture had carried away the initial letter: hardly more I fancy. In any case I could read the following letters:—

ITOCAYoY
ωT

What the letter preceding the I may have been, if there was one at all, I cannot say, but M. Changarnier supposes it to have been a curved character such as an open Greek C, rather than any letter with a vertical line. The first line would in that case be CITOCAYoY. In the second line there is one letter which is unmistakable, and that is T. This seemed to be preceded by another letter, which I made out with some trouble to be an omega.

The importance of this little inscription will appear presently. It was the first I looked at on my visit to Alise last April, when with the assistance of Dr. Epery I took an extemporized squeeze of it by pressing on the stone a piece of blotting-paper, thick and wetted. This was in the evening; when I returned in the morning (April 25) I took another. They were both quite successful, and completely dispelled various difficulties which had troubled me. The stone is oolitic, and the edge measures about six inches. I now consider it certain that there was no writing before the omega of the second line, and the oblique position in which that letter lies and the length of its last limb accounts for the distance at which the T appears to follow. The roughness of the surface, where the ω is situated, prevents me from tracing with precision the way in which the three portions of that letter were joined with one another at the bottom. I may add that there was no letter before ITOC; had there been such there is so much of the surface left that some of the letter would be still visible. My previous reading is confirmed as making ITOC AYOYωT. This is shown in photograph No. 8, which represents one of the pieces of blotting-paper which I have mentioned, but with the hollows of the

thus: 'Martialis fils de Dannotalos a fait pour Ucuetis cet édifice, et pour les prêtres (?) qui servent Ucuetis à Alise.' The general sense of what M. Vendryes treats as the verb is compatible with what I have suggested, and one would have only to read 'who belong to Ucuetis at Alise'.

lettering gently darkened by means of a lead pencil. This is not scientific, but it will serve to show what the cast enabled me to trace on the stone itself.

The name *Ito-s* is probably to be equated with the element *ito* in *Itotagi*, the genitive of a Gaulish gladiator's name occurring at Pompei: see Holder, s. v. and *C. I. L.*, IV. 2451. We come next to the strange looking sequence AYOYWT, in connexion with which it may be mentioned that Greek αυ and αου are both transcribed AV in Latin inscriptions. Compare, for instance, Νεμαυσος or Νεμαυσου with Latin NEMAVSENSES, and Καύαρος, Καούαροι with the Latin spellings *Cavaros*, *Cavares*. Thus we have not only Greek AY making AV in Latin, but the Greek digraph OY regularly represented in Latin by V. So AYOYWT should make in Latin orthography AVVOT, and we know exactly how we stand.

In 1888 M. Heron de Villefosse, one of the leading members of the 'Académie des Inscriptions', called attention to a Celtic word variously abbreviated AVVOT, AVOT, AVO, AV, A, found appended to the name of the manufacturer on several pieces of Celtic pottery. see the *Revue Archéologique*, series III, volume XI, pp. 155-9. It had been assumed that *avvot* was a verb meaning *fecit*; but some years later M. d'Arbois de Jubainville solved the mystery of *avvot* in a short article in the *Recueil de Mémoires*, published in 1903 by the 'Société des Antiquaires de France' on the occasion of that body celebrating its centenary. He went on to show that even *avvot* was an abbreviation, for there was a longer spelling *avoti* on a piece in the museum at Trier, and another in that of Nymeguen (*C. I. L.*, XIII. iii. p. 160, No. 160, and p. 146, No. 217). That was not all, for he was able to point to the full nominative at the museum at Ghent, where one reads (ibid., p. 163, No. 362):—

BVCCOS
AVOTIS

Of the forms with *vv*, the *Corpus Inscr. Latinarum* gives (ibid., p. 474, No. 85) several instances, one of which reads: REXTVGENOS SVLLIAS AVVOT. It comes from Fégréac (Loire-Inf.), and it is in the Nantes Museum. M. Reinach has had a cast of it added to his excellent collection at the Château de Saint-Germain, No. 31462. It may be mentioned that among the names on the shields on the triumphal arch at Orange (A. D. 21) one is [BO]VDILLVS AVOT. I cannot pass in silence over the instances which I was shown at the Departmental Museum at Moulins-sur-Allier by its keeper, the veteran archæologist, M. Bertrand, who has made, among other things, a remarkable collection of moulds. Three of them have graffito

writing on them traced with a stile: one of a saddled horse reads *Sacrillos Avot*; and another, that of a pigeon, reads:—

AUOTI FORMI
SACR(I)LLOS CARATI

For these instances associated with Sacrillos see *C. I. L.*, XIII. iii. 10015. 38 (p. 470), and Photos. 13, 14, 15 of M Bertrand's tracings presented to me for this paper.

M. d'Arbois closed his paper with the etymology of the word *Avotis*, connecting with it a man's name, *Avota*, so read by no less an authority than M. Mowat (*C. I L.*, ibid., p. 150, No. 249). Here might doubtless be added AVVIIT from an inscription in the Autun Museum, reading *Norba Avvet*[*i f.*] (*C. I. L.*, XIII. 2747a). The late Professor of Celtic detects the *avo* of *Avotis* in the *ói* of the Irish verb *con-ói*, 'he protects,' for an early **com-auet*. Then he equates *avet* with the Sanskrit *avati*, **aueti*, which he gives as meaning 'il fait avancer, hâte, protège, commande'. And *avotis* he accordingly explains to be 'celui qui fait faire', 'celui qui commande dans l'usine', in other words the literal rendering of *avotis* into Latin would be, he thought, '*factor* ou peut-être même *dominus*.' Latin *avus, avos,* 'grandfather,' he regarded as belonging to the same stock; for as a matter of fact the grandfather was in Roman law the master. I am inclined to emphasize the idea of *dominus*, as against that of *factor*, as meaning in relation to a workshop the owner, the proprietor also and the master of the slaves who did the work, in a word, the lord of the whole concern. This is corroborated by the editor of the *Corpus* (XII. 1231): two of the shield inscriptions on the Orange triumphal arch appear to consist of two words, the *Boudillus Avot* already mentioned, and another near the end of the series, *Bodvacus . . . vavne.* On these the editor has the following note: 'Nomina sunt ducum Gallorum; AVOT et VAVNE vocabula nominibus adiecta utrum originem an dignitatem indicent dubitari potest.' *Bodvacus* was a princely name, and so probably was *Boudillus*, and the fact that the latter has the first place on the south side of the arch may have had a significance favourable to the view that *Avotis* in the wider sense of the word meant a lord or prince. In the present instance, however, one can only claim for it the sense of proprietor, director, or head of the firm, and the inscription ITOC AYOYѠT, that is *Itos Avvōt*, may be most aptly compared with that of BVCCOS AVOTIS, except that the latter gives the nominative in full.

Far the commonest form of the word in writing is the abbreviation *avot*, with which, of course, I include *avvot*. It is hardly necessary

to say that *vv*, probably pronounced *uu̯* or *w*, is familiar enough to the reader of Holder's great collection of Celtic names, in such cases as *Bavviacus* (s. v. *-aco-*), *Cavvama* (s. v. *-amo-*), and others, not to mention instances of Greek origin, such as *Evvaniclis* and *Evvaristus* (*C.I.L.*, XII. 192, 1751). Similarly some of the earliest Ogam inscriptions of Ireland and Wales double the *u̯* or *v* (ᚢᚢ), as in *avvi*, *avi*, a word of the *i̯o* declension, and meaning 'those connected with the *avos*', those reared and protected by him. We have the doubling also in the Latin portion of an Irish bilingual epitaph reading IVVERE DRVVIDES, which might be written *Iu̯u̯erae Dru̯u̯ides*, or *Iwerae Drwides*: see my *Studies in Early Irish History*, read to the British Academy in March, 1903. The spelling IVVERE, 'of Erin,' is the key to Mela and Juvenal's name of Ireland, namely IVVERNA, which, if we believe the editors, the poet must have pronounced *i̯ūverna*. This carries the spelling with *vv* which was common to the Goidels and some of the Celts of Gaul back to the first or second century of our era, and it argues intercourse between Gaul and Ireland.

3. A Celtic inscription found in August, 1906, in a field called Lapipe-Sené on Mont-Auxois, is briefly described by Commandant Espérandieu in the periodical *Pro Alesia*, 1906, pp. 43–5, plate xi. It was found near the western wall of a building with three apses, which he has promised to describe. The inscription is on four fragments, without reckoning comparatively small bits, some of which have never been found, while the position of others cannot be fixed. These do not appear in the Commandant's last photograph, which is reproduced here with his kind permission as Photo. 9 *a*. He gives the dimensions as 0^{m} 29 high by 0^{m} 20 thick: the length could not be given as the blocks had not been brought close together when I saw them in August, 1909; but as I had them placed last April the length was about 0^{m} 88. In 1909 they were in a temporary museum, but since then the Société des Sciences de Semur has had all the fragments that could be found set up in the new museum which it has organized at Alise.

I have received letters from M. Changarnier and M. Seymour de Ricci, kindly giving me their readings of the fragments, but I differ from both in places; and as they have not published their readings I shall, as a rule, confine myself to comparing my own guesses with Commandant Espérandieu's reading, as given in *Pro Alesia*, 1906, p. 43. He has kindly given me permission to make use of previous photographs, which he sent me from time to time. The differences between our versions reduce themselves within narrow

limits. Photograph 9 *a* gives a view of the *tout ensemble* of the bigger fragments.

My reading of the letters extant or partly visible in the first line runs as follows :—

CAM . . TAΛO . . : *a*ΥOΥωT . . ΚNO
C

I only differ from the Commandant as to the Κ, the perpendicular stroke of which is mostly gone ; he took what is left of the letter as forming the first part of an A leaning on the N following, but not touching it. At the very first sight of the earliest photograph which he sent me, I guessed that the group of letters at the end, including the C underneath, made ΚNOC, *cnos*. The ΛOC of *Samotalos* was on a fragment not represented in photograph 9 *a*, though most of it was in the first photographs which he was good enough to send me (Nos. 9 *b*, 9 *c*) That fragment was loose, it is true, but it was an important one, and it had on it nearly the whole of the Λ preceding the O, together with the upper half of the A of MA below in the second line. I may add, that M. de Ricci thinks that he can fit to it the first of the Commandant's smaller bits in such a way as to complete the O of TAΛOC and produce most of the C. I have seen neither of the pieces themselves.

The fragmentary letter before the first crack suggests a wide M, and the whole compound would be CAMOTAΛOC, which I was able to confirm on re-examining the stone. The photograph shows before the T what appears to be a bit of a slanting straight line, which, however, on being carefully scrutinized proved to be a deeply cut arc of a large O. The first letter on the next block (Photo. 9 *c*) was either an A, Λ, or M, but the two latter are ruled out by the unmistakable identity of the singular sequence AΥOΥωT—the last trace of writing can only be part of a T—with the AΥOΥωT of the previous inscription. Lastly, since by far the most common vowel preceding *cno-s* in ancient Celtic names is *i*, we may treat the first line as CAMOTAΛOC : AΥOΥωTIΚNOC, meaning 'Samotalos, son of Avvōtis', or son of an *avvōtis*.

The second line I read thus: CЄC . . . . . . $\frac{AΛ}{ΛA}$MA . . . . : ΓAPMA. It ends with ΓAPMA, of which the second A is imperfect, as it reaches only into the last gap. It does not come near the C beneath the first line and belonging to that line. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that ΓAPMA is an abbreviation. I take it, therefore, to be a woman's name, and to have been preceded by a feminine CЄCIA, or perhaps CЄCI*s*, the whole designation being approximately CЄCI*a*

ΓΑΡΜΑ, with the genitive of the father's name coming between them. What remains of the latter consists of ΜΑ preceded by ΛΛ or ΛΑ or ΑΛ; and the ΜΑ was followed by a letter with a perpendicular, along a part of which the fracture seems to have run, so that the letter may have been a Κ. The first letter of the name may have likewise been Κ, and the genitive as a whole some such form as ΚΛΑΜΑΚΙ or ΚΑΛΜΑΚΙ. The line might then be represented as CECIA : ΚΑΛΜΑΚΙ : ΓΑΡΜΑ, meaning 'Sesia Garma, daughter of *Calmacios* or *Clamacios*'. The latter part of the second Α of ΓΑΡΜΑ is gone, and the cementing has been rather badly done.

The third line reads: ΒΙΡΑΚΟΤϢΥΤΙ . . . . . ΑΝΝϢ. Here all the first eight letters are certain, though a fracture runs through the first Α and leaves a little of the first limb on the first block, and the rest on the second, on which the top of the Κ is gone. The next letter after the ϢW was Υ : the right arm is there, and the bottom point of the perpendicular. Then come the letters ΤΙ, with no room left for the stop (:) to precede as one would expect. The letters ΤΙ are followed by a slight trace of some curved letter like Greek sigma, C, at the edge of the gap: it may equally well have been Ο. In any case I am unable to decide what letter or letters have disappeared in the gap preceding the letters ΑΝΝ. We then come to the edge of the last gap, where we have the beginning of a letter which I take to have been ϢW rather than Ο: the Commandant, reproducing only what is still visible, gives it as C. This line ended with the letter in question, whatever it was, just opposite the final Α of ΓΑΡΜΑ.

The fourth line reads: ΚΟΒΡΙΤΟΥΛϢΥ . . . . Β : ΑΤΝΟ. The first name ΚΟΒΡΙΤΟΥΛϢΥ has its Β divided by the fracture already mentioned as passing through the first Α of the third line. After the ϢW comes an oblique ⸌ which the Commandant gives without hesitation; it is there and can only be the beginning of Υ. So we may compare the sequence ϢΥ here with the same in the third line, and both may be equated with the dative ending *oov* of *Ταρανοου* of the Orgon *ex-voto* (*Celtic Inscr.*, p. 17). The *Corpus*, XIII. iii. 10017, Nos. 72 and 83 (pp. 489, 490), gives two instances; one, at Autun, is read by the editor ΑΜΟΥΤϢΥ, but query ΑΜΒΙ ϢΥ and compare *Ambitivus* cited by Holder. The other comes from Mont-Beuvray and is at Saint-Germain: it reads ΟΥΟΓΙΤΙϢΥ, 'to Vogitius,' whose name was evidently related to that of Vogitoutus mentioned at p. 271 above.

Returning to our text, we have after ΚΟΒΡΙΤΟΥΛϢΥ a lacuna followed by Β, which I take to be the last letter of an abbreviation

of some word in the dative plural entitled to a case termination in *bo*, such as we have in Ανδοουννα-βο and Ματρε-βο Ναμαυσικα-βο, from an earlier *-bos*, equivalent to the Latin *-bus* in *dominabus*, *filiabus*, *matribus*, *vatibus*, *regibus*, and the like. At this point the inscriber had inevitably perceived that he would not have room enough for what he had to cut—hence the abbreviation. This is not our only misfortune, for a fracture has severed the group of letters for which he found space. As they stand, they read AT . . NO, with only the left half of the T intact, and of the N still less, to wit, the right perpendicular together with a little of the diagonal joining it at the bottom. But here there seems to be a difficulty: the NO appears to be on a slightly higher level than the rest of the line. This is partly—perhaps wholly—explained by the form of the N, which in this inscription tends to be Ͷ with its first perpendicular reaching lower than the second one. The same peculiarity may be noticed in the case of NꞶ at the end of the third line, where the Ꞷ is on a level with the first perpendicular of the Ͷ and not with that of the second. In the case of the NO at the end of the first line, the two limbs of the N do not differ much in length, but the second ends perceptibly higher than the level of the angle where the first begins to run downwards, and in this instance the O following takes an intermediate level. In the case in question in the fourth line we have to regard the N as having been probably of the form Ͷ and the O following as having been placed on the level of the second limb of the Ͷ. These forms of N are common enough in Latin inscriptions; and one may also compare the N in the Todi bilingual with the Celtic put into letters supposed to belong to the North Etruscan alphabet. For an extreme form of the N see the NN of the Collorgues fragment p. 281 above. In this connexion we are somewhat hampered by the bad cementing to which I have already referred: in the case of the second N of ANN we detect a distinct step in the first perpendicular of that letter, and it is visible in the photographs. If corrected, I do not know how it would work out. As it is, I found it was impossible to get the tops of the pieces to fall into line: the top of the KNOC fragment always appears to stand too high, which is due to the top of the preceding fragment having been fixed too low, owing to the clumsiness of the workman who did the cementing. It can hardly be remedied without running the risk of damaging the original stone.

This completes the front of the monument, but the Commandant called attention to two letters on the end of the stone, round the corner, and approximately on a level with the KNO of KNOC. He

reads them ΔΩ: the second letter is incomplete, but I could not make it anything else than an omega. Probably we should be right in regarding this as a continuation of the inscription on the front of the monument and completing the last word into ΑΤΝΟΔΩ to be interpreted as an adverbial expression reminding one of the Latin *pie* or *piissime*; let us suggest 'affectionately, tearfully' or some such note of tenderness.

Putting before you the letters wholly or partly extant, together with some of those conjectured, we arrive at the following legend:—

ϹΑΜΟΤΑΛΟϹ : αΥΟΥΩΤιΚΝΟ | ΔΩ
ϹЄϹΙα : κΛΑΜΑκι : ΓΑΡΜΑ ᶜ |
ΒΙΡΑΚΟΤΩΥΤΙ . . . . ΑΝΝΩ |
ΚΟΒΡΙΤΟΥΛΩΥ : . . . . . Β : ΑΤΝΟ |

Now, though there are two lacunae left, a glance at the whole inscription discloses its nature. It is a sepulchral monument set up by a husband and his wife to their three children. The names of the parents are in the nominative case, while those of the offspring are in the dative. No verb is expressed, but the legend seems to close with an adverbial expression. Having gathered so much as to the general meaning of our text we may turn back to consider further some of the individual words of which it consists.

(1) ϹΑΜΟΤΑΛΟϹ, *Samotalos*. The name is cited by Holder from an inscription in the museum at Épinal, whither it found its way from Monthureux-sur-Saône (Vosges), and from a stamp on a basin at Le Châtelet in Belgium: see *C. I. L.*, XIII. iii. 10006. 82, where it has been treated as *Samoialus*. The late M. d'Arbois de Jubainville interpreted the compound as meaning 'l'homme au front doux', just as he renders *Samo-rix*, 'aimable roi': see his 'Noms Gaulois', pp. 2, 12, 188. The elements of the compound are *samo-*, Irish *sám*, *sáme*, 'rest, tranquillity,' *sáim*, 'quiet, mild': *săm*, 'summer,' is probably related, and Welsh *haf*, 'summer,' whence an adjective *hafeid*, now *hafaid*, 'summerly, tractable.' The other element is *talo-*, Welsh *tal*, made in Mod. Welsh into *tâl*, 'forehead.' The Irish is attested only as *tul* or *taul*, 'forehead,' but *talcen*, the Mod. Welsh for 'forehead', seems borrowed from an earlier Irish *tal cinn*, which occurs as *tul cind*, 'end or front of the head, forehead': see Windisch's *Irische Texte*, p. 299 ('Fled Bricrend', § 88).

(2) αΥΟΥΩΤιΚΝΟϹ, *Avvoticnos*. By far the most usual vowel preceding the termination *-cno-s* was *i*, but *u* also occurs as in ϹΙΛΟΥΚΝΟϹ (p. 271 above), *Taranu-cno-s*, 'son of Thunder,' from Ταρανου-ς (not from the kindred name *Taranucus*), the god

Taranucnos being regarded as son of the divinity named *Taranus* of the *u* declension: see also p. 276, where *-a-κνος* has been suggested. The vowel preceding *-cno-* was the one ending the stem of the simpler noun; but *i* became a favourite, and appears to have been brought in where it had no etymological right to come. Here, however, this need not delay us, since *i* was the vowel ending the stem *avvoti-*, from which *avvoticnos* was formed regularly. The next question is how *avvoticnos* is to be explained. Two conjectures offer themselves: the first is, that *avvotis* was here used as a proper name, just as we have such names as Lord, Prince, King. The other is that *avvoticnos* did not mean that Samotalos was son of a man named Avvotis, but that the word gave his rank as that of the son of a proprietor or lord. We have analogy for this in the inscriptions of the Goidels in Britain: thus *tigernacos*, 'princely, lordly,' is found denoting rank in a Pembrokeshire bilingual epitaph (Holder, s.v. *Tigernacus*); also *filius tigernacus* (*Cymmrodor*, XVIII, p. 49) and *Maqveriqi* (genitive), 'of a king's son, of princely rank.' This last was in Irish *mac ríg*; but the other *filius Tigernacus* must, in its Irish garb of *mac tigirn*, have had wide acceptance, as we trace to it the Welsh *mechdeyrn*, *mychdeyrn*, 'monarch, ruler,' Cornish *mychtern*, 'a lord, a sovereign,' and Breton *machtiern*: the Latin plural is entered in De Courson's index to his 'Cartulaire de l'Abbaye de Redon' thus: 'Machtierni, Tiarni, Tyranni,' and 'Machtierni vel principes plebium et parochiarum'. On these lines it would be reasonable to interpret *avvoticnos* as meaning 'the son of an *avvotis*, one of the rank of an *avvotis*', a word which, as we said, was likely to have signified lord or head. This derives support from the fact that the monument is of unusual pretensions for one in a Celtic language.

(3) CECI*a*, CECI*s*, *Sesia*, *Sesis*. CECIA would be the feminine of CECIOC, which is cited by Holder from Rome as *Sessius* in Latin (*C. I. L.*, XV. 420). He quotes Sessis from Ennodius, Bishop of Pavia, who lived from 473 till 521; but he only uses it as the name of a tributary stream of the Po, now called *Sesia*, near Vercelli in Piedmont: another form of the latter name Holder gives as *Sesites*.

(4) κΛΑΜΑΚι, κΑΛΜΑΚι, *Clamaci*, *Calmaci*. Holder cites *Villam Clamiciacum* as the old name of Clamecy in the Department of Nièvre. *Clamici* comes very near the *Clamaci* which is favoured by the reading of the second line of this inscription. If instead of *κλα* we read *καλ* we should have ΚΑΛΜΑΚΙ, genitive of ΚΑΛΜΑΚΙΟΣ, which Holder finds imbedded in *Calmaci-acus*, whence the modern name of Chaumuzy, borne by a place near Rheims. *Calmac-* would be of the same origin as Irish *calma*, 'valiant, brave,' from an early

calmio-, which Brythonic, treating as *calmiɀo-*, has made into *celfyd*, 'ingenious, artistic,' Breton *kalvez*, 'a carpenter': compare Welsh *celficyn*, 'a small article of furniture.' We have possibly to fall back on a shorter genitive ΚΑΑΜΑι or ΚΑΑΜΑι like *Eccaios* and the other instances collected by Holder under *-aio-s*, to which may be added the genitive *Oxtai* occurring in one of the Moritasgus inscriptions to be mentioned presently. It looks, however, as if a longer genitive like ΚΑΑΜΑΚΙ would fit the space occupied by the name somewhat better.

(5) ΓΑΡΜΑ, *Garma*. The probable explanation of this name is that it is a levelling of *Gorma*, of the same origin as Modern Irish *gorm*, 'blue.' Stokes in his Fick volume, p. 114, has two words *gorm*, one from *gormo-s*, 'warm, roth,' and the other from *gorsmo-s*, 'dunkel,' but they seem to me to be one and the same word with a curious variation of meaning. The Welsh is *gwrm*, 'dun, dusky, of a dark brown colour'; but I take it that neither the Irish nor the Welsh was originally the name for any special colour. This is corroborated by a gloss of O'Davoren—'Gorm .i. *urdairc*': see Stokes's *Three Irish Glossaries*, p. 94. *Urdairc* means 'splendid, illustrious, glorious', and the lady whose name has here been guessed to have been *Sesia* or *Sesis* may have had an epithet with some such signification.

(6) ΒΙΡΑΚΟΤΩΥ is the dative of ΒΙΡΑΚΟΤΟΥϹ, *Biracotus*, of the *u* declension, a compound which analyses itself into *Bira-cotu-s*. The qualifying element *bira* is of the same origin as Irish *bir*, *biur*, Mod. Ir. *bior*, genitive *bero*, *bera*, 'a spit, a lance point, a spike,' Welsh *ber*, 'a spear, a lance, or pike; a spit for roasting meat; a skewer or stake.' The related Latin form is *veru*, 'a spit or stake,' which suggests that both the Irish and the Welsh were originally neuter of the *u* declension, like Latin *veru*, a fact attested in the case of the Irish word, though both are now masculine: see Hogan's *Irish Neuter Substantives* in the 'Todd Lecture Series', IV. 206. The other element is *Cotu-s* of the *u* declension, and possibly to be identified with Caesar's *Cotus* which is treated as of the *o* declension; but this does not prove that it was not of the *u* declension in the Celtic of the Aedui. That it was so is suggested by the probably related form *Cotu-atus*, the name of a leader of the Carnutes, also mentioned by Caesar: see Meusel's edition of the *De Bello Gallico*, vii. 3, 39. The Indo-European root seems to have been *kuth*, whence in Teutonic *hud*, related possibly to Greek κεύθω, 'I hide': see Kluge, s.v. *Hütte*. The Welsh is represented by *cot*, *cod*, and *cwd*, 'a bag or sack.' So *Bira-cotu-s* may be inferred to have meant 'a hiding or heeding with a spear', more generally speaking of 'one who

is a protection effected by means of the spear'. Names of the *u* declension, be it noticed, may be masculine or feminine: this is probably masculine.

(7) TIC . . . . ANNω. This represents the dative singular masculine of a name ending in the nominative in ANNOC. The second element might be ΔANNO-C which is suggested to me by the *danno-* of Danno-talis, p. 290 above, but it might just as well be BANNO-C: in fact this will be found to be the more probable of the two. Among the related forms cited by Holder may be mentioned *Banna*, and the place-names *Bannaciacus*, *Bannaventa*, *Bannolus*, *Bannovallum*, and others. The meaning may possibly be akin to that of Irish *bann*, 'law,' *for-bann*, 'command,' from *banno-*, 'a ban, interdict, prohibition': see Stokes in Fick's book, II, p.159, and d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les Premiers Habitants de l'Europe*, II[u]. 335. The first element in the compound reads TI followed by traces of a letter which seems to have been C. The whole of it may have been TICA of the same origin as the *Tisios*, *Tisia*, *Tisiacus* and the like cited by Holder, but hardly, perhaps, to be severed from others that he gives such as *Tessius* (*Teđđius*), *Tessillus* (*Teđđillos*); *Tessilla*, f. *Tessignius* (*Teđđicnius*). These suggest that *tess-* represents an early *tens-* to be traced in the Latin *tensu-s*, *tensu-m*, *tensā*, 'stretched out, drawn tight, strained, tense,' Gothic *-þinsan*, O.H. German *dinsan*, 'to draw or pull,' Lithuanian *tē̃s-ti*, 'to draw or stretch.' Should these surmises prove well founded, Τισα-βαννο-ς may have meant 'one who strictly observed the prohibitions affecting him, one who carefully avoided the ill-luck of violating his *gessa* or taboos': a man's *gessa* play an important part in old Irish tales. However, the exact signification of these proper names is of no great consequence here; one is more troubled by the inability to decide whether the space required some such spelling as Τισσαβαννω, Τισιαβαννω, or the like, rather than Τισαβαννω, to which I give the preference.

(8) KOBPITOYΛωY is the dative of Κοβριτουλου-ς, *Cobritulu-s* of the *u* declension. The first element is κοβρι-, in O. Irish *cobir*, Modern Ir. *cobhair*, *cabhair*, fem. 'help, assistance, support': see the *Gram. Celtica*, p. 781, and Stokes's Fick volume, p. 169. When the first element in such a name as that in question here means protection or safety one naturally looks to the second element to convey the idea of bearer or bringer, as in the case of such Greek names as Ονησί-φορο-ς, Ελπιδό-φορο-ς, Καρπό-φορο-ς and the like. So the τουλου-ς of the Celtic compound may be taken as meaning bringer or bearer, and the compound *Cobri-tulu-s* may be rendered 'Aid-bringer'. The vocable *tul-* of the same origin as Latin *tul* (as perfect of *fero*) occurs in several Irish per-

sonal names, such as the following, to be met with in the pedigrees in the Book of Leinster—*Tulach*, fo. 368^{c}; *Tuladrain* (genitive), f. 357^{f}; *Tolaing* (genitive), f. 317^{c}; *Tola*, f. 350^{f}, gen. *Tola*, f. 350^{b}, and *Tolai*, f. 358^{b}; *Tuli latha*, f. 355^{f}; *Tolaid*[1] (gen.), f. 331^{b}, 332^{b}. Among these we seem to have an inverted compound parallel to *Cobri-tulu-s* in *Tolang*, gen. *Tolaing*, in the tribal designation *Húi Mælain Tolaing*, 'the descendants of Mælán, the bringer of protection or safety,' where *aing* is to be interpreted by means of the verb *angim*, *aingim*, 'I protect,' which Thurneysen would refer to some such theme as *aneg-* (*Handbuch*, p. 331). Lastly, I should guess Κοβριτουλους to have been a woman's name. Compare *Cartimandus*, already mentioned (p. 289), which appears to have been the Celtic name of the Brigantian queen. A woman's name in *-us* must, however, have struck a Roman as somewhat strange, and she seems to have been provided with an alternative one which sounded feminine enough. This was *Cartimandua*, derived from *Cartimandu-s*. See Mr. Furneaux's edition of the *Annals of Tacitus*, xii. 36 (II, p. 259, note).

(9) Now should come a word ending with B as an abbreviation of the dative plural of an ancient vocable meaning children. The search for it brings me back to the question of the small fragments with letters or portions of letters on them. Commandant Espérandieu sketches three of them in his article in the journal *Pro Alesia* (Nos. 3 and 4), p. 45. For the student's convenience and with the Commandant's kind permission, these are embodied in photograph 9*f*. The first of them is used by M. de Ricci to finish TAΛOC in the first line; and to explain how he does it I give his sketch of the whole inscription in photograph 9 *d*, which shows also, in the left margin, how he reads the small fragment, which is second in the Commandant's description. Lastly, besides these three bits we seem to have one at least figuring above the KNOC fragment in photograph 9 *c*. It appears also in a sketch of the whole front of the monument given me by M. Louis Matruchot, the editor of *Pro Alesia*. That sketch is here reproduced as photograph 9 *e*. The sketches by M. de Ricci and M. Matruchot were not intended for publication, but they are so instructive at different points that I have taken the liberty of putting them into a permanent form. I have not seen any of the small fragments in question,

[1] According to Stokes and Strachan's *Thesaurus*, II. 267, this is read *Tolit* in the Book of Armagh (fo. 13^{a} 2) by Gwynn, but they have printed 'Cuil *Tolat*'. In the Book of the Dun (fo. 52^{b}) it is 'Cúil *Tulad* (? Talad'), and Hogan's *Onomasticon* has, besides the other forms, those of 'C. Thalaith' and 'C. Toladh', after the Four Masters who also have Cúil Toladh (A. M. 3303). The genuine forms were possibly *Tolat*, genitive *Tol(a)it* for early *Tulanto-s*, gen. *Tulanti*.

and M. Matruchot states that he does not know what became of them.

Even if we could handle the small pieces it would probably be hard to fit them into their places, but the two with letters belonging to two different lines can only go into the name beginning with TIC in the third line, and to the abbreviated word ending with B in the line underneath. Let us first take the reading approximately adopted by the Commandant and M. de Ricci of the bit[1] with three letters

A
BA or A
BΛ and add it to TIC. We then have TICA
B(A over Λ). In the next

place let us add on from photographs 9 *c*, 9 *e*, what M. Matruchot reads as a P with what I should treat as the lower portion of a B standing above it: the trial group would then look as follows:—

TICABANNω
B(A over Λ)P B:

This, however, admits of simplification, since the letter between B and P cannot be a consonant; so Λ is eliminated in favour of A, and the result stands thus:—

TICABANNω
BAP B:

It remains for us to fill the gap in the lower line. As what we are looking for is the dative plural of a word meaning offspring, children, the BAP at which we have automatically arrived reminds us of the Aryan root *bher* represented in Latin by *fero*, 'I bear,' and *fors*, *forte*, 'chance,' English *bear* and *birth*, Irish *beraim*, 'I bear,' and *breith*, 'birth,' Welsh *cymer*, 'take,' for *com-ber*: I refer to Stokes's articles on *berô* and its derivatives (Fick, ii, pp. 169, 170). One of them is in fact just what is wanted here, namely, *br̥tí-s*, 'tragen, Geburt.' In Irish it yields *breith*, *brith*, the verbal noun corresponding to *beraim*, 'I bear,' and meaning the act of bearing, birth; in Welsh *bryd* in *edfryd*, *edryd* (for *ate-br̥ti-s*), 'bearing back,' in the sense of 'restoring', and *cymryd* (from *com-brit*), 'the act of accepting, in the sense of bearing away with you, of taking to yourself.' The letters, therefore, to be inserted seem to be TI, which receive some confirmation in the bit which shows a part of the perpendicular of such a letter as T or I: see M. de Ricci's sketch and photograph 9 *f*. We arrive thus at a form BAPTIB, and extend the abbreviation into BAPTIBO or BAPTIBOC, corresponding to what might be in Latin *fortibus* from *fors*, 'chance,' though differing widely in sense. The

[1] The Commandant refers it to lines 2 and 3, but I take that to be a slip: it can only belong to lines 3 and 4.

spelling *ai* representing a stage in the pronunciation of what philologists write *ṛ*, cannot be reckoned a difficulty, as we are ignorant of the exact nature and history of the sound to which they apply that symbol suggested by Sanskrit analogy. With regard to the signification we may here mention, that in O. Norse this word was *burð-r* and that it signified not only birth but also embryo and what is born, as does also the etymological equivalent, *birth*, in English: see the *New English Dictionary*, s.v. We are not without evidence of the analogous transition of sense from the abstract to the concrete in the case of the Celtic equivalents. *Ed-fryd* in its reduced form of *ed-ryd* (plural *edrydau*) meant not only the act of restoring, but also, in direct reference to bearing and birth, that which is born; for it is found used by the poets to signify stock, family, or as Dr. Davies puts it, 'genus, prosapia, cognatio.' In short, whether we consider the form or the signification, we appear to be at liberty to assume the possibility of a dative plural *bartibo(s)* used in reference to offspring.

(10) ΑΤΝΟΔѠ. This I take to be a contraction of an earlier *ατε-νοδω*, possibly *ατε-σνοδω*, the root being *nod* or *snod*, yielding in Welsh the word *nodd*, 'the juice of a vegetable, the sap of a tree,' Irish *snódhach*, given in O'Reilly's *Dictionary* probably for a more correct *snodhach* (with a short *o*), meaning 'sap or juice'. Modern Welsh has also a plural *adnoddau* signifying 'resources', suggested possibly by that word. Here we have *ad* representing the ancient prefix *ate* which has approximately the same meaning as Latin prefix *re*. But the meaning I should be inclined to ascribe to the *ατνοδω* of our inscription would be the adverbial one 'with the shedding of tears, with weeping, tearfully, mournfully'.

In trying to get the readings suggested to fit to scale there are two or three things to be noticed. Between Σαμοταλος and Αυουωτικνος there was probably the colon stop: as there may have been also between Σεσια and Κλαμακι, whereas it seems to have been absent between Βιρακοτων and Τι . . . . It was probably also absent after Κοβριτουλων, the other word ending with ων. On that supposition it seems possible to get the required letters in, but even then there will be no room to spare. The first fragment in photographs 12 and 13 requires to be pushed up close to the large compound fragment on its right, so that the split letters, to wit, Α in line 3 and Β in line 4, may be closed as far as the damaged edges will help to show how they fitted. The ΥΟΥѠ piece must not be pushed quite close to the large fragment: room must be left in the first line for : Α, and further on for the missing half of the Τ of Αυουωτικνος,

the whole of the I and the vertical portion of the K, the rest of which appears on the last or KNOC fragment. The pieces should be brought together with due regard to these details in so far, at any rate, as the cementing does not force them out of scale. Then another good photograph should be taken of the whole, and copies of it should be distributed among the Celtic scholars most likely to make use of them. In this way we should soon have the uncertainties of the reading reduced within their narrowest limits. When I visited the temporary museum at Alise I had forgotten to procure permission to scrutinize the inscribed fragments: they were inside a wire enclosure, and I looked at them from the floor. Last April I sought the permission of Dr. Adrien Simon, president of the Semur Society, to examine the inscription more closely, and thanks to him I received all assistance possible, which I take this opportunity of cordially acknowledging.

These notes on the inscription may be conveniently summarized here and preceded by the text which they appear to imply, as follows.—

CAMOTAΛOC : αYOYωTιKNO
C
CЄCIα : κΛAMAKι : ΓAPMA
BIPAKOTωY TICABANNω
KOBPITOYΛωYBAPTιB : ATNO ΔΩ

That is, freely rendered into English:—

Samotalos son of Avvõtis (and)
Sesia Garma, daughter of Clamacios,
tearfully (set up this monument) to
their children Biracotus, Tisabannos,
(and) Cobritulus.

4. Soon after my visit to Alise in 1909 Commandant Espérandieu and Dr. Epery favoured me with copies of a photograph showing a score of small objects which they had discovered on Mont-Auxois in the course of their diggings there. Among them are two pieces of lead with writing of the graffito kind on them both, in the Greek alphabet: I had a look at them last April. The bigger one measures four centimetres long by rather more than one centimetre broad and it reads KAPOMAPO. The end of the lead is very jagged, and there is nothing left to show whether or not the name had a final C. Elsewhere it occurs in Latin as CAROMARVS stamped alone on a vessel in the museum at Mannheim, but on others with *F* (for *fecit*) appended, to wit, in the Mainz Museum: for further instances see *C. I. L.*, XIII. iii. No. 10010. 461 (p. 174). The name analyses itself

into *Caro-maro-s*, with *caro-* of the same origin as the Latin *cārus* and the second part of *Su-caru-s* (ibid., 10010. 2408, p. 405), Welsh *hy-gar*, 'dear, beloved,' O. Breton *-ho-car*. The other element is the familiar one of *māro-s*, 'great.' Even so it is not quite certain what the compound exactly meant: it may have signified 'a great one who is beloved'. Possibly it meant simply 'greatly beloved'.

5. The other bit of lead is very small, and Dr. Epery suggested the reading ƆYIΓPA, where he would regard the first character as part of an O. We should accordingly have OYI, which reminds one of the dative termination of certain names of the *o* declension. I am not quite certain that what figures here as Γ is not a B imperfect at the bottom. That would recall the Βρατουδε formula of the South. Were that reading certain we should be warranted in drawing some important conclusions from it; but, as it is, we cannot do anything of the kind. Both bits of lead are represented in photographs 10, 11. We may guess that the inscription is part of a humble *ex-voto* from a temple sacred to the god Moritasgos.

*** Two Latin inscriptions found by the same gentlemen, for copies of which I am indebted to Dr. Epery, equate the god with Apollo: the first, on a stone carved to represent a person's thigh and knee, runs as follows: see photograph 12, for which I have to thank Commandant Espérandieu:—

AVG SAC
DEO APOLLINI
MORITASGO
CATIANVS
OXTAI

Here the O of DEO, of APOLLINI, the final O of MORITASGO, and the initial O of OXTAI are a modification of omega. See the second Genouilly epitaph, p. 315 below. Whether the same peculiarity is to be traced in the next *ex-voto* I cannot tell. Dr. Epery reads it as follows:—

AVG SAC
APOLLINI
MORITASGo .... AVIVS · ALI
DIOFANES .... ER · LIB · P ·

Perhaps Moritasgos was also named in a more fragmentary inscription, which the same gentleman had brought to light some time previously on the handle of a patera, reading as follows:—

.... SAC DEO APPOL
.... CVS POSVIT

PHOTO 9*d*

PHOTO 9*e*

THE MORITASGOS EX-VOTO

2 A ΓΑ

3 I

PHOTO 9*f*

ON TWO PIECES OF LEAD

PHOTO 13

PHOTO 14

For this see Com. Espérandieu's *Fouilles de la Croix Saint-Charles au Mont-Auxois: Premier Rapport* (Dijon, Jobard, 1910), p. [277]. See also Holder, s. v. *Mori-tasgus*, where another important inscription is given, the only one then known to mention that god. *Moritasgos* was evidently the Apollo of ancient Alesia, in the character of the repeller of diseases, as Caesar describes him. The *tasgo-s* of his name is to be compared with the *Tasgia* mentioned at p. 287 above; but what are we to make of *mori*, which would seem to suggest the sea? It is likely to prove of the same origin with the *mor-* of *Morrígain*, which Stokes (Fick, 211) took to have meant 'elf-queen', and to have only been distorted by popular etymology into *mór-ríqain*, 'great queen'. The element *mor-* equates with *mare* in English *nightmare*, French *cauchemar*, and German *Mahr*; also with O. Bulgarian *mora*, 'a witch.' In that case one might guess that *Mori-tasgo-s* meant a repeller or queller of elves and witches, that is to say, of the evil powers supposed to cause disease, blights, and baleful blasts, and to be routed, according to Irish story, by Lug: see my *Notes on the Coligny Calendar*, pp. 17, 36. In fact, *Moritasgos* may only have been a local name of the god Lug in the capacity of healer of sundry diseases of the human body.

IV

1, 1. In August, 1909, I visited the museum at Bourges, and saw the inscribed stone from Genouilly (Cher), mentioned in my paper on the *Celtic Inscriptions of France and Italy*, p. 54: see *C. I. L.*, XIII. 1326. What we have on it consists, strictly speaking, of two inscriptions belonging presumably to persons of one and the same family. The stone is a slab 1m 60 high by 0m 52 or more in the widest part. Unfortunately a considerable piece of it is gone from the left top corner, carrying with it the beginning of the two first lines of the first epitaph, which reads as it stands:—

. . . . . . OS · VIRILIOS
. . . . . TOC · OYIPIAAIO
ANЄOYNOC
ЄΠOЄI

Before TOC the *Corpus* has a short horizontal line, but I failed to notice anything before OS or TOC; in fact, the left side of the first O is gone in the first line; and the French antiquary, M. de Laugardière, to whom the *Corpus* refers the reader, seems to have found no more of this line; and both OS and TOC appear to have been

followed by a point or stop. A feature of the L in the first line has been overlooked in the *Corpus*: it has two horizontal bars at the bottom, so that it looks rather like an F upside down, that is to say, it stands for LL, a conclusion favoured by the next line with its ΛΛ. On the other hand, one would have expected ΟΥΙΡΙΛΛΙΟ to have had a C at the end: in any case the inscriber had left himself no room for it. Enough of the first two lines is left to dispose me to think that they consisted of the Celtic name of one and the same person, given in Latin letters and in Greek ones, both times in the nominative, and meaning 'So-and-so, son of Virillos'. Then comes, at a larger distance from the second line, the name of the man who erected or prepared the monument, and that not only in the Greek alphabet, but also in the Greek language. The spelling of the verb does not seem so much to argue carelessness in copying ἐποίει, as the wish to give the phonetic spelling, ἐπόει, at a period when ει was already pronounced ι: the result was, at any rate, to give us what appears to have been the correct Attic spelling of the word.

The name Ανεουνος enters into the longer name *Otuaneuni*, genitive of *Otuaneunos*, which is found on the triumphal arch at Saintes (*C. I. L.*, XIII. 1036). The former probably analyses itself into Αν-εουνο-ς, where αν- is presumably the intensive particle: so the compound would mean 'very εουνος', but what did εουνος mean? Holder has collected words ending in *-uno-*, *-unā*, but the *u*, in stems regularly formed, belongs to the stem, and this is the case here; we may therefore divide the word into *Eu-no-s*, which occurs as a man's name, *Eunus*, in an inscription to be seen at Bourges, already mentioned (p. 290 above), and has a derivative *Eunius* cited by Holder. Thus the stem would be *eu*, which I regard as standing for an earlier *ehu* from *esu*, that is to say from the name of the god Esu-s. In that case *An-euno-s* would mean 'partaking greatly of the nature of Esus, very like Esus'. Compare for the treatment of vowel-flanked *s* such parallels as Holder's *Esuggiu-s* and *Eugiu-rix*, where we have the same element *E(s)ugiu-*; also *Ucueti-s* from *Ud-guheti-* = *Ud-guseti-* (p. 291 above, also *Celt. Inscriptions*, p. 7), and *Suiōrebe* for **Suihōrebe* = **Suisōrebe*, 'to two sisters' (ibid., p. 53).

The disjointed syntax of this epitaph is emphasized by more space being left between lines 2 and 3 than between 1 and 2 or 3 and 4. In Latin epitaphs, moreover, we are usually informed as to the relationship between the person who has the monument erected and him whose memory it is to commemorate. Here we have no clue, but it is reasonable to suppose that Aneunos was of the same family as Virillos.

THE GENOUILLY TOMBSTONES (CHER)

PHOTO 16*a*, 16*b* PHOTO 17

1, 2. Some eight inches lower on the stone, but on a higher level of the surface, we have the other inscription, which reads as follows: the letters are Latin, but the language is Celtic, probably Gaulish:

ELVONTIV
IEVRV · ANEVNΩ
OCLICNΩ · LVGVRI ·
ANEVNICNΩ

Here are several things to be noticed: for instance, I found what I took to be marks of interpunction: the one occurring after IEVRV is the only one given in the *Corpus*, but I thought I detected a similar one between the two words forming the third line, and another of a somewhat different shape at the end of that line. All these consist of diminutive triangles; but there is a point in the Ω at the end of the second line which may also have been meant as a part of the interpunction, though it is more likely to have been merely ornamental. In that capacity the point occurs often enough: see p. 271 above, where C also was found provided with it. In the next place it is to be noticed that the Ω in question is not the ordinary Latin O, but a form of the Greek omega resembling an O on a horizontal line, Ω, which was doubtless derived from Ω by making the straight lines continuous, a very natural simplification which is known to occur often enough in somewhat late Greek documents: so I learn from one of my Oxford colleagues, who is a distinguished Greek scholar. In the case of the omega at the end of OCLICNΩ, the horizontal line has been produced as a sort of tangent towards the left until it touches the bottom of the N preceding it. The one at the end of the last patronymic is more carelessly formed and looks almost like a Δ with its two sides consisting of arcs of a circle. The minuscule omega is used four times in the spelling of Celtic names in the Samotalos inscription at Alise, and in one instance it occurs for the long *o* ending the dative singular of a noun of the *o* declension, as in the three instances here in question: see *p.* 309 above. What is remarkable is that the Greek character should have been retained in epitaphs which are otherwise in Latin letters. It seems to prove two things, that the length of the final vowel of the dative was well marked in the Gaulish pronunciation of the time implied, and that the influence of the Greek alphabet among the Celts of Gaul had been by no means of brief duration.

The name Elvontiu is obscure, but it is probably a nominative of the *n*-declension. The patronymic *Oclicno-s* is derived from *Ocli-s*, or else *Oclo-s*, just as *Anevnicno-s* is seen to be from *Anevno-s*, but neither *Ocli-s* nor *Oclo-s* is other than obscure. If I could feel sure

that I have read C instead of G I should compare the following inscription:—

OGL · AVG · SAC
ATEVRITVS
SEPLAS · V · S · L · M.

M. de Ricci found this on a small bronze pedestal supposed to come from the vicinity of Rheims: see the *Revue Celtique*, xxx. 268, 269, and plate. *Luguri* would seem to be a derivative from the name of the god *Lugu-s*, Irish *Lug*, genitive *Logo*: see my *Notes on the Coligny Calendar*, pp. 24–30 and *passim*. Compare *Rivos* (an alias for *Lugus*) and *Rivros*, the name of the Rivos month, to wit, August, probably for *Rivo-ro-s*. In any case *Luguri* must have been the dative of **Luguri-s* of the *i* declension. This seems to be involved in the Irish tribe-name of Cinél *Lugair*, to which belonged the head poet or *file* of Ireland in St. Patrick's time, Dubthach maccu *Lugir*, one of the Saint's most famous converts. The genitive occurs mostly as *Lugair*, but the Book of Armagh has also *Lugir*: see Stokes and Strachan's *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus*, II, p. 267, where we have *subulcus Lugir*, and p. 260, where we have Dubthoch maccu *Lugil*, with *Lugil* carelessly written for *Lugir*, and *Dubthoch* correctly given as a more ancient form than the more usual *Dubthach*. Witness the Latin genitive *Dobituci* and its Ogmic equivalent, *Dovatuceas* (of the *i* declension), at Clydai in Pembrokeshire; in Welsh it is *Dyfodwg*. To return to *Lugair*, the editors of the *Thesaurus* give the nominative as *Lugar*: the nominative, however, seldom occurs, but Stokes's *Gorman*, May 11, has *Lugair Lobor*, 'Lugair the Infirm,' in the nominative, and the Book of Leinster (f. 315[c]) has in the nominative *in file Lugair*, 'the *file* Lugair.' Nominative *Lugair*, with genitive *Lugair*, argues a stem of the *ī* declension, inflected somewhat like the Irish feminine *inis*, 'island,' genitive *inis*. The name occurs also on a piece of black pottery at Saint-Germain, but unfortunately it breaks off short of the case ending, and only reads ΛOYΓOYP: see *C. I. L.*, XIII. iii. 10017. 77 (p. 489). One word remains to be mentioned, and that is IEVRV, which I equate approximately with the ЄΠOЄI of the Greek portion of the other inscription. The rendering of the whole runs thus: 'Elvontiu made (it) for Aneunos son of Oclos (and) for Luguris son of Aneunos.'

M. de Laugardière's suggestive description of the stone is to be found (accompanied with a drawing) in the *Bulletin archéologique du Comité des Travaux historiques et scientifiques* for 1894, pp. 127–37 (plate ix). I had not seen it when I visited Bourges,

so I wish to indicate some of the differences between his readings and what I have given above from the notes I made at the time. His account of the L in the first line runs thus: 'Il est à remarquer que, dans l'inscription, la haste de la lettre L paraît être un peu plus haute que le sommet des lettres voisines, ce qui me peut porter à penser que l'intention du graveur était de lui donner une valeur double,' &c. He seems to have written that from an inexact recollection of the lettering. On the final O of the second line he places the horns of a Y, which, according to my reading, would perhaps make OY, and imply a nominative in *-ους*. In both lines I thought that I detected a stop. Lastly, he suggests restoring the first name in the first line as [OCL]OS, and the first in the second line as [ATEΞ]TOC, which seems to imply that the inscriber cut Ξ instead of X. I may mention that M. de Laugardière writes that 'les O sont en général sensiblement plus petits que les autres caractères', which is probably true as to the actual height of the O in these inscriptions, but their smallness here is not so conspicuous as to attract immediate attention, as frequently happens in other instances. Lastly, his paper would suggest, that some mishap had overtaken my note on the distances between the lines of the first of the inscriptions; for I jotted down that the distance between lines 1 and 2 is only one-half or one-third of the distance between lines 2 and 3; but this is corroborated by M. de Laugardière's own plate.

2. In the same paper M. de Laugardière has described another inscribed stone found at Genouilly: it is of the same material, and he gives the dimensions as 1m 29 by 0m 27 wide at the level of the writing, which consists of only a single word—RVONTV. It is possible that there was a letter or two preceding the R, but I could not find anything there; and as to the T, that letter is peculiarly formed with the top stroke tilted up behind; I was not able to make it out to be any other letter. Taking RVONTV as the entire inscription, I would suggest explaining the name as standing for an earlier *o* stem, *Rugonto-*, with the soft vowel-flanked *g* elided just as in the TIO of the Coligny Calendar, for *tigos*, 'house, temple.' Compare the instances of elision of *g* collected by Holder, I. 1503, 1504, including such as 'deo *Mounti*' for *Mogonti*, 'dis *Mountibus*' for *Mogontibus*, 'deo *Mouno*' for 'Apollini *Mogouno*', not to mention *Latio-ma(g)us*, *Ri(g)oma(g)us*, and (Gregory of Tours') *Mantolomaus*, *Montalomago*, and other instances of the same kind: see also p. 324 below. We have the element *rug* in a name *Caturugi* (genitive of a *Catu-rugio-s* or *Catu-rugo-s*) in Latin letters on a stone at Merthyr Mynach in Carmarthenshire. We may possibly have the shorter

forms in *Ruga* and *Rugus* cited by Holder. The Neo-Celtic words related are Welsh *rhu-o*, 'to roar, also to bluster,' Irish *rucht*, *ruchd*, 'a great shout, clamour,' *rucht mîled*, 'a soldier's cry,' used of a far-reaching shout for help uttered by Cúchulainn when overpowered by his foes, also of the sound of the sword in use (Windisch's *Táin Bó Cualnge*, 2960, 5583), Manx Gaelic *roogh*, 'to bellow, to roar.' The Welsh *rhu-o* and kindred forms would seem to indicate that *rug-* was *rūg*, which rather militates against the conjecture that the Welsh word is a loan from Latin *rŭgīre*, 'to roar,' for the *ŭ* of which compare ἐρῠγή, 'a bellowing' (Hesychius) and the Homeric ἐρυγόντα, 'bellowing,' together with other cognates: see Walde. The meaning of *Catu-rug-i* would seem to have been 'one who is loud in the conflict, a battle roarer,' and that of *Ruontos* cannot have been very different. *Ruonto-s* is a species of participial formation to be compared with **Anaganto-s* (in Irish *Anagat*), *Caranto-s*, *Decantae*, and the like (*Notes on the Coligny Calendar*, pp. 14 n., 60 n.), but it shows the same conjugational vowel *o* as *Nodons*, dative *Nodont-i*, in the name of the god Latinized *Nodens*, genitive *Nodentis* (ibid., p. 50, *Celtic Folklore*, p. 446). *Ruontu*, with its final *u*, is the dative, and this brief epitaph means 'To Ruontos, or to the memory of Ruontos'.

When I visited Bourges I was met by M. P. Gauchery, engineer and architect from Vierzon (Cher), who kindly vouchsafed me information as to the bibliography of the inscriptions found at Genouilly, and notes of his own as to the locality of the finds. The latter were of such interest that I asked him to be so good as to send them to me in writing at his leisure: he did so in 1909, and I venture to have them printed here:—

'La commune où ont été découvertes ces stèles se nomme Genouilly; elle est à 15 kilomètres à l'ouest de Vierzon. Le mouton, motton (petite motte) est une petite éminence à l'ouest de Genouilly. C'est sur les flancs de cette motte qu'on a decouvert ces stèles — au sommet de cette éminence déserte se trouve une sorte de fortin. C'est un ouvrage en terre sans aucune maçonnerie. Il est rectangulaire et sensiblement déprimé à son sommet. Les fossés sont à sec, ils ont 8^{m} 00 de large. La hauteur verticale du parapet au-dessus du fond du fossé atteint à peu près 4^{m} 00; la dépression intérieure est de 13 mètres carrés. Le circuit extérieur est de 38^{m} sur 32^{m}.

Comme il n'y a pas de vestiges de maçonnerie (quoique la pierre ne manque pas en cet endroit), on peut supposer que le fortin était en bois comme étaient beaucoup d'ouvrages anciens dans nos contrées, notamment les mottes normandes qui ont été reconnues sur les bords du Cher. Mais ici le *mouton*, qui est une éminence naturelle au-dessus de la plaine, est distant de 7 kilomètres au sud de la rivière du Cher.

Le sous-sol de cette éminence est constitué par des grès crétacés de l'étage cénomanien. C'est une sorte de grès à pavés qui se divise en tables d'épaisseurs variables, les stèles en proviennent. C'est en voulant utiliser ces pierres pour

l'empierrement des routes que les ouvriers ont cru remarquer des inscriptions sur ces pierres brutes

Au dedans, comme au dehors du fortin, j'ai rencontré une grande quantité d'éclats de silex et des nucléus de silex d'où ces éclats étaient tirés. Dans cette contrée on ne rencontre pas de silex en place. Ceci fait supposer que les assiégeants et les assiégés se servaient de pointes de flèches en silex : la présence de nucléus prouve qu'on les fabriquait hâtivement sur place

J'ai cru reconnaître aussi, près de l'endroit où se trouvaient les stèles, des poteries gauloises ; ce sont des poteries grossières en fragments indéterminables. Aussi je n'affirme rien quant à la provenance.'

I owe the photographs 16, 17, to the kindness of M. Gauchery and of M. de Goy, of the Société des Antiquaires du Centre à Bourges.[1]

V

Before proceeding further, I append a few notes and corrections relating to the inscriptions at the Hôtel de Cluny in Paris and the Château de Saint-Germain. The references are to my previous paper.

P. 46, a little of the top corner of the P of PVBLICE is still visible.

P. 47, a bit of the final I of VSEILONI can be detected, but the N suggested will not fill the gap: possibly NN is required.

P. 49. The scratch before ESVS was possibly a clumsy attempt to convert the latter into IESVS.

P. 50. The final S of [C]ERNVNNOS is very doubtful. I can find no certain trace of it. As to SMERT[VLL]O[S], I thought I detected a little of the right side of the O, but if that should prove correct, there would be no room left for a final S.

P. 51. The T of FORT[VNA] is only partly there. The altar face to the left of Fortuna shows Cernunnos with a female figure to his right. On the face to Fortuna's right there is another group of two figures, but in both instances the inscriptions are gone.

[1] The photographs have come to hand late and I find that the photographer, anxious about the success of his work, has baffled the three of us He seems to have traced the letters on the stones with something black before attempting to photograph them. He has for example made ЄΠΟЄΙ into ЄΝΟЄΙ with quite a neat N, which nobody had seen before, and he appears to have mended other letters including the omegas. But if anybody familiar with photographs scrutinizes them, he will detect the top of the Greek Π intact, and he will fix on at least one Ω, as a friend of mine has done The photographs show the relative positions of the writing, but it is useless to consult them for the peculiarities of individual letters.

P. 52. In the Bratronos inscription the reading RICI is right, the G has its lower part continued some distance horizontally and on that stands an I, the top of which almost touches the top end of the G. The O of LEVCVILO has a tangent (Ꝺ) which reaches the tops of the IL. Compare the case of the last O (= ω) of OCLICNO with the tangent underneath (p. 315 above). This is not all, for we have here two instances of omega. I find that I noticed them in 1905, but thought that the variation was not deserving of mention. My note in reference to NANTΩNICN runs thus—'The O here and in SVIO is circular except at the bottom, which is a straight line.' I have only come across it by accident after studying the Genouilly inscriptions. From this inscription one learns that the *o* of NANTON- was long, and in the case of SVIΩREBE there is no difficulty in proving it long. Witness the Welsh *chwior-yd*, 'sisters,' Latin *sororēs*, and Welsh *cy-chwiawr*, which Silvan Evans renders 'coequal; even, like; participant', but in the line from the poet L. G. Cothi, which he quotes—'Henri a Siaspar gychwiawr', it admits of being rendered 'brothers'. For a remarkable parallel in point of meaning compare the German *ge-schwister*, 'brothers, brother and sister.'

P. 56. In the inscription on the Celtic Mercury's shoulders in the court of the Château de Saint-Germain I formerly read SOSI in the second line and suggested SOSIN. I have looked at it several times since and I thought that I got so far as to trace the N of SOSIN. When I was there last April I had the invaluable assistance of M. Camille Jullian, who thought he could detect the beginning of the N, but that letter, I must confess, is not certain. We came to the conclusion that the third and last line ended with RO, which I had previously thought to be PO. The letters immediately preceding seemed to be MA, though I had some difficulty in tracing them. The three letters preceding the M seemed to be ESO, and preceding these near the edge M. Jullian thought that a depression, which I did not regard as carried through, was the top portion of a C. He thought also that he could detect the return end of that letter behind the foot of the E. On a previous visit I examined these doubtful traces with M. Reinach, who had a good cast made of the inscription, and we failed to read them into a C or G. M. Jullian's reading would make the whole into CESOMARO, better GESOMARO, for an older spelling of GAISOMARO, nominative *Gaiso-māro-s*, 'the man of the great *gaesum* or spear,' or perhaps 'great in using the spear'. Even now, however, I am not quite certain that it is not the name of Esus which forms what is practically the first element in the compound: the latter in that case might be interpreted as meaning 'great like Esus, or with,

Esus'. Our reading of the inscription as a whole may be represented thus:—

APRONIOS
IEVRV · SOSIN
(G)ESOMARO

It would have to be rendered: 'Apronios made this for (G)esomaros.'

⁂ Here we may briefly discuss an inscription in Latin containing a name *Esumopas* into which that of Esus seems really to enter. It is a bronze bust at Saint-Germain, with the inscription:—

ESVMOPAS · CNVSTICVS
V S L M

It appears to have been discovered in 1830 in the course of excavations made in the forest of Beaumont-le-Roger, near Évreux. The foundations were then discovered of some four dwellings and a small rustic temple to which the bust probably belonged. A short and systematic account of the whole find was published by M. Salomon Reinach in the *Revue Celtique*, xv. 413-17, with a plate; also in his *Cultes, Mythes et Religion*, i. 253. The interpretation offers very considerable difficulty. The abbreviation means *votum solvit libens merito*; but who paid his or her vow? Whose was the name, and whose the bust? The obvious conclusion would seem to be that Esumopas was the person who paid his vow. In that case the name of the divinity is not given, but that was sufficiently fixed by the fact that the vow was paid in a certain temple, which was well known to the worshippers as belonging to such and such a divinity. Perhaps the bust was that of the divinity, and perhaps it was meant to be the visible expression of the identity of that divinity. In any case we could hardly expect the bust to have been that of the donor. On the other hand, we should hardly expect the donor to have concealed his name. The epithet or surname was doubtless a Celtic adjective *cnūstico-s*, derived from a stem represented in Irish by *cnuas*, 'a collection; treasure; recollection, reflection,' and by *cnuasaim*, 'I collect, gather, glean,' and *cnuasaire*, 'a collector, a gatherer' (Dinneen). The surname may have meant 'fond of gathering, habitually collecting', unless we render it still more simply as treasurer or collector.

Assuming then that Esumopas was the donor's name, and that the first part of it was the name of the god Esus, we have *mopas* left to be considered. In the first place, the first vowel may be *o* or *a*. Witness the Latin genitive *Agedomapatis* (*Acedomapatis*) cited by M. Reinach, also *Agedomopatis* (compare *Agedillus*,

Agedovirus) and others given by Holder. The form with *a*, *mapas*, for *mapat-s*, is doubtless of the same origin as Gaulish *mapo-s*, 'son' (in *Maponos*), Welsh *map*, *mab*, 'boy, youth, son,' and *mopas* for *mopat-s* cannot be severed from it. Now if we substitute the consonants of Goidelic or a language resembling Goidelic, we have a stem *maquat-*, which according to the phonology of Goidelic must eventually reduce *qu* to *c*. This latter, subject to lenition, would become *ch*; and subjected to further lenition it would result in *gh*, written *g*. Similarly the *t* would become successively *th* and *dh*, written *d*. Now this, with the vowel *o* preferred, would give us exactly the stem and declension of the Medieval Irish word *mog*, genitive *mogad*, dative *mogaid*, which is explained as meaning a servant or a slave: see Stokes's *Three Middle-Irish Homilies*, p. 70, Windisch's *Irische Texte*, p. 694. But there was an Irish word liable to be confounded with it, and that was *mug*, genitive *mogo*, *moga*, 'a slave, a servant': see Stokes's *Oengus*, pp. 4, 5, 347, 348, where we have *Dé mog*, corresponding to the Welsh *meu-dwy*, 'a hermit or Culdee,' literally *servus Dei*: see p. 263 above. Here we have the etymological equivalent of the Gothic *magus*,[1] 'a boy, a child, a slave.' Whatever the exact signification of *mug*, genitive *mogo*, may have been originally, that of *mog*, genitive *mogad*, was probably not slave or servant, but lad or young man; for words starting with this sort of meaning frequently acquire that of service. Take, for instance, such a word as Welsh *gwas*, 'a young man,' which is now mostly used in the sense of 'a servant man'; not to mention the English and French *page* derived from the Greek παιδίον, 'a boy, a slave boy.' Keeping in view the idea of age as originally underlying *mogad*, and giving the preference this time to the vowel *a*, we can account for Irish *maccdacht* in the term *ingen maccdacht*, 'a grown-up girl.' The latter word was borrowed into the Brythonic dialects when the Irish pronunciation was *machathecht* or *machadecht*, and it makes in Medieval Welsh *machteith*, 'a damsel, a young woman.' Allowing here for the influence of the word *macc*, 'boy, son,' and for the preference for *a*, we see that *maccd-* is a short equivalent for *mogad-* = *mochath-* from *macat-* for *maquat-*. This last with *o* in its turn making *moquat-*, would be the early equivalent of the Gaulish *mopat-* of the name

[1] M. d'Arbois de Jubainville in his *Premiers Habitants de l'Europe*, II. 344, suggests that this was one of the Celtic words borrowed early by the Teutonic nations; another according to him (p. 343) was the adjective *free* for early *frijo-s* from a Celtic *prijo-s*, which appears in Welsh quite regularly as *rhydd*, 'free.' Hence it would follow that Celtic at the time of the Teutonic borrowing had not done away with Aryan *p*, and that the borrowers had not done provecting *p* into *f*.

A POTSHERD FROM LEZOUX (PUY-DE-DOME)

Photo 18 *a*

A POTSHERD FROM ANNECY (AIN)

Photo. 18 *b*

Mopates, applied by a Nervian citizen to his own Mother Goddesses: see Holder. From this use of such a name one may infer that they were regarded as being in the bloom of life.

VI

1. In the thirteenth volume of the Berlin *Corpus*, part iii, p. 459 (No. 10012. 19), the editor, Dr. Hirschfeld, has brought together under the heading *Vasa Gallica Ornata* two inscribed fragments of two earthenware vessels. One of them is in the Plicque Collection in the French National Museum in the Château de Saint-Germain, and comes from Lezoux in Auvergne. The other is in the museum at Annecy (Ain). Thanks to the courtesy of M. Salomon Reinach, I have before me a cast of each in plaster of Paris. The fragments do not belong to the same vessel, but they give portions of the same writing. That writing was made with a stilum on a mould, and then stamped on the vessels while they were still soft. So the inscription on the vessels stands in relief and reads from right to left. The Lezoux fragment has its surface well preserved for the most part, while the Annecy one had its lettering a good deal levelled and flattened by a clumsy touch of the potter's hand. In one direction the fragments overlap, so that it is possible to combine them into one, giving nearly the whole of the inscription. The writing is of the graffito kind and runs thus, as will be seen in photographs 18 *a* and 18 *b*, which represent the casts and should be scrutinized at every point:—

(1) CALIA · VII . . .
(2) BIVSANITI
(3) ⺅ OBIIRTII · M
(4) OVNO ꝏ
(5) CALIINI
(6) OFICINA

Line 1. After the VII near the end one detects the bottom of the perpendicular of an N and there is room for a vowel O or I.

Line 2. The only thing to remark is that Dr. Hirschfeld and M. Plicque read the fifth character as a conjoint AN, which is probably right; it would be possible perhaps to read TI instead of AN.

Line 3. M. Plicque read the first character as X, and Dr. Hirschfeld as I or X (queried). To my thinking X is out of the question, and the letter meant is either I or a form of Є, to wit, ⺅: I give the latter

the preference, though the vowel I would do, as will be shown later. In support of ⲉ in the same volume, one may turn to p. 479 (No. 5) and p. 480 (No. 8), in each of which several instructive instances of this kind of ϵ will be found to occur.

Line 4. At the end of this line in the Annecy fragment is something that was evidently meant to mark the end of the first part of the inscription. Dr. Hirschfeld suggests an ivy leaf.

Line 5 appears to begin with a C differing at the top from the C in lines 1 and 6. Only the top of it appears in the Lezoux fragment, while two bits of it may be detected in the Annecy one, namely, the tip of the top of it just over a letter ⋀ and the lower tip joining the lower end of the right limb of that ⋀. That vowel has a trace of the underneath stroke shown in the final ⋀ of Calia in the first line. Then follows an *l* of the type Ⲕ and after that *u* = II, that is E. In all these the strokes look very clumsy and broad, the ridges of all having been accidentally pressed flat in the making. The line is completed by the addition of NI, but these two letters, unlike the others, are scratched in the surface of the vessel to complete the lettering wiped off, and the two previous ones have their outlines traced in the same way. I ought to say that this line of letters as given in the *Corpus* differs considerably from what I seem to read on the cast of the Annecy fragment.

Line 6. Here the paste which stood out forming the first I of *oficina* is gone, but the area covered by it is distinctly traceable. The N is like that of NITI. The A is crowded into a corner, and only two out of the three strokes of an ⋀ are present: they have to be read conjointly with the N preceding.

So far these notes have mainly had to do with the writing and individual letters. The next thing is to complete the separation of the letters into words, which I do as follows: *Calia* · *Venⁱ|bius Anniti* | *e oberte* · *M|ouno* ꝺ | *Caleni* | *Oficina* |.

The first word to notice is *Calia*, which may be masculine of the *ā* declension, or else entitled to a final *s*. The latter would etymologically represent *Caliat-s* and make as its genitive *Caliat-os*, nom. plural *Caliat-es* (like *Mopates*, which I have just mentioned), meaning the individuals of a Calian *gens*, clan or family, or the inhabitants of a place known by some such name as *Calion*. In either case we may accordingly render *Calia(s)* as 'Calian', and treat *Venobius* as his name. Other names like *Calia*, treated as *Calias*, occur in the same volume of the *Corpus*, witness the following: REXTVGENOS SVLLIAS AVVOT 'Rechtugen the Sullian, Proprietor', *C.I.L.* XIII. iii. p. 474 (No. 85); ΔONNIAC, p. 489

(No. 76); MATIEPIAC, p. 489 (No. 78), which reminds me of an Ogam inscription in the neighbourhood of Lismore, in Co. Waterford. The probable reading is *Ercagni Maqi Miteres* or *Mitereas*, where the last word is presumably a genitive of a name *Miteri-s*. Whatever the reading of the last letters may prove to be, the name seems an early form of *Midir* (usually indeclinable). The bearer of the latter used to be treated as one of the chiefs of the Fairies of Ireland. Possibly it was originally an ancient divinity of the race represented by them in so far as they may be regarded as historical, but compare *Mitis* (p. 269 above). Another name of this class is *Nettas*, which will be mentioned presently. For more instances see Holder, s.v. *-ati-s*.

The next word to demand attention is *Venobius*, which coupled with *oficina* would seem at first sight to prove the inscription to be in Latin; but these cannot be compared for weight with the Celtic tense form *oberte*. The presence of *oficina* can only show that the Latin word in the form *oficina* was borrowed early by the Celts of Gaul: in French it was reduced to *uisine*, now *usine*, 'a workshop.' It might be conceded that what follows the nondescript stop, namely, *Caleni Oficina*, was meant as Latin, but I see no evidence that the potter was conscious of it. Even had he been so, it does not involve our having to regard the previous portion of the inscription as Latin: we should merely have to regard the whole as bilingual. *Venobius* we may state with confidence to have been a Celtic name which took that form as a contraction of *Vēno-bivos*, which would be in Irish *Fían-béo*, *Fían-bhéo*, meaning the 'quick or alert warrior'. The first element occurs in other names, such as possibly the following cited by Holder, *Veni-carus*, *Veni-marus*, and *Veni-touta*: compare the Lepontian feminine *Venia Metelicna* discussed by Danielsson, loc. cit., p. 18. The other element is in Irish *béo*, 'quick, alive,' Welsh *byw* of the same meaning. It occurs in such Irish names as *Béo-aed*, *Buad-béo* (early genitive *Bodi-bev-e*, in Ogam), *Cloth-béo*, *Find-béo*, *Béóc*, *Béoan*, in Old Welsh *Biuan*, *Biuuan*, *Biuguan*, and contracted *Buan*, as an ordinary adjective *buan*, 'quick, swift.' It is due to their translating Celtic names that the Déssi had such Roman ones as *Vitalis*, *Vitalianus*, and *Vitalinus*: see the *Cymmrodor*, XXI. 48–50. But to return to the potsherds, it is merely an accident that we have here a name *Venobius* which looks like Latin. It does not prove that the inscription is Latin; and it is probably to be explained as a contraction of *Venobiuos* into *Vēnobius* of the *u* declension.

Anniti seems to be the genitive of *Annitios* or *Annitos*, and this can be referred to a group containing such instances as *Annios*, *Anniccus*, *Annicco* (fem.) cited by Holder. Our genitive is followed by *e* (or *i*)

and the sequence is exactly parallel to Latin *Marci f.*, 'son of Marcus.' The potter has been careless about the punctuation—he has only two points in the whole inscription plus the leaf or nondescript stop: to be consistent he ought to have inserted either more or none at all. I venture to treat the present case as if it had been *Anniti e.*; and to translate it 'son of Annitios'. The inscriber might have left the genitive standing alone or used some such patronymic as we have had in Cιλουκνος: he was tempted by the Latin formula to suggest one of the vernacular words for 'son', indicated here by the abbreviation *e* (or *i*), which would have been *f* or *f.* if he had been writing Latin. The question now arises, what that word was. The answer is given by a bilingual inscription at Eglwys Cymun in Carmarthenshire. see the *Archaeologia Cambrensis* for 1893, p. 285 (also for 1889, p 6). The epitaph is probably of the fifth or sixth century, and there the Goidelic equivalent for Latin *filia* is given in Ogam as *inigena*, the spelling in old manuscript Irish was *ingen*, now *inghen*, 'daughter, girl.' The corresponding word for 'son, boy', would doubtless at one time have been *inigenos*. Both probably meant a child that was in-born, that is to say, born in the house. Compare the Latin *ingenuus*, *ingenua*, 'a free-born man or woman.' Both of these occur also as cognomens in Roman nomenclature, and we can match them in the case of *ini-geno-s*, but in the slightly different spelling *eni-geno-s*, as in an inscription from the neighbourhood of Grasse (Alpes-Maritimes), which reads SECVNduS ENIGENI F(ilius): see Holder, s.v. *Eni-g(e)nus*. His instances show that the second *e* was liable to be dropped, leaving the name shortened into *Enignos*; genitive *Enigni*. With regard to the other *e* we may mention that the Celts of Gaul seem to have treated the prefix not as *ini* but *eni*, which recalls the Greek ἐνι, 'in.' Among other instances cited by Holder are the following: *Eni-boudius*, *Eni-cenius*, *Eni-cus*, *Eni-ca*, *fundus Eniānus*. This suggests a personal name *Enianos* which is in Welsh *Einion* and appears in the Marches in the English garb of *Onion-s*, while *Ab Ein(i)on* yields *Beinon* or *Beynon*. One is tempted to ask, whence came John Bunyan's surname?

The next word to require notice is OBIIRTII, which is the verb of the sentence. It doubtless meant 'gave' or 'offered', and stood for *od-ber-te*, from *ber*, 'to bear or carry, *ferre*,' with the preposition *ud*, 'out.' But the analogy of *Ucuetis*, from *Ud-gus-etis*, would lead one to expect not *oberte* but *operte*, which was possibly one of the ways of spelling the word. The reason for hesitation may have been that the consonant resulting from the assimilation of *db* was not exactly either *p* or *b* but an explodent of intermediate force between those

two labials. At any rate one finds the same uncertainty in the orthography of the kindred words in Irish. I select some instances from the *Grammatica Celtica*^{2}, where we have two groups involving *od-ber*. (*a*) One of them prefixes the preposition *ad* (*ed*, *id*, and *iodh*), 'to,' as follows: *ad-opuir*, 'offert' (885^{a}), *ad-opart*, 'tradidit' (455^{a}), *adobartat*, 'obtulerant' (885^{b}), *ad-oparar* and *ad-obarar*, 'offertur' (471^{a}, 885^{b}), *ad-oparthe*, 'offerebatur' (480^{b}). Some of the instances have the particle *ro* inserted, such as *ad-r'-opart*, 'obtulit' (885^{a}), *atrópert* $=$ *at-ro-opert*, 'obtulit ei' (885^{a}). To the foregoing may be added the forms of the verbal noun *ed-part* (shortened from *ad-opart*), as follows: nominative singular feminine *adbart*, *edpart*, *idpart*, 'oblatio' (5^{a}, 59^{a}), genitive *idbairte*, 'oblationis' (242^{b}), dative *edpairt* (5^{a}, 59^{a}), accusative *adbirt*, *audbirt*, *idbirt*, 'oblationem' (7^{b}), genitive plural *idbart*, 'oblationum' (245^{b}), dative *edpartaib*, 'oblationibus' (5^{a}, 59^{a}), accusative *idbarta*, 'dona' (246^{a}). The modern spelling is *iodhbairt*, which is treated as the nominative, though etymologically it represents the accusative; that is, the accusative is used as both accusative and nominative, which happens often to feminine nouns in Modern Irish. (*b*) The other group has the preposition *di* (*do*), 'from,' prefixed to *od-ber*, as in the following instances, likewise from the *Grammatica Celtica*: *do-opir*, 'privat' (430^{a}, 885^{b}), *di-oiprid*, 'fraudatis' (885^{b}, 994^{a}), *na ti-ubrad*, 'ne privet' (365^{b}, 885^{b}), *di-uparthe*, 'privatam' (885^{b}), *di-upart*, 'decrease' (885^{b}), *oc di-upirt* or *oc di-ubeirt* (484^{b}, 885^{b}).

Now such a form as the Irish absolute preterite *birt*, 'tulit,' is supposed to be derived from *ber-ti* (Thurneysen, p. 392), and on the other hand the *bert* of such a compound as *du-bert*, 'dedit,' and the *od-ber-t* of *at-ro-opert* harmonize exactly with our *ober-te* with *-te* rather than *-ti*. Compare also Welsh *cymerth* (from *com-ber-t*), 'took,' *differth*, 'defended' (also *cymyrth* and *diffyrth*); and *gwan-t*, 'wounded,' *can-t*, 'sang,' which seem to be derived from *ųan-te* and *can-te*. So we may perhaps regard *-te* as one of the original terminations of the forms in question in Irish and Welsh, just as it was in our Continental *oberte*.

Mouno is the dative of *Mounos*, the name of a god, given also in the dative, as DEO MOVNO in an inscription from Risingham in Northumberland (*C. I. L.*, VII. 997). Practically the same name occurs in the longer form *Mogovnos*, as in an *ex-voto* found at Horburg in Alsace, reading *Apollini Granno Mogovno* (*C. I. L.*, XIII. 5315): other spellings are *Magounus*, *Magonus*: see Holder, s. v. A related form *Mogon-s* yields the dative *Mog(on)ti* in an inscription from Netherby in Cumberland (*C. I. L.*, VII. 320). From *Mogont-* comes

a shortened form *Mount-* as in DIS MOVNTIBVS in an inscription from High Rochester, now in the museum at Newcastle (*C. I. L.*, VII. 1036, cf. 321). In this connexion may be mentioned the statement that one of St. Patrick's names was *Magonius*, that is, *Magōnius*, which by dropping the vowel-flanked *g* became in Welsh *Maun*: see Mommsen's 'Historia Brittonum cum Additamentis Nennii' in the *Chronica Minora*, III. 195 (§ 51). An ancient instance of *g* being made a spirant and reaching the vanishing point occurs in the Coligny Calendar in the word for house or temple, namely, *tio* for *tigos*, whence the woman's name *Tioccia Peregrina* (*C. I. L.*, XII. 3897), which may be compared with the Latin *Domestica* and *Domesticus*. For other instances see Holder, I. 1503.

There remains to be mentioned the genitive *Caleni*, of which I have but little to say, except that the reading is not very certain, but *Caleni*, if approximately correct, may be regarded as belonging to the same family as *Calia*. In any case *Calenos*, latinized *Calenus*, is a name known in the ceramics of the Continental Celts: witness the *Vascula Gallica* in the thirteenth volume of the *Corpus*, part iii, p. 167 (No. 10010.404), where we have as one of the 'tituli signaculo impressi' the following: CALENVS from Saignes (Cantal), in the museum at Limoges; CALENVS ✧ from Trion, in the Guimet Museum in Paris, a stamp which I have seen; CALENVS ✧ F(ecit) from Tongres, in the Brussels Museum; also one said to read CALENVS ✧ F from Trion, in the Guimet Museum, which I failed to find; another reading CALEN . FC from Trion is said to be in the Lyons Museum. The reader of Tacitus's *Histories* will remember *Calenus* as the name of an Aeduan whom he mentions (iii. 35): see Holder, s. v.

When the foregoing notes are taken together, the resulting text and translation are the following: Calia Venobius Anniti e(*nigenos*) oberte Mouno ✧ Caleni Oficina. = Calias Venobius Anniti f(*ilius*) obtulit Mouno ✧ Caleni Officina.

2. A small red pot found at Banassac (Lozère) is described in the thirteenth volume of the *Corpus*, part iii, p. 480 (No. 10016. 13) as having on it a graffito reading:—

NIIDDAMON
DIIKGV KINOT

Here I take *Linot* to be an abbreviation, like AVVOT (p. 298 above), of the nominative to *delgu*, which I regard as a transitive verb, governing as its accusative *neddamon*.

I have nothing more to say of *Linot*, so I come to *delgu*, which appears to be a preterite ending the third person in *u*, like IEVRV, for which see p. 316 above, where it is found translated into Greek

by ἐπόει; or let us say that it meant *fecit*, and that in point of formation it reminds one of Italian *cantò*, from Latin *cantavit*, 'sang.' We have *delg* in the Old Irish *condelgg*, one of the meanings of which was the holding of two things together for the purposes of comparison. The modern spelling is *coindealg*, which Dinneen explains as 'contention, persuasion, comparison'. The verb derived from it is *coindealgaim*, which gives as its meaning 'I advise, I persuade, I convince'. The Welsh is *cynhàliaf*, 'I support, maintain,' from *cynnal*, 'to support or hold up.' But we have in Welsh the simplex also, which is *dal*, *dàla*,[1] 'to hold, to catch.' Our glottologists would probably refer these words to some such form as Fick's *dérghô*, 'fasse' (4th edition, I. 68), but we require *délghô*, and so apparently do the Germanic nations. Witness the related Gothic words employed in Ulfilas's *New Testament*, to wit *tulgjan*, 'to confirm, to stablish,' *tulgus*, 'steadfast, firm,' and *tulgiþa*, 'stronghold, foundation, safety' (1 Cor. xv. 58, 2 Cor. ii. 8, x. 4, 1 Thess. iii. 13, v. 3, 1 Tim. iii. 15, 2 Tim. ii. 19).

We now come to the accusative *Neddamon*, in which the *dd* probably mean *đđ*: that would imply that there was another spelling, *nessamon*, which I should try to explain with the help of the Irish word *neas*, the meaning of which Dinneen states to be 'The wheel or machine by which an earthen vessel is turned in a pottery; the earthen vessel itself'. O'Reilly defines it somewhat similarly as 'a tool or frame for making earthen pots'. A sentence or two in Cormac's *Glossary*, to wit, in the article on *nescoit*, seem to carry us a good deal further back. They relate how Goibniu, the great smith of the Tuatha Dé Danann, was at work when he heard something about

[1] Welsh has another word *dàl* or *dàla*, to wit in the story of Kulhwch and Olwen (Oxford *Mabinogion*, pp. 118-20), once in *dal cleheren*, 'a gadfly's sting,' once in *dàla gel*, 'a leech's sucker,' and lastly in *dala ki*, 'a (mad) dog's tooth.' The Irish equivalent is *dealg*, genitive *deilge*, f. 'a thorn, a pin, a brooch, and the derivative *dealgán*, 'a bodkin, a peg, a skewer, a knitting-needle.' Here also we have the *lg* equivalents in the Germanic language, for instance in the A.-Saxon *telga*, 'a branch or twig,' German *Zelge*, *Zelch-holtz*, 'a stick or piece of waste wood.' In spite of irrelevancy I cannot help pointing out the interest attaching to the Welsh word *cleheren*; it is contracted into *cleren*, and has as its plural *clêr*, meaning 'gadflies, stinging flies', also 'itinerant bards, musicians, or reciters, minstrels', *cler y dom*, 'dunghill minstrels, the meaner and more unskilful sort of minstrels.' *Clêr* is also used as a feminine collective, as in *bôn y glêr*, *tin y glêr*, 'the lowest of the low minstrels.' This *clêr* is in Irish *cliar*, gen. *cléire*, f. 'a band, a company, the clergy, the bards, strolling singers.' The vowels of *cliar*, *cléire* are explained by the uncontracted Welsh *cleher-en*; but the Christian *clērus* = κλῆρος comes in. There was, however, another κλῆρος in Greek which may possibly claim a common origin with *cleher-en*, as it is said to have meant 'a mischievous insect in bee-hives'.

his wife which made him angry and furious, and that he happened to have in his hand at the time a stick or piece of wood—the late Dr. Stokes called it a pole—on which he sang spells of magic, and with which he struck anybody coming near him, with the result that burning boils were produced on him of the shape of the piece of wood. The name of this wood or pole was *ness*, and we are told that it was used for forming around it a furnace of earth or clay (*an urnise criad*). The note enumerates four senses in which the word *ness* was used. Two of them are given thus: 'Ness ainm donchrund *ut prediximus*. Ness d*ana* ainm dondaurnisi criad f[é]issin amal asbert ben araile goibenn dorigéni marbnaith dia fir *dicens*.'[1] That is, '*Ness* is a name for the pole, as we said before. Then *ness* is a name for the clay furnace itself, as a certain smith's wife said who made an elegy to her husband, saying—'. Then follows a quatrain which was rendered into English by Dr. Stokes, in his last treatment of it, as follows:—

> ''Tis sad to me to look at him,
> The red flame of his furnace grows into the wall:
> Very sweet was the bass which his two bellows
> Would chant to the hole of his furnace'

The instances which here follow, from Dinneen's *Dictionary* and from the Milan Codex, make me doubt whether the interpretation of *aurnise*, *urnise* as meaning furnace is tenable. Dinneen's spelling of the borrowed word for furnace is *foirnéis* or *fuirnéis*, which offers great facilities for confusion. Into the quatrain, however, no form of that vocable enters, but only the genitive of *ness*, namely *nis(s)*, *neis(s)*, m. The word *aurn(a)isi*, *urnise* or *aurnisi* (*urnisi*), without *criad* to qualify it, would seem to have had much the same meaning as the Modern Irish *uirnis*, also *uirlis*, *urlais*, 'a tool, an implement, an instrument' (Dinneen), *uirnis* f. 'apparel, tools, implements' (O'Reilly). In any case it is possible that *aurnis-* and *uirnis*[2] are derived from the word *ness*, with the

[1] This is copied from Dr. Stokes's edition of the Bodleian Fragment read by him to the R. Irish Academy, Nov. 30, 1871, englished and edited with notes in *The Phil. Society's Transactions*, 1891–4, pp. 171–3. His previous versions are to be found in the *Three Irish Glossaries* (text, Edinburgh, 1862), pp. 32, 33, and his edition of O'Donovan's *Cormac's Glossary* (translation, Calcutta, 1868), pp. 123, 124. Since the above was set up in type a recent number of the *Journal of the R. Soc. of Antiquaries of Ireland* reached me containing an elaborate note on the quatrain by Dr. P. W. Joyce (vol. XLI, pp. 130–2).

[2] This would put an end to the idea that these words are derived from *harness* or words related to *harness*: for the discussion of that question see Thurneysen's *Keltoromanisches*, s.v. *arnese*, pp. 36–8, and discard the alleged Welsh word *haearnaeth*. See also the *New English Dict.*, s.v. *harness*.

prefix *are*, which sometimes takes in Irish, besides the form *air*-, that of *aur*-, *ur*-, &c. Cormac's is not the earliest allusion to the *ness*. It occurs in the Milan Codex, which has notes on the text of the Psalms, both of them being provided with a wealth of glosses in Old Irish. Now, in fol. 18[a], 18[b], the ninth verse of the second Psalm is annotated in that way. The text reads. 'Reges eos in virga ferrea et tanquam vas figuli confringes eos.' The commentator remarks that vessels which have proved failures are, while still unbaked, broken up and placed on the potter's wheel for him to form them again—'dum adhuc (vasa) viridia sunt et nondum fornace durata comminuat (figulus) ac formanda rursus rotae imponat' (Stokes & Strachan's *Thesaurus*, I. 22, 23). On *rotae* there is the gloss: '.i. roth crund forsandenat nacerda innalestrai . . . ł. craun cruínd immuambiat ocuan denum,' which means 'that is a round wheel on which the potters make the . . . vessels, or a round piece of wood about which they are while being made'. This is a reference to the *ness*, though no distinctive name is given, but the gloss adds the statement that it was round in shape. Lastly, it will be noticed that the Latin contains nothing to suggest the alternative explanation which the Irishman introduced on his own initiative.

All this, however, does not completely cover the word *neddamon*, and the force of the ending *-mo-* is not certain. Possibly it did not greatly affect the meaning of the word, and in that case I should suggest translating the sentence thus: 'Linot. held the *ness* stick,' or, having regard to the collocation of the words and the emphasis implied, I should put it: 'The *ness* stick Linot. held,' or, more precisely still: 'The *ness* stick was held by Linot.' I ought, perhaps, to point out that the difference of form between the G and the V of *delgu* is slight as represented in the *Corpus*. Were it possible to read *delvv* or *delvu*, I should translate: 'The vessel was fashioned by Linot.'

3. The same volume, p. 489, No. 79, gives the reading of a name on a piece of red earthenware in the National Museum at Saint-Germain, where it is numbered 17931. We are not told whence it comes, but the reading is given as NЄ TA, which is probably to be completed as NЄTTA. I guess that the letter which has been worn away was a T: the form *Netta* may be taken as representing an earlier and longer one, *Nettas*, of the same declension as the *Esumopas* already discussed, not a feminine NETTA: see NETTAS in No. 4 below. Its Celtic genitive in Gaul may be expected to have been *Nettat-os*, though no trace of a nominative *Nettas* or of a genitive *Nettatos* is known to me in any Goidelic inscription. There is, however, no lack

of traces of a related form which made its genitive in *-os*, *Nett-os*: the corresponding nominative would be *Nett-s*, yielding *Nēs*, *Nē*, which Goidelic eventually made into *nie*, *nía*, explained to mean '*trenfer*, a champion'. see Cormac's *Glossary*, translated by O'Donovan, and edited by Stokes (Calcutta, 1868), and Stokes's edition of the fragment of the *Glossary* in the Bodleian MS. Laud 610; also Zeuss's *Gram. Celtica*[ii], p. 255[a], where a spelling *nihe* is given. The corresponding genitive in Old Irish was *niath*, *niad*, also *niat*; but we have older inscriptional forms of *Nett-os*, which even in the earliest Goidelic inscriptions had to become *Net*[*t*]*-as*, *Net*[*t*]*-a*. Thus an epitaph at Island, near Stradbally in Co. Waterford, reads in Ogam, 'Cunanetas ma(qi) muc(oi) Netasegamonas,' meaning the monument 'of Cū-Netas son of the kin of *Nēs-Segamonas'. *Cuna* stands for an earlier *cunas*, genitive of *Cū*, 'hound, dog,' meaning in personal names the guardian and protector of the house. So *Cū-Netas* meant a house guardian or protector belonging to *Nēs*. But what did *Nēs* or *Netas* mean? That has already been answered in connexion with the later forms *nia*, genitive *niat*[*h*], but we can get at the signification in another way. The inscription in question may be of the fifth century, and in some 200 years, say in the seventh century, *Cuna-Netas* would have lost its short-vowelled case endings and appear as *Con-Net*. Now this virtually occurs in an inscription on a large stone near the foot of the mountain which is crowned with the ruins of Cahirconree, that is to say, the *cathair* or citadel of Cú-Rí, which you frequently find hidden in the clouds as you travel past from Tralee to Dingle. This late Kerry epitaph reads *Conu-Nett maqi Conu-Ri*, 'the monument of Cú-Nétt son of Cú-Rí.' Here there is a slight difference, for the genitive of *Cú* is not *conu* but *con*. The *u* is a hypocoristic and indeclinable termination appended to *con*: in fact, the word occurs elsewhere as *Conu* and *Cunnu*, as do other names such as *Eochu* (otherwise *Eochaid*), *Dinnu*, *Finu* or *Finnu*, *Sinnu*, and the like: see my *Studies in Early Irish History*, p. 4. The point to which I wish to call attention is the fact that *Nett* is the exact equivalent of the early genitive *Net*[*t*]*as*, previous to *ē* becoming *ia*, as in *nia*, *niath*: compare a late inscription, *Veqreq* (not *Viqreq*) *moqoi Glunlegget*, 'the monument of Fiachra, kin of Glunlegget-': see Rhŷs's *Ogam-inscribed Stones of the R. Irish Academy* (Dublin, 1902), pp. 7, 32.

The genitive *Net*[*t*] occurs later, for instance, in Cormac's *Glossary*, p. 25, where we have *Be Net* explained to mean the woman or wife of Nett, whose own name is said to have meant *cath*, 'battle.' The wife's name is said to have been *Nemon*, given also as *Nemain*;

and she is usually either equated or correlated with Badb, of whom O'Donovan speaks as a war goddess of the Tuatha Dé Danann. On the next page of the *Glossary* we have the entry repeated as follows: 'Beneid .i. neid nomen viri. Be ejus nemon a ben,' to wit, 'Be Neid, that is, Neid is the name of the husband. His woman is Nemon, his wife.' The Laud Fragment has under *Néit* (p. 9) the following: 'Néit .i. diacatha lagente goedel. nemon uxor illius,' which may be rendered thus: 'Neit, i.e. deus pugnae apud (paganas) gentes Goedelorum; Nemon uxor illius.' Besides Bé Net, among others called after the battle god was *Mug Néit*, a king whose name, meaning 'Slave of Nét', figures in the Eber pedigrees in the Book of Leinster (fo. 319[b], 320[b]) as father of Mug Nuadat = Eogan Mór, the hero of the story of the Battle of Magh Leana, published by Eugene Curry (Dublin, 1855). Another was called grandson of Nét, namely, Balor, the terrible leader of the Fomorians in the story of the Battle of Moytura, edited by Dr. Stokes in the *Revue Celtique*, xii. 52–130: see also my *Notes on the Coligny Calendar*, pp. 44, 45. There was still another great figure that passed as grandson of Nét in Irish legend, namely, Bres, son of Elathan, son of Nét, from whom one of the landmarks of Ireland is supposed to take its name of *Carn húi Néit*, 'the Cairn of Nét's grandson.' In Hogan's newly published *Onomasticon Goedelicum* it is called in a more modern spelling *Carn Uí Néid*, and located near Mizen Head in Co. Cork. The same work has also duly registered *Ailech Néit* or *Néid*, now called Elagh or Greenan Ely (in Irish *Grianan Ailigh*): it was the palace of the Northern Kings, situated some seven miles from Derry. For both place-names see Stokes's edition of the Rennes Dinnshenchas in the *Rev. Celtique*, xv. 438, xvi. 40–3.

From the statements which have been cited from Cormac's *Glossary* we know that Net had two meanings, those of battle and battle personified, let us say a god of battle. When, however, it was applied in a compound name to a man, it can only have meant one who makes successful fights, a brave warrior, a powerful champion, and this is the meaning, as already mentioned, which Old Irish gave to the word *nía*, genitive *níath*. We may now consider what light this may shed on the difficulties of some old Goidelic names; let us take the genitive *Neta-Segamonas*. This I take to be a syntactic compound meaning the warrior or champion fighter of *Segamo*. On the Continent *Segamonas* would have been *Segomonos*, with a nominative *Segomo*, the *o* of the same sound as that of the *-os* of the genitive singular having been modified into *a* in Goidelic inscriptions. Now the god Segomo is equated with the Roman Mars, as for instance

in an important inscription at Lyons dating from Vespasian's time, and containing the words *Marti Segomoni sacrum.* The other inscriptions cited by Holder come from Cimiez, near Nice, from Artemare, near Culoz (Ain), from Bolard, near Nuits (Côte-d'Or), and from Arinthod (Jura): see *C. I. L.*, V. 7868, XIII. 1675, 2532, 2846, 5340. *Neta Segamonas* comes down into the Irish (Eber) pedigrees as *Niad Segamain*, where *Segamain* is a re-made genitive as if the original had been *Segamani*, corresponding to a nominative *Segamanos* (Bk. of Leinster, fo. 319[a], 320[b], 346[d]). In an extract from 'The Colloquy of the Ancients' in the Book of Lismore, printed in O'Grady's *Silva Gadelica*, II. 483-4, we have the following cases of the name—acc. *Nia seghamain*, dat. *Nia shegamain*, gen. *Niadh shegamain*, where the last *h* is as unexpected as the accompanying statement that in the time of the ancient king of this name both cows and does used to be milked. The Four Masters give the genitive as *Niadh Sedhamain*, with the *s* unmutated: they have a corrupt *dh* for *gh* throughout. They date this king's reign from A. M. 4881 to 4887. As far as one can judge, the inscribed name *Neta Segamonas* is to be identified with the Déssi of what is now County Waterford, where it occurs three times, at Island as already mentioned, at Seskinan, and at Ardmore, but no trace of it has been detected anywhere else in Ireland. A shortened and more correct form is cited from the Bodley MS., Laud 610, by Stokes in his *Oengus*, p. 70, where we read 'isna Deissib Muman atá q*ui* Crónan mac *Nethsemon*' = 'in the Déssi of Munster is he, who (is also called) Cronan mac Nethsemon.'

As Neta-Segamonas meant the champion fighter of *Segamo*, so Neta-Ttrenalugos, Neta-Vroci, and Netta-Sagru should mean respectively the champion warrior of Trenalugus, of Vrocas, and of Sagru. These three vocables may be inferred to have been names of gods or great ancestors. *Trenalugus*, later *Trianlug*, occurs as the name of a man and an ancestor on the Ogam stone discovered not many years ago by Lord Walter FitzGerald in Donoughmore churchyard, near Maynooth, in Co. Kildare: see the *Journal of the Co. Kildare Arch. Society*, for session 1903, pp. 155-60, where the difficulties of the reading are discussed. Of *Neta-Vroci*, the second element has not been identified: it looks as if we ought to have had either *Broci* or *Vroici*. The inscription is on a stone in the neighbourhood of Stradbally in Co. Waterford. *Netta-Sagru maqi mucoi Br : ci* is an Ogam epitaph at Bridell near Cardigan. The vowel to be supplied is not certain, but I think it *e* (or *i*)—the two notches for *o* would not fill the gap. We are here more concerned with *Sagru*, which I take to be

a shortening of an earlier genitive *Sagrūs*. It belongs to an important group of names, one of which occurs as *Sagrus* in a Latin *ex-voto* from Aquileia (*C. I. L.*, V. 790). In the same neighbourhood of Cardigan, to wit, at St. Dogmel's, we have a closely related form *Sagragni*, which was Mr. Romilly Allen's reading of what had been more usually treated as *Sagramni*—the difficulty arises from the stone having split right across. Mr. Allen supported his reading by means of a photograph, which he showed me shortly before his final illness. The *netta* names are sometimes real compounds, which is the case with the Castletimon (Co. Wicklow) epitaph reading: *Netacari Netacagi*, that is perhaps 'the monument of Neta-caras and of Neta-cagias'. The first compound would mean a friend or beloved one who is a warrior, a warrior friend, and the other would mean a fence or defence consisting of a warrior, a fighting protector. I examined the stone in August, 1891, and considered the above reading certain, and I am surprised to find that Holder prints *Netacagni* instead of *Netacagi*: it should be examined again.

Besides the foregoing groups of forms there are at least two more, one postulating a nominative *Net[t]-os* and another an *n*-stem *Net[t]o*. As an instance of the latter Holder cites from Trujillo in the Spanish province of Estremadura an *ex-voto—Netoni deo Caelius v. s. l. m.*, and he expands an imperfect genitive NE into *Netonis* in another, to wit, from Guadix in Granada. Of this form of the name no instance has been detected in our Goidelic inscriptions. Of the other he cites an inscription from Condeixa a Velha in Portugal, reading 'Neto Valerius Avitus Turanius Sulpici de vico Baedoro gentis Pinton' (*C. I. L.*, II. 365, 3386, 5278). He also cites a passage from the *Saturnalia* (i. 19. 5) of Macrobius, a grammarian who flourished in the time of Theodosius; it runs thus: 'Martem solem esse quis dubitet? Accitani etiam, Hispana gens, simulacrum Martis radiis ornatum maxima religione celebrant, Neton vocantes.' This name should be *Netos* in the nominative and *Neti* in the genitive, which agrees with the treatment of it in Irish as nom. *Nét*, gen. *Néit*, *Néid*, but a nominative *Nét* might from the eighth century down appear as *Níat*, *Níad* (genitive *Néit*, *Néid*), of which we have the exact equivalent in Modern Irish *níadh*, with a genitive *niaidh* (incorrectly formed), which Dinneen interprets as 'a hero, a champion, a prize-fighter'. Thus we come back in a roundabout way to Cormac to find his god of battle, his *dia catha*, entering the ring as an ordinary prize-fighter. However, the use of *Nét*, with the genitive *Néit*, *Néid*, does not appear to have been general: witness Stokes's text of the Rennes Dinnshenchas in the *Revue Celtique*, xv. 438, 439, xvi. 40, 41, where we have

Néit functioning as nominative, genitive, and dative; this means that it was sometimes treated as indeclinable.

The spelling of these names will have appeared somewhat capricious; but there can be no doubt that in Celtic the *ē* was long, that is to say, that the name was *Nét*, *Néit*, *Néid*; and in the genitive *Nētas* this is proved by the diphthong in the Irish *níath*, *níadh*. Why it was long I cannot say; it has been suggested sometimes that here *ētt* stands for *ant*, that otherwise *Néttos* was the double of *Nantos*; but any reasonable dating of the inscriptions in point renders that explanation inadmissible. There is some difficulty as to the dental consonant; but *tt*, liable to be pronounced *d* and written so later on, is clearly what we have in *Nétt*, *Neitt*, *Néid*, as in *Carn Uí Néid*. On the other hand *t* between vowels becomes *th*, liable to be softened into a spirant *d* (= *đ*), written *dh* in Modern Irish but pronounced as if it were *gh*. This would apply to the modern *niadh*, *Niad Segamain*, and the earlier *Neta Segamonas*; similarly the *tt* of *Netta-Sagru* was probably pronounced *th*, and so in the *Nettac-i* of a fragmentary inscription on a stone found on Topped Mountain, near Enniskillen, though we seem to have the same name in Welsh as *Nethawc* (Oxford *Mab.*, p. 134). In other terms the dental was not the same in all the names in point: what then was the cause of the inconsistency? Cormac's *Glossary* supplies the explanation when it gives a word *niae*, *nia*, 'a sister's son,' and explains it as *mac sethar*, with that meaning; for Irish carries us back towards a state of matriarchy, where the sister's son would, next to the brother, be the heir and successor, and where there could be no brother's son reckoned. More modern ideas appear to make *nía* mean a brother's son as well as a sister's son; but Dinneen remarks that 'there is no single word in the modern language to express nephew without ambiguity; *garmhac* is the nearest to it', and he defines this as 'a nephew, a grandson, or great-grandson'. The Welsh equivalent was *nei*, now *nai*, 'a nephew,' without any distinction made between a sister's son and a brother's. These are equivalents, etymologically speaking, of Latin *nepos*, *nepōtis*, except that Celtic drops the *p* and Latin prefers the *o* long: thus Irish *ni-a* = Latin *ne(p)os*, while Latin *nepōtis* has its equivalent in a Goidelic *ni-ottas* which occurs as *niotta* in an ancient Ogam epitaph at Gortatlea in Kerry. It reads as follows:—

Dumeli maqi Glasiconas
Niotta Cobranar . . .

That is, the monument 'of Dumel son of Glasiuc, the Distributor's sister's son': compare *cómhrann*, *cómhroinn*, 'a share, an equality,' Welsh *cyfran*, 'a share,' and Irish *rannaire*, '*partista*,' *ronnaire*,

'a butler' (Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, p. 731[b]). At Dunloe in Kerry a late Ogam, say of the seventh century, has *Niottas* reduced to *Niott* in the name *Niott-Vricc*, where *Vricc* (? *Vrecc*) is probably to be identified with the second element in the Welsh name *Cyn-wric* (*Kyn-wric*, *Ken-wric*, *Cyn-wryg*, in the Oxford 'Bruts'), of which the English name *Kenrick*, *Kendric*, seems to be an adaptation. To return to *Niott-Vricc*, this in a later spelling would make *Nioth-Frich*, and the way for the introduction of the sound of *th*, *dh* into this group was opened by the confusion occasioned by the two *nia* meaning 'fighter' and 'sister's son', and kept open by the change of *nioth* into *niath* in accordance with the tendency to make *o* into *a* in Irish. But for the influence of another word the dental in *Nĕttas* and the forms allied with it would have remained *tt* to be reduced to *d*. So with *Nétt*, *Néitt*, *Néid*, and so with the Continental *Netta* and the *Nettas* to which we are coming; but the *Neto* and *Netoni* of Condeixa a Velha and Trujillo point to another pronunciation of the dental; not to mention Macrobius's *Neton*, which, however, carries no great weight in a matter of this sort. That there should prove to be a difference in the pronunciation of the same word between the Middle Rhine and Central Spain is less remarkable than the fact that it was sounded the same on the banks of the Middle Rhine and in the West of Ireland.

It ought perhaps to have been pointed out that we cannot be certain whether the man who scratched the name *Netta* on the vessel meant it to be Celtic or Latin, or regarded it as both the one and the other. This applies to other inscriptions in this volume of the *Corpus*. One of the instances deserving of a passing notice is that of OLILLOS on one of the 'Vascula Gallica' at Angre near Mons in Belgium (*C. I. L.*, XIII. 10010. 1459), and OLLILO in the museum at Calais and another in that of Mainz. *Ollilo* is short for *Olillos*, which, judging from analogy, I should be inclined to treat as a Latin nominative like *Olillus* in a Lyons inscription, containing the name of C. Gentius Olillus, described as *Magister pagi* of Condate (*C. I. L.*, XIII. 1670). *Olillos* may pass as a Latin nominative, but it may also be treated as a Celtic genitive *Olillōs* of a name *Olillus* of the *u* declension. It equates with the common Irish name *Ailioll*, which in an older form was *Oilill*: it has always remained of the *u* declension: see Stokes's and Windisch's *Ir. Texte*, II. 2 (p. 196), and Windisch's *Táin*, lines 2231, 2234, 5465, 5470, 5471, and pp. 303, 745: Hogan (p. 479[a]) cites *Lec* (or *Airdlec*) *Oilella* as formerly the name of the O'Flanagans' seat in the barony of Ballybrit in King's County.

4. In the same volume of the *Corpus*, p. 698 (No. 90), are given

two inscriptions on a bronze kettle now in the Mainz Museum, having been fished out of the Rhine in the year 1892. As represented in the *Corpus*, one of the inscriptions is small and illegible, while the other consists of letters punched beneath the handle reading:—

NIITTAS
MVCVRVЄ

Of this the editor writes thus. 'Nomina sunt Celtica; de priore cf. Holder, II. 738. Fortasse intellegendum est *Nettas Mucuru (filius)*; sequitur signum incertum (vix littera S ut Koerbeio visa est) aut interpungendi aut ornandi causa positum.—Praeterea impressum est sigillum fabri aerarii lectionis incertae.' Enough has already been said concerning *Nettas*, and we come at once to the other line. If we follow the editor we should read *Mucuru*, that is to say, *Mucurū* for *Mucurūs* as a genitive of the *u* declension, and the meaning would be what he suggests—'Nettas, son of Mucurus.' But what he treats as a 'signum incertum' at the end of the second line, looks as he has represented it, like an Є, which I should treat as representing *enigenos*, 'son.' This, however, makes no difference in the interpretation, except that instead of supplying the word for 'son', we suppose it to be already there, to wit, represented by the *e* of *e(nig(e)nos)*. There is perhaps a third possibility, namely, that the doubtful character is an S, as Körber thinks. This would make the second line *Mucurus*, and the whole inscription Latin, with *Mucurus* functioning as an epithet or surname to *Nettas*. On the whole I prefer either of the other interpretations.

In any case *Mucuru-* would seem to be a derivative from *mucu-*: compare *Rivros* from *Rivos* and the dative *Luguri* from *Lugu-s*. The stem recalls a word of frequent use and considerable difficulty in Goidelic inscriptions. In the genitive it is *mucoi* (*mucoe*) or *mocoi*: the nominative seldom occurs, but we have *moco* once for certain on a stone at Ballyquin near Carrick-on-Suir, but on the Co. Waterford side of that river. Now in Adamnan's *Vita Sancti Columbae* it is *moc(c)u* indeclinable, later *mac(c)u*. It often admits of being rendered by descendant or offspring, though the matter is not so simple as it looks. It equates with *dál*, 'a division, a cohort, μοῖρα,' as in *Mocu Sailne* = *Dál Sailne* (Reeves's Adamnan, p. 29), *Mocu Runtir* = *Dál Ruintir* (Adamnan, p. 47) = *de genere Runtir*, Stokes's *Patrick* (p. 306). It interchanges also with another tribal term *corco* (*corcu*, *corca*), thus: *Mocu Dalon* = *Corca Dallann* (Adamnan, p. 220), *Mocu Themne* = *Corcu Temne*, *Corcu Teimne* (Book of Armagh, 13 b 2, 14 a 1: see the Thesaurus, II. 267); and *Clogher* in Tyrone occurs as 'Clochar macu Doimni' (*Patrick*, pp. 178, 622), but in Adamnan's

Latin as 'Clocherum filiorum Daimeni' (Adamnan, p. 111). But though it may be rendered *gens* or *genus*, it is applied in the case of individuals, and Adamnan leaves it always without change as in the following—'per Lugbeum Mocu Min' (Adamnan, pp. 43, 141). Frequently, however, he introduces the Latin word *gente* as in 'Oissenco nomine, Ernani filio, gente Mocu Neth Corb' (Adamnan, p. 22). Adamnan's learned editor, Dr. Reeves (p. 29), found, for instance, that 'Every man in the clan Dál Sailne was a *mac Ui Sailne*', that is, individually, a *Macu Sailne*. I take 'kin' to be the best word for it in English.

What *Mucuru-s* can have meant is not very clear, but most likely it signified 'of ancient race, of good family'. In any case it would be the sort of name that a Celt would be tempted to render into Latin by some such vocable as *Gentius*, which we have had in the inscription with 'C. Gentius Olillus'.

VII

Since my *Notes on the Coligny Calendar* were printed off I had an opportunity of revisiting the fragments of the latter on Aug. 18, 1910. I had provided myself with a large number of queries, and in this examination of the originals I once more had the kind assistance of Professor Lechat and M. Dissard. We found very few instances which require correction; and hardly any of them are of any importance. Such as they are, they stand thus:—

Page 88. Samonios, Col. 1, First Year, Day viii, instead of sMO it would probably be more correct to print SMO.

P. 90. Dumannios, Col. 7, Third Year, Day i, for LOD read LODD, not LODL. The fourth letter there is an imperfect D, and the engraver must have cut LODD for LOVD by mistake. The note on p. 91 should be corrected accordingly.

P. 92. Rivros, Col. 5, Second Year, At. viii. The lower end of the perpendicular of the P of PETIVX is there.

P. 95. Anagantios, Col. 11, Fourth Year, At. iiii. The cancelled letters should be read AMB.

Col. 14, Fifth Year, At. v. For AMB read AMB.

P. 105. Equos, Col. 13, Fourth Year, At. vi, for BV read BV.

P. 110. Cantlos, Col. 4, First Year, Day xv, for BREXT read BRIXT.

There remain more serious errors of a different order of which I shall now speak. The *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland* for 1910, pp. 367–74, contains a review of my *Notes on the*

Calendar by Mr. Goddard H. Orpen, who also reviewed my previous paper on the same subject in the *Journal* for 1906, pp. 207–211. His first criticism in his review of 1910 relates to Dr. Fotheringham's conclusion that the Coligny Calendar is probably, like our Easter Calendar, a lunar calendar accommodated to the Julian Calendar in a cycle of 19 years. This conclusion appeared to be admissible only on the supposition that Equos (February) had only 29 days (not 30) in the third year; but that is precluded by a note in Celtic at the head of the intercalary month in that year. I ought to have called Dr. Fotheringham's attention to that note, but I forgot to do so: the fault is entirely my own and not his. He accordingly renews one of the alternative suggestions which he had made in my paper, that the Coligny Calendar was a quondam lunar calendar which had been allowed to become independent of the moon, like the Calendar of the Roman Republic, and he offers a new alternative which appears towards the end of this paper.

Among other things in Mr. Orpen's review, he has, where I had been satisfied with crude approximations, made calculations which go 'to show a much more precise coincidence in the dates of the great Celtic festivals and their supposed analogues in the Calendar' than I had claimed for them (p. 372). He conjectures that Samonios, Year 1, commenced a new cycle, and started in harmony with the Julian Calendar. On this assumption he found that the kalends of August, November, and May, with which the three Great Celtic festivals became respectively identified, would fall in Year 1 precisely at periods where the entries in the Calendar seem to mark important festivals, and in particular where the formula PRINNI LOVD occurs.

Next comes the question of the 'borrowed days', which I accounted for at first as weather forecasts, though later I was somewhat attracted by Dr. Thurneysen's propitiatory hypothesis. Now Mr. Orpen advances facts which he rightly regards as forming a strong confirmation of my original view, as follows (p. 373):—

'In the first place, nearly all these borrowed days fall either singly, or in groups of two, or, more often, three, on or about the 1st, 8th, 16th, and 23rd days of the lunar month. In other words, as we must suppose each month to have commenced approximately with a new moon, they *centre about, or immediately follow, the periods of the moon's changes*, which are still vulgarly regarded as heralding a change in the weather. These groups, too, are smaller and occur less frequently in the summer months, and tend to increase in size and frequency in the winter months, notably in those equated with January and February.

'Secondly, all the lucky days (i. e. days marked MD or DM) in an unlucky month are borrowed, without exception, from a lucky month.

'Thirdly, in a lucky month all days borrowed from an unlucky month are marked D alone (not MD or DM). These last two rules suggest that the borrowed day brought with it the quality of good or bad luck which attached to the month from which it was borrowed.

'But, fourthly, no day to which the puzzling vocable AMB is affixed, even when in, or borrowed from, a lucky month, is marked lucky; and this vocable, as has been noted by Sir John Rhys, though occurring upwards of 200 times, is never affixed to an even-number day. This last rule does not seem to support Sir John Rhys's view that AMB represents *ambaxti* (Lat. *ambacti*) in the sense of the servants or labourers of the chief ruler of the Temple.'

The suggestion which he offers in connexion with AMB is perhaps even more important than the rules just given, as being a decided step in advance, for he proceeds as follows:—'It occurs to me, however, that the contraction might represent the word in the singular, and mean that the day had been lent to some other month, and was, as it were, attendant on it in the same way as, according to Sir John Rhys, the intercalary months were called *ambaxti*, as being attendant on the ordinary months, and making them square with the seasons. This would imply that a regular banking account of days borrowed and lent was kept. The Calendar is in too fragmentary a state to audit the account properly, and see if an exact balance was maintained, but the attested figures in each case are not very different. Moreover, certain exceptional cases seem to bear out the supposition. Thus, nights are very rarely borrowed, but Samonios 24, year 1, and Samonios 1, year 2, each borrows a night from Dumannios. In Dumannios we find two nights (not the corresponding nights) marked AMB, as if to signify that for some purpose they were attendant elsewhere.'

For a moment I turn aside to show how Mr. Orpen's rules help in the matter of the restoration of imperfect readings, as for instance in the following:—

P. 87. Line 8 of the second intercalary month has been left thus by me—MAT D DVMAN IVO, but according to Mr. Orpen's rule 3 the MAT cannot stand, since Dumannios was not a lucky month.

P. 88. Samonios, Col. 4, Second Year, At. xi, where the printed entry reads MD AMB IVOS, requires the first M to be cancelled. It does not appear in the corresponding entry in Year 4, and it probably crept in by accident: at any rate Commandant Espérandieu has not got it, and I can find no allusion to it in my notes.

P. 104. Equos, Cols. 6 and 10, Second and Third Years, Day iii, the month to be supplied after MD must have been a lucky one. The nearest month of that kind is Simivisonios, and the vocable to be supplied is SIMI, which in fact occurs on that day in Year 1. This follows from Mr. Orpen's second rule.

P. 112. Fragment No. 2 with D four times unqualified must belong to an unlucky month; so it cannot be Cutios which was a lucky month. It may have been Giamon., say Year 1.

Fragment No. 3 has been assigned with some hesitation to Equos, and that is probably right, but the three SIMIVISO ought presumably to have not D but MD before each. The spelling with SIMI rather than SEMI would seem to suggest Year 5, but Years 2 and 3 are also available.

Fragment No. 5 with MD thrice without any indication of borrowing would seem to postulate a lucky month, so not only Cantlos, but also Giamonios and Elembivios, would be out of the question, though it resembles Elembivios and Giamonios.

There are other instances where Mr. Orpen's rules apply; but they are of no great importance here, so I abstain from tiring you with them, as the process of dealing with them is quite easy. I shall come presently to a more difficult order of cases.

I wish to mention that in the meantime Mr. Orpen undertook, for Year 1, the audit which he suggested in his review. The details are shown in the two tables hereto appended as pages 344, 345. The results show the totals of borrowed days amounting to 91 on both sides of the account; and a slightly different treatment of one or two of the data restored from analogy would enable one to analyse these totals into lucky and unlucky days of identical numbers on both sides But, considering the state of the Calendar, Mr. Orpen does not wish to lay too much stress on the equation. He is convinced, however, that if we had a full text, all the equations would be found exact.

Recently Mr. Orpen sent me the following communication, dealing for the most part with the same questions:—'My analysis of the entries has led me to suspect that, if we had a complete and correct text, the last three rules stated on p. 373 of my review might be expressed more comprehensively and more logically as follows: (1) In a lucky (mat[us]) month all the days are lucky and are marked MD; except those borrowed from an unlucky (anm[atus]) month and those marked AMB as attendant elsewhere. These two classes are unlucky, or at least without any positive quality of good luck, and are marked D simply. (2) In an unlucky month all the days are unlucky or without good luck and are marked D; except those borrowed from a lucky

month and not also marked AMB. These alone are lucky, and are marked MD. There are a few entries in the text not in accordance with these rules, but these exceptional entries seem to conflict with analogous entries and are perhaps incorrect as they stand. The most difficult one to explain away is Duman. 9–11 where the triple RIVRI occurs. As Rivros is a lucky month these days ought to be marked MD. But the detached piece of the Tablet on which this entry occurs has been moved more than once, and is perhaps not yet in its right place, or *is not complete*. It would be normal, for instance, if it were:—

MD RIVRI
MD RIVRI
D RIVRI AMB

'From these rules as above stated it would seem that what was transferred was not a day, but the quality or qualities of a day, denoted in the "transferee-day" by M or the omission of M, or as we may conjecture by good or bad luck. The borrowing from a month of different quality in respect of luck changes accordingly the quality of the transferee-day; but the good luck of a day, even the acquired good luck of an uneven-numbered day, is always lost to it if required to be attendant elsewhere (AMB). Moreover, from the fact that the borrowings centre about or immediately follow the times of the moon's changes, and from the facts that a lucky month sometimes borrows from a lucky month (as Ogron from Cutios and vice versa), and an unlucky from an unlucky month (as Equos from Elemb.), we may infer that other qualities, including the normal character of the weather, were also transferred. Indeed, the belief in this transference has survived, as you have shown, into the so-called Age of Reason.

'I think then that we need not suppose that any change was regarded as made in the succession of days, or any transfer of a period of time, but only that certain qualities of a day were transferred to another day, thus altering the normal qualities of the latter, or some of them, and depriving the transferor-day of its quality of good luck, if it enjoyed such.'

The simplification of his rules by Mr. Orpen has suggested itself to me also, and I began to examine the instances which seemed to stand in the way, in detail as follows:—

Samonios, Year 2, At. iv. As the month is a lucky one D here should be MD, which is the entry in Years 1, 4, 5. There is room and metal for the M, and Commandant Espérandieu has had MD printed.

TABLE I.* 'BORROWED DAYS' IN YEAR 1.

Day.	Samon. M.	Duman. ANM.	Rivros M.	Anag ANM.	Ogron M.	Cutios M.	Giamon. ANM	Simivis M.	Equos ANM.	Elemb. ANM	Edrin. M.	Cantlos ANM.
1	1 D.	1 Sa.	1 A.	1 R.			1 Si.	1 G.			1 Ca.	1 Ed
2												
3								3 Eq.	3 Si.			
4												
5	5 R. a.											
6								6 Eq.	6 Si.			
7	7 D.		7 A.	7 O.		7 G.	*7 Si.*	7 Eq.	7 El.		7 Ca.	
8			8 A.	8 O.	8 Cu.	8 G.	*8 Si.*	8 Eq.	8 El.		8 Ca.	
9	9 D.	9 R.	9 A.	9 O.	9 Cu.	9 G.	*9 Si.*	9 Eq.	9 El.		*9 Ca.*	
10		10 R.										
11		11 R.										
12												
13								13 Eq.	13 Si.			
14									14 Si.			
15								15 Eq.	15 Si.			
At. 1	1 D.	*1 Sa.*			1 Cu.	1 O.		*1 Eq.*	1 Si.	1 Ed.	1 El.	
2		*2 Sa.*			2 Cu.	2 O.		*2 Eq.*	2 Si.	2 Ed.	2 El.	
3					3 Cu. *a.*	3 O. *a.*		*3 Eq. a*	3 Si. a.	3 Ed. a	3 El. a.	
4												
5												
6								6 Eq.	*6 Si.*			
7	7 D. a.			7 O a.		7 G.	7 Si. a.	7 Eq. a.	7 El. a.	7 Ed a.		
8	8 D.			8 Cu.	8 Cu.	8 G.	8 Si.	8 Eq.	8 El.	8 Ed.		
9	9 D.			9 O. a.			9 Si. a.	9 Eq a.	9 El a.	9 Ed. *a.*		
10												
11								11 Eq. a.				
12												
13												
14												
15												
Totals	8	6	4	7	6	8	7	16	15	6	7	1

Total of Borrowed Days in Year 1 = 91, made up of 46 from lucky months and 45 from unlucky months.

* Italicized entries are conjecturally restored from analogy, and a. affixed signifies the addition of AMB, which is sometimes also a matter only of analogy.

TABLE II.* DAYS MARKED AMB. YEAR 1.

Day.	Samon. M.	Duman. ANM.	Rivros M.	Anag. ANM.	Ogron. M.	Cutios M.	Giamon. ANM.	Simivis. M.	Equos ANM.	Elemb. ANM.	Edrin. M.	Cantlos ANM.
1												
2												
3												
4												
5	5 R.						5		5	5	5	5
6												
7		7										
8												
9												
10												
11	11			11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
12												
13												
14												
15												
At. 1												
2												
3	3	3	3	3	*3 Cu.*	*3 O.*	3	*3 Eq*	3 Si.	3 Ed.	3 El	3
4												
5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
6												
7	7 D.	7	7	7 O.	7		7 Si.	7 Eq.	7 El.	7 Ed.	7	7
8												
9			9	9 O.	9	9	9 Si.	9 Eq.	9 El.	9 Ed.	*9*	
10												
11	11	11	11	*11*	11	11		11 Eq.	11	11	11	11
12												
13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
14												
15	15		15		15	15		15	*15*		15	
Totals	8	6	7	7	8	7	7	8	9	8	9	7

Total of Days marked AMB in Year 1 = 91, forming an equation with the number of 'Borrowed Days' in the same Year, as in Table I; 47 AMB's are in lucky months and 44 in unlucky months.

* Italicized entries are restored, as in the other table, from analogy. Where the day is a borrowed day the initial of the month from which it is borrowed is added.

It is possible that I have inadvertently omitted some cases that should have been considered, but, on looking through the foregoing notes on those here brought together, you will have seen that there are nine entries which present difficulties, namely, on the following dates :—

Dumannios, Year 1, Day xi.
" Year 2, At. vi.
Ogronios, Year 1, At. iii.
" Year 4, At. vi.
" Year 5, Day xiiii.
Equos, Year 1, At. vi.
Elembivios, Year 5, At. ii.
Edrinios, Year 1, At. x.
Cantlos, Year 1, Day i.

The alternatives to which we seem to be left in these cases, are, that the surface of the bronze, owing to wear or oxidization, shows no traces of letters, or else that the missing word or letter was never inscribed, though it was intended to be inscribed. All this points to the desirability of having the above entries carefully examined with a good glass. In the case of the nine here specially mentioned this is particularly desirable; it would probably reduce their number. Even then the work cannot be considered complete without photographs of the whole Calendar as it stands.

Now that Mr. Orpen's theory of borrowed days has been sufficiently illustrated, I wish to point out very briefly how it helps in a somewhat different direction. It enables us to construe the letters AMB everywhere in one and the same sense as representing *ambachtos* (spelt probably *ambaxtos*, with X for Greek X), Latin *ambactus*, and signifying attendant, as in the case of the intercalary months. Just as MIDX AMBAXTOS was an attendant month, so D AMB was an attendant day, and it is worth noticing that even the abbreviation was the same. For the letter immediately preceding ANTARAN in line 5 of the second intercalary month appears to have been the B of AMB, and the designation in its original form was probably M AMB ANTARAN, for the full spelling MIDX AMBAXTOS ANTARANOS, which may be translated 'interloping attendant month'. All this renders unnecessary the dubious proceeding of postulating any reference to attendants or labourers belonging to the chief ruler of the Temple.

After the publication of Mr. Orpen's review, Dr. Fotheringham in a letter to me, dated April 10, 1911, dealt with certain points in it, as follows:—

'There can be no doubt that the figures CCCLXXXV in the

heading of the second intercalary month are fatal to my attempt to bring the Calendar of Coligny into harmony with the elements of lunar theory. I must, therefore, fall back on the two alternatives which I specified on p. 75 of your paper, viz. that the Calendar "must be either a quondam lunar calendar which had been allowed to become independent of the Moon, like the Calendar of the Roman Republic, or some crude and ignorant attempt at a lunar calendar, of a type that would have to be revised after the lapse of a very few years".[1]

'The error appears to me to be too gross to admit readily of the second of these explanations. As I pointed out in the passage referred to, the error, if allowed to accumulate, would after the lapse of 18 years make the months begin at the full moon instead of the new; to this I may add that if each month had a fixed duration, the error would as a matter of course accumulate.

'I therefore prefer to think that the Calendar, like that of the Roman Republic, had parted company with the moon, and I think there can be no reasonable doubt that the cause of the disturbance was the substitution of a 30-day for a 29-day Equos, in spite of which that month retained the unlucky character belonging to a 29-day month. Perhaps at an earlier date Equos had been given a 30th day when necessary, and at some date the Calendar was altered so as to give it a 30th day annually. One curious point of resemblance between this Calendar and that of the Roman Republic is that in each the length of an unintercalated year was 355 days instead of 354·4 days. I am not prepared to say whether the error was due to the operation of the same ideas among both races.

'Now, if I am right in supposing that the Calendar had parted company with the moon, it follows that any connexion of festivals or other observances with the phases of the moon must go back to a time before the corruption of the Calendar had taken place. In other words a festival on the 14th or 15th day of the month would have as much or as little connexion with the full moon as the Roman Ides had.

'The length of the individual months has no necessary connexion with the cycle of intercalations. In the modern Jewish and ancient Babylonian Calendars the 19-year cycle is used for intercalations but not for determining the lengths of the individual months. It is therefore quite possible that that cycle survived the addition of the 30th day to Equos in the Calendar before us. But we cannot prove this from the fragments. They show us intercalary months at the begin-

[1] Another suggestion which Dr. Fotheringham now prefers is set forth on pages 355-8 of this paper.

ning of the 1st year and the middle of the 3rd year, but not in the 2nd, 4th, and 5th years. The next intercalary month could not, therefore, have been earlier than the beginning of the 6th year. This gives us one interval of 2½ years and one of either 2½ or 3 years between intercalations. The only other calendar, so far as I know, where intercalary months had two fixed positions in the year, separated by six months, was the Babylonian. No such practice is known in any Greek calendar. The two intercalary months in the Babylonian Calendar come down from a remote antiquity. In the Babylonian 19-year cycle which dates from 381 B.C. at latest, the spring intercalation occurs 6 times and the autumn intercalation once in 19 years, but the preponderance of spring intercalations was much less pronounced before this cycle was adopted. In the Babylonian 19-year cycle, the successive intervals between intercalations were 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2½, 2½ years. A more even distribution of intercalations would be obtained by the series 2½, 3, 2½, 3, 2½, 3, 2½. If the intercalary month is to be made to occupy one or other of two fixed positions in the year, any cycle of intercalations will be made up of intervals of 2½ and 3 years, with perhaps, as at Babylon, occasional intervals of 2 years. The cycles will differ only in the arrangement of these intervals. But we cannot from one interval of 2½ years and one of either 2½ or 3, deduce anything as to the arrangement of these intervals. If it was desired to make the mean length of the year the same as in the Julian Calendar, this could, with the recorded lengths for the individual months, be best achieved by a cycle of 120 years, containing 41 intercalations, 35 of which would occur after intervals of 3 years, and 6 after intervals of 2½ years. But we have no evidence for the existence of anything so scientific.

'The passage cited from Diodorus is, of course, evidence that the insular Celts of the time of Hecataeus of Abdera were already acquainted with the 19-year cycle. I have not sufficient knowledge of Celtic religion to be able to follow Mr. Orpen's objection to an epiphany of 68 days. A long festival could not, I suppose, be maintained on the same level of excitement as a short one, but a festival that only occurs once in 19 years is rather unique, and some of our watering-places have an annual season of festivity lasting as long as 68 days. A succession of pilgrims scattered over 68 days might bring in more offerings than a crowd concentrated upon 7 days, and might justify the priests in enduring the strain of the long epiphany.

'Nor do I feel inclined to attach much importance to Mr. Orpen's

objection that "the vernal equinox does not appear to have had any religious importance in the Celtic world". The festival which Diodorus is describing occurred at the beginning of an astronomical cycle, and the vernal equinox is of prime importance in the annual motion of the Sun. From the earliest times the signs of the zodiac have been made to begin at the vernal equinox, and it is a very natural starting-point for a cycle which is to depend on the relative positions of the Sun, the Moon, and the fixed stars. As the vernal equinox is the most salient phenomenon connected with the first sign of the zodiac, the heliacal rising of the Pleiades is the most salient connected with the second sign of the zodiac. It was, very possibly, the next phenomenon after the equinox, which the agricultural population observed in order to know the progress of the seasons, on which their lunar calendar threw very little light. It is notorious that the ancient Greeks and Romans recognized the seasons for agricultural operations by making astronomical observations. See Hesiod *passim*.

'I cannot accept Mr. Orpen's suggestion "that in the statement concerning the Hyperboreans the particular season when the cycle recommenced, and indeed possibly the length of the cycle itself, were taken from the calendar with which the writer was familiar and foisted into the story". Meton's cycle did not begin at the vernal equinox, but at the summer solstice, and the season at which the cycle is said to have recommenced among the Hyperboreans was therefore different from that with which the writer was familiar. The Babylonian 19-year cycle did, it is true, begin at or near the vernal equinox, but the writer was doubtless more familiar with the Greek than with the Babylonian cycles.

'Mr. Orpen suggests that Samonios in the first year commenced not only a new year, but a new cycle. I doubt whether we can prove this.[1] The five years covered by the inscription cannot be a complete cycle of intercalations, for they contain 1,835 days, whereas five Julian years contain no more than 1,826·25 days. The Calendar must have been a very crude one, if it accumulated an error of $8\frac{3}{4}$ days in five years. Fifty-two years of such a calendar would move each feast a distance of three months in the solar year. If the five years of the inscription are not a complete cycle of intercalations, can we be sure that they are even the beginning of a cycle, or anything more than the five years following a proclamation? Of course, the last year of a cycle would naturally end with an intercalation, but intercalations are

[1] But see page 357 below.

too frequent for us to infer anything from this. Mr. Orpen's point comes to this, that as Apollo (or Rivos) according to Hecataeus (?) was present to the insular Gauls at the beginning of a cycle, so Rivos's presence in the first year of this Calendar probably indicates that it is the beginning of a cycle. Now the initial point of a cycle is purely artificial. It may, therefore, have been reckoned from different years and different seasons at different temples. It is not likely that all the great temples had their festivals at the same season or for the same length of time. An epiphany of Rivos for 68 days in the spring at the great island temple at intervals of 19 years is, therefore, quite consistent with an epiphany of Rivos of shorter duration in the harvest season at a temple in Gaul at some unknown interval. The 19 years' interval was astronomical. Does it follow that the interval in the temple to which this inscription belongs was also astronomical? If not, there may have been a five years' cycle of feasts which bore no relation to the system of intercalation, and there may have been an epiphany of Rivos in the first year of each cycle of feasts. The shorter the epiphany, the easier it would be to arrange for it at frequent intervals. I think the whole of Mr. Orpen's criticism of the passage cited from Diodorus is strained, by the implied assumption that the epiphany there described is identical in season and duration and perhaps in interval with that of which mention is made in the Coligny Calendar.

'I note the reference to Greek pilgrims who made offerings at the island temple. The epiphany at that temple is clearly the occasion of a great festival (τὸν θεὸν κιθαρίζειν τε καὶ χορεύειν συνεχῶς τὰς νύκτας). This can hardly have been the case with the epiphany of Rivos in the Rivros of the Coligny Calendar, which takes place while all hands are busy with the harvest.'

With Dr. Fotheringham's permission I submitted his letter to Mr. Orpen, from whom I received a letter in reply, dated April 22, 1911. Omitting the preliminary remarks, I quote from the point at which the writer begins to argue 'that the quinquennium of the inscription commmenced (with Samonios) a new cycle', in the following terms:—

'Here I do not think that Dr. Fotheringham has done full justice to the argument. The idea that the epiphany of the god occurred in the first year of a new cycle was suggested by the close analogy of the case of the Hyperboreans, but I went on to show that the hypothesis enables us to identify with something like precision the formulae in the calendar referring to the great Celtic *aonachs* (or *oenachs*), and, if I am not mistaken, assigns them to the dates in the first year

corresponding to the solar dates with which they were eventually equated. Now if we ask how was it that these *aonachs* came to be fixed on the Kalends of May, &c., it seems a probable conjecture that when the Celtic tribes adopted a solar calendar (the Julian) instead of their former lunar one—probably after they became Christians—they fixed the dates of their semi-Christianized *aonachs* on the solar dates corresponding to the lunar dates in the first year of a new cycle, when these dates were not very disparate.

'I do not say that this argument is in itself convincing, but if I am right in thinking that the equation Samonios 1 (Year 1) = June 1 (commencing at sunset) yields the best results, this fact seems to lend considerable support to what is already suggested by the Hyperborean analogy.

'I should perhaps say that I never supposed that the quinquennium of the inscription represented a *complete* cycle, but only that it commenced one. Indeed, in this last review I avoided giving any opinion about the length of the cycle. Perhaps it would be worth while asking Dr. Fotheringham, who knows so much more about Calendars than I do, whether my former suggestion that the Athenian civil year presents the closest analogy will hold water. I have no good books on the subject, but I somehow gathered that "the Athenian civil year, from the time of Cleisthenes at any rate, consisted of 12 lunar months of 29 and 30 days alternately, making 354 days in all. This was brought into periodic harmony with the solar year by taking a cycle of 8 years and intercalating a month of 30 days in the 1st, 3rd, and 6th year. . . . The periodic harmony was not fractionally exact, &c." (*Journ. R. S. A. I.* as before). Now allowing for the mistake or corruption as to Equos, this seems to agree with our Calendar. I am still inclined to think that our Calendar was originally derived from the Greeks of Massilia, and that the old 8-year cycle may have been retained. It must, however, have got dislocated by the mistake as to Equos, if that was repeated for any length of time.

'I cannot think with Dr. Fotheringham that the Coligny Calendar had parted company with the moon. The whole framework of the Calendar seems to me to be lunar, and as I pointed out the "borrowed days", like the changes of weather in present popular belief, centre about the changes of the moon. This mistake as to Equos may not have been of long standing, may conceivably have been made for the first time in this Tablet, and may have been corrected. It is easier to my mind to suppose something of this sort than to suppose that the great seasonal festivals had gone very far astray. Dr. Fotheringham

says, "it is not likely that all the great temples had their festivals at the same season." But all our evidence goes to show that in Ireland, at all events, the great *aonachs* were always held on the same dates, though different places were associated with the chief celebrations of each festival. Moreover, as you have mentioned in *Celtic Heathendom* (p. 421), there is evidence tending to show that at Lyons, Lugudunum, the city of Lug (not very far from Coligny), the Lugnassad or its counterpart was celebrated, as in Ireland, on a day equated with the 1st of August.

'The 8-year cycle works out as follows:—

$$(354 \times 8) + 90 = 2{,}922 \text{ days,}$$
$$365\tfrac{1}{4} \times 8 \quad = 2{,}922 \text{ days.}$$

But undoubtedly the passage from Diodorus suggests that the Metonic cycle had been adopted by the Celtic tribes generally, and this as Dr. Fotheringham has shown, if correctly used, involves a month of variable length.'

On the question of the derivation of the Coligny Calendar from the Greeks of Massilia, raised by Mr. Orpen, Dr. Fotheringham wrote to me on August 16, 1911, as follows:—

'We know nothing of the non-Attic civil calendars except the names of the months and the seasons of the year when they fell, and even in these respects our information is very defective. We know nothing at all of the Calendar of Massilia, but we know a great deal about the scientific astronomical calendars, and we have a good deal of evidence for the history of the Athenian civil calendar, which must have been widely known. The oldest 19-year cycle, that of Meton, began in 432 B.C., and the 19-year cycle is generally supposed to have been officially adopted at Athens about 340 B.C., but the intercalations do not appear to have been made with strict regularity. The 19-year cycle must have been well known at Massilia long before the date of these fragments, though in the absence of all direct evidence it is impossible to say whether it was officially adopted. The intercalations recorded on the fragments would fit equally well into a 19-year or an 8-year cycle.

'The lunar character of the framework of the Calendar does not, in my opinion, prove that it had not parted company with the moon. My suggestion is that the framework had remained when its *raison d'être* had departed. The Roman festivals were mainly at what had once been the four quarters of the moon, but retained their positions in the calendar months long after these had ceased to have any relation to the actual lunar phases.

'The Greek 8-year cycle, according to Geminus, contained (354×8)

$+90+1\frac{1}{2} = 2{,}923\frac{1}{2}$ days, whereas 8 solar years $= 365\frac{1}{4} \times 8 = 2{,}922$ days. He states that the equation between the mean calendar and solar year was established by omitting one intercalary month every 160 years. He does not tell us how the 3 additional days in each 16 years were inserted. Probably 3 of the 10 non-intercalary years were made to consist of 355 instead of 354 days. So the 8-year cycle, like the 19-year cycle, involves a month of variable length.'

Dr. Fotheringham, I may add, is still unconvinced by Mr. Orpen's reasoning as to the dates of the great Irish festivals: they were, he maintains, fixed on the calends of May, August, and November because they were calends. He is also unconvinced as to the beginning of the quinquennium being also the beginning of a cycle,[1] and adds the words —'I am much more struck by what Mr. Orpen says about borrowed days. This seems to me convincing, but I do not propose to work through the audit.'

I take this opportunity of recording my cordial thanks to both of my learned friends for what I cannot help regarding as serious and far-reaching contributions to the elucidation of a very difficult document of great antiquity. As will be seen, however, this does not mark the limit of either's help. I have received from Dr. Fotheringham the following very important note dated October 5:—

'Since my last letter to you on the Coligny Calendar, Mr. W. H. Forbes, of Balliol, has called my attention to the resemblance between the holes against the numbers of the days in the Coligny Calendar, and the similar holes in the fragments of "parapegmata" or solar calendars discovered in the winter of 1902–3 at Miletus, and discussed by Diels and Rehm, *Parapegmenfragmente aus Milet*, in Sitzungsberichte d. k. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften (1904), i, pp. 92–111, by Dessau, *Zu den Milesischen Kalenderfragmenten*, ibid., pp. 266–8, and by Rehm, *Weiteres zu den Milesischen Parapegmen*, ibid., pp. 752–9. A comparison of these Calendars has induced me to offer some suggestions, which may, I hope, be not without value.

'The fragments discovered at Miletus belong to two, perhaps more, "parapegmata," and date from somewhere about 100 B.C. One of these bears a name which Dr. Rehm has restored as Epicrates, but which Professor Dessau suggests may be really Anticrates; the other records an observation, apparently recent, at a date which would fall in 109 B.C. In the text of each Calendar no notice is taken of the civil or lunar year, but a series of astronomical (and in the Calendar of "Epicrates" also of meteorological) phenomena is recorded, which are

[1] But see the letter which follows the next paragraph.

supposed to retain a fixed place in the solar year. In the Calendar of 109 B.C. the year is subdivided according to the passage of the sun through the twelve signs of the zodiac, but in the Calendar of "Epicrates" there appears to be no subdivision of the year. Neither Calendar assigns any numbers to individual days, but in both Calendars there is a hole against each day, even against those to which no phenomenon is assigned. Each Calendar has an explanatory introduction, the existing fragments of which relate in the one instance to the history of the equation of the solar and lunar calendars, and in the other instance to the methods to be adopted in placing pegs in the holes against the different days. The fragmentary condition of the Calendars renders it impossible to state with certainty what these rules were. It appears, however, that the holes were called κυκλίσκοι, and the word for placing the peg is παραπηγνύναι, from which Dr. Rehm, doubtless correctly, derives the name παράπηγμα. The name used for the peg does not appear, but from Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, v. 14. 1, I infer that it was παράπηγμα. The παράπηγμα would, therefore, be properly something "fixed beside", i. e. the peg beside the entry for the day, from which it came to mean the whole Calendar which was planned out by means of these pegs. The Calendar of "Epicrates" in which the directions for placing the pegs were found is, unfortunately, in too mutilated a condition to render it possible to restore these rules with any certainty. It is, however, clear that the pegs had to be moved at the completion of some period, either a year or a month, and that some at least of them served to indicate days. Dr. Rehm is of opinion that the pegs were used to indicate the first day of each lunar month, and that there were also numbered pegs to indicate the different days of each month. If he is correct in this opinion, it would follow that the pegs indicating the months would have to be moved at the end of each year, because the lunar months would not begin on the same days of the solar year in two consecutive years, and the pegs indicating the days would have to be moved each month in order to mark out the days of the new month. He quotes, however, an opinion of Herr Bilfinger[1] that, while the month-pegs were fixed each year, there was only one day-peg, which was moved daily and always stood opposite the current date. This would agree with your suggestion, quoted by Mr. Nicholson in his *Keltic Researches*, p. 120 note. Of the two opinions about the day-pegs I incline to prefer Dr. Rehm's, because in the Metonic cycle, to which the

[1] *Die öffentlichen Kalender im alten Griechenland*, Württembergischer Staatsanzeiger, April 22, 1904, pp. 65 ff.

παραπήγματα must have been originally accommodated, all the months were made to run to a 30th day, but every 64th day was omitted (Geminus, *Elementa Astronomiae*, viii. 52–6). It was, therefore, impossible to indicate the lunar date by merely marking the first day of the lunar month; it would be necessary to number the individual days, so as to indicate whether any day, and, if so, which day, was to be omitted from the lunar reckoning. The use of the pegs to mark the lunar months on a solar calendar will explain the object of the introduction to the Milesian Calendar of 109 B. C., which, as has been seen above, deals with the history of the equation of the solar and lunar calendars. The use of these pegs seems to me to be further illustrated by two passages from Cicero, one of which is quoted in the note in Mr. Nicholson's *Keltic Researches*. These are *Ad Atticum*, v. 14. 1 "In prouincia mea fore me putabam Kal. Sextilibus. Ex ea die, si me amas, παράπηγμα ἐνιαύσιον commoueto", and *Ad Atticum*, v. 15. 1 "Laodiceam ueni pridie Kal. Sext. Ex hoc die clauum anni mouebis". Here we have a movable παράπηγμα ἐνιαύσιον or "clauus anni" used to indicate the beginning of the official year. It makes no difference whether in the particular passages the phrase is to be taken literally or metaphorically. The metaphor would not have been intelligible, had it not been the custom to use a παράπηγμα to indicate the beginning of some year other than that for which the Calendar was constructed.

'This much at least is clear, that the pegs were used to indicate dates which had no fixed place in the Calendar in which they were inserted, such for instance as the beginning of the official as distinct from the tropical year, or the beginning of the lunar month, and they were clearly used in some way to mark the days. Now, if the pegs in a solar calendar like those of Miletus were used to indicate lunar dates, it is not improbable that the pegs in the lunar calendar of Coligny were used to indicate solar dates, very likely the dates of the Julian Calendar. If so, it is probable that the five years of the inscription are not merely the five years following a proclamation, but a cycle of five years. If the Calendar was meant to apply only to five particular years, the Julian date of each day would have been known and it would have been possible to inscribe it on the Calendar, but, if the Calendar applied to a cycle of five years, not exactly corresponding to five Julian years, there would be no definite equation of each day on the Calendar of Coligny with a Julian day, and the Julian months and days would have to be indicated by means of the movable pegs.

'The idea that the five years were a cycle carries with it further possibilities. There is no astronomical cycle of five years, and the

five years must, therefore, make up a cycle of feasts, which repeats itself irrespective of astronomical cycles. This may help us to explain the excessive frequency of intercalations and of 30-day months. To equate the lunar and solar reckoning there ought to be 7 intercalations in 19 years or 35 intercalations in 95 years. But this Calendar presents us with 2 intercalations in 5 years, which would amount to 38 intercalations in 95 years; in order, therefore, to make the Calendar true to the sun, it would be necessary to omit one of the intercalary months three times in 95 years Similarly the Calendar gives us 37 months of 30 days in 62 months, whereas the true proportion would be only 33 in 62 months, so that it would be necessary four times in every five years to omit the final day of one of the months of 30 days. When I believed that the Calendar was intended to apply to five particular years, I was driven, after a vain attempt at another explanation, to suppose that the Calendar was one which had parted company with the moon. I now offer the suggestion that the Calendar was truly lunar, but that every month and every day that were ever required, were inserted upon it. If they were not required in the particular year or month, they would not be marked out with pegs, and an intercalary month would be dropped, doubtless after a proclamation, or no 30th day would be given to Equos, as the case might be. But, if they were required, there they were in the Calendar, just as the 29th of February has its place in our table of calendar lessons, and the 27th Sunday after Trinity has its place in our table of proper lessons. This explains again the fact that Equos was regarded as unlucky. The month would normally contain 29 days. About once in every five years, but not, apparently, always in the same year of the cycle, it would receive a 30th day, to make the Calendar agree with the moon, but its character of ill luck was not affected by this calendarial exigency.'

From associating the Coligny Calendar with the Museum in Lyons, which possesses it, I have fallen into the habit of treating the two places as being quite near one another, which they are not. Coligny is about half an hour's distance by rail from Bourg-en-Bresse, the capital of the Department of the Ain, and Bourg, the name of which I heard pronounced *Bourk*, is about thirty-five miles from Lyons. I visited Coligny, from Bourg, on August 21, 1910, and was met at the station by M. Roux, of Charmoux, near Coligny, the proprietor of the ground where the bronze fragments were discovered. The station is a short mile from Coligny, to which we went in a public conveyance. From there we set out on foot following the high road leading north to Lons-le-Saulnier, the capital of the Department of the Jura. We

followed that road some 1,200 metres, I am told, and then turned suddenly to our right into a vineyard. Walking from the road about 100 metres, we arrived on the spot where the bronze fragments were found in a hole about 40 centimetres below the surface. There is nothing to distinguish the spot except a young cherry-tree which M. Roux has planted there awaiting an inscription, which it is his intention to put up. The field of which the vineyard consists rises very gently from the high road until it reaches the bottom of the hill to the right of the high road, which is much steeper. Along the side of the hill there is supposed to lie the course of a Roman road, the position of which was indicated to me by M. Roux: roughly speaking it seemed to be parallel with the course of the present high road on the lower ground. Retracing our steps to the latter from the cherry-tree, we pursued the road a short distance further until we came to a stone which looked freshly worked and inscribed marking the boundary between the Departments of the Ain and the Jura. It is worth while recalling the fact, that the Jura is the Department in which the other bit of an ancient calendar was found, resembling those of the Coligny one: see my *Celtae & Galli*, p. 1.

I have been told that one finds on the land of M. Roux and that of his immediate neighbours what was described as 'des débris très menus de tuiles et de poterie rouge'. Among others that statement had reached M. Dissard, but M. Roux did not seem to have any vivid recollection of that kind: he called my attention to certain geological shells which we could see in one part of the vineyard lying exposed on the surface. To my question whether all the bronze of the find had been given to M. Dissard when he effected the purchase, he returned a very decided affirmative. I asked this because I had in my mind the suspicion which I have heard whispered in Paris, that, in spite of the proprietor, bits of it had found their way into the hands of his neighbours and had never been recovered. I do not think this story is believed in Lyons: I did not pursue the subject.

Lastly, the Temple in which the Calendar had been set up was probably situated near the Roman road, at a spot whence it would have been comparatively easy for a man to carry the bronze down hill in order to have it hidden to await an opportunity for taking it away, an opportunity which presumably never came. The Temple had probably been deserted and fallen into decay, so the thief may be supposed to have smashed the bronze tablet and the statue of the god before he began to carry the metal away to where he had dug a hole for it in the ground, at a spot which at that time was perhaps concealed by some kind of forest growth. Probably an archæologist who is an

experienced judge of sites would have no great difficulty in discovering the exact spot, and in bringing to light most valuable relics of a long forgotten past including among them many more fragments of the Calendar. The following note of Mr. Orpen's may prove of help in searching for the site of the Temple :—

'Assuming that the ritual was analogous to that of the prehistoric Gaelic tribes in Ireland, we might expect to find close to the site of the Temple an artificial mound, probably sepulchral in origin, or a shaped hillock, with perhaps a pillar stone and a flat lump of a stone near by. At least I think such a mound (which I have called vaguely a "ceremonial mound") and generally such stones are, or were, to be found in Ireland at the sites associated with the ancient aonachs and with the traditional inauguration places of prehistoric chieftains, e. g. at Cruachan, Tara, Emain Macha, Magh Adhair, and perhaps Clogher. Also at inauguration places used in early historic times; as at Carnfree, Carnawley, Tullaghog, and at several places named Cruachan[1] ("a heap").

'The existence of such a mound or hillock at or near the site of the Temple is indicated in the Calendar by the entry on the 4th day of Rivros in the 2nd and following years, namely, BRIG RIVROS, where *brig* is the Irish *bri*, 'a hill' (as in Cruachán Bri Eile, the inauguration place of the O'Conor Faly), and where the meaning, as you have pointed out, seems to be that the firstfruits were on that day carried to the hill as an offering to the god, just as was probably done at our Lugnassad. If such a mound or hillock can be detected it ought to be a great help in locating the site, but of course it may have been improved away by the modern vindemiator.'

Is the search here suggested too much to expect of French archæology? I appeal to M. Reinach and Commandant Espérandieu.

[1] Here Mr. Orpen refers to his paper on 'Motes and Norman Castles in Ireland', *Journ. Roy. Soc. Antiquaries of Ireland*, 1907, pp. 143–7, and to another paper in the September number of this year, pp. 267–76.

HITTITE PROBLEMS AND THE EXCAVATION OF CARCHEMISH

By D. G. HOGARTH

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read Dec 13, 1911

THE reasons which have led the authorities of the British Museum, and would lead any one else interested in ancient history, to promote the excavation of a first-rate Hittite site in Syria are very briefly these. The two Syrian sites, producing remains of Hittite character, which have been partially dug, viz. Sinjerli and Sakjegözu, have not yet yielded Hittite inscriptions at all, nor any other good evidence of having been inhabited by genuinely Hittite populations; yet it is on a Syrian site that there should be the best chance of finding inscriptions couched both in Hittite and in cuneiform characters, for the benefit of two populations which lived side by side but used different tongues. The nearer a site is to the Euphrates, the better are the chances of the discovery of such a bilingual text.

Further, even if the Hittite inscriptions should remain unread, the excavation of a very old stratified site, occupied at some period or periods by Hittites, must throw light on the obscure history of this people south of Taurus. Were they settled in Syria before the great descent of the Cappadocian Hatti which we now know to have taken place in the reign of Subbiluliuma, early in the fourteenth century B. C.? Hittites invaded Babylonia more than 300 years earlier than this. Were these Syrian or Cappadocian Hatti? What of the latter also after the great descent? Did they occupy Syria or merely conquer it? Its civilization certainly became Hittite; but were the Syrians who used this civilization all or any of them Hittites? What was the ethnic relation of the Hatti to the Mitanni, and what became of them and their civilization after the fall of Carchemish in 717 B. C.? Foreign influences acted upon both Hatti folk and Hatti civilization to the south of the Taurus, which did not act so strongly or at all to the north of that range. What were these, and how great was their influence? Was there a counter influence of the Hittite civilization on alien peoples? In a word, what part, if any, did the Hittites play in the general development of European civilization out of Asiatic? To answer these and similar historical questions we must first learn

a great deal more about that almost unknown thing, Hittite archaeology. The commoner and the smaller Hittite products, such as the pottery, terra-cottas, weapons, have never been studied in the light of excavation evidence; yet these, by their wide diffusion and frequent occurrence, should have as much to tell us as the architecture or sculpture or written documents, and often more. If we are ignorant of the common apparatus of Hittite life, we are even more in the dark about Hittite customs in death. No Hittite graves had been found and explored before last spring. In short, Hittite archaeology has been hitherto entirely embryonic.

In the hope of new light on historical and archaeological problems, which become every day more interesting and more important with the progress of exploration in Asia Minor, the British Museum resumed last spring the excavations at Jerablus in North Syria, which it had begun on a small scale more than thirty years ago. These excavations are to be continued in the coming season. Therefore anything said now of their results must be purely provisional. But already it may be legitimate to forecast some conclusions to which they tend.

The site called the Kaleh, i. e. the castle of Jerablus or Jerabis, situated on the right bank of the Euphrates, about sixty miles north-east of Aleppo, has long been known for its comparatively great size, and for the height of the mound which represents its acropolis and for the bulk of its fortifications. There is no other ancient site on either bank of the river of such obvious importance until Babylon is reached some 500 miles down-stream,[1] and it is therefore natural that Jerablus should be identified with the principal ancient city which is known to have stood actually on the right bank of the middle Euphrates. This is the Gargamis of the Assyrian records, the Carchemish of the Old Testament.[2] Here was the capital of a kingdom always referred to as Hittite by the Ninevite scribes from at least the twelfth century B. C., and always a principal objective of the military expeditions which were pushed across the river into what the same scribes habitually called Hatti Land, viz. North and Eastern Syria. They refer, however, to other sites and tribal capitals in North Syria, and there is no evidence to show that Carchemish, when attacked by Assyria, had any lordship over these tribes and capitals, and still less that, as the capital of a Hittite province, it remained politically dependent on the Hittite realm in Cappadocia. Every-

[1] See Miss G. L. Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, p. 33.

[2] See W. Max Müller, *Asien und Europa*, p. 263; Delitzsch, *Wo lag das Paradies?* p. 265; J. Menant, *Kar-kemish*, in *Mem. Acad. Insc.*, xxxii.

thing, on the contrary, goes to suggest that from at latest the twelfth century B.C. it was the self-dependent capital of a community isolated from the Cappadocian Hatti, though probably it had been once dependent on them. In fact it was a detached survival of the empire established by the Cappadocian Hatti in Syria early in the fourteenth century B.C., of which the Boghaz Keui archives (as well as those of El Amarna in Egypt) have informed us. The cuneiform records further reveal that Carchemish was a strong place with a high acropolis rising immediately from the river, that on several occasions it yielded rich spoil, and that it had sufficient commercial importance to give its name to a measure of weight called the *maneh* or *mina* of Carchemish. The discovery of monuments in Hittite artistic style, accompanied by Hittite inscriptions, during the slight excavations made at the spot between 1876 and 1880 by the British Museum, practically confirmed the identification of Jerablus with Carchemish,[1] and, although even now no absolute proof has come to hand, that identification may safely be assumed.

The site may be considered in two parts: (1) the great Acropolis mound, and (2) the Lower City. The latter consists of an oval area fenced landwards by a great horseshoe wall between whose horns the acropolis rises from the river. The oval covers about three-quarters of a square mile, and its fortifications are pierced by two main gates on the south-west and south-east. Outside these gates roads can be traced with tombs beside them, and also remains of an outer circumvallation, which probably enclosed dwellings of poorer folk excluded from the royal city. But since no excavation has been done in this outer area, we need consider at present only the inner royal city, with its acropolis.

Let me take the acropolis first, although this is to invert the geographical order in which we actually dug. The great flat-topped citadels which rise out of Hittite sites in Syria have long called for thorough examination. Their summit plateaux, if they bear any ruins of structures at all, generally show Byzantine, early Moslem, or even Frankish remains, and Carchemish is no exception, for it shows Byzantine mixed with later Arab. But on many such mounds Hittite stones have been extracted from the flanks, e.g. at Tell Ahmar and Kellekli. The question to be solved at Jerablus was whether a Hittite fortress had stood on this mound but had either been removed by later builders or been buried by the accumulation

[1] See Wright, *Empire of the Hittites*, pp. 63 and 143; and W. H. Rylands in *Trans. Soc. Bibl. Arch.*, viii. 3. No report of the actual excavation has ever been published.

of dust and later remains. If the latter was the case, then at what level had it stood? How deep did human remains descend in the bowels of this great mass about 150 feet in height and a quarter of a mile in length?

In the past season, in short, we had first to find out by cuttings the magnitude of our task. Had we to remove a mountain in order to get at the Hittite level, or was there a rock core rising so high in the heart of the mound that the earliest remains might lie not so very deep down after all?

This problem was not to be wholly solved in the first season. The later structures on the acropolis proved to have left a very deep deposit, and the work went slowly owing to frequent interruptions by terrible afternoon winds which sweep down the Euphrates valley in spring, raising such whirlwinds of dust that digging has to be suspended on exposed spots. But considerable progress towards the solution was made by means of headings, driven into the steep slope falling to the river where the winds have prevented much accumulation, and also by deep shafts sunk from the summit and in some cases opened into the headings so as to become cross trenches. Thus it was found that on the southern and broadest end of this mound there had been built in the Roman Syrian epoch a great structure, probably a temple, in the style of Baalbec, based on a solid platform, whose foundations went down nearly thirty feet through masses of unburnt brickwork. This structure must belong to the earlier period of re-occupation which is represented by the superficial remains in the lower city. No sign of a Hittite building appeared at this end of the acropolis, but nearer the centre, where the temple platform had not extended, crude brickwork had survived not more than four feet down. This appears to be remains of an Assyrian structure, probably of the eighth century B.C. But the diggers were unable to get below its great mass and therefore no Hittite structure was reached here (though a few fragments of Hittite sculpture were found), and it is clear that without enormous labour and expenditure it cannot be explored if it does exist. In the lowest level of a heading driven into this end of the mound from the river slope, however, and about fifty feet perpendicularly below the summit, the outcrop of a horizontal stratum was tapped which contained implements of very white obsidian, such as comes from the Caucasus, and of flint. With these were sherds of pottery, both pebble-polished and painted, but wheel-made, and beads and other small objects in rock-crystal and polished stones. Though representing a primitive settlement these objects can hardly have belonged to the very earliest inhabitants of Carchemish; nor was

virgin earth anywhere touched. It looks, therefore, as though the original dome of the rock lies more than fifty feet below the present summit of the mound—a fact which renders thorough exploration of the earliest level of human settlement here practically impossible, although its outcrop may yet be reached by lateral headings.

At the other end of the acropolis, however, i. e. the northern, which is narrower and can be cut through more quickly, the prospect is better. Here there has been no massive late structure, but merely a complex of mean rooms without deep foundations. Eighteen feet below are remains of a roughly-built stone fortification, and almost immediately under this again was found a well-built course of walling, resting on solid foundations ; some of its blocks are dressed with such slightly convex faces as characterize masonry uncovered in the lower town and dated to the later Hittite age by the sculptures and other objects found in association or at the same level. The diggers in the past spring were able only to lay bare one short stretch of this wall at the bottom of a very deep trench ; but they were fortunate enough to find close to it two remarkable Hittite monuments, a column-base flanked by two lions, and a very well preserved altar-stela inscribed with a linear Hittite inscription. These monuments seem to have been overthrown and abandoned at the same epoch as the neighbouring wall, and they go far to confirm the excavators' impression that they have here determined the position of a fortress or palace of the latest Hittite period.

The discovery of the two monuments just mentioned, which are of unusually fine work and true Hittite, offers good hope that something more than a mere ground plan will ultimately be recovered here. The palace was perhaps restored and reused after 717 B.C. by the Assyrian conqueror, Sargon III, one of whose bricks was found hard by.

The acropolis was not only a fortress at various stages of its growth, but also during a certain period a cemetery. The number of burials which have been brought to light is surprising when the small area of surface actually probed is considered. There are three different kinds of graves ; but since the bodies in all these appear to have been cut up in the same way before interment and the pottery associated with them is always of the same peculiar kind, the dead buried in all three kinds of graves must have differed not in race or period, but only in social circumstances. The poorest were buried in earth and their huddled remains were covered by basins of coarse red or buff ware. These graves seldom or never have any furniture.

The next grade is pot burial, the jars used being about two feet long and of slender form with narrow mouth.[1] Placed beside the coffin

[1] Cp. Report of Cornell Expedition, *Travels and Studies*, I. ii, p. 23.

jar but never inside it were found in several instances small vases of the shape of a champagne glass, whose bowl and foot were wheel-made while their hollow connecting stems had been shaped by hand. Very rarely are these vases painted, and the few exceptions show simple geometrically disposed lines in matt red on buff ground. Apart from the graves fragments of this ware were so rarely found on any part of the site, that it seems possible it was a peculiar fabric used only for funerary purposes.

The best graves, however, were oblong cists, walled and roofed with stone slabs. Only four of these came to light, the largest being one which I cleared out with my own hands. It contained three dissected skeletons, nearly fifty large 'champagne-glass' and other vases, some bronze pins, many tiny glazed beads, fallen from necklaces, and a small bronze axe-head of plain wedge shape with straight cutting edge and no shaft hole. Bronze knives and many pins were obtained from other cists. These graves occurred in the flanks of the acropolis up to only twelve feet below its present summit. They must, therefore, have been made when that summit was not greatly lower than now; but since they contained no trace of iron, but did contain bronze, they are to be dated as far back at least as the Assyrian occupation. One, however, occurred under the foundation exposed at the north end of the mound which has been already described and conjectured to be late Hittite. On this account, as well as on account of the bronze types found in the cist-graves, I incline to regard all these burials as of the full Hittite period, probably of the eleventh or twelfth century B.C.

If so they are the first Hittite graves which so far have been explored anywhere and are of great archaeological interest. The graves found by von Luschan at Sinjerli (on the Palace mound) were not certainly Hittite. Indeed one may doubt whether Sinjerli was occupied by Hatti at all. All its inscriptions are Cuneiform or Aramaic, and its art appears to be of a derived type, not true Hittite.

There remains to be described the more extensive work done by us below the acropolis on the landward side. It was far more productive of archaeological spoil than that just described, but, to my mind, it promises less, for its results tend to show that the acropolis was the only part of the site inhabited until a comparatively late period—until, at earliest, the coming of the Hatti from Cappadocia in the fourteenth century B.C. At any rate the original Carchemish, known to the Egyptians of the eighteenth dynasty, was a much smaller place, perched on the mound above the river, and under its ruins only can we hope to recover the primaeval history of pre-Hittite Syria. What

has been done so far in the lower city is this in brief. A great stone stairway, at the landward foot of the southern end of the acropolis, had been found by the diggers of thirty years ago, but not completely cleared. They seem also to have explored very partially certain ruins of structures lying to the north of this stairway. From these ruins, but chiefly from the sides of the stairway itself, they extracted the inscribed and other monuments now in the British Museum. We reopened the stairway, which had become covered again with débris, and found that it rose by twenty-one shallow steps from a court, paved with pebbles, to a much ruined platform; but so far as we can find it did not continue beyond this towards the acropolis, nor to any building lying directly in its own axis.

If so it must have given access to some other building, probably a palace or temple, lying to one side of it, and the researches of our predecessors and our own later trenching suggest that such a building lay to the left or north. But how far it extended and what its character was we are not yet in a position to say. Part of it seems to lie very deep. A trial pit sunk a short distance north of the stair went down nearly twenty-four feet and then hit the top of a good ashlar wall. There are evidently hollows to be expected in the original superficies of the site and the virgin soil lies deeper on the northern part than on the southern.

Having cleared the stairway, we cut back landward from its foot for about thirty yards, digging down through about seventeen feet of earth to the Hittite pavement, and sinking shafts at intervals to the virgin earth. This occurred on an average not more than three feet below the pebble pavement, without any intermediate human remains, except at one point close to the stair-foot, where a pot burial of later type than those on the acropolis was found. On this part of the site, then, the lowest existing stratum has been explored; but it is not nearly so old as the lower strata of the acropolis.

In cutting back from the stair-foot we found that the pebble pavement was bounded on the north by a long wall of ashlar, faced on the south side but left rough on the north, which continued, with a slight outward slant, the line of the north edge of the stair. After continuing about eighty feet to the west this returned northward, but we had not time to follow it far. The roughness of the ashlar facing on the inner side of the angle so formed precludes the idea that we had here turned a corner of the palace or temple lying north of the stairway. This must begin farther east, and a small door which opens off the stair itself into a paved court must be one way of approach to it. Time did not permit the thorough exploration of this

building; but some trials were made within its probable area, both at the south-western angle and elsewhere, and a well-built but much ruined chamber was cleared, the masonry of which is of the late Hittite type. The walling of the little court opening off the stairway was evidently lined with glazed and coloured bricks, of which several were found fallen.

Into the long lower wall seems to have been built a series of large reliefs, which faced outwards to the paved court. We found them fallen into the court to the number of thirteen in all. Six of these represent war chariots in action; two, warriors on foot; four, monstrous divine figures; and one, occurring about the middle of the series, bears a long inscription in relief characters, below which appear three bearded heads and sixteen cut-off hands. As these slabs originally faced outwards, they were the lining of a monumental approach to the stairway, and led up to a series which lined the north side of the latter One member of this series is still *in situ*, as to its lower half, and we were able to restore its upper part almost entirely from fragments found near by. Another large slab has fallen in two pieces not far away; and part of a third, which was still *in situ* thirty years ago, as the photographs taken by the Wolfe expedition and published in the American Journal of Archaeology[1] show, was recovered from the foot of the stair. Parts of others were found higher up. Similar reliefs evidently lined the opposite edge of the stair; but these had almost all been removed by the diggers between 1876 and 1880. A great carved slab at the south foot, however, defied their efforts, and still stands on its original plinth.

In excavating the considerable area occupied by the stairway, and the approach to it, we lighted on a number of inscribed and carved fragments, none of which, however, was found in its original place, but all lay at various levels in the overlying débris, as though abandoned at various periods by seekers after squared stones. About sixty out of the ninety Hittite inscriptions, which we can add to the *Corpus Inscr. Hettiticarum*, were so found. The rest, with the exception of one from the north end of the acropolis mound, and three or four discovered in other villages of the district, were picked up on the surface of the site or its immediate vicinity, or were extracted from the walls of ruined Byzantine buildings. Several reliefs, much weathered but still possible to distinguish, which had remained unnoticed by our predecessors and even by ourselves for awhile, were also found on the surface. Three of these still stand in line as though they had flanked an approach to the river round the

[1] By Hayes Ward, vol. iv, pl. 9.

southern butt of the acropolis. All have an early appearance, the style of their art seeming to owe almost nothing to Assyria, but much to Cappadocia and Babylonia. Except for trial excavations in houses built of sun-dried bricks, remains of which apparently survive all over the site, wherever protected by hollows in the original superficies, and except also for a tentative exploration of a necropolis outside the walls on the north, which resulted in the discovery of some water-logged rock-graves of post-Hittite date, this was all the digging done in the first season. I shall try to estimate very summarily and provisionally the contribution which its results make, or seem likely to make, when followed up farther, towards the solution of some problems of southern Hittite history.

On the problem of decipherment, whose solution will contribute materially to the solution of all the other problems, we have not been able, unfortunately, to throw any new light as yet. We began the excavation in strong hopes of finding Hittite records in cuneiform, if not a bilingual inscription in both the cuneiform and the Hittite scripts. Our hope will be judged reasonable enough when the geographical situation of Jerablus is considered, and it is remembered that three years before both Hittite and cuneiform monuments were discovered at Tell Ahmar, about fifteen miles down-stream, on the opposite bank of the Euphrates. This latter place we now know (since Mr. Campbell Thompson has obtained a better reading of the inscriptions on its gateway lions) to have been Til Barsip, where Assyrian kings often embarked for the passage of the river.[1] But our four months' digging at Jerablus brought no scrap of a cuneiform tablet from any part of the site, and only a few small fragments of basaltic monuments inscribed in cuneiform, of about Nebuchadnezzar's time. Our Hittite inscriptions add several new characters, and illustrate more different styles of graving than have been noticed before. But they have not made decipherment easier, and we can only go on hoping through another season.

(1) *Hittite History*.—On certain of the historical problems we shall, I think, be in a position after another three months or so of digging to throw some light. We have found that the acropolis of Carchemish is stratified down to a depth which proves inhabitation back to a remote period, long pre-Hittite. The earliest stratum which we have explored contains pottery, stone implements, &c., to which no parallels have yet been found in Cappadocia; and this stratum is evidently not the absolutely earliest on the site. We ought

[1] Delitzsch, *op cit.*, p. 263.

by about next June to be able to say where Hittite strata end and pre-Hittite begin, and to assign rough dating.

In strata certainly Hittite we can already distinguish at least three periods in ceramic production, three in sculpture, and two, if not three, in architecture. Of the pottery, which has been carefully studied by Mr. T. E. Lawrence, the earliest Hittite types have been found on the acropolis, whose lower strata, above the obsidian-bearing stratum, contain wheel-made unslipped bowls, jugs, and urns, either unpolished, with simple geometric ornament laid on with a coarse brush in purplish black and red paint, or polished, with similar incised ornament. These precede by a long period of time the pottery in the acropolis graves, which takes several forms, the champagne glass, with a hand-made hollow stem joining wheel-made bowl and foot, predominating. All these funerary vases are unslipped and unpolished, but of finely levigated clay, and in a few instances they show simple chevrons or other geometric motives painted in red on their rims. The hand-made basins, used for the poorest burials, are contemporary with these.

Following the cist-grave vases come undecorated plates and pots in red, yellow, and buff wares, pebble-polished in vertical lines. Such are found not only on the acropolis, but also in the brick houses below, and are contemporary with the earliest and most numerous terra-cotta figurines. They were succeeded by horizontally polished wares, the burnished rings on which have been made by a sharp point while the vase was revolving on the potter's wheel. This type of ware is characteristic of the later Hittite stratum at the foot of the stairway, and is probably contemporary with the building lying to the north of the latter. It is the first ware found on the site which has also been found commonly in the Hatti area of Asia Minor. When it begins to get scarce, a rough buff ware with wavy combed ornament comes in; but this appears to be of the Assyrian age. Those who know the Cappadocian area will note the entire lack of the white slipped pottery with polychrome decoration, and the red faced pottery with black ornament, which prevail there,[1] and will wonder why it is only at a late Hittite age that Cappadocia and Syria begin to share their pot-types. I can only suggest that the Hatti of Carchemish were a small ruling class which imposed its art of sculpture on a subject population, but accepted the commoner local products.

A certain sculpture, a processional relief, which appears to stand almost in its original position at the south-eastern foot of the acropolis,

[1] See J. L. Myres, 'Early Pot Fabrics of Asia Minor,' in *Journ. Anthrop. Inst.* xxxiii.

where the accumulation of deposit above bed-rock is, for some reason—perhaps wind-erosion—very slight, is in a different style from all the rest so far found on the site, and this is, I think, an earlier style; for while it shows no Assyrian influence and only remote Babylonian, it is very close to the style of the reliefs of Eyuk, which are thought the earliest of the north Cappadocian sculptures. One would naturally ascribe this relief to a Cappadocian sculptor who had come down to Syria before the great descent of the Hatti of Boghaz Keui. Then there is a group of reliefs found in and about the monumental approach to the stairway, mostly executed in basalt, and all of finer and more individual style than the others, which are mainly of limestone. Such are a very typically Hittite god's head, with legend in relieved characters above it; a broken part of a statue with beautiful rosette ornament on its robe; and two lower parts of stelae showing marching warriors. These display some Babylonian characteristics but no Assyrian, and approximate closely to the Yasili Kaia sculptures near Boghaz Keui. Finally, there are the rest of the approach and stairway reliefs, which are strongly influenced by Assyrian art, but still distinctly Hittite.

As for the architecture, there are certainly two Hittite periods represented in the stairway and approach. The former had been laid out originally independent of the latter. One of the flanking reliefs (of earlier style) has been shifted to suit the slight angle at which the later approach meets the stair-foot, and the stairs show numerous patches and signs of reconstruction. Such reconstruction cannot, however, have been done after the Assyrian conquest, for purely Hittite sculptures were used to adorn the latest stairway. The courtyard to which the gate on the north side of the stair leads lies very high, and so does the room dug out by us to the south-west; but in a trial pit close to the latter a very much lower structure (seven metres down) was revealed. This last will be found, I prophesy, to belong to an earlier palace, and the courtyard and room with the approach and the reconstructed stairway will be relegated to a later—the earlier being of the Boghaz Keui period, i.e. fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C., the later of a period when Assyrian influence had become much stronger than Cappadocian in Syria, perhaps in the eleventh century.

The sum of the evidence obtained so far at Carchemish, therefore, seems to me to support the theory that there were Hittites, or at least Hittite cultural influences, in Syria before its conquest by the king of the Hatti of Boghaz Keui; that the Cappadocian occupation established by the latter did not eliminate the earlier stock at Car-

chemish, and was not very long-lasting; and that it was succeeded by a period of independence of Cappadocia and dependence on Assyria, prior to complete conquest by the latter. The period of Cappadocian occupation was, however, that of the city's greatest extent and power; while that of the Assyrian occupation, after Sargon's conquest in 717, was one of weakness and decay, to be followed, not by an Aramaean revival, but by virtual desolation until Graeco-Syrian times.

(2) *Character of Hittite Civilization in Syria.*—This large question involves others, of which the chief is concerned with the nature, period, and strength of the new external influences which may have come to be exerted on Hittite civilization when domiciled south of Taurus. The sculptures from the Hittite strata so far explored at Jerablus show general cultural uniformity with Hittite monuments farther north. There can be no question, not only that the Carchemish society came under direct Cappadocian influence, but also that this Cappadocian civilization was a very vigorous and independent one, when it reached Syria. The script and the manner of cutting it on hard stone are the same in Syria as in Asia Minor, and the Carchemish lapicides show from the first that sureness of hand, both in the general disposition of symbols and in the particular details of them, which could only have resulted from an artistic tradition very long established. The facial types on both the two earlier classes of monuments are identical with those of the most typical Hittite art of Asia Minor and have the same individuality. Not less identical are the poses of the figures, their dress, their attributes. So too are most of the divine representations. From near the Black Sea and the Aegean to the Middle Euphrates there was at one time one plastic art of the Hatti, expressing identical subjects in one and the same spirit and technique. But both on monuments and on lesser objects of local fabric, which are to be referred to the later Hittite period at Carchemish, one notes discrepant elements—elements, that is to say, whose origin and development are not obviously to be traced to the Hatti of Cappadocia. One alien influence is so patent in those sculptures of the Lower City which seem to belong to the approach and restored stairway, that it needs no proof except such as three or four illustrations will afford. This is the *Assyrian*. The Chariot reliefs, the great slab still *in situ* at the south foot of the stairs (bearing, be it noted, Hittite symbols), the bearded bull-footed figures upholding sacred palm-trees, and the great slab inscribed in Hittite, but showing also three bearded heads and sixteen hands, are as Assyrian as they can be, while remaining clearly Hittite work.

There is nothing known to me among the Hittite monuments of Asia Minor so Assyrian as any of these sculptures.

Among what may be considered Mesopotamian importations into the southern Hittite country, special attention should be called to the religious ones. I have said above that there is much in common between the religious representations of the Cappadocian Hatti and those of the Syrian; but there are also differences. The chief is the presence of the nude goddess in the south. The Jerablus relief, on which she appears before a throned king, near whose head is a Hittite inscription, has been known for thirty years, but now for the first time we are able to publish good photographs of its severed parts. The Cappadocian goddesses are generally seated and always draped. Other non-Cappadocian divine figures at Jerablus are the bearded bull-footed demons who grasp the stems of palm-trees. Both these and the nude goddess have well-known Mesopotamian prototypes, and it is obviously from the east that they have come into the Hittite theology.

If Assyrian influence was to be expected, so too was another, the *Egyptian*. But actual evidence of the latter is somewhat lacking on the Carchemish site. A handful of amulets in Egyptian glazed clay, and apparently not of earlier period than the Saitic, alone among objects discovered by us represent commodities of the Nile. I cannot trace direct Egyptian influence on any of the Hittite sculptures found so far at Carchemish, early or late, and very little that can have come indirectly viâ Assyria. This fact, however, must not be insisted upon after only one season's digging.

There are also, in my opinion, indications of another foreign influence, which I should trace ultimately to the Aegean civilization in its latest Bronze Age period, but proximately to Cyprus. I prefer not to deal in detail with these until more of those smaller objects, which usually illustrate foreign influences better than the larger, have been found, and I will only call attention now to two phenomena. First, the crested helmets of the warriors on two slabs from the Approach —helmets such as a steatite filler-vase from Hagia Triada proves were known in Late Minoan Crete. Second, the curious 'champagne-glass' vases from the Acropolis graves, for which I find it difficult to account without presuming indebtedness to some alien model. The form should belong to a late stage of ceramic art, which has always been slow to evolve a foot for vases, and slower to evolve a long foot. The particular form found at Jerablus has, it will be remembered, a peculiar feature, that the cup and foot are neatly wheel-made, but the connecting stem is rather clumsily shaped by

hand. The potters seem to have been botching a borrowed form which was somewhat beyond their powers. If so, what was their model? Mr. H. R. Hall has suggested to me that the carinated form of the bowl and the small foot recall certain Egyptian *alabastra*; but I cannot find any convincing Egyptian prototype, although he is probably right in seeing resemblance between some other vases, found with the 'champagne-glass' vases, and Ramesside forms. Nor can I find a Mesopotamian prototype. The nearest and most accessible region which was producing a 'champagne-glass' vase round about 1100 B.C. was the Aegean in the last period of the Bronze Age. Such vases, though of much finer fabric, having bowls not carinated, and bearing ear-handles, have been found at several points on the western coast of Asia Minor and in Rhodes and Cyprus. It is not a very far cry thence to North Syria; and I suggest provisionally that the Jerablus potters in the latest Bronze Age were trying clumsily to cater for a fashion which had been set by the Aegean at a very slightly earlier period of the same age.

Such a connexion is not difficult to credit, nor is it now suggested for the first time. There are several classes of Hittite antiquities found in Syria (though not yet at Jerablus) which have already been held to suggest the passing of artistic types and influence from the Mediterranean to North Syria and vice versa. Such are the Syrian bronze cult figurines with high peaked caps which in dress and pose recall Aegean statuettes, for example, a silver figurine from Nezero in Thessaly, now in the Ashmolean. On these Prof. W. N. Bates's article in the American Journal of Archaeology (1911, No. 1) should be consulted. Such too are many of the Hittite seal types.

On the other hand, there is also a good deal of Cypriote evidence for a connexion between Cyprus, after it had received an Aegean, probably Cretan, immigration about 1300 B.C., and the south Hittite area. Cypriote pottery or local ware repeating Cypriote ornament has come to light in all the three excavations conducted on north Syrian Hittite sites, viz. at Sinjerli, Sakjegözu, and Jerablus; and if north Syrian Hittite ware has not been noticed yet in Cyprus, its lack may be explained by the fact that, up to the present, no one has known enough about this ware to be able to detect it. Several objects in the Salaminian treasure of Enkomi, the date of whose burial falls in about the last century of the second millennium, have long been recognized as giving proof of Asiatic influence which was ultimately Mesopotamian, but had filtered through some medium, presumably north Syrian; and, especially, a correspondence has been pointed out between the hunting scenes carved respectively on

the ivory casket of Enkomi and the slabs from Sakjegözü, now in Berlin. The curious Cypriote cylinder seals, too, have been accounted for in the same way, and there are other classes of seals which suggest connexion between Cyprus and the Hittite country. For example, a claw-handled seal in gold, found in a tomb at the ancient Tamasos in Cyprus, shows the same peculiar decorative elements in its ornate borders as distinguish the so-called 'Half-Bead' seals, i. e. hemispheroids, which often bear legends in Hittite characters. One of these hemispheroids in the Ashmolean collection is inscribed in what is almost certainly a primitive Cypriote script; while another seal also of typically Hittite form, a flattened spheroid, which is in the same collection, bears a legend in Cypriote characters.

THE SYRIAC FORMS OF NEW TESTAMENT PROPER NAMES

By F. C. BURKITT

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read January 24, 1912

THE subject I have chosen for this Paper sounds, I fear, rather dry and technical, so that it may not be out of place to begin by claiming that it presents one element of general interest. The Pilgrim from Palestine, with his staff and his scallop-shell and his tales of the Holy Land, is one of the most picturesque figures of the middle ages: it will be my task this afternoon to introduce you to the earliest of that band, the earliest that has left any record. His tale is told in a dead language, and perhaps not all his archaeology is correct, but he deserves to be heard with the respect due to a pioneer.

The New Testament is a collection of Greek writings, and it is not till the last quarter of the second century A. D. that there is any evidence of efforts to translate it into other tongues. But in the period between 170 and 200 the Gospels, Acts, and Pauline Epistles were translated into Latin in the West, at Rome or Carthage, and into Syriac in the East, at Edessa in the Euphrates Valley. The translation of the New Testament into Latin presented no special difficulty, and least of all in the proper names. There is, of course, a right way and a wrong, as those know who have read Professor Housman's amusing article in the last number of the *Journal of Philology* on Greek Nouns in Latin Poetry[1]. But the points raised are, after all, of subsidiary interest. The Latin translator had merely to give the Latin letter which custom and authority prescribed as equivalent to the Greek letter. He had no need to be wise above that which had been written: it is a pretty question whether we ought to write *Pharao*

[1] It is worth while recording the fact that the oldest Christian MSS. support Professor Housman's general conclusions, e. g. *k* has 'Herode*n*', and the Würzburg Palimpsest in Jeremiah xiii has 'Eufrate*n*'.

or *Farao*, but all that either form tells us is that the title of the king of Egypt is spelt ΦΑΡΑΩ in Greek.

The translator from Greek into Syriac is in a very different case. Syriac, the former common speech of the Euphrates Valley, is a Semitic language, the first cousin of Hebrew. Like Hebrew, many of the vowels do not appear in writing, and those that are written are given in a notation that, according to our ideas, is singularly imperfect. On the other hand, many distinctions are made, especially in the sibilants, which disappear in the Greek, and (as in Hebrew) there are four true guttural sounds which are not represented in Greek at all.

It is easy enough to transliterate true Greek Proper Names into Syriac. They look indeed rather clumsy, and without the insertion of vowel signs the transliterations are often ambiguous[1]. The real difficulty and the real interest arises when, as so often in the New Testament, the Proper Name in the Greek is itself a transliteration or adaption of a Semitic word. Greek is a poor language for such a purpose, and the Semitic words lose in transliteration many of their most striking characteristics. The Patriarchs are shorn of their gutturals: *'Abrāhām*, *Yiṣḥāḳ*, and *Ya'ăḳōb* become ΑΒΡΑΑΜ, ΙΣΑΑΚ, and ΙΑΚΩΒ, and there is nothing to tell the reader that Abraham's *h* is an English *h*, Isaac's is a *kh* (or very nearly), while Jacob's is the peculiar Semitic *'ain*. Moreover, without private information, the retranslator from Greek into a Semitic language would not know where to put the gutturals in: as a matter of fact, the *h* in Αβρααμ comes between the second and third *a*, the *ḥ* in Ισαακ comes instead of the first *a*, and the ' in Ιακωβ comes between the *a* and the κ.

These difficulties lie in the nature of the languages and confront a translator as soon as he sets about his task. When therefore we find that the older Syriac Versions, speaking generally, do not simply transliterate the New Testament Proper Names, but give the proper Semitic equivalent, we are obviously in the presence of a learned achievement, of a work of Biblical learning which demands elucidation and explanation. How did the Syriac translator come by his information?

A few words may here be said on the Syriac Versions of which account will be taken here. The Syriac Vulgate, commonly called

[1] The commemoration of a certain Δούλη at Nicomedia on March 25 is given by Lietzmann from the ancient Syriac Martyrology as 'dvl's'. It doesn't look quite so bad in Syriac letters!

the Peshiṭta, comprises the greater part of the Old and New Testaments. It is preserved with a surprising absence of variation in many MSS., some of which are as old as the fifth century. The Canonical Books of the Old Testament were translated originally direct from the Hebrew, probably by Jews rather than Christians; but certain books, notably that of Isaiah, seem to have been revised from the Greek Bible. The so-called 'Apocrypha', such as the Book of Wisdom, must have been translated from the Greek. The text of the Peshiṭta in the New Testament is also a revision; it is now generally recognized that this revision was made by Rabbula, Bishop of Edessa from 411 to 435. No MS. of the Acts or Pauline Epistles previous to this revision survives, but two MSS. of the Gospels are known, Cureton's MS. and the Sinai Palimpsest, which represent the texts current before Rabbula. Besides these MSS. we have the scanty remains of Syriac literature earlier than the fifth century, notably the works of Aphraates (345 A.D.) and Ephraim (d. 373 A.D.). A large mass of evidence tends to show that the form in which the Gospel generally circulated among Syriac-speaking Christians before the time of Rabbula was not the Four separate Gospels, but Tatian's Diatessaron: this work survives in a late Arabic translation, but the Syriac text from which this Arabic translation was made had been assimilated wholesale to the Peshiṭta. In any case, the Arabic cannot be depended on for details connected with the spelling of Proper Names.

Our three chief authorities, therefore, are the Sinai Palimpsest (S), the Curetonian MS. (C), and the Peshiṭta (P). A later Syriac version of the parts of the New Testament not comprised in the Peshiṭta (viz. 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, and the Apocalypse), made in the sixth century for Philoxenus of Mabbogh, is cited as ϕ. Many of the Proper Names in the Gospels are mentioned by Aphraates, whose works include a Homily on the Gospel Genealogies: his evidence, where necessary, is quoted as A. It is clear that for the most part Aphraates used the Diatessaron[1].

Rabbula's revision of the text was in many ways drastic and thorough-going, but fortunately the Proper Names were very little altered. His procedure was not unlike that of the English Revisers of 1881, who also left the Proper Names much as they were, though in other respects they made alterations in the direction of conformity to the Greek. The proof of the above statement lies in the very

[1] The number after A is the page in *Patrologia Syriaca*, vol. i (1894), vol. ii (1907).

numerous agreements of S, C, and P, and the very few cases of actual difference. For instance, the final *b* in 'Beelzebub' is attested by no Greek MS., so far as I know, but Rabbula retains it, following both S and C, and also A 714.

The agreement between S, C, and P in the Gospels is the justification for using P in the rest of the New Testament, where S and C fail us. It should, of course, be remarked that the definite agreement of P with S C is naturally confined to those Proper Names which are transmitted without variant in the Greek. Naturally it may happen that there is a variant in a name, and in such cases P and S C are sometimes found on opposite sides, e.g. in Joh i 28 S C support 'Bethabara', while P supports 'Bethany'. But such cases are comparatively rare, and do not seriously call in question the general faithfulness of P to the nomenclature of the Old Syriac Version.

A glance at S C and P shows that the general practice of the translator of the New Testament into Syriac, whoever he may have been, was to give the Old Testament equivalent for the Proper Names, as far as this could be done. A discussion of this part of the subject will be found in *Evangelion da-Mepharreshê*, vol. ii, pp. 201–205, and I need not repeat it here, as I do not think the dependence of the Syriac New Testament in this respect upon the Syriac Old Testament has ever been seriously challenged. The evidence forces us, in fact, to regard the Old Testament Peshiṭta as older than the Syriac New Testament, and as having been familiar to the translator of the latter.

This at once accounts for a large number of peculiar forms, the origin of which does not here concern us, as it is sufficient to say that they were taken from the Old Testament. Thus 'Zion' is transliterated צהיון *Ṣehyôn*, though the Greek is Σιών and the Hebrew צִיּוֹן. It is difficult to see how the Syriac form can have arisen, but it throws no direct light upon the geographical knowledge of the New Testament translator, as no doubt it was taken direct from the Old Testament in Syriac[1].

Some of the greater Geographical names may very well have been derived from common knowledge and use, names such as אורשלם *Urishlem* for Jerusalem, or בית נהרין *Bēth Nahrīn* for Mesopotamia. What needs investigation are the rarer names, names of persons that

[1] צִיָּה 'dry land' is regularly rendered in the Peshiṭta by ܨܗܝܐ 'thirsty (region)': it is, therefore, probable that ציון was understood to mean *Dry Tor*, or some such signification.

do not appear to have been familiar to Syriac-speaking folk, and names of places for which we can hardly suppose that the natives of Edessa, or even of Antioch, could have had special appellations.

Once more we may remind ourselves of the nature of the processes gone through before a New Testament Semitic Proper Name appears in Syriac. It has been transliterated from Hebrew or Aramaic into Greek letters: the Syriac translator then takes this Greek transliteration, and either transliterates it into Syriac letters, or decides on an appropriate Syriac equivalent. The latter process is not transliteration, but really a kind of translation: it may afford us historical information about the subject matter of the New Testament, but should not be used as a textual 'variant'. This simple caution is not always remembered, as an example will make clear. The name *Caiaphas* (Καιάφας or Καΐφας) is transliterated קיפא; *Cephas* (Κηφᾶς), on the other hand, is כאפא. At first sight it seems irregular that the Syriac equivalent to Κηφᾶς should begin with כ instead of ק. But what we have to recognize is that כאפא is not a transliteration at all, but the Syriac for 'stone': the translator, or possibly Syriac Church custom, recognized that S. Peter's name was *Simon Stone*, and they called him, where necessary, by this appellative [1].

When Westcott and Hort discuss the breathings to be assigned to New Testament Proper Names such as Αλφαῖος, they talk about 'the authority of the Syriac' (*Introd.*, § 408). It is one of the chief objects of this Paper to find out in what exactly the 'authority' of the Syriac consists. Is it, we ask, a real and continuous Palestinian tradition, or is it merely an achievement of learning, meritorious and interesting indeed, but not really authoritative? What had the Syriac translator to go by, when the Old Testament failed him, and when the context did not suggest (as it did in the case of S. Peter's name) a practically certain solution?

Now it is true that there are a number of excellent transliterations or identifications, whichever we like to call them, to be found in the Syriac versions. Simon the Cananaean (Καναναῖος) is rendered קנניא, and so is properly distinguished from the Canaanite woman (Χαναναία), who is כנעניתא. *Tabitha* and *Talitha* are sadly confused in Latin MSS.: in the Syriac texts they are properly distinguished and intelligently spelt. Words referring to Jewish Parties, &c.—Pharisees (*Perīshē*), Sadducees (*Zaddūḳāyē*), Osanna (*Osha'nā*), Phylacteries (*Tephillē*),—are given a Syriac dress that is near enough to the

[1] It is the same in Arabic, where S. Peter is commonly called شمعون (or سمعان) الصفا.

current Jewish technical term to suggest some knowledge of Jewish conditions. Of the personal names, חנן for Annas, כוזא for Χουζᾶ[ς][1], שפירא for Sapphira, בר אבא for Barabbas[2], בר שבא (i. e. Saturday's child) for Barsabbas[3], are all well spelt. תדי for Thaddaeus and שילא (*Dalman* 124) for Σίλας are recognized as Semitic names and spelt accordingly: it may be remarked in passing that the name of Simon Magus is spelt סימון (*Sīmōn*) in Syriac, as distinguished from Simon Peter and Simon the Tanner, who are given the same name as Simeon (שמעון *Shim'ōn*) the Patriarch.

As is well known, the Syriac New Testament translates Χριστός by *Mshīha*, i.e. 'Messiah', wherever it occurs. Ἰησοῦς becomes ישוע (pronounced *Yeshu'* and *Isho'*), which is the later Hebrew form of Joshua. The Peshitta always represents יהושוע by ישוע, e. g. in Josh i 1, and it was no doubt the Syriac form of the name Joshua that determined the spelling of the name for Jesus among Syriac-speaking Christians. It may here be mentioned that the controversial works of Ephraim Syrus, now being edited by my friend Mr. C. W. Mitchell for the Text and Translation Society from a palimpsest in the British Museum, will show that the Syriac-speaking Marcionites were not similarly influenced by the Old Testament, and that they transliterated Ἰησοῦς by יסו.

Of the place-names in Syriac, כורזין for Χοραζείν agrees with the Talmudic spelling; בית פגא (*Beth Phaggē*) for Βηθφαγή is at least probable; and בית צידא (*Beth Ṣayyādā*) for Βηθσαιδάν, though otherwise unattested, is possible. Other spellings, such as ארביא for 'Arabia', which at first sight might seem inappropriate, are to be explained from the fact that such Greek words are not representations of Semitic names at all, but new Greek appellations. The Ἄραβες of Acts ii 11 are properly rendered by ערביא; but Ἀραβία is a mere geographical expression, invented by the Greeks and Romans, which is wisely transliterated by the Peshitta in Gal i 17, iv 25 without Semitic gutturals: S. Paul never meant us to infer that he passed three years among the Bedouins.

All these Syriac transliterations are intelligent, and a few of them really striking. At the same time it will be noticed that they are fairly straightforward; the best of them, such as those for Χοραζείν

[1] Lk viii 3. The name is certified as Nabatean by an inscription at Madāin Ṣāliḥ: see *Expositor* (5th Ser.) for February 1899, p. 121.

[2] The same patronymic was borne by the well-known Rabbi Ḥiya b. Abba.

[3] The name of Mr. Satturday Davenant may occur to some English readers. More antique and oriental is *Barḥabbeshabba* (i. e. Sunday's child), one of the martyrs commemorated in the ancient Syriac Kalendar of 411.

and Χουζᾶς, simply follow the most ordinary rules of transliteration. We now have to consider one or two that I venture to characterize as strikingly bad.

The first impression of the modern scholar, accustomed to the methods of the Syro-Hexaplar and Harclean versions, is to regard with respect all Syriac transliterations that contain Semitic gutturals or Semitic sibilants, i. e. all words containing ח or ע, צ or ש. But this assumes that the Syriac word is meant for a real transliteration of the Greek; the case is quite different when there has been an attempt to find a Syriac equivalent for the Greek word. The clearest instance of what I mean is to be found in the Philoxenian (and Harclean) rendering of *Abaddon* in Apoc ix 11. Here we are definitely told that the word means 'destroying' in Greek, so that it is quite certain that the Old Testament word אבדון is intended. But the Syriac equivalent is עבדון, i. e. the translator has used the abs. sing. of ܥܒܕܘܬܐ 'servitude'. This is universally recognized as being a translator's blunder and nothing more. At the same time it leads us to infer that the translator could have had no contact with any real tradition about the Jewish background to this Apocalypse.

But what *Abaddon* proves about the Apocalypse, *Jairus* proves for the Gospel in Syriac. The name Ἰάειρος occurs in the Greek Bible in Esth ii 5, where we read of Μαρδοχαῖος ὁ τοῦ Ἰαείρου. When we look the passage up in the original Hebrew we find that Mordecai was the son of *Jair* (יָאִיר). This evidence is really sufficient to establish both the original form of the name in the Gospel story and also its appropriateness there. Any name thought appropriate for an Israelite in a late and popular book like Esther might be expected to occur as the name of a personage mentioned in the Gospels[1]. Jairus (Mk v 22, Lk viii 41) should therefore have been יאיר in the Syriac. But the name only occurs in the nominative, and the translator seems to have thought that the final -ος was part of the root, and so he turns Ἰάειρος into יוארש[2], as if it were one of those Jewish names beginning with -יהו. It is a bad blunder, as bad as turning *Abaddon* into 'servitude': the value of it for us is to make it unlikely that the Syriac translator of the Gospels was in touch with any real historical tradition about the names that occur in the course of the narrative.

'Jairus' does not stand alone. It would, indeed, be unfair to lay

[1] We may also record the existence of Eleazar b. Jair (Ἰείρου), mentioned by Josephus *BJ* ii 19.

[2] Written ܝܘܐܪܫ Lk viii 41 in S, a spelling also found in Gwilliam's 36 (Mk).

very much stress on certain Names in the Genealogies, such as מטתא (Lk iii 31 S P), where, no doubt, S. Luke's *Ματταθά* was meant for מַתַּתָה. In some of these obscure names the irregular spelling of the Syriac, particularly as preserved in S, appears to be due to a knowledge that the Greek spelling itself was quite irregular: instances are ܒܥܙ and ܥܘܒܠ in Lk iii 32 S for *Boaz* and *Obed*, corresponding, no doubt, to Βοος and Ιωβηλ. The 'course of *Abia*' in Lk i 5 is spelt אביא in the Peshiṭta, in agreement with the Greek and with 1 Chr xxiv 10, while S has אבים in agreement with the Old Latin MSS. *e* and *l**. In such cases as these we are dealing with transliterations rather than identifications, and at the same time the Syriac becomes for the nonce an authority for the spelling of the Greek word from which it is derived.

More significant than these are נאין for Ναίν (Lk vii 11) and גדסמנא S (Mk), גוסמני S (Matt), גדסמן P (Matt, Mk), for Γεθσημανεί (Matt xxvi 36, Mk xiv 32)[1]. Whatever view may be held about the original meaning and spelling of these obscure names, it is clear that the Syriac translator had no private information, and that he guessed, and guessed badly, from the Greek letters in his exemplar. 'Nain', if it be connected with the place quoted in *Neubauer* 188, ought to have an *'ain* in it (נעים), and the latter part of 'Gethsemane' is connected with the Hebrew for oil, and should have a ש, not a ס (see *Dalman* 152). 'Gennesaret' or 'Gennesar', again, is גנסר in Syriac: the Talmudic form is גינוסר, and it is natural to suppose that if the Syriac translator had derived his spelling of the name from living tradition it would have included a ܘ between the n and the s.

Of the names in the Acts and Epistles, ܐܪܝܛܐܣ for Ἀρέτας (2 Cor xi 32) is a very poor transliteration[2]. The name of the Ethnarch must have been חרתת, later spelt in Syriac ܚܐܪܬ (Wright, *CBM* 704 b), corresponding to the well-known Arabic names *Ḥāritha* or *el-Ḥārith*. In Acts ix 35 it is odd to find סרונא put for τὸν Σαρῶνα (instead of שרונא), side by side with לוד for Λύδδα. 'Ptolemais' becomes עכו and 'Joppa' יופא, but 'Tarsus' is merely transliterated טרסוס · possibly the pride of Roman citizenship had made Tarsus forget that in the Persian period it had spelt its name תרז on its coins. 'Gaza' (גזא) and 'Azotus' (אזוטוס) have Greek, not Semitic, forms of their names.

I have left out of consideration hitherto a number of the most interesting and controversial proper names in the Syriac New Testa-

[1] The oldest transmitted pronunciation is *Gadsēmān* (see *Gwilliam*, p. 171, note).

[2] The Armenian of Ephraim[100] has *Aret*, with no sign of an initial guttural.

ment, because we ought to examine them with reasonable ideas of the kind of rules or information from which the Syriac translator worked. So far as we have gone, I venture to think we have found nothing pointing to a special or extraordinary knowledge. The translator is familiar with the Old Testament in Syriac, and he has a good knowledge of ordinary geography, which he shows by giving the native names of the coast towns. But he does not always recognize Semitic names in their Greek dress, and there is no sign that he is specially familiar with the towns of Judaea or Galilee, or with the forms of Jewish names apart from those in the Old Testament.

I begin with the name *Caiaphas*, about the spelling of which the 'authority of the Syriac' has frequently been invoked[1]. This name is spelt ΚΑΙΑΦΑΣ in most Greek MSS. in agreement with Josephus (*Ant.* xviii 2), but D and the Latins have ΚΑΙΦΑΣ. The Syriac has קַיָּפָא, and this is often supposed to be a definite pronouncement in favour of the first over the second Greek reading. I doubt this it is, of course, an indication of the way the Syriac translator thought the word was spelt in Palestinian Aramaic, but I do not think it gives us any information of the way the word was spelt in the Greek MS. from which the Syriac was translated. The Syriac translator thought Βηθσαιδά (or Βηθσαιδάν) meant 'Fisherman's Town'. well and good. But if he turns Βηθσαιδά into *Bēth Ṣayyādā*, as he does, it is fairly obvious that his *Ḳayyāphā* may stand for Καιφᾶς as well as Καιάφας.

A somewhat similar conclusion appears to me to be indicated in the case of *Bethabara* and the *Gergesenes*, a couple of names which are very important in this connexion, as the forms found in the Old Syriac MSS. have been supposed to demonstrate that the Old Syriac Version itself was made later than Origen and under the influence of his exegesis[2]. It has been supposed that Origen himself introduced the name 'Gergesenes' (for Gadarenes or Gerasenes) as the name of the people among whom the Demoniac was healed, and also the name 'Bethabara' for Bethany beyond Jordan, where John was baptizing. Consequently, when we find גרגסיא in Mk v 1 S and בית עברא in Joh i 28 S C, it is a plausible inference that the Old Syriac reading is founded upon Origen's conjectures[3].

[1] See e. g. *Ency. Bibl.* 172, note 1.

[2] The substance of the following discussion on these words is taken from the present writer's article in the American *Journal of Biblical Literature* xxvii 128–133, called '*Gergesa—a* Reply'.

[3] It may be convenient to indicate here some textual facts which are assumed in the following discussion. (1) On general grounds there can be little doubt

It seemed at first a confirmation of this theory that the name in Mk v 1 was written in Syriac with a ס, not with a ש. Origen had not only expressed his opinion that the name of the city near which the swine had rushed into the sea was Gergesa, rather than Gadara or Gerasa: he went on to identify the people with the Girgashites of Gen xv 21. Mr. Raymond Clapp, to whom is due the credit of having called attention to the great importance of these names for our estimate of the date of the Old Syriac Version[1], concludes that גרגסיא, the reading of S in Mk v 1, is a simple transcript of a Greek MS. which read Γεργεσηνῶν, a reading which was itself the result of Origen's conjecture. A little consideration will, however, show that the Syriac form suggests the opposite conclusion, viz. that all that it tells us is that the translator identified 'the country of the [Gerasenes]' with 'the land of the Girgashites'. For, strange to say, the Old Testament Peshiṭta, in Gen xv 21 and elsewhere, represents the Hebrew הגרגשי by גרגוסיא. The reason for this is quite obscure, just as it is quite obscure why the Plain of Shinar (שִׁנְעָר) should be turned in the Peshiṭta into סנער. The Sinai Palimpsest, therefore, intends us to understand 'Girgashites' in Mk v 1, and the word should be pronounced *Gargosāyē*[2].

With regard to 'Bethabara' in Joh i 28 the case is similar. The word is written ܒܝܬ ܥܒܪ̈ܬܐ in C with the plural points; they are not legible in S, but whether they are really absent or merely illegible in S their presence in C shows that the word was regarded as plural, and therefore as a significant appellation (like 'Overstrand')

that Hort's conclusion is right, viz. the genuine reading of the Greek is 'Gadarenes' in Matt, but 'Gerasenes' in Mk and Lk. (2) In the Syriac, P has 'Gadarenes' everywhere; C has 'Gadarenes' in Lk (the only place where it is extant); S has 'Gadarenes' in Matt and Lk, but in Mk 'the district (χώρα) of the G.' is rendered 'the land of the גרגסיא'. (3) The rendering of the Diatessaron is not known from any early authority: naturally Ciasca's Arabic implies 'Gadarenes', the reading of P. (4) Syriac Versions appear to have had some tendency to introduce the name Gadarene: Abimelech of Gerar becomes Abimelech of ܓܕܪ (Gen xx), and the Hagarenes of Ps lxxxiii 6 become ܓܕܪ̈ܝܐ. These Gadarenes also meet us in 1 Chr xxvii 28 P. (5) 'Gadarenes' in Matt viii 28 S is simply a correct rendering of the Greek, and needs no further explanation; 'Gadarenes' in Lk viii 26, 37 S C may be a harmonization with Matt, or (more likely) an assimilation to the Diatessaron. It is the reading in Mk v 1 S, which has escaped harmonization, that needs explaining.

[1] *Journal of Biblical Literature* xxvi 62–83. See also Baethgen's *Evangelienfragmente* (1885), p. 83.

[2] The dropping of the ܘ in ܓܪܓܣܝܐ presents no difficulty in the case of a MS. like S. For parallels, see *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe* ii 40: see also Matt viii 28 in the margin of the Harclean Version.

and not as a transliteration of a Greek word. In this interpretation the Syriac differs from Origen, who thought that Βηθαβαρâ meant οἶκος κατασκευῆς (i. e. בית הבּרא, from ברא, to create!)[1], while the Syriac connects it with πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου.

We find, then, that the Syriac agrees with Origen in thinking of the 'Girgashites' as the people who owned the Herd of Swine, and also in identifying the place where John baptized with a spot which may be spelt in Greek Βηθαβαρâ. A couple of identifications such as these can hardly have been made independently, but we have further to go on and ask whether there is any justification for the common view, that these identifications were made for the first time by Origen.

Origen's Commentary on S. John, in which these identifications are found, is a bulky work, composed partly at Alexandria, and partly much later at Caesarea. In the former books, so far as they survive, the geographical interest is absent, though there are several pieces of Origen's characteristic lore about the Hebrew meanings of New Testament names[2]. But from Book vi onward, i. e. in the part written at Caesarea, Origen airs his knowledge of Palestine, and is quite ready to change the transmitted text of Scripture accordingly. What has happened in the interval? We could almost have guessed, even apart from our author's express statement, for we have all seen it in our friends and contemporaries. Origen has been on a Pilgrimage through the Holy Land, and he no longer needs information about the sites, for has he not seen them for himself?

At the same time, as I pointed out in the Paper already referred to, Origen does not himself claim to have discovered 'Bethabara' or 'Gergesa'. What he tells us is that '*they say* that Bethabara (τὰ Βηθαβαρâ) *is shown* by the gorge of the Jordan, where *they declare* that John baptized' (Orig. *in Joan.* vi 40). Further on he mentions 'Gergesa, from which come the Girgashites (οἱ Γεργεσαῖοι), an ancient city by what is now called the Lake of Tiberias, by which is a steep place close to the Lake, from which *it is shown* that the Swine were cast down by the demons' (Ibid. vi 41). This is what he learnt when he went on his pilgrimage, and in accordance with his geographical information he points out that Bethany is not beyond Jordan, and that neither Gerasa nor Gadara is situated on the Sea of Galilee.

The step that Origen took was to emend the Greek text of the Gospels in accordance with the local identifications. This is some-

[1] See Isaiah xl 28, xliii 7; also Βηθέβερρα οἶκος κατασκευῆς *OS* 201_{55}.

[2] E.g. ii 33 (*Brooke* i 99).

thing more than the translator of the Syriac Version can be proved to have done. His general aim was to find the proper Aramaic equivalent of the names, not to tell us with what letters the Greeks represented the Aramaic names. He does not care whether the Evangelist wrote Ἱεροσόλυμα or Ἱερουσαλήμ: the place meant is what his countrymen called *Urishlem*, and he writes it so. No various reading is implied in Acts xxi 7, where for κατηντήσαμεν εἰς Πτολεμαΐδα the Syriac has 'we came to Acre'. And if our translator was persuaded that the χώρα τῶν Γερασηνῶν was the land of the Girgashites I do not think he would scruple to write it so.

The view I am here advancing is that the agreement of the Old Syriac with Origen about the place-names Bethabara and Girgashites or Gergesenes comes not from the Old Syriac following Origen, but from both the Old Syriac and Origen following local identifications. I venture to think I have proved this conclusion not to be excluded by the evidence. I have now to try and show that it is not too artificial and improbable a theory to be believed.

In the first place, it seems to me fair to urge that any theory which makes the Old Syriac Version dependent upon Origen is in itself improbable. Apart from the evidence afforded, or seemed to be afforded, by these few place-names, the latest date assigned to the Old Syriac Version, as it stands in the Sinai Palimpsest, is about A.D. 200, more than a generation before Origen's commentary was written. In style, in manner, in tone, it is idiomatically Semitic, and far removed both from Origen's textual accuracy and his fanciful allegorizing. Further, the agreement with Origen is confined to geographical identifications; when it comes to the etymology of Semitic names there is a great difference. Origen was not really a profound linguist, and his ear for Semitic sounds seems to have been no better than that of most European tourists. The Syriac translator on the other hand was thoroughly skilled in Aramaic, his native language, and he discriminated between sounds which Origen confused. Palestinian Aramaic is, of course, different from the Syriac of Edessa, and the transcription of sounds in any language is a delicate matter, but the two dialects have the same gutturals and the same sibilants, and to a Semite they are not easily interchanged.

The independence of Origen and the Syriac is best represented by a Table: the right-hand column gives the transmitted Syriac text, while the middle column gives Origen's etymologies together with a conjectural restoration of the Semitic words intended by him.

	Origen.	*Syriac.*
Bethabara	οἶκος κατασκευῆς (vi 40) בית הַבְּרָא	בית עברא
Bethania	οἶκος ὑπακοῆς (vi 40) בית ענוה	בית עניא
Bethphage	οἶκος σιαγόνων (x 30) בית פכא	בית פגא
Jordan	κατάβασις αὐτῶν (vi 42)	יורדנן (i. e. no suffix)
Aenon	ὀφθαλμὸς βασάνου (*Brooke*, Fr. 76) עין און	עין נון (S) עין יון (C)
Salim	αὐτὸς ὁ ἀναβαίνων (Ibid.) ש עלה (?)	שלים

Origen's explanations are themselves in sad need of elucidation. Either he misheard certain Aramaic names, or he only heard them from Greek-speaking persons, and himself gave them his fantastic meanings. But if Origen were an *authority* at all for the Syriac translator, I cannot see why he should be trusted for place-identifications and deserted for derivations. Origen's derivation for Bethphage is especially interesting, for it is definitely Aramaic, yet it is different from that adopted by the Syriac Version.

The general inference I draw is that by Origen's time the identification of place-names in the Gospels had already begun to excite some interest among Palestinian Christians, themselves mainly a Greek-speaking body, not scientifically trained in the niceties of Aramaic pronunciation or grammar. At any rate, I venture to claim that the theory which makes the Syriac Versions depend upon Origen breaks down under investigation, and with it the theory that these Versions in any surviving form are later than Origen breaks down also.

The name of *Bethphage*, as already remarked, is spelt in the Syriac the same as in the Talmud. ܒܝܬ ܦܓܐ means in Aramaic 'the Place of Unripe Figs', and this is a far more likely derivation than οἶκος σιαγόνων (i.e. ܒܝܬ ܦܟܐ 'Place of Cheeks'), which is what Origen tells us it means. But Origen does not propose to change the spelling of Βηθφαγή in Greek, so most likely his fantastic explanation (repeated in the *Onomastica*) rests ultimately upon a mere error of the ear for Semitic sounds. About the identification of Bethphage there can be little dispute, though the exact site may be difficult to locate. It was a known place, and Origen tells us it was a τόπος ἱερατικός, which looks

as if he was really indebted to Jewish lore for his information, as the notices of Bethphage in the Talmud are connected with the virtual inclusion of the place in the Holy City for certain purposes [1].

The identification of *Bethany* is less certain, and therefore there is more doubt about the right pronunciation of the word. The Syriac has בית עניא, and this spelling also appears to underlie Origen's *οἶκος ὑπακοῆς*. On the other hand, no place of this name is mentioned by Jewish authorities, while there is mention of a place called בית היני which *may* be near the site of 'Bethany'. The question is complicated by the gloss Βηθανία· οἶκος δόξης (*OS* 173_{58}, 182_{04}, 188_{74}), which seems to indicate that a Christian tradition once existed that equated Bethany with בית אונ[ים], another spelling of בית היני [2].

I do not think we are in a position to solve the question. Bethany was, no doubt, a small and unimportant hamlet: if it really was Beth Hini, then what we know about it is that it was destroyed three years before Jerusalem was taken by Titus [3], and most likely all local knowledge of the place disappeared. When in the fourth century the victorious Christians built a great church over the reputed grave of Lazarus, the name Bethany, having no real root in the soil, withered away. The Lady Etheria, in the fifth century, knows of *Bethania* from her Bible, but on the spot she finds the place called *Lazarium*, and El-'Azarīyeh it is called to this day. I venture to think, therefore, that the first Christian archaeologists had nothing to go on but the letters of ΒΗΘ-ΑΝΙΑ. It is hardly surprising that, with the analogy of Anathoth to help them, they should have thought that ΑΝ represented ען rather than הינ. And, after all, they may be right in not connecting the New Testament Βηθανία with the Talmudic Beth-Hini. If the writer of the Second Gospel was really a Jerusalemite he must have known the true pronunciation of the name. Greek writing does not explain to us the initial consonant of ΑΝΙΑ: it may equally well be א or ה or ח or ע. But the Gospel is good evidence that the following vowel really was 'a' and not 'i' or 'ai', as it ought to have been if בית היני was intended. In short, the evidence suggests that the Syriac translator and the earliest Christian identificators (represented by the *Onomastica*) had no real traditional evidence to go upon; at the same time it is equally insufficient to prove that the pronunciation they suggest is wrong [4].

[1] See the discussion in *Neubauer* 147 ff.

[2] For בית אוני see Tosifta, *Shebiith* § 7; for δόξα = אונים see Isaiah xl 26.

[3] *Baba Mezia* 88 a.

[4] *Dalman* 143 suggests that the name of בית היני was originally בית חֲנָיָה.

The spelling of four other place-names in the Syriac Gospels raise considerations of general interest. These are *Gennesareth*, *Nazareth*, *Cana* of Galilee and *Bethesda*.

Gennesareth is a fertile district in Galilee that sometimes gives its name to the Sea of Tiberias. It is variously spelt Γεννησαρέτ, Γεννησαρέθ, and Γεννησάρ, but our Syriac texts have גנסר without variation, vocalized *Gēnēsar* in the Peshiṭta. No true Old Latin MS. has *-eth* or *-et* at the end of the word [1].

Our Jewish authorities give us גינוסר in the Talmud, גניסר in the Targums [2], while Josephus and 1 Maccabees (xi 67) have Γεννησάρ. The Syriac spelling, therefore, is vindicated as correct for an Aramaic document. But when we ask what is the genuine spelling in the Greek Gospels, the answer is not so easy. 'Gennesaret' is so familiar a word to us, that we realize with difficulty that it is confined to the non-western text of the Synoptic Gospels. For that very reason it is probably genuine there. The odd thing about the matter is that it is the Western authorities, including the Old Latin, that present the spelling which seems to be influenced either by local knowledge or knowledge of Josephus. It looks as if the longer form had altogether disappeared for a time from the text of the Gospels and then been reintroduced, possibly by Origen.

It would satisfy the general literary conditions if we supposed that Gennesar*et* belonged originally to Mark alone—a peculiar form belonging to the Evangelist who owes least to literary tradition. On this hypothesis Mark's 'Gennesaret' was changed to 'Gennesar' by the more literary Evangelists Luke and Matthew. Harmonistic corruption would then cause the rarer form 'Gennesaret' to drop out of Mark, while at a later date it was re-introduced into the Greek text of all three Gospels. But I cannot say that the textual evidence at all points directly to the longer form being more characteristic of Mark than of the other Evangelists. 'Dalmanutha' (Mk viii 10) is not a real parallel, for that word never found any acceptance in the other Gospels. A nearer parallel may possibly be found in 'Nazareth'.

The name *Nazareth* is connected with more than one insoluble problem. In the Greek Gospels the name is spelt sometimes Ναζαρέθ, sometimes Ναζαρέτ, while in Matt iv 13, Lk iv 6 we find Ναζαρά in

[1] Mk vi 53 *a* is not really an exception: it has genneza|retcumexis|sentdena|ui. The *et* is wanted to begin ver. 54, so that the archetype must have read *Gennezar* [54] *et* . . .

[2] Corresponding to the Biblical כנרת, e.g. Num xxxiv 11, Jos xiii 27.

the best authorities, both Greek and Latin. Neither of these verses is taken from Mark, while they are historically parallel to one another. It is, therefore, a legitimate inference that the statement of our Lord's settlement at this town was taken by Matthew and by Luke from Q, the non-Markan source, that the name of the town was given in Q, and that it was there spelt Ναζαρά. We have, then, *Nazaret* (or *Nazareth*) for Mark and *Nazara* for Q.

The Syriac texts, without exception, have נצרת, vocalized *Nāṣrath* in the Peshitta. The adjectives, Ναζαρηνός and Ναζωραῖος, are rendered by נצריא. In accordance with this identification, the accepted site of 'Nazareth' is called الناصرة to-day, and the Moslems call a Christian *Nasrānī* (pl. *Naṣāra*).

Nevertheless, there are difficulties in this identification. The first and gravest is the *z* in 'Nazarene'. The fact is, that in hardly any other instance does Greek ζ stand for Semitic צ[1]. We are accustomed to the representation of צ by *z* in English, because it is done in the Authorized Version of the Old Testament. But this *z* is really 'made in Germany': it is the German ʒ, to be pronounced like *ts*, and it was first used by the German Reuchlin, the friend of Erasmus, to imitate the sound which his Jewish teachers used. Before Reuchlin's time the universal transliteration of צ was simple *s*, both in Greek and in Latin. The difference between the ancient and the Renaissance system is best illustrated to English people by the name of the city of David, which is 'Zion' in the Old Testament, but 'Sion' in the New Testament and in the Prayer Book. Now whether we accept the form Ναζαρέτ or Ναζαρά, the second consonant of the Semitic equivalent ought to be *zain* (ז) not *sade* (צ). Or putting it the other way, if the name of the town were נצרת, or if the Jews were right in calling Christians נוֹצְרִים (*Taan.* 27b), then the name of the town should have been written Νασαρέτ or Νασαρά. It should not be forgotten that our Greek Gospels are some two generations earlier than any surviving monument of Semitic Christianity. According to the Acts, Christians were once called members of the sect of the Nazoraeans (τῶν Ναζωραίων), and we know that in later times a Semitic-speaking sect of Christians was called by this name. Unfortunately we do not know how these persons wrote their name in their own Aramaic vernacular. The Talmudic passage quoted above (Gemara of R. Johanan) is later than the Old Syriac Version. Tertullian's reference to Jews calling Christians *Nazaraei* or *Nazareni* is connected by that Father with Lam iv 7 and the *Nazirites*, i.e. with the נזירים.

[1] See Appendix III for details.

But, it may be said, at any rate there is the town Nazareth; how is that spelt? Here comes in the importance of Dr. Cheyne's statement that 'no such town as Nazareth is mentioned in the Old Testament, in Josephus, or in the Talmud' (*Ency. Bibl.* 3360)[1]. The fact is, that the identification of the Gospel Ναζαρέτ or Ναζαρά with a place spelt נצרת stands on the same footing as the equation of Bethany with Bethabara, or Gerasenes with Girgashites. It is a piece of early Christian archaeology, rather than of primitive tradition.

An attempt has been made to regard Nazara or Nazareth as a name for Galilee, but it seems to be destitute of any ancient evidence, and it certainly contradicts the Gospels, which speak of Nazareth as a town (Matt ii 23, Lk iv 29). The one thing that is told us is that it was situated on a hill (Lk iv 29), which is true of half the villages of Palestine. If you leave out of consideration the narrative of the address at the opening of the Ministry in the Synagogue at 'Nazara', a narrative peculiar to S. Luke, and apparently composed by him out of Mk vi 1–5 together with some very probably genuine sayings of our Lord which he took from another source, there is nothing whatever in the New Testament to individualize Nazareth at all beyond the mere letters of its name.

There are, it must be noticed, two passages where the name of Nazareth might have been expected, where nevertheless it does not occur. The first is Mk vi 1–6, which relates the unsuccessful ministry of Jesus in His 'own country' (εἰς τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῦ). No further name is mentioned, though we hear of the Synagogue, and of the villages round about. The other is Lk x 13–15 = Matt xi 20–24, i. e. the 'woes' on Chorazin, Bethsaidan and Kapharnaum. Of these places, Kapharnaum is the actual centre of the Galilean preaching, Bethsaidan (said in the Fourth Gospel to be the town of Andrew and Peter) is the place of refuge just outside the domains of Herod Antipas, and wonderful deeds are actually recorded that took place in its immediate neighbourhood. But nothing is recorded in the Gospels about work or preaching in Chorazin, while the rejection of Jesus by His fellow-townsmen would have made 'Nazareth' quite appropriate in this passage. No place in Galilee, indeed, would be so appropriate.

With some misgivings, I venture to suggest that the name 'Nazareth', like that of 'Dalmanutha' and 'Boanerges', may have

[1] The nearest thing is Beth Leḥem Ṣerieh (בית לחם צריה) in *Megilla* i 1, on Josh xix 15. See *Neubauer* 190 f.

arisen from a literary error. I mean this, that we ought to consider the possibility that the city of Joseph and Mary, the πατρίς of Jesus, was *Chorazin*.

I do not suppose the adjective 'Nazarene' to have been originally derived from Chorazin. This adjective, in the two forms Ναζαρηνός (Mk) and Ναζωραῖος (Matt, Joh, Acts; Lk having both), is better attested than the name of the town from which it is commonly derived. It is difficult not to think that Jesus was called 'the Nazarene', or 'the Nazoraean': what is doubtful is the meaning of the term. It is not easy to understand the form Ναζωραῖος in any case, but the difficulty is greater if we have to make it an adjective denoting an inhabitant of Nazara or Nazareth.

After considering the matter from various points of view, it seems to me most probable that the word is really connected with נזיר and the vow of the Nazirites. Of course Jesus was not a legal Nazirite, whatever John the Baptist may have been, for He drank wine. That He did not scruple to touch an apparently dead body proves nothing, for the daughter of Jairus came to life again. Moreover the saying 'Let the dead bury their dead' actually expresses an integral part of the Nazirite's enforced freedom from certain social obligations. Is it not possible that 'Nazoraean' was a nickname? It might conceivably mean 'this odd sort of Nazarite'—one who calls for repentance, and yet eats and drinks like other folk (Matt xi 19, Lk vii 34). The true origin of nicknames is easily lost, and it may have been supposed that the name referred to some place in Galilee. It should be noticed that most of the consonants of χοραζειν reappear in reverse order in ναζαρεθ.

It is a desperate conjecture, and I would not make it, were it not that the ordinary view of Nazareth seems to me wholly unproved and unsatisfactory. And the most unproved and least satisfactory part of the ordinary view is that part of it which is attested by the Syriac Versions, whereby the *z* is made to represent a Semitic צ.

Cana of Galilee is mentioned four times in the Fourth Gospel[1], and has been variously identified. But in the Syriac it becomes ܩܛܢܐ, and this in the constant tradition of the Syriac Vulgate is vocalized *Ḳāṭnē*[2]. There is no variation in the Greek, which is, moreover, treated by the Evangelist as fem. sing. (εἰς τὴν Κανά, Joh iv 46).

[1] Joh ii 1, 11; iv 46; xxi 2.

[2] This is the vocalization it would have if it were the emphatic plural of a participle active, and accordingly some MSS. of the Peshiṭta spell it ܩܛܢ̈ܐ with the plural points.

This change of Κανά into *Ḳāṭnē* cannot be explained on palaeographical or linguistic grounds. the words are really as distinct as Ptolemais and Acre, and I think we must infer that the Syriac word represents a deliberate geographical identification.

Unfortunately, neither this identification nor the ordinary one can be made out with certainty. The marriage-throne of the bride and bridegroom at 'Cana', three miles from Diocaesarea, on which in the year 570 or thereabouts Antoninus of Placentia scratched his family name[1], has disappeared, and the Syriac *Ḳāṭnē* is almost equally hard to find. Kaṭanā near Damascus is too far away, and possibly the place meant is קטונית, the Biblical Ḳaṭṭath (*Neubauer* 189). But this hardly explains the odd vocalization.

We are not, however, directly concerned with the actual site. The important thing in our investigation is that the variation between the name of 'Cana of Galilee' as written in Greek and as represented in Syriac suggests a geographical identification. Such an identification could hardly have been made by a Christian scholar staying at home in Edessa, and we must infer that the translator himself, or the source from which he derived his geographical theories, must have been a Palestine Pilgrim.

Round the name of *Bethesda* many controversies have raged, both topographical and textual. The latest and certainly one of the most interesting studies of the questions regarding it is that by Dr. Rendel Harris in his book called *Side-Lights on New Testament Research*, pp. 36–51 and 70–76[2]. I shall not attempt to touch upon all the points raised, except in so far as they relate to the subject immediately before us, which is the 'authority' of the Syriac Biblical tradition. The 'Bethesda' question is twofold: there is a doubt concerning the site, and a doubt concerning the name. As for the site, excavations near the church of S. Anne in the north-east corner of Jerusalem, not far from where our topographical authorities place the Sheep-gate mentioned by Nehemiah, have brought to light the Pool which in the early days of Christian archaeology was identified with the προβατικὴ κολυμβήθρα mentioned in Joh v 2 and in the *Onomastica*. It was this Pool that was seen by the Bordeaux Pilgrim in A. D. 333, and in certain other ways it satisfies the data very well. But this Pool is in the quarter of Jerusalem called Bezetha by Josephus, and as several very ancient

[1] *Itinera Sancta* 161: in ipso accubitu, ubi ego indignus nomina parentum meorum scripsi.

[2] Angus Lectures for 1908.

authorities spell the name in the Gospel Βηζαθά instead of *Bethesda*, it is almost an irresistible inference that Βηζαθά (or something like it) is the true reading. There is some doubt about the spelling of Bezetha in Josephus: a more accurate expression, therefore, for our conclusion will be that Josephus and the Evangelist intend to give the same name.

The most puzzling part of the evidence is that Josephus seems to tell us that Bezetha means Kainopolis or New Town [1]. This is really quite impossible. The best attested spelling is Βεζεθά. Now ζ between two vowels must stand for Semitic *zain*, and there is no *z* in 'New' or 'Town', whether we try Hebrew or Aramaic. *Beth Ha(d)tha* has been suggested, but this does not mean 'New Town'. It does not even mean 'New House' or 'The New House'; if it means anything it means 'The House of the New Man'. *Beth*, literally 'House', is used in the construct state before nouns to mean 'The Place of', as in *Beth Phaggē*, i. e. 'The Place of Unripe Figs'. But it is not so used before ordinary adjectives. Neither in Aramaic nor in English is New House synonymous with New Town. And when we come to the actual words of Josephus we find that he does not quite say that the Greek for *Bezetha* is καινὴ πόλις. He says, *BJ* v 4, 2 (*Niese* v 151): ἐκλήθη δ' ἐπιχωρίως Βεζεθὰ τὸ νεόκτιστον μέρος, ὃ μεθερμηνευόμενον Ἑλλάδι γλώσσῃ καινὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν πόλις, i. e. you *might* translate it so, but perhaps another phrase would be better. In *BJ* ii 19, 4 he seems to distinguish between 'Bezetha' and his 'Kainopolis' (τήν τε Β. προσαγορευομένην καὶ τὴν Καινόπολιν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον Δοκῶν ἀγοράν).

Professor Dalman (*Gram.*, p. 115) connects the name with Βηζέθ (1 Macc vii 19), a place also spelt Βηθζαίθ, *Begeth*, and *Bethzecha*, and he supposes the name to mean 'Place of Olives' (בית זיתא). But it seems to me, on the whole, best to take a hint from a previous sentence to the above-quoted passage from the 'Jewish War'. Josephus says, describing the hills of Jerusalem (*Ibid.* = *Niese* v 149): τέταρτον περιοικηθῆναι λόφον ὃς καλεῖται Βεζεθά, κείμενος μὲν ἀντικρὺ τῆς Ἀντωνίας ἀποτεμνόμενος δὲ ὀρύγματι βαθεῖ, 'a fourth crest which is called *Bezetha*, situated opposite Antonia and *cut off* from it by a deep moat' [2]. But does not this suggest a derivation? Is it not possible that Βεζεθά or Βηζαθά stands for בִּזְעָתָא, i.e. 'the bits cut off', or possibly בִּזְעֲתָא 'the bit cut off'?

[1] *BJ* ii 19, 4; *BJ* v 4, 2 (= *Niese* v 151).

[2] There was a great pit or tank (φρέαρ) in 'Bezeth', where Bacchides flung his victims.

But whether we take this, or regard Bezeth as the old name of an outlying village, now become part of the town, or suppose that the name means 'Place of Olives', we do not in any case come to *Bethesda*. This, the most familiar form of the name to us, is with one significant exception not supported in any of the authorities by which modern critical editors are generally influenced. It is not in the *Onomastica*, which have Βηζαθά in Greek and *Bethsaida* in Latin. It is not in B (Βηθσαιδα), in ℵ (Βηθζαθα), in D (Βελζεθα), in the genuine Old Latin (*Bezatha*, *Betzata*, *Belzatha*, *Betzetha*), or the Vulgate (*Bethsaida*). The Egyptian versions, also, with the text of the Harclean and the Ethiopic, have 'Bethsaida', spelt like the 'city of Andrew and Peter'.

The supporters of Βηθεσδά are the vast majority of Greek MSS. (including, of course, A and C), the Gothicizing revised Latin texts *f* and *q*, and all the Syriac versions, except the text of the Harclean. It is also in the Armenian, where the spelling (*Beth ḥezda*) makes it pretty certain that it has been derived from a Syriac source.

For 'Bethesda' are the Byzantine tradition and 'the authority of the Syriac'; *against* 'Bethesda' are the ancient Versions (except the Syriac), local tradition, and the most ancient and trusted Greek MSS.

Such a division of the evidence is not only unfavourable to *Bethesda*; it makes it very likely that the Old Syriac Version, which is the one really ancient authority that supports this reading, is also the source of it. We are dealing with probabilities, and by the nature of the case we cannot hope to do more than frame a hypothesis, which will cover the facts of the case and be consistent with the phenomena of other various readings and unlikely forms of Proper Names. My hypothesis, then, is that Βηζαθά was the form written by the Evangelist; that this became extensively corrupted to Βηθζαθά, Βηδζαθά, &c., and also widely assimilated to 'Bethsaida'. The Syriac translator, on the other hand, whatever of these forms may have been before his eyes, thought that 'House of Mercy' was not far off, and so wrote *Beth Ḥesda*. The Martyr Lucian, or whoever else is the real foster-father of the Antiochian-Byzantine text[1], may very likely have had 'Bethsaida' in the text that lay before him: this was a manifest geographical blunder and needed correction, and the correction that was chosen was derived from the Syriac tradition.

The whole question is, in certain ways, parallel to the question of 'Nazareth'. In both cases we have a current tradition now in vogue about the names, a tradition which is unsatisfactory in the light

[1] The text called *K* by von Soden.

of the earliest evidence. In the case of Nazareth it is the selection of a site, in the case of Bethesda it is the form of a name. In both cases by far the oldest witness to the unsatisfactory current tradition is the ancient Syriac Version. I do not believe these Syriac names have any more 'authority' than *Joārāsh* for Jairus, or *Ḳāṭnē* for Cana; the only difference is that the former pair found favour at the end of the fourth century among the Greeks and the latter pair did not.

It will be convenient to notice here certain Syriac forms of Proper Names that for various reasons need some elucidation.

1. The Elamites of Acts ii 9 are rendered אלניא (*Alanāyē*) in P. This is not an irregular transliteration of 'Ἐλαμεῖται, but means the Alans, a barbarous people mentioned by Pliny (vi 26) in connexion with the Kurds and by the Dialogue *De Fato* (ܦܐ 3) in connexion with the regions north of Pontus. The name of the Elamites was no doubt taken by S. Luke from the Old Testament, but a Mesopotamian translator would know that they were extinct as the Druids, and so he chose a more modern name from the same sort of region as an equivalent. In exactly the same spirit De Sacy's Arabic translates the 'Parthians' by أكراد, i. e. Kurds.

2. Bar-Jesus, the name of the Magus in Acts xiii 6, is variously spelt in important Western texts, so that the original reading is somewhat doubtful. In P בר שומא (*Barshuma*) is given as an equivalent. The meaning of *Barshuma* is not known: what is known is that it was an old family name in Edessa, where it appears on the pre-Christian grave of עיו ברת ברשומא (i. e. 'Stella, daughter of Barshuma')[1]. I do not suppose we can reconstruct the Greek word which suggested Barshuma to the Syriac translator, any more than we could recover 'Ἐλαμεῖται from 'the Alans' in Acts ii 9.

3. Matthias in Acts i 23, 26 is transliterated מתיא in P. So far as I know, there is no variation in the name in Greek or Latin, except that some ancient MSS. have Μαθθίαν instead of Ματθίαν. But in Syriac the case is different. Aphraates 150 (*Demonstr.* iv 6) calls him תולמי, and this name is substituted for 'Matthias' wherever it occurs in the Syriac Version of Eusebius's *History*. It is evident that

[1] *ZDMG* xxxvi 164. I take this opportunity of suggesting that the difficult word in line 3, read ܐܫܘܕܐ by Sachau, may be an ill-cut ܐܫܘܬܐ. The first four lines will then run: (1) 'I, 'Iu bath Barshuma, (2) have made for myself this tomb. (3) I beg of thee, *whoever else* enters (4) here, not to move my bones and the sarcophagus.' I assume that עיו is the abs. state of עיותא (Job ix 9), the name of a certain Star or Constellation.

this is no mere palaeographical error, but that the Old Syriac Version of the Acts must have had תולמי also. This name occurs as Θολομαῖος in Josephus (*Ant.* xx 1), and is, of course, the second part of the name Bartholomew[1]. An obscure name תלמי does occur in Judges and Samuel, but תולמי is nothing more than Ptolemy in a Semitic disguise (see Levy, *Neu-Hebr. Dict.*, s. v.). Why the Old Syriac of Acts should have represented Matthias by this name cannot now be ascertained.

4. Malchus in Joh xviii 10 is rendered מלך (*Mālēk*) in P, but מלכו (? *Malĕku*) in S. The word occurs in S at the end of a line, so that it is not quite certain that an ם may not be lost in the margin: in that case S would present a mere commonplace transliteration of Μάλχος. But as the name appears to be treated as a Semitic one in P, it is more likely that מלכו is the true reading, in which case we have an interesting parallel to 'Gashmu the Arabian', mentioned in Neh vi 6[2]. מלכו (i. e. مالك) is a very common Palmyrene name (Cook, *Aramaic Glossary*, p. 73, where, however, 'vol. 7' is a misprint for 'vol. 6', and מלכו is a *woman's* name).

5. Finally, as bearing upon the general sociological equipment of the Syriac translator, it should be noticed that the technical Jewish term סנהדרין (*Sanhedrin*) is never used to render συνέδριον, even when it might have been not inappropriate. In Matt x 17 S P the technical Jewish term for the *local* Jewish Court is correctly given (בית דינא, *Beth-din*)[3], but even in Acts xxii 30 πᾶν τὸ συνέδριον is only rendered כלה כנשא דרשיהון, i. e. 'all the assembly of their Heads'. I imagine the translator was only acquainted with the provincial Judaism of Upper Mesopotamia. 'Phylacteries' and 'Beth-dins' he knew, but the parts of the Jewish organization that came to an end with the Destruction of Jerusalem were as unfamiliar to him as to the rest of the Gentile world.

It is now time to sum up the main results of these scattered observations. I shall attempt to do so in a series of propositions.

(1) The translator of the Syriac Version aimed at giving the vernacular equivalent of the New Testament Proper Names, rather than a transliteration of the Greek.

Examples: *Acre* for Ptolemais, *Alans* for Elamites.

[1] In Matt viii 3 *tholomeus* occurs in *a* for Bartholomew.

[2] No doubt גשמו corresponds to جُشَمُ: it would be interesting to know whence ℵAB derived the spelling Γοσεμ'.

[3] The Syriac should be vocalized *Beth dīnē*, with Gwilliam's *Mas.* 3, not *Beth dayyānē* (i. e. 'Place of the judges').

(2) Wherever possible, the forms of the Names in the Syriac New Testament are assimilated to those in the Syriac Old Testament (Peshiṭta), which is earlier and normative for the Syriac New Testament.

Examples · *Ṣehyōn* for Sion, *Yeshu'* for Jesus.

(3) When the Old Testament failed, the Syriac is sometimes demonstrably wrong.

Example · *Yoārāsh* for Jairus.

(4) A connexion between the Syriac translator and Origen is to be noted, but it is by way of agreement in identification combined with disagreement in etymology.

Examples: *Bethabara* and *Bethphage.*

(5) The connexion is to be explained by the rise of local Palestinian Christian traditions, fostered by the rise of Christian pilgrimage.

Examples: '*Gergesenes*' and again *Bethabara.*

(6) Some Syriac identifications never influenced non-Syriac Christian tradition. This demonstrates the existence of a certain independence in the Syriac identifications.

Example. *Kāṭnē* for Cana.

(7) In other cases the Syriac identification is the oldest evidence for the modern and incorrect theory, and in some cases may have been the parent of that theory.

Examples: *Nāṣrath* for Nazareth, *Bethḥesda* for Bezatha.

(8) Now that a direct dependence of the Syriac New Testament upon Origen is excluded we are free to date the work in conformity with all the other indications, i. e. in the last quarter of the second century A. D. It is thus the earliest surviving monument of the reviving interest which Christians were beginning to take in the Holy Places. This lessens its value for textual criticism, as the translator becomes, to a certain extent, a critic rather than a witness. When minutely examined, the Syriac Version, even in its oldest form, shows, like all other monuments of Christianity, the great chasm that separates the second-century Christian Church from Palestinian life before the Destruction of Jerusalem. The only bridge across this great chasm is the Greek text of the New Testament itself. Naturally I do not wish to deny the continuity of Catholicism with the first preaching of the Christian Gospel, but the continuity with the Fathers of old time to which the Catholic Church of the second century justly attached so much weight was connected with ideas and not with tangible antiquities. It is possible for theologians to have very different notions of the 'deposit' which Timothy was charged so carefully to guard, but quite certainly it did not include

any theory as to the site of Nazareth. For such things we are driven back to the words of the Greek Testament, and the Semitic consonants of the Syriac Version bear witness to no geographical or linguistic tradition that goes behind this.

F. C. BURKITT.

APPENDICES

I. Alphaeus, Agabus, Hebrew.

The three names *Alphaeus*, *Agabus*, and *Hebrew*, are best treated together in the form of a Note to Westcott and Hort's well-known *Introduction* § 408, a paragraph explaining and defending the smooth and rough breathings adopted by them in their edition of the Greek text of the New Testament. They say:—

'In proper names transliterated from the Hebrew or Aramaic we have . . . exactly followed the Hebrew or Aramaic spelling, expressing א and ע by the smooth breathing, and ה and ח by the rough breathing. . . . In Ἁλφαῖος we follow the Vulgate Syriac (the Old Syriac is lost in the four places where the name occurs), which agrees with what the best modern authorities consider to be the Aramaic original. We have also in the text accepted the authority of the Syriac for Ἀγαβος (from עגב): but Ἅγαβος (from חגב) is supported by the existence of a *Hagab* in Ezr ii 45 f.; Neh vii 48. In like manner Ἐβέρ, Ἐβραῖος, Ἐβραίς, Ἐβραϊστί have every claim to be received: indeed, the complete displacement of *Ebraeus* and *Ebrew* by *Hebraeus* and *Hebrew* is comparatively modern.'

The fame of Hort's *Introduction* is assured, but some evil genius must have possessed him when he compiled this paragraph. It contains highly doubtful opinions stated as if they were axioms, and one or two downright blunders. As however it quite accurately represents the actual practice followed in all editions of 'W.-H.', it seems worth while to point out the facts.

I never could understand why ע should have a Greek 'smooth' breathing, while ה and ח are to be indiscriminately represented by the 'rough'. The Greek breathings do not exactly correspond to any Semitic letter, but they do exactly correspond to the rules

observed about aspirating or not aspirating the preceding consonant, and these rules are our only safe guide.

To take the case of *Hebrew* first. Here mediaeval Latin and English spellings tell us nothing at all, and unfortunately there is no instance either in the Old or New Testament where Ἑβραῖος stands immediately after a mutable consonant. But Westcott and Hort appear to have forgotten all about the 'Gospel according to the Hebrews', τὸ καθ' Ἑβραίους Εὐαγγέλιον. So far as I know, κατ' Ἐβραίους never occurs: certainly καθ' Ἑβραίους is the spelling of the MSS. in Eusebius *HE* iii 25, 27, iv 22, and in Origen *in Joan.* ii 12. This, surely, is decisive evidence in favour of the rough breathing[1].

Agabus has been equally unlucky. I do not know how Westcott and Hort came to think that this name began in Syriac with ע, or why the statement has been so often repeated, e. g. by Blass in his edition of the Acts, the fact being that the name in Syriac is written ܐܓܒܘܣ (אגבוס) both in Acts xi 28 and in xxi 10.

Since the name ends in וס, i. e. since the Greek termination is transliterated into Syriac, we must infer that the Syriac translator did not regard the name as recognizably Semitic; in other words, he gives us no opinion as to its derivation. ܐܓܒܘܣ is simply a transliteration of ΑΓΑΒΟϹ, and tells us nothing as to the breathing we ought to prefix to the word. If on quite other grounds we think ΑΓΑΒΟϹ corresponds to חגב, just as ΑΡΕΤΑϹ corresponds to *Ḥāritha*, we may prefix a rough breathing, but the Syriac evidence tells us nothing except that our proposed derivation was not obvious in ancient times.

The decision between *Alphaeus* and *Halphaeus* is less clear. Here the Syriac versions, now reinforced by the Sinai Palimpsest, have *Ḥalpai* (חלפי). This really does imply that the word is recognized as Semitic, not only because of the initial guttural, but also because the Greek termination is dropped. It may further be remarked that the Greek name Ἀλφειός becomes in Syriac ܐܠܦܝܘܣ (Eus. *Mart. Palest.* i).

The name *Ḥalpai* does not certainly occur in Jewish sources. Dalman (p. 142) cites חילפיי from j. Kidd. 58 d, but this is not the name of a Rabbi. The word seems to mean 'controversialist' (خِلافِيّ). Moreover, in b. Taan. 21 a it appears as אילפא. However, as there is no sign of a various reading Ἀλφειός in the New Testament, the 'authority of the Syriac' may in this case stand, *quantum valeat*, and we may continue to write Ἁλφαῖος.

[1] Under the influence of Westcott and Hort the smooth breathing has been used for Ἑβραῖος in the Cambridge LXX and the Oxford Concordance to the LXX !

II. Capernaum, Capharnaum.

It is well known that the *Textus Receptus* of the New Testament has Καπερναούμ, while all critical editions spell the word Καφαρναούμ. These names are the subject of a study by Professor E. Nestle in a Festschrift for Theodor Zahn (Leipzig, 1908, pp. 251–270), which like all Nestle's work is packed full of curious and recondite information. Nestle points out that Καπερναούμ is attested by the great mass of Greek MSS., Καφαρναούμ by ℵBD, and also by practically all the Versions. The Syriac has ܟܦܪܢܚܘܡ, and Nestle conjectures that the two forms arose from different pronunciations of this It is well known that the East Syrians pronounced ܦ hard (i. e. hard for Semites): if then כפר was really a monosyllabic form, and if the East Syrians pronounced the word *Kapr*, then Καπερναούμ might have arisen from the East Syrian form.

Nestle is quite right in saying that the ancient Syriac Versions cannot be claimed as witnesses to decide between π and φ, as they use ܦ indifferently for both. But the other part, equally essential, of his ingenious theory breaks down on investigation. The East Syrian pronunciation of the name is ܟܦܰܪ ܢܚܘܡ, i. e. *Kpar Nāhūm* or *Kphar Nāhūm*, not *Kapr N.* This is not only the reading of the Urmi editions and those founded upon them: I have ascertained that ܟܦܰܪ ܢܚܘܡ is the reading of the 'Nestorian Masora', i. e. B.M. Add. 12138, one of the most careful and accurate MSS. ever written. Further, the place called כְּפַר העמונה in Josh xviii 24 is called in the Urmi Bible ܟܦܰܪ ܥܡܘܢܐ. It is, therefore, evident that the ε in Καπερναούμ is definitely rejected by the East Syrian tradition.

This brings the matter back where it was. But on general grounds it was not likely that the solution of this curious problem would come from beyond the Euphrates. The main facts are that Καπερ- is attested by what Dr. Hort calls the Antiochian text, while Καφαρ- is attested by all others. It is a natural inference that the pronunciation of the Greek-speaking population of the Antiochian district may have something to do with the matter. Dr. Nestle quotes Theodoret for Καπερσαvᾶ, and Theodoret is certainly a witness for fourth to fifth century Antiochian fashions, which is exactly what is wanted. Using then 'Syrian' in the sense used by Hort, i. e. not for that which is Aramaic, but for what is characteristic of the Greek-speaking district of which Antioch was the capital, we may after all agree with Nestle, that in the prevalence of the spelling

Καπερναούμ in Greek MSS. of the Gospels we may see 'eine der stärksten Bestätigungen der Theorie von Westcott-Hort, dass der *Textus receptus* die Frucht einer *syrischen* Rezension ist'.

III. Greek Z for Hebrew צ.

The Greeks habitually represented Semitic צ by simple σ. Besides words like Σιών for ציון, which is after all an exclusively Biblical and Jewish name, we have Σιδών for צידון and Σάρεπτα for צרפת. No rule, however, is without apparent exceptions, and in view of the importance of the statement made above (p. 392) that in hardly any instance Greek ζ stands for Semitic צ, it is worth while to examine the names in the Greek Bible (besides 'Nazareth') in which ζ is apparently so used.

In all there appear to be ten. Taking them in their most familiar English form and in the order of the English alphabet, we have

1. *Adonizedek* (Josh x 1). 'Αδωνιζεδέκ (Aq., Symm., Theod.) = אדני צדק. Here the LXX has ἀδωνιβεζέκ, i.e. the Greek Bible reads אדני בזק, as in Judges i 5 ff. This reading seems to have been corrected to agree with the Hebrew in Origen's Hexapla, with the least possible change of the traditional consonants. Josephus has ἀδωνιβέζεκος. It should be noticed that 'Melchizedek' is never spelt in Greek with ζ either in the Old or the New Testament.

2. *Arzareth* (4 Ezra xiii 45). This is the name of the land where the Ten Tribes went, according to the Latin text of 4 Ezra. It appears to denote some region beyond the sources of the Euphrates, and against all probability it has been explained as ארץ אחרת, to agree with Deut xxix 28. Not only is the equation of *z* and צ highly contentious: besides that, it is very doubtful whether the word really ended in *-areth* at all, as the Syriac has ܐܪܙܦ. ܣܘܦܗ ܕܐܪܥܐ, i.e. *Arzaph, the end of the earth.* Certainly this word can do very little to prove that the ζ in Ναζαρέθ corresponds to צ.

3. *Bozez* (1 Regn xiv 4). The rock Bozez (בוצץ) is spelt Βαζεϲ in B and βαζεθ in 'Lucian'. Presumably the Greek read בזץ for בוצץ.

4. *Hezron* (Ruth iv 18). The grandson of Judah (חצרון) is spelt 'Εσρώμ in the NT Genealogies. In the OT we find 'Εσρώμ, 'Εσρών, 'Ασρώμ, 'Αστρών, and in Josephus 'Ασσαρών. Besides these, 'Εζρών occurs in the Lucianic text of Ruth iv 18, a text which here rests

upon two minuscules, and 'Εζρώμ occurs in Lk iii 33 E, i. e. in an inferior Uncial of the 8th century. There can be little doubt that these spellings have nothing whatever to do with the writers of the 1st century A. D.

5. *Huz* (Gen xxii 21, 1 Chr i 17), the brother of Buz, is spelt in Hebrew עוץ, the same name as the land of Uz, where Job lived. The land of Uz in the Greek Bible is the χώρα αὐσῖτις, while in Genesis we find Ὦξ and in Chronicles Ὦς. Josephus has Οὖξος. But the Lucianic text has Ὦζ for Genesis and Οὖζ for Chronicles. This again is surely nothing more than a mediaeval variant in an unfamiliar 'barbarous' word.

6. Duke *Mibzar* of Edom (Gen xxxvi 42, 1 Chr i 53) is spelt Μαζάρ in the Greek, but Μαβσάρ also occurs. The Hebrew is מבצר.

7. A name ϲωλζ seems to occur in 1 Chr xxvi 14 B, where the Hebrew has יועץ. Here A has ιωιαϲ.

8. *Zalmunna*, King of Midian (Judges viii 5 ff., Psalm lxxxiii 11), appears in the Greek Bible as Σαλμανά or Σελμανά. But 'Zeba and Zalmunna' (זבח וצלמנע) are called by Josephus Ζεβῆν καὶ Ζαρμούνην (*Antiq.* v 228). Is it too fanciful to suppose that in this instance Josephus modified the name for the sake of alliteration?

9. *Zaraces* (Ezra A i 38) corresponds to the יואחז of 2 Chr xxxvi 4. It is conceivable that there may have been in the Semitic original a mention of Zedekiah (צדקיה), but the text is doubtful as B has ζλριον and the Latin *Zaracelem* and *Zachariam*.

These nine instances appear to me to be of no importance at all. The case is different with respect to the remaining one:—

10. *Zoar*, the city near the Dead Sea, where Lot took refuge, in Hebrew צֹעַר. It is mentioned eleven times in all. In eight of these (Gen xiv 2, 8; xix 22, 23, 30 *bis*; Deut xxxiv 3; Isai xv 5) the Greek Bible has Σήγωρ, a transliteration which points to a vocalization different from the Massoretic (? cf. צִיעֹר Josh xv 54). Further, the use of γ for ע is characteristic of the earlier Greek transliterations. But besides Σήγωρ we find in Gen xiii 10, Jerem xxxi (xlviii) 4, Ζόγορα and in Jerem xxxi (xlviii) 34 Ζόγορ. This is something more than a transcriber's mistake. It is clear that there must have been a definite reason for spelling the name of this town with Z.

No doubt the reason was that 'Zoar' was a known place, spelt Zοάρα or Ζωάρα by Ptolemy (v 16). Eusebius (*OS* 231) says, referring to Gen xiv 2, Βαλά, ἥ ἐστι Σιγώρ, ἡ νῦν Ζωορὰ καλουμένη . . . ἣ καὶ εἰς ἔτι νῦν οἰκεῖται. Further, there was a special reason why this town should be spelt with Z. We know from Gen xix that

the name was supposed to mean 'Littleham' or 'Littleborough', and Josephus says of it Ζωὼρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγεται· καλοῦσι γὰρ οὕτως Ἑβραῖοι τὸ ὀλίγον. Now though ז and צ do not indiscriminately or regularly interchange, yet one or two roots containing these letters do interchange, and זער—צער is one. צעיר is one of the words for 'little' in Hebrew, while in Jewish Aramaic it is זעיר and in Syriac זעור. When therefore Josephus says that Ζωώρ means τὸ ὀλίγον, it is Aramaic rather than Biblical Hebrew that he has in mind, and very likely he knew of the town of Ζωορά as זֹעַר, the form found in the 'Jerusalem' Targum to Gen xiv and xix, and also in the 'Jerusalem' (i. e. Palestinian) Talmud.

Somewhat similarly the root זדק is used in Syriac (not in Palestinian Aramaic) instead of צדק, so that e. g. the Σαδδουκαῖοι appear regularly in the Syriac versions as זדוקיא. But this is an exclusively Syriac form and does not occur even in the Christian Palestinian dialect. Thus the names of Zoar—צער—Ζωάρα do not really form an isolated exception to the rule that Greek Z does not correspond to Semitic צ. The evidence rather suggests that in historical times this town was known by an Aramaic name (זער), rather than by the old Hebraeo-Canaanite one (צער) by which it is called in the Old Testament. It is possible that the more modern Aramaic name had once a footing in the Old Testament itself, and that this stage is reflected by the Greek Bible, in which possibly Σηγώρ corresponds to צֹעַר while Ζόγορα represents זֹעַר. This peculiar case is a very slender foundation for supporting the theory that in Ναζαρέθ or Ναζαρά the second consonant corresponds to a *ṣade* and not to a *zain*.

INDEX

The following works are quoted by an abbreviated title.

Dalman.—G. DALMAN, Grammatik des Jüdisch-Palästinischen Aramäisch (Leipzig, 1894).

Gwilliam.—G. H. GWILLIAM, Tetra-evangelium sanctum (Oxford, 1901). [The number after *Gwilliam* signifies a Syriac MS., not the page of his book.]

Itinera Sancta.—Vol. xxxviii of the Vienna Corpus Script. Eccl. Lat., edited by P. GEYER (1898).

Neubauer.—A. NEUBAUER, La Géographie du Talmud (Paris, 1868).

OS.—P. de LAGARDE, Onomastica Sacra (Göttingen, 1887), quoted by the *marginal* pagination.

SUMMARY

REPORT OF DISCOVERIES OF ROMAN REMAINS IN BRITAIN IN 1912

By F. J. HAVERFIELD

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read February 28, 1912.

1. Great difficulty of annual Reports such as these is that most of the items involved are merely little additions to things previously announced. A date has been made a little more precise; a few more potsherds have come out from a place already known to have been occupied; a few more rooms have been uncovered in a 'Villa'. This difficulty is peculiarly present now, since there has only been one serious excavation on a large scale this year.

2. A further difficulty peculiarly great this year is an excess of tinkering at sites:—work begun and never completed, or completed and never described in print, or described by some one nearly or quite incompetent. Such faults have been abundant recently. More has been attempted than the supply of good men and subscriptions warrant.

3. The one large excavation has been at Corbridge, in which the principal points are:—the uncovering of the western area with its gold hoard, the dedication *Soli invicto* of about A.D. 163 erased for an unknown reason, the tombstone of a Palmyrene, and much (sadly defaced) sculpture.

4. Other excavations of importance have taken place on the Roman Wall near Birdoswald, throwing the problem of the Wall even into deeper darkness; also at Cappuck, a Roman fort between Melrose and Cheviot; at Casterly, a Roman-British village in Wiltshire, and lesser finds at other places.

5. The Literature of the year, Macdonald's *Roman Wall in Scotland*, Curle's *Newstead*, &c.

SOME PALESTINIAN CULTS IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN AGE

By G. F. HILL

Read March 20, 1912

It is a little difficult in the present day for us to arrive at a true conception of the relations between Judaism and the religions which hemmed it round, and for a time overwhelmed it, during the Graeco-Roman period. To the ordinary person who is interested in Palestine, that country seems to be merely the home of the Jews and the cradle of Christianity. Of the existence of Phoenicians, Samaritans, Philistines, and Arabians he is dimly aware, thanks to incidental references in the New Testament. But that these names represent peoples active and flourishing at the time, even the serious student of the history of the period is likely to forget. The reason partly is that these peoples were much more receptive than the Jews of the veneer of Hellenistic civilization. That their individuality in respect of their religion was not wholly crushed is, however, clear to any one who goes into the matter. The object of this paper is to examine some of the evidence as to the existence in Hellenistic and Roman times of local cults and mythology in certain districts of Palestine. The great Phoenician cities,[1] and those of Arabia, I do not propose to touch upon, but shall confine myself to various cities in Samaritis and Judaea. And the evidence with which I shall deal will be drawn, so far as extant remains are concerned, almost entirely from coins, which have the advantage that they can be accurately dated and localized. They have, it is true, compensating disadvantages, especially in the obscurity of details caused by their smallness of size and still more by the usually degraded character of their workmanship and their bad preservation. Nevertheless, if we interpret them with due caution, we shall find in them much evidence about local cults, showing interpenetrations of Syrian, Phoenician, Philistine, and Egyptian strains,

[1] With these I have dealt in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (1911), pp. 56 ff.

overlaid, of course, by the Hellenistic and Roman surface culture. The result is in many cases such complete confusion of ideas that it is impossible to disentangle them from each other; but we may rest assured that the people who believed in, or worshipped, these deities were hardly more clear than ourselves about their significance and origin.

With one exception, none of the coinage of these parts can be dated before the time of Alexander the Great. That exception is the much-discussed group of silver coins of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., generally attributed to the rulers of Gaza, and including the famous unique piece in the British Museum with the representation of Yahu or Yahweh (Pl. no. 1). These coins do not properly fall within the scope of the paper, and I forbear accordingly from dealing at length with this much disputed piece. I will only make two remarks. First, that the reading יהו seems no longer to be disputed; and that the balance of opinion is in favour of its naming the type, and not being a personal name of some dynast.[1]

Second, this coin is only one of a large group, which represents the most miscellaneous assemblage of deities and monsters. Assyria and Egypt, not to speak of Greece, lend types to these coins (Pl. nos. 2, 3); and there seems to be little doubt that the coins were made by people who put on them any types which were likely to attract their customers. Thus the types of archaic Greek, notably Athenian, coins which circulated in the Philisto-Arabian district were freely imitated. The types, therefore, that we find on these Philisto-Arabian coins—as I prefer to call them, rather than coins of the 'dynasts of Gaza'—do not necessarily indicate the existence in Philistia itself of the cults of the deities represented. It follows that the coin with the figure of Yahu does not prove that he was worshipped in Gaza. It may, indeed, be merely the local engraver's attempt to represent the Jewish god.

I propose to deal first with one or two cults which are probably of purely Greek or Roman origin, proceeding later to subjects more Oriental in character.

Herod's foundation of Caesarea had an extensive coinage, from the time of Nero to Gallienus. Its commonest type (Pl. no. 6) is the figure

[1] R. S. Poole's objection that he knows of 'no instance of the name of a god occurring without qualification of the name of the mint, as *Baal-Tarz* on coins of Tarsus' (quoted by Driver, *Studia Biblica*, 1885, p. 19), will not hold. Thus we have the name of Atargatis on coins, probably struck at Hieropolis in Syria, without any place-name; although it must be admitted that these coins bear the names of rulers on the other side. In any case, however, it must be remembered that these coins of Gaza are quite exceptional, and would not conform to the ordinary rules of Phoenician mints.

of a goddess, wearing a mural crown (or sometimes a mere kalathos) and a short chiton, with her mantle hanging over her left arm; she wears a short sword at her side, her right foot rests on the prow of a ship; she leans with her left hand on a cross-headed standard, and holds in her right hand a *human bust*. About this bust, often barely distinguishable, some controversy has arisen.

The old writers very generally accepted the theory that the goddess is Astarte, and that she holds the head of Adonis—a theory which has no foundation except the statement in the tract *de Syria dea* that such a head came yearly from Egypt to Byblus, borne by waves and winds θείῃ ναυτιλίῃ. This identification of the head has now generally been discarded. The latest scholar to discuss the type (A. Heisenberg[1]), while accepting the usual interpretation of the goddess as Astarte, rejects both the older view that the bust is Adonis, and a later view, due to Head,[2] which sees in it the bust of the reigning Emperor. There is, however, more to be said for this last interpretation before it is swept aside. It should be noted that, though Caesarea is perhaps the first by a few years to employ this type on its coins, it occurs also in various modifications at the following places: Tiberias in Galilaea, Neapolis, Nysa (probably), and Sebaste in Samaria, Aelia Capitolina and Anthedon in Judaea, Adraa, Esbus, and Medaba in Arabia, and, to go farther afield, at Cremna in Pisidia. The figure, therefore, is either some very general personification, or a goddess whose cultus was widely disseminated. Further, this bust carried in the hand is not an attribute peculiar to her, since it (or at any rate a similar bust) is also carried by a *male* figure on coins of Caesarea and Aelia Capitolina. Heisenberg is somewhat unwilling to accept the evidence of places such as Adraa and Cremna; presumably because they are rather far afield. The evidence of Cremna is indeed important, since there the inscription on the coin identifies the figure as Fortune.[3] The mural crown worn by the goddess in the Palestinian cities also identifies her as the City-Tyche; but of course Astarte may easily have played the part of City-goddess here, as she undoubtedly did elsewhere. It is, however, noticeable (though it has hardly been observed) that on practically all well-preserved specimens of the ordinary Caesarean type the goddess is seen to be armed with a short sword or parazonium girt at her waist. Another peculiarity is seen on certain coins on which the bust of this goddess, wearing a mural

[1] *Grabeskirche und Apostelkirche* (1908), i, p. 202.

[2] Quoted by Wilson, *Golgotha and the Holy Sepulchre* in *Pal. Expl. Fund Qu. St.*, 1903, p. 243, note 2. Heisenberg (loc. cit.) disguises Mr. Head as 'Barclay'.

[3] Brit. Mus. Catal. of Greek Coins, *Lycia*, &c., pl. xxxv. 11.

crown, appears as type, instead of her complete figure; on this larger scale it is seen that her chiton is worn so as to leave one breast bare.[1] Now the parazonium and a similar disposition of the dress are not, so far as I know, associated with Astarte; but they are characteristic of certain representations of the goddess Roma.[2] We have thus a further indication that the personification of the City is at any rate the basal element in the type before us, the figure of the local city being assimilated to that of the goddess Roma. But if that is so, it is difficult to see whose bust she would hold if not that of the reigning emperor. The coins of Samaritan Neapolis afford a further slight confirmation of this view. In the reign of the emperor Philip there is a tendency to commemorate him and his sons jointly on the coins. Now as the reverse type of one of the coins of his reign[3] there appear two figures of the goddess, each holding a bust. It seems obvious to conclude that these two busts are Philip the Elder and his son. It might, it is true, be argued that the duplication of the figure shows that each represents not the Tyche of the City, but the Genius of the Emperor or his son. Between these two conceptions there is considerable analogy, and it is quite possible that the type partakes of both. If the figure represents the Genius of the Emperor, *a fortiori* the bust represents the Emperor himself. But I take it that, even where the City-goddess is certainly identified with Astarte, as she is at Aelia Capitolina, it is as City-goddess, and not as Astarte, that she carries the bust in her hand. Whatever be the exact interpretation, we have in this type an illustration of the form taken by the cult of the Emperor in this part of the Roman world.

The other cults of Caesarea are such as we should expect to find in a city founded when it was: thus Zeus, Poseidon, Athena, Apollo, Dionysus, Ares, Helios, Demeter, Heracles, Hygieia are all represented, and the cult of Sarapis, to judge by the coins, played a great part here, as it did at Aelia Capitolina and Neapolis.

Nysa-Scythopolis, the ancient Bethshan, was traditionally a foundation of the Scythians who invaded Syria in the seventh century. The name Nysa, whatever its origin, naturally gave rise to a legend associating the place with the birth of Dionysus. His nurse was said to be buried there. The coins show her sitting on a throne nursing

[1] She is similarly represented on coins of Diospolis-Lydda.

[2] See, e.g., F. Gnecchi, *I Tipi monetarii di Roma Imperiale*, pl. v. It is a reminiscence of the type of the Amazon-foundress, so common in Asia Minor.

[3] It occurs attached to an obverse of the Empress Otacilia, but it is well known that reverse types belonging to an emperor were constantly used on the coins of his empress, unless there was some obvious inappropriateness in the conjunction.

the infant; but more curious than this is a representation of his re-birth from the thigh of Zeus. Two stages of the story are represented on the same coin (Pl. no. 5), this re-birth, and his reception by Nysa, who holds him in her arm; the two figures are combined as if they made a group. Finally, the coins illustrate some other episode, which I cannot identify, in the Dionysiac legend; the god appears to be threatening a small primitive idol with his thyrsus.

The coins of Raphia, the Judaean city on the extreme border towards Egypt, are also influenced by Dionysiac legend. Stephanus (s. v. Ῥαφία) records the tradition that the place got its name 'from the story of Dionysus'. The apparent connexion between the name of the city and the Greek word for seam (ῥαφή) is not too absurd for Greek etymologists to say that the place-name referred to the story of the infant Dionysus having been sewn up in the thigh of Zeus. His re-birth is not indicated on any of the extant coins of Raphia, as it is on those of Nysa; but the city-goddess is represented holding the infant on her outstretched hand (Pl. no. 4).

These are instances of the more purely Greek or Roman cults which prevailed in Palestine. The next city to which we come, Neapolis, brings us more within the Syrian sphere of influence. Neapolis stood on or, rather, near the site of the ancient Shechem, on the neck between Mt. Gerizim and Mt. Ebal. By an exception to the general rule, the modern name *Nabulus* preserves the Graeco-Roman, and not the original native name. Yet the Samaritan element survived obstinately, and has survived, as is well known, to the present day. The sacred mountain Gerizim (Pl. no. 7) plays on the coins a part almost as important as Mt. Argaeus at Caesarea in Cappadocia. It shows two distinct peaks, the steepness of which is doubtless exaggerated. On the left-hand peak is the temple which, since it first appears on coins of Pius, is doubtless the temple of Zeus Hypsistos which we know to have been founded by Hadrian.[1] Behind it is a small erection which may be an external altar. On the other (right-hand) peak is a construction which again is certainly rather an altar than a small temple. Since the mountain is doubtless supposed to be seen from the town, i. e. from the north, this smaller peak must lie to the west of the larger. We may perhaps identify it with the spur west of the main summit on

[1] Damascius, *vita Isid.* (ed. Westermann), 141. The Samaritan Chronicle (see Adler et Seligsohn, *Une Nouvelle Chronique Samaritaine,* 1903, p. 46) calls it a temple of 'Saphis', which may be meant for Jupiter Sospes; cp. 2 Macc. vi. 2: Zeus Xenios on Mt. Gerizim. Guérin (*Samarie,* p. 421) confuses Neapolis with Aelia Capitolina when he adduces Cassius Dio as an authority for the fact that Hadrian built a temple on Mt. Gerizim.

which are the ruins known as Khûrbet Lôzeh or Luzah[1]; here the Samaritans still offer up sacrifice.

The coins clearly indicate the steps by which, as the Bordeaux pilgrim (333 A.D.) records, one ascended to the main temple; they were 300 in number. There were, as we see, chapels at intervals reminding us of many another *sacro monte*, Varallo before all; but no trace of them seems to have survived to the present day. Along the foot of the mountain was a long colonnade; an opening gave access to the foot of the stair and to the road, doubtless for wheeled traffic, which wound up the hill between the two peaks, branching about half-way up.

What form was taken by the Zeus Hypsistos worshipped in this temple? It has been thought[2] that he was the Zeus of Heliopolis, who certainly was, as we shall see, worshipped in the city. But of this there is no proof. The figure which is indistinctly visible in the temple on some specimens does not suggest the mummiform deity. A head of Zeus of the ordinary type occurs on a coin of Macrinus, and we also find him seated with Hera and Athena, making the Capitoline Triad. Now this last type occurs on the large coins of Antoninus Pius, in whose reign we also find for the first time the large representations of Mt. Gerizim. It seems probable therefore that the temple on that mountain was sacred to the ordinary Greek Zeus, who might be represented like Jupiter Capitolinus with Juno and Minerva. It may be added that the mountain is sometimes shown supported by an eagle, or in the hands of a figure of Nike; but no stress can be laid on this fact, since the eagle is also an attribute of the Heliopolitan Zeus[3]; and in many Oriental representations Zeus is supported by an eagle.[4]

The star or sun which appears in the field (sometimes the moon is present also) in association with the mountain indicates the solar nature of the deity worshipped there.

At Neapolis, Zeus Heliopolites occurs on coins of the Antonine period (Pl. no. 8). He is of the usual type, with whip and ears of corn, and accompanied by two bulls.[5] His appearance on the coins of this period was doubtless prompted by the erection of the great temple of the god at Heliopolis by Pius. I need not go into the details of this well-known type, but will pass at once to the interesting type of the

[1] P. E. F., *Survey of W. Palestine*, ii, pp. 187, 192.

[2] Dussaud, *Notes de mythol. syrienne*, p. 51, henceforward cited as 'Dussaud' simply.

[3] Dussaud, p. 15.

[4] Cumont in *Festschr. für O. Benndorf*, pp. 291 ff.

[5] On this type see especially Drexler in Roscher's *Lex.* ii. 1180 (Kewan) and Dussaud, pp. 29 ff., 117 ff.

Ephesian Artemis (Pl. no. 9). She is clad, like the Heliopolitan Zeus, in a sort of sheath, evidently of metal with panelled reliefs. She is veiled, and on her breast are represented two small figures (like wingless figures of Nike, holding a wreath between them). Her hands, extended as is usual in archaic cultus figures, rest on fillet-like supports. That these are real supports, not pendent fillets, is shown by the fact that on a well-preserved specimen they are seen to be topped by small birds (doves ?), on which the hands of the goddess seem to rest. They have all the look of sceptres. She is flanked by two stags, which turn their heads to look up at her. On her head she wears a strange gear, resembling three plumes, supporting a structure which is usually obscure. Sometimes it resembles a cross-piece with three uprights standing on it; but on the best-executed or best-preserved specimens this structure is seen to be merely the façade of a temple, with four columns and a pediment. Now all these details, *except the doves on the tops of the supports*, are paralleled by the ordinary representations of the Ephesian Artemis.[1] But, considering the importance of doves in the local Syrian cults, this modification is significant.

Quite different from this goddess is another who appears on a coin of Faustina Junior. The rarity of this type (I know of only one instance, Pl. no. 10) points to her cult being of less importance. She has the ordinary Greek dress: long chiton with kolpos, and peplos falling over each arm in folds which suggest an archaistic treatment. She is veiled, and wears a head-dress which is unfortunately incomplete; it may be merely a polos, or it may be three plumes. In her hands, which project in the usual archaic or archaistic fashion, are either wreaths or phialae; and she is flanked by two long-legged birds, which may possibly be meant for peacocks.

There is a curious parallelism in the representations of Zeus Heliopolites and Artemis Ephesia on these coins. They serve as types for coins of the same size, but, when they first appear, Zeus appears on the coins of Marcus Aurelius, Artemis on those of his Empress Faustina Junior. It is only natural, of course, and according to custom, that the male god should be associated with the Emperor, the female with the Empress. But we shall not be too fanciful if we go farther, and see in the so-called Artemis the local consort of the Heliopolitan Zeus. At Heliopolis itself there was a triad consisting

[1] See especially Amelung in *Jahreshefte des oesterr. arch. Inst.*, xii (1909), pp. 172 ff.; Imhoof-Blumer in *Nomisma*, vi (1911), p. 11. Mr. H. R. Hall suggests that the temple-headdress may have been derived from, or suggested by, the pylon-headdress of Hathor in Ptolemaic times, as seen especially in the Hathor-headed sistra and models of sistra.

of Zeus, Aphrodite, and Hermes, to give them their Greek names. The Ephesian Artemis might, as a nature-goddess, be identified by the Neapolitans with Astarte-Aphrodite, and this identification is suggested by the doves—if doves they be—on which her hands rest. If the birds which accompany the other goddess are peacocks, the Neapolitan Greeks would probably call her Hera; that is the name which the Greeks gave to the consort of Zeus at Hierapolis.[1] It may be suggested that she is, at Neapolis, the consort of the Zeus Hypsistos of Mt. Gerizim. We should then have the two pairs complete: first, Zeus Heliopolites and his consort, the stag-goddess, the so-called Artemis, and second, Zeus Hypsistos and his consort Hera.

But there is yet a third goddess of an allied kind at Neapolis. In speaking of Caesarea we have already described the City-goddess holding the bust of an emperor. At Neapolis she sometimes holds Mt. Gerizim. But the point of interest is that she stands on a couchant lion; and we also find a goddess standing on a running lion. Both are representations of the 'Syrian Goddess', Atargatis, who functions as the City-goddess. Earlier writers describe a figure of 'Cybele seated between two lions', who is, as Dussaud has seen, no other than the same Syrian goddess of Hierapolis.[2]

Another Syrian cult prevailed for a brief time at Neapolis. On a coin of Elagabalus there is represented a conical or beehive-shaped baetyl, side by side with Mt. Gerizim, above a quadriga advancing to the front. An eagle with spread wings decorates the front of the baetyl. There can be no doubt that it is the sacred stone of Emesa, the god whom Elagabalus served as priest.[3]

The same cult prevailed at Aelia Capitolina during the reign of Elagabalus (Pl. no. 11). But the only type at that city which is of outstanding importance in connexion with the subject of this paper is the temple of the City-goddess, who was here, as already stated, identified with Astarte. Her temple[4] stood on the site of the crucifixion, and her consort 'Jupiter', i. e. Baal or Adonis, was worshipped on the place of the Resurrection. Doubtless they had a joint temenos. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre was afterwards erected on the same site, probably more or less on the same plan as the old temple; just as, after the destruction of the Marneion at Gaza, it was proposed by some to rebuild the Christian church on the same plan. This

[1] Lucian, *de Syr. dea*, 31, 32.

[2] Dussaud, p. 51.

[3] Studniczka in *Rom. Mitt.*, xvi (1901), p. 272 f.

[4] See Heisenberg, *Grabeskirche*, &c., i, p. 200 f.

question has been fully discussed by Heisenberg, so that we need not linger over it here. The goddess is represented holding the human bust, to which we have already referred.

Of the great cities of the Philistine coast, two only survived, or retained any degree of importance, in the times with which we are concerned. These were Ascalon and Gaza. Let us see first what literary records we possess of their cults. Ascalon was famous in the time of Herodotus for the worship of Aphrodite Ourania; Herodotus and after him Pausanias regard this cult as of very ancient origin. The other chief goddess mentioned in connexion with Ascalon is Derketo or Atargatis. To her was sacred a temenos not far from the city, with a large pool full of fish. The goddess had a woman's face and the body of a fish (or a woman's face and body to the waist, the rest being fish-like). Doves and all kinds of fish were sacred to her. The euhemeristic explanation of the story of Derketo was that she was drowned with her son Ichthys in the pool of Ascalon and devoured by fishes. According to another legend, the daughter of Derketo was Semiramis, who was brought up by doves.

Lucian, if he is the author of the tract *de Syria dea*, distinguishes Derketo (of Ascalon) from the goddess of Hierapolis (Atargatis), who was worshipped in human form; but there is little doubt about the connexion between them.[1] The Greeks identified both with Aphrodite.

We should expect to find the great god of the Philistines, Dagon, at Ascalon; St. Jerome knows him as 'idolum Ascalonis, Gazae et reliquarum urbium Philistiae'. But the identification of this god has become uncertain since the old view that he had the form of a fish is now generally discredited.[2]

In an inscription from Canopus, of A. D. 228, an Ascalonian dedicates to Zeus Helios Sarapis a figure of *θεὸν πάτρι[όν] μου 'Ηρ[ακ]λῆ Βῆλον ἀνείκητον*.[3]

Another Syrian deity of Ascalon was known as *'Ασκληπιὸς λεοντοῦχος*. The Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus addressed a hymn to this god, as he did to Marnas of Gaza; but we know no more. He may have been the Phoenician Eshmun, represented in Syrian fashion with lion supporters. Or, again, he may have been Eshmun assimilated to Melqart-Heracles, with the lion-skin; such a contamination was found at Citium in Cyprus.[4]

[1] See, e. g., F. Baethgen, *Beiträge zur semit. Religionsgesch.*, p. 74.

[2] See Dussaud, p. 77 f.

[3] S. de Ricci in *Arch. f. Papyrusforsch.*, ii, 1903, p. 450, no. 87; Dussaud, loc. cit.

[4] See the speculations in Movers, *Phonizier*, i, p. 534; Stark, *Gaza*, p. 592.

What light do the coins throw on these literary records? We may, to begin with, rule out of court the remarkable fourth-century stater,[1] struck at some city on the Phoenician coast, which represents a sea-god, fish-like from the waist downwards, holding trident and wreath. The weight of evidence points to this coin having been struck in Northern Phoenicia, and not at Ascalon or Ashdod.

The City-goddess of Ascalon appears constantly on the coins (Pl. no. 12) from Augustus to Geta; she stands upon a prow, holds a naval standard and aphlaston, and is regularly accompanied by a dove and an altar of somewhat peculiar form, with three projections at the top which have caused it to be described as a trident. The dove also appears as the attribute of a goddess who figures on coins from the time of Antoninus Pius onwards (Pl. no. 13). She wears on her head, not a turreted crown, but a crescent.[2] She stands, not on a prow, but on a Triton, who holds aloft a cornucopiae; she carries, not a standard, but a sceptre; and the dove is in her hand, not in the field of the coin.

From the evidence of the numerous other representations of the marine Astarte in Phoenician coast-cities, it is certain that the former goddess is Astarte functioning as City-goddess. Is the other goddess also Astarte, or is she Atargatis (Derketo)? We know that Derketo was worshipped at Ascalon in a semi-piscine form; but it does not follow that there was not also a human representation of her, since in other cities inland, such as Hierapolis, this fish-form did not prevail. The sea-monster on which the goddess stands would express her marine nature. The dove was also sacred to her. Dussaud has insisted on the view that the lunar crescent alone, uncombined with the solar disk, is never the attribute of Atargatis. Possibly, however, at the late period with which we are concerned, a period of great confusion between various deities and their attributes, the rule which he asserts may have been relaxed. There was, in any case, so much that was peculiar in the cults of Ascalon, that we cannot deny the possibility of such a modification.

Beside the City-goddess type, there appears on the coins throughout the Imperial period another deity, whose name is fortunately inscribed on some of the coins of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius (Pl. no. 14).

[1] B. M. C., *Phoenicia*, p. cxliv, pl. xiv. 1; *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xxxi, p. 63, pl. iv. 33.

[2] This is perfectly clear on many specimens, and Dussaud's statement (op. cit., p. 99) to the contrary must be corrected. If he is right in denying lunar character to Astarte (p. 84), he must be wrong in assuming this goddess to be Astarte.

This is Phanebalos.[1] The name is obviously a transcription of some Phoenician word containing the element בעל, and we are immediately reminded of the epithet of Tanith פן בעל, which is explained as 'face of Baal' or 'manifestation of Baal'.[2] It is true that Tanith was a female deity, whereas the figure on the Ascalonian coins has generally been described as male. And male I am inclined to think it is, although on some coins the dressing of the hair, the long skirt and broad hips give it an extraordinarily feminine appearance. The name too has a masculine termination, but since it might be an adjective of two terminations we can lay no stress on this. On a coin of Hadrian there appears in the field beside the figure a sign which looks like an attempt to reproduce the symbol of triangle, disk, and horns, the so-called 'sign of Baal', which is constantly found on Carthaginian votive tablets, and elsewhere.[3] This symbol, it is to be remembered, may belong not to Tanith, but to Baal-Hamman; in any case, it is too obscure on the coin in question to bear much stress.

Phanebalos wears a helmet, and wields a weapon which, Dussaud[4] maintains, is not a sword but a harpe. The dress is probably a cuirass; on some specimens the pteryges are clearly represented, but on others the skirt is unusually long. In the left hand are a small circular shield and a long palm-branch. The figure sometimes stands on a pedestal. Finally, on the latest coins on which the god is represented, he assumes an attitude similar to that of Sarapis, as that god appears on coins of the same date, with right hand raised (Pl. no. 15). His weapon, the harpe, disappears, and in

[1] First correctly deciphered by Imhoof-Blumer, *Rev. Suisse de Num.*, 1908, p. 129.

[2] G. A. Cooke, *North Semitic Inscr.*, p. 132 f., where it is also noted that Robertson Smith explains the epithet as 'having the face of Baal', i.e. bearded or androgynous. But the theory of a primitive androgynous deity is at present under a cloud. Prof. Cooke and Prof. A. R. S. Kennedy incline to confirm the suggestion made in the text of the equation פן בעל = ΦΑΝΗΒΑΛΟC, and the latter reminds me of the equation פְּנוּאֵל = ΦΑΝΟΥΗΛ. Dussaud (op. cit., p. 6) regards the Carthaginian symbol of combined disk and crescent as the 'traduction par l'image de l'expression *pené Ba'al*'. Mr. L. W. King writes: 'In Babylonian theophorous names of the Achaemenian period the combination of *pânu* "face" with the name of a deity is not uncommon. It is thus possible that we may connect the origin of Phanebalos with *Pânı-Bêl*, the abbreviated form of *Pânı-Bêl-adaggal* (lit. "I behold the face of Bêl"); cp. the similar abbreviation in the name *Pânı-ılu* (= פְּנִיאֵל), which occurs in a business document of the time of Artaxerxes I.'

[3] *C. I. S.*, i. 265 and *passim*; Cooke, loc. cit.; Hill, *Coins of Ancient Sicily*, pl. x. 9, xv. 18 (coins of Sicily and Cossura).

[4] Op. cit., p. 76.

the field we see a thunderbolt The connexion with Zeus—and that is only another way of saying Baal—is thus established. Now of course a goddess intimately connected with Baal might use his attribute; but the balance of probabilities seems to me to indicate that we have in our mysterious deity a male 'manifestation of Baal' as a war-god, and not a goddess. After all we do not know enough about the meaning of the term פנבעל to be able to assert that, because at Carthage it was an epithet of a goddess, therefore at Ascalon it could not be the epithet of a god.

It would be idle to attempt to disguise the fact that this explanation of the nature of Phanebalos is a tissue of conjectures. But one can only state the arguments on either side fairly. The only other solution proposed is due to Dussaud. He sees in the deity a solar god (because of the harpe), of the class of Bel-Kronos, and identifies him with the Herakles-Belos whom we know, from the Canopus inscription, to have been worshipped at Ascalon.[1]

Ascalon provides us with a number of other curious types. Under Antoninus Pius first appears a remarkable building which appears to consist of a series of four doorways, one within (i.e. really beyond) the other (Pl. no. 16). The Egyptian element in the architecture is strong, being perceptible not merely in the uraei which decorate two, if not three, of the architraves, but in the columns flanking two of the entrances. The type probably represents the approach to some sanctuary through a series of doorways—an adaptation of the Egyptian temple-plan.

In the same reign also we meet for the first time with the type of a male deity, apparently Osiris, with his usual attributes of flail and sceptre, but accompanied by three lions which stand beside and before the basis which supports the figure. On later coins he stands in true Syrian fashion on the lions (Pl. no. 17). On the earlier coins he wears a plain kalathos; on the later he has the atef crown; and on the latest he no longer holds a sceptre, but raises his right hand in the attitude usually adopted by Sarapis on late coins. We have just noted that this attitude is also affected on the latest coins by Phanebalos (who consequently has to dispense with the harpe, as Osiris with his sceptre); and the same is true of Poseidon (whose dolphin is consequently placed in the field instead of in his hand). The same

[1] He goes further and identifies Herakles-Bel with Dagon. Dagon may be, as he argues (p. 79), connected with agriculture; but the supposed representation of the deity in question as holding ears of corn in his hand (De Saulcy, *Num. de la Terre Sainte*, p. 189, no. 4) is surely the ordinary type with the palm-branch, misdescribed by Reichardt.

tendency affects Marnas on the coins of Gaza about this time. Is it due to assimilation to the ordinary attitude of Imperial statues in the act of adlocutio?

Coins of Caracalla, Severus Alexander, and Maximinus show us a bust of Isis, below which are sometimes discernible three lion's heads —shorthand for the whole animals (Pl. no. 18). We may assume that at Ascalon there was a pair of deities, adapted from Osiris and Isis, represented like Syrian gods, standing upon lions. A statue of Isis suckling Horus, in the ordinary form, was found at Ascalon.

Pius also introduced on Ascalonian coins the type of the Dioscuri with a crescent, representing Astarte, between them. This group I have discussed elsewhere.[1]

Finally, under Macrinus appears the type of a nude Heracles, holding a small Nike and his club. I take this to be the Heracles-Belos of the Ascalonians to which we have already referred; the Nike gives significance to the epithet ἀνείκητος applied to this god in the Canopus dedication.

Thus, at Ascalon, so far as we can interpret the evidence, we find nothing of specially Philistine character, but a highly characteristic mingling of Phoenician, Syrian, and Egyptian elements, which is quite in place geographically. The local colour of Gaza is quite different.[2]

Two passages in Stephanus of Byzantium[3] form the starting-point of any consideration of the cults and legendary history of Gaza. He says: 'It was called *Aza*, as well as Gaza, and to the present day the Syrians call it Aza, from Azon son of Herakles. But some report the legend that it was founded by Zeus, and that he deposited there his private treasure, for *gaza* is the Persian word for money. But it was also called *Ione*, from Io who came thither by sea and abode there. And also it was called *Minoa*, because Minos, with his brothers Aeacus and Rhadamanthys, leaving his own country, founded[4] this city. Whence also there came to be the temple of the Cretan Zeus among them, whom even in our time they called Marnas, which is interpreted Cretan-born. For the Cretans call maidens thus: *marnans*. And again: 'The sea from Gaza as far as Egypt was called Ionian; for

[1] J. H. S., xxxi (1911), p. 62 (Tripolis).

[2] A statement in S. A. Cook, *Religion of Ancient Palestine*, p. 33, that 'in Merneptah's reign we hear of a man of Gaza who is described as a servant of Baal', is based on a mistranslation in Breasted, *Ancient Records*, iii, § 630. Mr. A. H. Gardiner informs me that the translation 'there went up the servant of Baal Roy, son of Zeper, of Gaza' should be 'there went up the servant (or retainer) Baal-Roy' &c. No conclusion can be drawn from this theophorous name as to the worship of Baal at Gaza in Merneptah's time (thirteenth century B. C.).

[3] *s. vv.* Γάζα and Ἰόνιον πέλαγος.

[4] Reading ἔκτισεν for ἐκάλεσεν.

Gaza also was called Ione, from Io, and has a cow beside her in the image representing her.'

Minos is represented on a coin of the year A.D. 131–2. I do not know of a well-preserved specimen; but he appears to wear a short chiton or cuirass and to hold in his right hand a long branch, in his left a spear. On the reverse of these coins is a tree, but of what kind it is difficult to say. This association of a founder with a tree has a Cretan air. Thus at Aptera the hero Ptolioitos stands in adoration before a tree; at Phaestus Herakles stands beside one; at Priansus a palm grows beside the throne of the goddess; and we shall have to mention immediately some of the Cretan figures seated in trees. As Svoronos has remarked of such representations,[1] 'we may say that they are the most characteristic feature of the Cretan coinage.' They certainly reflect an important aspect of Cretan religion.

The City-goddess of Gaza is shown resting on a sceptre and holding a cornucopiae; a heifer stands beside her, bearing out the passage just quoted from Stephanus (Pl. no. 20). When Io is present in human form with the City-goddess, the heifer, which would be tautological, is omitted. But for the benefit of those who would be unable to recognize Io without her attributes, her name is then always written beside her.

We now come to the most remarkable of the Gazaean deities, Marnas. This god played an important part in the struggle between Christianity and paganism at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century. To the Christians of the time he was almost as deadly an enemy as Sarapis. The struggle is described in the most vivid way by Mark the Deacon in his life of Porphyry, bishop of Gaza—a narrative which is not surpassed in human interest by any work of its time.[2]

Mark identifies Marnas with Zeus Kretagenes, and describes his temple, the Marneion, as the most famous of all temples. Allowing for the writer's local pride, we may suppose it to have been of considerable importance. His description is not clear, and the Latin translation in which it was alone accessible until recently does not make it clearer. The building appears to have been circular, with a double portico or peristyle, one set of columns within the other, and a central dome. Mark's description of the dome is ἀναφυσητὸν κιβώριον, καὶ ἀνατεταμένον εἰς ὕψος. 'An inflated cup extended

[1] *Rev. Belge de Num.*, 1894, p. 127.

[2] It is nothing less than extraordinary that the Greek text of this narrative, which has been accessible since 1874 in Haupt's transcript (*Abhandl. Berl. Akad.*) and since 1895 in the Teubner edition, is still ignored by some of the most learned writers on archaeology and religion.

vertically' sounds like an elliptical dome[1]; but I am inclined to think it merely means a dome of the ordinary kind. The coins showing the temple (Pl. no. 19) unfortunately do not help us, the engraver having been content with the most conventional indication of two columns supporting an architrave with a pediment above. Probably this is meant for the façade of the building. This summary rendering may be due to the fact that two figures had to be represented in the temple, and the engraver did not feel capable of giving many details of the architecture as well.

The god is shown in the temple confronting a figure resembling the ordinary Greek Artemis as huntress. Beside him is written his name MAPNAC.[2] Eckhel, puzzled by the Apolline appearance of the god, suggested that the word was not his name but an epithet of the city. But in that case one would expect an adjectival form. What is more, this inscription is found only in association with this particular figure; were it an epithet of the city, it might be expected to appear elsewhere, with other types.

Who was this Marnas? We have already seen that he was identified with the Cretan Zeus. Epiphanius,[3] speaking of the worship of

[1] Miss Gertrude Bell points out that such a shape is extremely probable in itself, but the earliest Persian dome is probably about A.D. 226, whereas the Marneion, it would seem, was most likely of the second century. Stark (*Gaza*, p. 599) had long ago recognized that the building was domed, and of the Pantheon type. It is possible, of course, that Mark is using the word κιβώριον technically, in the sense of a canopy of some sort. Draseke (*Ges. Patrist. Untersuch.*, 1889, p. 235) supposes the word to have the sense of the seed-vessel of the water-lily, and to be used to indicate a dome. Strzygowski has devoted a brief passage to the subject in his *Kleinasien* (1903, p. 101), it is unfortunate that he seems not to have consulted the original Greek, instead of the Latin translation, of the life of Porphyry. If the Greek is difficult to understand, the Latin is sheer nonsense. Strzygowski's instinct seems, however, to have kept him on the right track: 'it is probable', he writes, 'that it was not, as Dehio assumes, a hypaethral central room with two circular porticoes, but a domed room with gallery and opaion, or outlet for smoke. For only in the case of a closed central room could they have entertained any idea of employing the scheme of the temple for a church.' He goes on to refer to the supposed opaion, which naturally could not exist in a hypaethral building; but since this feature is only assumed in order to make sense of the Latin translation, and has no basis in the Greek, we need not consider it further. As regards the possibility of a hypaethral central room, it is true that Mark, in a later passage (c. 84), speaks of the hypaethrum of the temple; but this was after the inner temple had been burnt, and any roof which it had possessed was destroyed; I do not think he is using the word in its technical sense.

[2] The full form is clear on some specimens, which were unknown to those who doubted whether it referred to the figure of the god.

[3] *Ancoratus*, 109 C (i, p. 209, ed. Dind.).

mere mortals, instances *Μαρνᾶς δοῦλος Ἀστερίου τοῦ Κρητὸς παρὰ Γαζαίοις, Κάσιος δὲ ὁ ναύκληρος παρὰ Πηλουσιώταις*. Now Asterios or Asterion was a name of the Cretan Zeus.

But we can go a little further than this. I have noted that two deities seem to have been worshipped together in the Marneion. Mark the Deacon, in fact, speaks of the 'images of the gods' which were hidden by the priests when the temple was threatened with destruction; there were, then, more than one cultus-image. The god, on the coins, appears to be nude, and perhaps to hold a bow. This Apolline appearance does not prevent his having been a Zeus; the Zeus Kasios of Pelusium, mentioned by Epiphanius, was similarly youthful.[1] But Crete furnishes us with the best parallel, in the youthful Zeus Velchanos of Phaestus. Overbeck[2] has already noted the apparent connexion between this Velchanos, as he appears seated in a tree, and the so-called Europa, also in a tree, on the coins of Gortyna. And this Europa, as Svoronos maintains,[3] is really in all probability the Cretan Britomartis, who is well known to have been identified with Artemis, more particularly in her capacity of huntress. Now the lover of Britomartis was Minos, himself a hypostasis of Zeus. Britomartis is glossed as 'sweet maiden', and the second part of her name is plausibly connected with the Cretan word *marna* = maiden. I suggest that *Marnas* and *marna* would stand to each other as κόρος or κοῦρος and κόρα.[4]

Modern critics have preferred to see in Marnas a Syrian name, equivalent to 'Our Lord'.[5] Modern, but not the most modern critics, have also shelved the whole of the literary records about the connexion between Crete and Gaza as the invention of scholars. It is remarkable that the whole of the recent evidence[6] about the

[1] If the young, Apolline Zeus Kasios of Pelusium was of the same origin as we shall see is probable in the case of the Zeus of Gaza, we can well understand how the name 'Ionian' came to be applied to the sea which washed the coast from Gaza to Pelusium. 'Ionian' meant, not the sea of Io, as Stephanus supposed but the sea of the children of Javan, from 'the isles afar off'.

[2] On the youthful Zeus, *Kunstmythol.*, ii, pp. 194 ff.

[3] *Rev. Belge*, 1894, pp. 113 ff.

[4] On Ζεὺς Κοῦρος in Crete see Miss Harrison's article in *B. S. A.*, xv, pp. 308 ff.

[5] F. Baethgen, *Beiträge zur semit. Religionsgesch.*, p. 65 f. Hall (*Oldest Civilization of Greece*, p. 320), however, suggested that the word need not be Semitic at all.

[6] See the summary in A. J. Evans, *Scripta Minoa*, pp. 77 ff. To the evidence there mentioned must be added that from Tell es-Safi (Gath). The Palestinian pottery was seen to be Aegean by Welch (*B. S. A.*, vi, pp. 117 f.), but its Cretan character and date were established independently by Thiersch (*Archäol. Anzeiger*, 1908, pp. 378 f.) and Hall (*P. S. B. A.*, 1909, p. 235). Finally,

onnexion between Crete and Philistia, overwhelming as it is, should till be ignored by some writers on Palestinian archaeology. I think hat the facts that have been briefly stated above help not a little to onfirm the view of the Cretan origin of Gaza, if it needed confirmaion; that the two deities, looking like Apollo and Artemis, in the emple at Gaza, are Marnas and his consort Britomartis, the Cretan Zeus and the Cretan Artemis, connected in name in the same way as Zeus and Dione; and that the name Marnas is probably Cretan in rigin, its Syrian appearance being fortuitous.

The approximation of Marnas to the ordinary Greek Zeus is arried out further on a coin of Gordian. He is still a slight, youthul-looking figure; he holds a thunderbolt in his left arm; sometimes here is an eagle at his feet, or he is crowned by a Nike standing on column behind him. He raises his right hand, in the attitude which I have already noticed as coming into fashion on the later coins f Ascalon.

Whatever may have been the real nature of Marnas, his importance o the city of Gaza was such that the whole coinage, except in the ery earliest period, bore his mark, even if he was not actually epresented. This mark was the Phoenician letter *mem*, the initial of is name. Damascius the Neoplatonist enlightens us on this point; or it is doubtless to this letter that he refers in a passage describing igns which are sacred to various divinities: 'as, with the Egyptians, he sign called *tet*, consisting of one upright straight line and three ross lines, one at the top and two below that; and again, another ign with the Heliopolitans, and with the Gazaeans yet another, which is sacred to Zeus.'[1]

This sketch of the numismatic evidence relating to the cults and egends of the neighbours of the Jews in the Graeco-Roman age is, I am only too well aware, incoherent and, in parts, speculative. But perhaps it may serve to indicate to Semitic scholars that there is a considerable body of evidence which, though obscure and difficult to handle, cannot altogether be neglected by students of Palestinian religion.

Mackenzie has found similar evidence in his excavations at Bethshemesh (*Pal. Expl. Fund Qu. St.*, 1911, pp. 141 f.).

[1] Damascii Successoris *Dubitationes*, ed. Ruelle (Paris, 1889), ii, p. 127 f. fol. 300 r.). Sir Arthur Evans suggests that this supposed *mem* at Gaza is really a modification of the swastika-symbol.

PALESTINIAN CULTS

HE METAPHYSIC OF MR. F. H. BRADLEY

By HASTINGS RASHDALL

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read June 5, 1912

The critical period for great literary reputations is the generation after that for which the authors wrote or by which they were first appreciated. The generalization holds as much in regard to professional Philosophy as in more popular branches of literature—only that with philosophical reputations the generations are short and succeed each other with great rapidity. In Philosophy the craving for something new is even keener than in literature; a Philosophy that has to any extent become official soon becomes an object of suspicion to the questioning spirits. The philosophical reputation of Mr. Bradley has, it would appear, reached this stage. His is no longer the last word in Philosophy. He has outlived the period in which young and enthusiastic disciples were disposed to set down all the philosophies that preceded his, except the great philosophical classics, as matters of merely historical interest. It is not yet certain that he will be treated as himself belonging to those classics. That period can hardly be reached till his reputation has spread beyond the limits of the English-speaking world, for in England the road to eminence is to be talked about in other countries; and English philosophical reputations are slow to attract the attention of continental thinkers. This process has only just begun in the case of Mr. Bradley. Meanwhile there is a danger that the importance of his works should be unduly overshadowed by that of writers who have succeeded in administering more recent and still more sensational shocks to traditional modes of thought. That danger is all the greater since Mr. Bradley's reputation was always an esoteric one. It has never reached the greater public—even the public of highly cultivated persons outside the circle of those who have at least studied Philosophy a little in their youth: while the philosophies which are now absorbing most attention even among professional students of the subject are philosophies which—whether that be regarded as a merit or a defect—are particularly adapted to attract to themselves

a measure of attention in the world of religious thought and of general literature. I hope the present moment will not be an unfavourable one for attempting an impartial examination of Mr. Bradley's metaphysical position.

As this paper will be chiefly critical, I should like to begin by saying that I am one of those who do place Mr. Bradley among the classics of Philosophy. When *Appearance and Reality* came out, Dr. Edward Caird said that it was the greatest thing since Kant. I should like respectfully to subscribe that dictum at least in the form 'there has been nothing greater since Kant'. It is not likely, indeed, that Mr. Bradley's actual reputation will ever place him quite in this position. The greatest and most enduring philosophical reputations will always be those of men who have not merely offered a new solution of the technical problems of Philosophy but have expounded some new and characteristic attitude towards life. Mr. Bradley—apart from a few *obiter dicta* which in all spheres except the religious are for the most part of an extremely conservative cast—has touched little on practical questions. Perhaps therefore his writings will never become quite as classical as they deserve to be. But just because I regard Mr. Bradley as a classic, I shall venture to handle him with the freedom which we all employ towards the great names of Philosophy. One is almost tempted to say that the greatest thinkers are just those who have made the greatest mistakes. We are all agreed that there are huge inconsistencies in Kant: much the same thing is beginning at least to be whispered about Hegel; and yet we do not cease to regard Kant or even Hegel as great men. I trust therefore that, if I venture to point out similar inconsistencies in Mr. Bradley, I shall not be supposed to be wanting in respectful admiration for his work. I need not say that it is only in the most inadequate way that in such a paper as this I can attempt an examination even of one or two central points in his elaborate construction—if the word can be applied to a system which is so much more destructive than constructive. A full examination of *Appearance and Reality* would demand a work at least as long.

If criticism must be brief, exposition must be briefer. And yet, even before an audience whose adequate acquaintance with the book may be pre-supposed, I can hardly begin to criticize without some slight attempt to state the positions I am attacking—if only for the purpose of indicating incidentally what are the elements of Mr. Bradley's thought which I regard as constituting his real philosophical importance.

Appearance and Reality may be described as the work of an

inquirer in search of Reality. The first and most obvious suggestion which would occur to the plain man in search of the real is 'Things are real'. An examination of what we mean by things shows that no *thing*, taken by itself, can be real. I need not recapitulate the ordinary idealistic argument by which it is shown that all that we mean by a thing is unintelligible apart from Mind. Secondary qualities are obviously constituted by feeling or perception, or by a content which is ultimately derivable from perception. Even 'Common-sense' does not suppose that things would be coloured if there was no one to see them, or scented if there were no one to smell them. Primary qualities are equally relative to Mind: for extension, taken apart from something which is extended, is a mere abstraction; and that something which is extended is always something given in immediate perception. In a world in which there were no perception and no percipients, there would be nothing to be extended. The force and clearness with which Mr Bradley has insisted upon this point, constitutes the most original feature in his re-statement of the case for Idealism. Moreover, when we do make the abstraction of extension from the extended, we find that extension so considered consists in relations, and relations by themselves are unintelligible without qualities. Here Mr. Bradley cannot quite use the argument, commonly employed by Idealists, that, while relations —at least the particular relations which enter into the constitution of space and of things in space—are nothing apart from a mind that apprehends the relation, they become fully intelligible when looked at in their due connexion with Mind: for according to him the relation between relations and that which is related is ultimately unintelligible. But at all events the fact that spacial relations cannot be thought of as existing by themselves is enough to show that neither the spacial relations themselves nor things in space can be the reality of which we are in search; for relations imply qualities, and the qualities have been shown to exist only for mind.

I will return to Mr. Bradley's peculiar view about the unintelligibility of relations hereafter. As to his general polemic against the notion that matter is real, I need not dwell further upon a line of argument which Mr. Bradley shares with all Idealists. I will only say, in view of recent revivals of the naïvest form of what we used to have the audacity to call naïve Realism, that to me one great value of Mr. Bradley's teaching consists in this—that he is the most thoroughly convinced and the most convincing, I venture to think the most irrefutable, of Idealists. In Mr. Bradley we have an Idealist who is not afraid or ashamed of Idealism. Mr. Bradley is not

a 'soft Idealist' who, after disposing of Materialism by arguments borrowed from Berkeley or Kant, suddenly, when faced with the difficulties of his own position and its antagonism to so-called Common-sense, turns round and condemns under the name of 'subjective Idealism' the inevitable inference 'if nature does not exist apart from Mind, then nothing really exists but Mind and what is *for* mind'. Mr. Bradley is a genuine, hard, impenitent Idealist, who over and over again asserts as his fundamental formula 'There is but one Reality, and its being consists in experience'.[1] Experience, be it observed, not (with Berkeley) 'ideas', used practically in the sense of feelings, or (with Hegel) mere 'thought'. Mr. Bradley recognizes that all thought involves abstraction—abstraction from an experience which always is, or includes, feeling. He further differentiates himself from much traditional Hegelianism by recognizing the existence of a distinct side of human experience called 'willing' which can, quite as little as feeling, be reduced to a mere kind of thinking, unless thinking is to be used in a completely non-natural sense which leaves us without a word to denote what ordinary people call thinking. Hence Mr. Bradley's preference for the most comprehensive term that we can possibly apply to conscious life—experience. It turns out then as the result of examination that matter, as we know it, can always be analysed away into a form of conscious experience. Consequently matter, understood as a thing existing apart from mind cannot be real.

But if matter be not real, because in ultimate analysis it turns out to be a mere accident of mind, why should not mind itself be the reality of which we are in search? By mind let us first understand the individual human self as we know it. It is obvious that such a self cannot be the real in the sense of the only reality: for such selves have a beginning, and only a small part of the world which Science reveals to us enters into the actual experience of any particular self; and when it does enter into it, it enters it in a way which implies that such entrance into an individual experience does not constitute the sole existence that the world can claim. We are bound to infer that things existed before we were born; the continual advance of our knowledge implies that there must be some existent things of which no human self has at present the smallest suspicion, and so on. But Mr. Bradley is not content with asserting that neither any individual self nor all the selves put together are *the* Reality. He will not admit that they are real at all, or any part of the Reality. And here it becomes necessary to allude to a peculiar feature of Mr. Bradley's nomenclature or

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 455. Cf. pp. 146-7.

rather, we ought to say, of his thought. His conception of 'the real' is that it is that which is not in relation—that which is what it is wholly in and by itself, so that nothing outside it is necessary to maintain or to complete its being.[1] Sometimes the statement is varied by saying that 'the real is individual',[2] or (what will seem to most of us to introduce a wholly heterogeneous and a purely ethical conception) the real is 'the perfect'.[3] This will strike most people on the face of it as a very arbitrary conception of the real. Mr. Bradley, in fact, begins by assuming that in saying something is real we mean that is the whole of Reality. This position rests upon the further allegation—that the real cannot contradict itself; Non-contradiction is the test of reality;[4] and relation always does involve contradiction. But before examining Mr. Bradley's proof of this startling position, I must briefly trace its consequences.

If to be out of relation is the essence of Reality, it is clear that the individual self cannot be real. For if the object of knowledge cannot be regarded as real apart from the subject, equally little can we find in the subject taken apart from the object an entity which owes nothing of its being to its relations to any other being. The self always reveals itself to us in the act of thinking something, and it distinguishes itself from that something. Moreover, the self is not only made what it is by relation to the object, but by relation to other selves. We have failed to find the reality that we want in the self—taken in any of the numerous senses in which the term self may be and actually is used. But can we not find such a reality in a self free from the limitations of the self as we know it—such a Self as the God of theistic Religion is supposed to be. To such a position Mr. Bradley objects that such a Mind must still be conceived of as related to the objects of His own knowledge whether these objects are looked upon simply as inevitable objects of thought existing in and for Him but independently of His Will, or whether they are treated as caused or created by the Mind which knows them. And then, moreover, according to the ordinary theistic conception the other selves—of men and animals—are regarded as being outside this divine Mind, and so related to that Mind: and yet those relations necessarily form part of the nature of the divine Mind itself. Once again we have relation: and so not Reality.

We might seem to reach a more tenable position if we adopted—if not *the* Hegelian position—at least one version of that position very common among Hegelians, and say that the divine Mind must be thought of as including all other minds, and also as including the

[1] Ib. pp. 129, 136-7, 140-3.
[2] Ib. p. 140.
[3] Ib. pp. 243-5.
[4] Ib. p. 136.

objects of its knowledge. We might then suppose that the All is real, that in the one comprehensive Mind or Spirit which includes, and is, all other and lesser minds we have found the one sole, absolute Reality. But this will not satisfy Mr. Bradley's demand for unrelatedness. For, though we have got rid of external relations, we have not got rid of internal relations. So long as we think of the All as a whole consisting of parts—including within itself subject + object, this self + that self, or even this self as within or a part of that self, we are still conceiving of our reality as made up of interrelated parts or elements: and to be involved in relation is, according to his definition, to be unreal. Nothing can be real but the whole; and even the whole is not real, so long as it is considered as a whole, a collection, a plurality of parts.

Are we then frankly to admit that Reality does not exist at all? That would be unthinkable and even self-contradictory. In calling some things unreal or appearance, we imply that there must be a Real with which such unrealities can be contrasted. Appearance is only intelligible as an appearance *of* the Real. To think of some thing as *merely* an appearance is to think of it as ultimately adjectival: and the adjective implies a substantive. If there were no reality, there could be no appearance: of the appearances we are immediately conscious; and their existence as appearances is consequently undeniable. Hence we must say, not that the All or the Whole as such *is* the real, but that the real is that which underlies all appearances, which is revealed more or less adequately, more or less inadequately, in all appearance. It is the whole only if we think of the whole as including the parts otherwise than by way of relation, as a whole which swallows up the parts so completely that all relation disappears, and they cease to be even parts. Knowledge of this Reality—this Absolute, as Mr. Bradley delights to call it—we can never obtain, for to know the Absolute at once implies that distinction between knower and known which cannot belong to the real. To know the Absolute I should have to *be* the Absolute. And even then I could not know myself, for even in self-knowledge a relation breaks out again—the fatal Dualism which we want to get rid of; the distinction between knower and known, between part and whole, which implies a relation between them.

This thesis—that Reality cannot be fully known or thought—is further defended by an elaborate attempt to show that all the categories of our thought imply incoherences or contradictions, inconsistencies which we cannot suppose to belong to Reality. This in fact is the topic with which the greater part of the book is occupied. I must

be content with noticing only one or two counts in this indictment against knowledge.

(1) In the first place all knowing, as *we* know—all judging—implies abstracting. It consists in the application of abstract universals to a logical subject. Yet this abstract universal does not as such exist except in my head. The 'green in general' which I predicate of the grass is a green which no eye has ever seen. Nobody ever saw a 'green in general'—which was neither light-green nor dark-green, neither bright nor dull, neither distinct nor indistinct. In immediate perception I am, indeed, in close and immediate contact with Reality, but the moment I begin to think, I in a sense get away from Reality, for I begin making abstract universals which leave out so much of the actual fact as it is in perception. And yet all Science implies this getting away from Reality, this dealing with abstract universals. In knowledge we are as it were dealing with counters which are in a sense fictions—though they stand for, and are exchangeable with and facilitate our relations with actual Reality. And yet on the other hand so long as we merely feel and do not think, we have no knowledge. In actual perception the disruption between subject and predicate has not yet taken place. All predication consists in putting asunder what Reality has conjoined. From the nature of the case, therefore, Reality cannot be fully known: and, wherever we do not know fully, we are always liable to error—we do not and cannot know how much error. Hence we are involved in this dilemma. If we knew the Absolute, what we knew could not be real just because it is the object of knowledge: in proportion as our experience becomes more real, the further it gets away from knowledge. The nearer to Reality, the further from truth: the more truth, the less Reality. Truth, in other words, cannot be perfectly true: if it were perfectly true, it would no longer be truth. Reality can never be known: directly it becomes known, it is no longer Reality.

(2) The most fundamental of all Mr. Bradley's alleged self-contradictions in our knowledge is connected with the category of Relation. It is, as I have already said, upon the allegation that the relative is the self-contradictory that his whole theory of the absolute Reality turns. All our knowledge is found on analysis to consist of feeling, or a content derived from feeling, and relation. We never have the one without the other—feelings without relation or relations without feeling. Each is unintelligible without the other: and yet the relation between them is itself unintelligible. Directly we try to think of the relation between the relation and that which is related, we find that it implies a further relation between them—which gives rise to the

problem, what is the relation between this relation and the relation between the relation and the related, and so on *ad infinitum*. The category of Relation involves a *regressius ad infinitum*, which cannot be thought of as belonging to Reality. Our thought, all thought as such, is therefore for ever incapable of getting itself into contact with the real world as it is.

(3) The other categories of our thought—cause and effect, substance and accident, quantity and quality—are likewise examined and found to be honeycombed with contradictions. Most of these I cannot go into. I must, however, touch upon one point—Mr. Bradley's attitude to the time-difficulty. All our thoughts about Nature imply time: the categories of Cause and Effect, of Substance or Accident, all that is implied by mechanism or by organism, is meaningless without it. Even our thinking itself has duration. Consequently Mr. Bradley cannot adopt the easy way out of the difficulty according to which the self for which time-distinctions exist is itself 'out of time'. And yet the well-known Kantian antinomy—the difficulty of admitting either a first event or an endless series—remains unresolved. Mr. Bradley has added difficulties of his own. That which is in time cannot satisfy his criterion of reality, for it is ever passing away into something else, implies something else; in short, it is related, and therefore is not real. That which becomes is and is not. Its very being involves contradiction. The Absolute therefore must be out of time: time-distinctions must be somehow transcended in the Absolute. But Mr. Bradley frankly admits, as has not always been done by those who adopt such a position, that he does not in the least know of any kind of being which is out of time, and can attach no definite meaning to the language which he is compelled to use. The time-difficulty constitutes, therefore, one additional obstacle in the way of knowing Reality as it is, and in particular it is fatal to any attempt to discover the real or the Absolute in a self (as we understand self-hood), or any plurality of selves, for these are in time.

(4) I will not dwell on the ethical side of Mr. Bradley's doctrine, for it would lead us far from our subject, and I have dealt with it at length elsewhere. I will only say that in the contrast between the ideal of Self-development and the ideal of Self-sacrifice we are presented once more with that element of contradiction which penetrates all our knowledge. Thus Morality has to go the way of knowledge. Morality is self-contradictory, and therefore appearance only—not Reality or belonging to the Real except as inconsistent or self-contradictory appearances belong to the Real. We are therefore precluded from finding (with Kant) in the Practical Reason a new world, as it

were, which is to redress the balance of the old—a practical truth which will serve humanity as a substitute for the speculative truth which the limitations of our Reason have rendered impossible for us. In the Absolute, Mr. Bradley assures us—on what grounds he has omitted to explain except in so far as it constitutes part of his arbitrary definition of 'the real'—all must be perfectly harmonious (the word here appears to be used in an ethical, and not a logical sense), and therefore must be very good. Our moral consciousness which pronounces that some things are very bad must therefore be a one-sided appearance. This apparent evil must in reality only add to the perfection and harmony of the whole. Our good and evil are only one-sided and contradictory appearances of a super-moral Absolute.

So far Mr. Bradley's argument might be said to have landed us in a position of pure Agnosticism—profounder than any ever dreamed of by Herbert Spencer and his kind. For Spencer's position was simply '*We* do not, and cannot know' the Absolute. Mr. Bradley's is 'No being can know the Absolute, not even Himself or (as he prefers to say) itself'. Mr. Spencer's position is 'We cannot get at absolute truth': Mr. Bradley's is 'there is no such thing as absolute truth; all truth is and must be partially false'. But there is another side to Mr. Bradley's position, by which he goes near to reducing his most violent paradoxes to something very like platitude. Truth cannot be wholly true, and can never fully express the nature of reality: but not all truth is equally false. There are degrees of truth and degrees of Reality. Matter is not absolutely real, but it is not a mere delusion· the ideas of common life and of Science about Matter, though not absolutely true, contain a great deal of truth. Science is nearer to Reality than mere Common-sense. We approach still nearer the absolute truth of things when we adopt the Idealist's point of view, and look at matter in its due relation to mind. The Idealist is right in thinking the self more real than matter. The conception of God—as conceived of by Religion or Philosophy—brings us still nearer to the absolute Reality, for it represents an attempt to think of things as a whole. And in the whole there is more Reality than in the part. But still even the whole, considered as a whole, cannot be thought of as absolutely real, for the reasons already mentioned. The knowledge of common life, Science, Religion, Philosophy, represent stages or levels of knowledge, each of which brings us nearer absolute truth and absolute Reality than the one below it, though the goal which we are in search of is one which we can never actually reach: for the goal of absolute knowledge is one which would melt away for us in the very act of our reaching it. Absolute truth, if

attained, would be no longer truth but Reality. Reality fully known would no longer be Reality.

How shall we examine this marvellous intellectual fabric? I think I can best do so by attempting to show that it involves a fundamental contradiction and inconsistency. That is, indeed, a difficult position to take up against Mr. Bradley: for the more contradictions one points out in knowledge—even in that latest and highest product of human knowledge constituted by Mr. Bradley's own system—the more his theory seems to be confirmed. You point out contradictions; he replies, 'I told you so: the contradictions are necessary, and only prove my case—that all our knowledge involves contradictions, and that is just what I assert.' Perhaps the best way of dealing with this position will be then to assume provisionally that Mr. Bradley is right, and ask ourselves only whether he has brought us as near to the truth about Reality as any system can do. For, though Mr. Bradley holds that contradictions in human knowledge are inevitable, he does not positively assert that contradictions are a mark of truth, such truth as it is possible for the human mind to obtain. He admits that we must provisionally assume the law of contradiction, and the other laws or categories of human thought, and that at all events unnecessary and avoidable contradiction is a mark not merely of that limitation and consequent error to which all human thought is doomed, but of avoidable error. I will ask then whether Mr. Bradley has in his ultimate Weltanschauung avoided such contradictions.

I will venture to say at once that there seems to me to be in Mr. Bradley's system a fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction between three sharply opposed points of view. They may be conveniently described as (1) Idealism, (2) Spinozism, (3) Phenomenalism.

The side of Mr. Bradley's thought which meets us first is Idealism; and this, I would venture to say, constitutes the truest of those numerous selves which, in accordance with Mr. Bradley's own teaching, I shall take the liberty to attribute to him. 'Sentient experience is reality and what is not this is not real,' 'the real is nothing but experience,' 'everything is experience': there we have the voice of the genuine Idealist. But, when we are told to think of all the kinds of conscious experience known to us as merely adjectives of a substance which we do not know, when this substance is spoken of as transcending the distinction between the thinker and the objects of his thought, above all when we are invited to apply the neuter pronoun to this substance instead of the masculine, then I submit that Mr. Bradley has entered upon the line of thought which conducts to Spinozism. It is true that

he does actually avoid Spinoza's conclusion; for, though he speaks of the Absolute as transcending the distinction between subject and object, between thinker and the object thought of, he does not speak of it as transcending the distinction between mind and matter, or (to keep closer to Spinoza's actual language) between Intelligence and Extension. Mr. Bradley has no doubt that the Absolute is experience, and he everywhere assumes that experience means conscious experience. If he will not call the Absolute 'Mind', he definitely calls it 'Spirit'. But I submit that he has no right to deny to the Absolute all the characteristics of consciousness as we know it—to deny to it the power of knowing either itself or anything else, and still to call it consciousness or experience. In justification of such a procedure, Mr. Bradley appeals to that lowest form of consciousness in which feeling is not yet differentiated from knowing, in which there is as yet no apprehended contrast between self and not-self, in which there is no distinction between logical subject and logical predicate. Of course he admits that this is a mere and a distant analogy: he admits that he does not know what such a not-knowing Consciousness is like. But I submit that the analogy does not help us. To point to the existence of a consciousness which is below knowing does not help us to understand, or without understanding to believe in, the existence of a consciousness which is above knowing, and yet (strange to say) includes knowing. Mr. Bradley admits that he can only supply us with an analogy. Yet he rejects the analogy of the self in thinking of the ultimate Reality, and falls back upon the analogy of a much lower kind of experience. He will urge of course that the self will not do, because it implies the contrast between self and not-self; and there we have relativity at once. But he does not escape the difficulty by treating the Absolute as a substance of which selves are attributes, as a substantive of which they are adjectives. For there too is relation. And if he pleads that here again this relation of substance to attribute is only intended as an analogy, I should submit that the analogy is a particularly misleading one. When we think of a substance, we necessarily think either of a permanent self with changing conscious states, or of a material thing with changing states known not to itself but to another mind. Mr. Bradley will not allow us to think of the Absolute after the analogy of a self: he therefore compels us practically to think of it after the analogy of a thing. Surreptitiously and unavowedly this is what he is doing when he talks of it as substance, or an 'it', and, if, for reasons the force of which the Idealist cannot deny, this substance is not to be identified with matter as we know it, the logical outcome of this line of thought would be

much better met by frankly dropping the assertion that the Absolute is consciousness, and saying with Spinoza that it is a substance which is neither mind nor matter, and of which both consciousness and extension are but attributes. But this of course would be to give up all that Mr. Bradley has said about the Absolute being experience, spirit, and the like, to give up, in fact, all his Idealism.

At this point Mr. Bradley would probably be disposed to accuse me of having forgotten another side of his system. Has he not warned us, more and more emphatically as he approaches the end of his book, that after all we are not to take too seriously his language about the Absolute? The Absolute is not to be taken as if it were something apart from its appearances: the Absolute in fact exists only *in* its appearances. Now, I submit, that here we are introduced to a third theory of the Universe, distinct from and irreconcilable with either of the other two. If after all there is no Absolute other than the appearances, what becomes of the fundamental distinction between the Reality and its appearances? Either we must say that the appearances are the Reality, or we must say that there is no Absolute but only appearances. The difference between these two ways of putting the matter will not be great: in either case we have really adopted the third view which I have ventured to describe as Phenomenalism. Of course Mr. Bradley will protest that, though in a sense nothing exists but appearances, it is not *as* appearances that they constitute the Absolute. It is not as a simple collection that they are the Absolute, but as a Unity, as a system in which all have their place, and yet in which what is discordant or inconsistent in the appearances disappears. But still we cannot help asking what kind of existence has this Unity or system? If there is any mind for which it exists as a system, then it would seem that after all the Reality must be a Mind (or minds) which know the system, and can be distinguished from it, whatever difficulties may remain in understanding the character of its relation to other minds. In the earlier parts of 'Appearance and Reality' it would seem as if Mr. Bradley did on the whole believe that there is a mind or an experience in which all other minds or centres of consciousness were in some sense included and merged, and yet which was more than they. The Absolute, we are assured, is not merely One, not merely one system, but one experience, an eternal experience, an individual experience. If the Absolute 'perhaps strictly does not feel pleasure', 'that is only because it has something in which pleasure is included' (p. 534). Such statements imply consciousness and a consciousness distinguishable from each and every finite subject. It possesses a sense of humour of a

rather malicious type; it can enjoy a practical joke.[1] But, as we go on, we meet with such utterances as these: 'Outside of finite experience there is neither a natural world nor any other world at all' (p. 279). 'The Absolute ... has no assets beyond appearances' (p. 489). 'There is no reality at all anywhere except in appearance, and in our appearance we can discern the main nature of Reality' (p. 550). And in a recent article in *Mind* Mr. Bradley has asserted more unequivocally than ever that he does 'not believe in any reality outside of and apart from the totality of finite mind'.[2] Now I submit that this is really a third view of Reality absolutely inconsistent with either of the two others—inconsistent with an inconsistency far more absolute and irreconcilable than he has ever alleged in the thinkings of poor common-sense, of 'popular' Philosophy, or of orthodox Theologies. It practically amounts to the assertion that the collective conscious experience of the Universe is the Reality. 'Yes,' Mr. Bradley will reply, 'but not as such, not as a mere collection. For so considered they are inharmonious; they contradict themselves; and contradiction is the note of Unreality.' But, I would insist, in what Mind or by what Mind is this process of reconciling and absorbing and removing the contradictions of Appearance performed? 'By finite minds,' he will reply, 'so far as men of Science at a lower level and Philosophers at a higher level actually succeed in performing this process.' Since Mr. Bradley is (I suppose) the only Philosopher who has excogitated exactly this conception of such an all-comprehensive and all-reconciling experience, the natural tendency of such a line of thought would be to make out that Mr. Bradley alone, or Mr. Bradley and his disciples, are the Absolute. But after all Mr. Bradley admits that no human mind or minds ever can perfectly and in detail perform this process of perfect reconciliation, absorption, removal of contradictions, transcending of relations. Then in what sense does an experience in which this remarkable feat is performed really exist? To say that it exists and yet does not enter into any consciousness whatever involves a flat contradiction of all that Mr. Bradley has said against the possibility of Reality being a something which is not conscious, and of which no one is conscious. It is to give up the whole idealistic side of his teaching. If it exists neither in any consciousness nor out of any consciousness, it becomes a mere ideal of a kind of consciousness admitted to be unattainable, and it is absurd to describe such a non-existent as experience. The appearances as they appear—with all their contradictions and inconsistencies, except in so far as any finite Philosopher has succeeded in removing them—are left as the only reality.

[1] Ib. p. 194. [2] *Mind*, N. S. vol. xvi (1907), p. 179.

Of course in Mr. Bradley's own writings these contradictions are disguised by many ingenious devices. The plausibility of his position consists in a see-saw between the two—or rather the three—views of Reality. When he exposes the difficulties of rival systems, his own system appears to escape them by the assurance that 'somehow' (Mr. Bradley's system might be described as the Philosophy of a 'Somehow'), all these contradictions are reconciled in the Absolute. When faced with the difficulty of a view which makes Reality consist in so strange an experience, an experience which does not know itself and yet in which all knowledge is absorbed, in which there is no relation or consciousness of relation and yet in which all relations have their being which includes all things and yet in which there is no plurality (for plurality is relation), then Mr. Bradley exhibits the other side of his shield and says, 'Oh, but this Absolute is only in the experiences: it is nothing apart from them or even beyond them'. But the two positions absolutely refuse to come together. We are assured that they come together somehow in the Absolute. But if our minds are to be allowed any power whatever of judging about the nature of the Reality, they cannot come together even in the Absolute. If Contradiction is the note of appearance or unreality, then Mr. Bradley's Absolute is itself the most unreal of all appearances, the greatest unreality in this world of shams. To tell us that all these distinctive, one-sided appearances may be harmonized in a complete experience might be intelligible; to say that they actually are harmonized in a consciousness and that that consciousness is the Reality might be intelligible. At least that might seem intelligible to some persons, though I personally could only admit the intelligibility in the sense in which one can admit the intelligibility of propositions which seem to one absurd. But to tell us that these self-contradictory appearances actually are such an harmonious and reconciling experience, while at the same time no consciousness exists except the self-contradictory appearances, is simply to require us to make an act of faith which cannot be made without such a sacrifice of the intellect as no religious fanatic or infallible Pontiff has ever demanded. If nothing is real but experience, a system of which no one is conscious cannot be Reality. If the unthought of, unexperienced system is Reality, Reality is something outside consciousness, and then on that view it is not true that 'Reality is experience'. Mr. Bradley has mistaken for Reality an ideal of knowledge—an ideal towards which, as he contends, all our efforts to know point as to a goal, but which, according to his own admission, could not be attained, which does not exist in consciousness anywhere, and which (if it were attained) would cease to be knowledge.

I shall now have the temerity to point out in a more positive way the fundamental mistake which, as it seems to me, lies at the bottom of Mr. Bradley's difficulties. I have nothing to say against that part of his argument which shows the impossibility of treating matter as by itself real. Of course matter has its own reality: it is only when it is taken out of its proper relation to consciousness that it becomes unreal. Its reality is that of actual or possible experience. To develope this fully would occupy much time. It is enough to say that here I am on common idealistic ground—the ground which, so far, Mr. Bradley shares with all thoroughgoing Idealists: nor have I any objection to enter against his criticism of the common Hegelian attempts to get rid of or practically to ignore the element which feeling undoubtedly contributes to the building up of what we call material things. It is this insistence in which I for one should discover Mr. Bradley's most conspicuous service to philosophical progress. But when we come to actual conscious experience, it seems to me that the suggestion that any such experience can be unreal is completely unmeaning. I recognize that that particular kind of mental experience which we call thought or knowledge is not all equally true. I have learned from Mr. Bradley the lesson that knowledge, though built up of perceptual material, is not the same thing as actual perception: it represents a manipulation, as it were, of our immediate experience. And our first efforts at this co-ordination are undoubtedly full of mistake, imperfection, one-sidedness, sometimes actual contradiction. It is the business of each successive stage in the development of thought to get rid of the inconsistency or one-sidedness in the preceding. It is undeniable, too, that *our* thought at least accomplishes this task only at the cost of getting in a sense away from the actual reality of things: it aims at representing what we perceive, but it only succeeds in doing this by leaving out much of the truth. Some of the incoherences and contradictions pointed out by Mr. Bradley may be really there. I will assume for the moment that they are all there. But, whatever may be said about the inadequate truth which can be claimed for that element in our consciousness which is called knowledge, nothing that may be said on this head can possibly affect its reality when considered simply as an actual conscious experience. No matter what manipulation some crude experience of ours may undergo before it passes into knowledge, the crude experience actually occurred before it was so manipulated. The raw material had, so to speak, as much reality as the finished article. Conscious states, as they are actually experienced, are perfectly real: knowledge and even false knowing or error are real. There may be degrees of Reality, if by that is meant that

different kinds of consciousness possess different degrees of insight into their own natures or the nature of other knowable realities, or again in the sense that they may possess different degrees of value. But this is, on the whole, as it seems to me, a misleading way of speaking. In strictness the most passing thrill of immediate feeling is no less real than the highest moments of philosophic insight in the soul of a Plato. One state of mind may, considered as knowledge, come nearer the truth about Reality than another, but considered as so much psychical experience it is just so much and no more a part of Reality. Everything, as Professor Bosanquet has put it, is real, so long as it does not pretend to be anything but what it is. The unreality only comes in when it is taken by a knowing mind to be more or other than it is. And that is best expressed by saying that there are degrees of truth, but no degrees of Reality.

And from this there must follow a further consequence. All speculations about lower kinds of consciousness being swallowed up or combined in a higher kind of consciousness must be dismissed as involving unthinkable contradictions. I have for instance a certain experience on the strength of which I judge a sensation to be related to another sensation—related, say, in the way of posteriority. You may tell me that that notion is from the point of view of higher knowledge a mistake, for there can be no relations in reality, and the relation between the relative and its relation is unthinkable. Another mind, or my own at a later date, may see this sensation and relation transfigured into a unity in which the distinction between sensation and relation disappears. Let us assume that this may be the case. But that will not alter the fact that I made the mistake. The mental experience was just what it was, not something else. The mental experience of making a mistake can never be swallowed up or merged in an experience which involves no mistake: mental confusion is a reality which can never be transmuted into an experience in which all is clear, consistent, and 'harmonious'. An experience in which that distinction is 'transcended' is not the same experience as mine. 'Everything', as Bishop Butler put it, is 'what it is and not another thing.' I am bound to accuse Mr. Bradley of not having duly learned the simple lesson taught by this (in comparison with such thinkers as himself) simple-minded Georgian Bishop.

What then will be the effect of this contention, if admitted, upon our ultimate Welt-anschauung? I do not deny that knowledge does postulate as its ideal a system of coherent truth, though many of the assumptions about the nature of this system are, I hold, quite gratuitous assumptions. The mere hypotheses that we make for the purposes of

scientific investigation or reasoning may be far from possessing that absolute and unvariable truthfulness which we erroneously attribute to them. But that the Universe must form, or that there is reason to believe that it does form, an ordered system of some kind, I fully admit—though philosophers are far too ready to make innumerable assumptions as to the nature of what is meant by order and system. Still, I should contend that we must not identify any fabric of coherent truth with Reality. Scientific knowledge exists as a fact in certain consciousnesses. There may exist a knowledge which surpasses in its completeness and coherence what we call knowledge as much as the knowledge of Science or Philosophy surpasses that of common, unanalysed, unreflecting experience. But quite equally, side by side with this knowledge, there exist unscientific knowledge, error, mistake, confusion; raw, crude, sensible experience. All these must be included in the whole: no piece of conscious experience can ever be banished from the realm of reality, or ever become, for a mind that truly knows, other than it was. Complete knowledge would have to know what all this experience was, but without being it. To know what another thinks, or feels, or wills, or otherwise experiences, is not the same thing as to be or to have that experience. Reality then consists of all the actual conscious experience that there is, was, or will be. An experience in which contradictions and one-sidedness should have disappeared, or been swallowed up, or transformed into something else would not be the whole. A knowledge in which they appeared to be so transmuted could not be true knowledge of the whole.

But of course we cannot think of this world of experience simply as a succession of experiences. In our own conscious experience the successive moments of thought, emotion, perception present themselves as happening to a continuous, relatively permanent self: and we have reason to infer some similar, though inferior kind of connexion and continuity in the experience even of those inferior minds to which we cannot reasonably attribute self-consciousness as it exists in ourselves. Some degree of continuity is a matter of immediate experience in ourselves: and it is a necessity of thought to assume that any experience which begins to be must be regarded as ultimately an effect or product of a something which is permanent. The fleeting experience in time, though real, cannot be regarded as the whole of Reality. For our provisional account of the real as all the conscious experience of the Universe we must therefore substitute all the conscious beings that there are—not taken, of course, in abstraction from their successive

experiences but with those experiences. The real world is made up of conscious Spirits and their experiences.

But of what sort are those Spirits, and how many are there? Can we think of the spirits of men and animals and similarly limited intelligences as constituting the ultimate Reality? It is an obvious necessity of thought that something must have existed from all eternity. We can as little treat a mere succession of temporary selves generating one another as being by themselves the whole Reality as a mere succession of experiences not united together and forming the experience of one and the same spirit. Something must persist throughout that changes, some reality on which the changes are dependent. Now if we assume on the ordinary idealistic grounds that nothing can possess in the fullest sense real and independent existence but conscious Spirits, the eternal Reality which is the source of all other Reality must be thought of as either one Spirit or many co-eternal spirits. The prima facie view of the matter is that spirits such as ours have not always existed. If they did, there is no reason to suppose that even between them they know the whole world which there was to be known. Geology tells us of a world which existed before us: even if we existed in some other state, there is no reason to assume that we formerly knew the geological history of their planet while that history was being enacted. Yet if that world existed, and the existence of material things implies experience, all of it must have entered in some way into the experience of one Spirit or more. All that has been said by Mr. Bradley and others as to the necessity of thinking that the world must form a coherent unity is in favour of supposing that the whole of it is known to one Mind, and is not merely the collective experience of many minds, each of which knows it in part, none of it as a whole.

If the world is to have any existence as a system or unity, it must exist in and for the experience of One Mind—one Mind at least. The hypothesis of a plurality of omniscient Minds is not, indeed, absolutely self-contradictory. Such a hypothesis might be dismissed as gratuitous, even if we thought of these Minds as merely knowing the world. But directly we introduce the idea of Will into our conception of the relation between the world and the minds whose experience it ultimately is, the hypothesis of two or more omniscient Minds becomes impossible. I have not time now to develope the argument that Causality or activity is intelligible only as the will of a Conscious being. My present hearers will of course know where that line of thought has been developed. I will only remind them in passing that Kant may now be numbered among the adherents of that view—

a view which involves the cancelling and suppression of two-thirds of his Critique and of much more that his disciples have based upon it.[1] I must be content here with saying that the unity, intercommunion, and system of the Universe prove that, if it was willed by Mind at all, it was willed by One Mind. The hypothesis of two or more minds which by their joint and completely concordant volitions continuously keep in being one and the same world of Nature and of other Spirits can hardly require serious refutation. It involves the hypothesis of a pre-established harmony which is not pre-established and which is harmonious only by accident. In the absence of such a grotesque alternative, we are driven to the view that Reality consists of all the Spirits that there are, among which only One is eternal and omniscient, and the source or ground of all the rest.

It will be obvious that I have now frankly taken leave of the definition of Reality adopted by Mr. Bradley himself. That definition seems to me an absolutely arbitrary one. This Reality which excludes all relation is after all the old 'One' of Parmenides, upon the emptiness and vanity of which all subsequent Philosophy has been a comment. An Absolute which excludes all relation is simply a One without a Many. To talk about a One which somehow 'includes' many members without being related to any of them and without their being related to one another is simply to take back with one phrase what has been conceded by another. Inclusion is after all for our thought a relation, and we have no other thoughts by which to think. The result of this quest has been what might have been anticipated. It has turned out that the One has no real existence except in so far as it is a name for the many considered in their mutual relations. Mr. Bradley's Absolute has turned out to be, as Green said of the search for a Real which was behind and independent of consciousness, simply that of which nothing can be said. Of course, if by Reality is meant the whole of Reality, such a Reality cannot have relation to anything outside itself: as to internal relations, there is no reason whatever for supposing that Reality, taken in its ordinary significance, involves any such exclusion.

Of course Mr. Bradley would reply that he has given reasons for holding that the notion of relativity involves incoherences and inconsistencies which we cannot suppose to belong to ultimately real things. The difficulty is one which would demand as elaborate an examination as Mr. Bradley has himself given it. Here I can but briefly urge two points. Firstly, I would submit that, even if he had succeeded in making good all—and even more than all—the contradictions which he has attempted to discover in our intellectual categories,

[1] James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II, p. 191.

that would only go to show what I for one should never deny—that is to say, the inadequacy of our thoughts about Reality. Mr. Bradley admits that he is obliged to use these categories of human thought. His own theory of Reality depends for whatever plausibility it possesses upon a use of these categories. In so far as he does make any attempt at getting beyond them, he only involves himself in more and far more glaring contradictions than those which he seeks to avoid. Our modes of thought, when we are most consistent and when we seem to ourselves to be most reasonable, may be inadequate and imperfect modes of thinking; but we are not likely to get nearer the truth by indulging in what seems self-contradictory even to us. There may be unavoidable contradictions in our thought: that is a poor reason for introducing avoidable ones. That which seems absurd to us is not likely to seem less so to the Absolute. And therefore, even if we suppose that the idea of relation in general—or the relation of whole and part in particular—is inadequate to the nature of Reality, the idea of a relationless Reality or (what is the same thing) of a whole without any parts at all is likely to be still more so. Mr. Bradley's device of throwing all contradictions into the Absolute and pronouncing that they are somehow reconciled in and for the Absolute is just as much open to believers in another kind of Absolute. Indeed, an Absolute which is thought of as consisting in self-conscious Spirits—in many reproductions or imperfect incarnations of a single Self-consciousness which is also omniscient—would seem to be distinctly more capable of such feats than an Absolute which is correctly described by an 'it', whose maximum intelligence is represented, or (so far as Mr. Bradley's system goes) *may be* represented by such minds as ours, and which after all only exists in those admittedly self-contradictory appearances.

But secondly I must confess that the difficulties upon which Mr. Bradley insists with regard to relation do not much appeal to me. I do, indeed, recognize that the experience which is attributed to God cannot be exactly like our experience: there cannot be in it the same distinction between abstract knowledge on the one hand—based on that process of generalizing which, as Mr. Bradley has shown us, leaves out so much of the perceptual Reality—and actual sensation on the other, which as it approaches the state of pure sensation becomes increasingly exclusive of thought. 'Somehow', to use Mr. Bradley's favourite adverb, we must suppose that in God there is not this distinction between abstract knowledge and actual perception; so far I recognize the high value of Mr. Bradley's criticism upon the Hegelian attempt to make the thought of God, and so the reality of the world,

identical with our system of abstract universals to the avowed or implied exclusion of all that wealth of actual perception to which these Universals owe all their content and all their claim to hold good of, or represent, Reality. But, if we cannot suppose that God's knowledge consists like ours in abstract universals, got by the clumsy process of generalizing from isolated perceptions, this is not because such knowledge implies relations but because it implies an advance from the unknown to the known, and so pre-supposes ignorance. Moreover, such knowledge, even when attained, fails to express the whole truth of actual perception: while actual perception, so long and so far as it is *mere* perception, does not know even itself. Such a distinction between the 'what' and the 'that' (as Mr. Bradley calls it) is impossible to an Omniscient Mind. The experience of the divine Mind must somehow transcend this distinction between a thought which falls short of Reality and a reality which falls short of thought. But I see no reason to believe that the element of Relation must disappear from such a consciousness, though for it relation may well become something other and more than it is for us. I cannot acknowledge the alleged self-contradictoriness of Relation. I do not see that, because we think of one sensation as related to another sensation, we therefore require a new relation to express the relation between the sensation and the relation, and so on *ad infinitum.* So to argue implies that we think of the relation as being an existence apart from that which is related, and that is inconsistent with the nature of a relation: just as, when with Plato—the Plato of certain dialogues or certain moments—we treat a universal as a real thing apart from its particulars, we are really taking away from it all that belongs to the nature of a universal, making it into a fresh particular, and exposing ourselves to the familiar τρίτος ἄνθρωπος criticism of Aristotle. A relation which itself wanted a relation to hook it on to its term would not be a relation at all. This difficulty—and many other difficulties of Mr. Bradley—seem to me simply to be created by the transparent device of taking ultimate notions, and demanding that they shall be explained. It is just like asking *why* two and two should make four, or asking *in what* consists the equality of the two angles at the base of an isosceles triangle, or demanding a definition of redness which shall explain the notion to a man blind from his birth, or insisting that, if one part of space is connected with the adjoining part, there must be a link to connect them which we must be able to isolate from the adjoining space and hand round for inspection. There must be a limit to all explanation, and when we have analysed the objects of

perception into a sensuous content and certain intellectual relations, we have reached that limit. I do not deny that an omniscient mind may know more about the matter than we do; but even in relations as we know them there is no contradiction.

Among the many consequences which follow from the rejection of Mr. Bradley's views about relation, there is one which calls in our present connexion for special notice. If relatedness or two-ness is not a mark of unreality, there is no reason why we should assume that in the Absolute the distinction between subject and object must altogether disappear. No doubt we can look upon the subject or subjects and the nature which they know as together constituting a single Reality. If the word Absolute is to be used at all, we must say that the Absolute includes the subject or subjects together with the Nature which is, in the most ultimate analysis, the experience of those subjects. In so far as subject and object are each of them unreal and unintelligible without the other, we may no doubt, if we like, speak of a 'higher Unity' which transcends the distinction; but we must not think of this higher Unity as a special and different Being with a nature or characteristics of its own distinct from the nature of subject and object considered as related to and implying each other. A further consequence of rejecting Mr. Bradley's Anti-relationism will be that we shall have cut away all ground for treating the distinction between one self and another—between one human self and another, or between any human self and that divine Self which we have seen to be logically implied in the existence of the world—as in any way an unreal distinction which has got to be merged and transcended in the Absolute. And this will avoid some of the outrageous positions to which Mr. Bradley would commit us. An omniscient experience which should include in itself experiences which are not omniscient involves a contradiction. And we are told that in the Absolute there must be no contradiction. An omniscient Being could not have the particular experience which consists in not being omniscient. He might know what such a limited experience is, but it would not be his experience or be known as such.

While we recognize the differences between thought, feeling, experience and all other words expressive of consciousness as they are for and in God from what they are in ourselves, while we admit that, in the scholastic phrase, such expressions are used *sensu eminentiori*, we need not make the difference to be so great as is implied in the assertion that in the divine experience all distinction between subject and object disappears—a mode of representation which is apt to end in a virtual evaporation of all real meaning in the assertion that God is Spirit or

Mind, and to embark upon the road by which a nominal Idealism so often descends into the virtual Naturalism of Spinoza. At the same time we shall be able to avoid what seems to me the excessive subjectivism of Mr. Bradley's extremest idealistic utterances. If relation is not to be expelled from Reality, we need no more merge the object in the subject than the subject in the object. I do not reject Mr. Bradley's phrase 'nothing exists but experience', but the phrase, taken by itself and still more when taken in connexion with Mr. Bradley's attitude towards relations, may easily be taken to mean that it is an experience in which all distinction between a consciousness of objects in space and non-spacial experiences such as emotions (though after all even these are vaguely localized) is altogether lost and denied. We need not deny the reality of things because we assert they could not exist apart from consciousness.

A certain community of Nature we must, again, recognize between God and all lesser spirits, a community great in proportion to the level of each spirit's capacities and achievements. But community is not identity. The Unity that we are in search of does not exclude differences All the spirits together no doubt make a single Reality, but the unity which they possess is not the particular kind of Unity which we recognize in ourselves as constituting self-consciousness or personality. God may no doubt reasonably be supposed to possess that Unity in Himself carried to a degree of which personality in us gives us only a glimpse. But to distinguish oneself from other Spirits, however fully one may know them, is not (as some people seem to imagine) an imperfection or (in any derogatory sense) a limitation, but, on the contrary, a note of the highest level to which Being can attain. It represents an ideal, to which other consciousnesses approximate in proportion to their intellectual elevation, and to which the nearest approach known to us is constituted by the human intelligence at its highest.

I have passed over a host of difficulties. A host of the alleged difficulties, contradictions, and incoherences in human knowledge have been left unexamined. I can only say here that some of them appear to me to be imaginary, others greatly exaggerated; while others remain real and undeniable, and consequently set a limit to the completeness and adequacy of our knowledge, though they do not, as it seems to me, involve the inferences which Mr. Bradley draws from them.

These matters I must pass over, but there is one of these alleged contradictions about which a word must be said even in the most summary criticism of Mr. Bradley's position. Green's timeless

individual self he has dismissed in a contemptuous paragraph: he still believes in a timeless Absolute. I am far from denying that there are antinomies involved in our ideas of time, and I do not believe that any thinker has ever transcended them: certainly they are not transcended by merely saying 'Let them be reconciled where all other contradictions are reconciled—in the Absolute' But the contradictions are not as great as Mr. Bradley makes them. The mere fact that time involves relativity and therefore multiplicity does not involve the reduction of time to the level of appearance. With the rejection of the notion that relativity is equivalent to unreality, we shall have got rid of one of Mr. Bradley's main reasons for treating time as unreal. But there remains the fundamental antinomy—the impossibility of believing either in a first event or in an infinite series of real events. This does not warrant our calling time unreal. Empty time is of course unreal, but temporality enters into all our experience, and is an element in our experience as real as anything we know or can conceive. To talk of God or of the Absolute or ultimate Reality as timeless is to use language which can mean nothing to us, or rather language which is certainly false. Whatever be the true solution of the difficulties involved in the nature of time, we shall not diminish them by denying the reality of an element in actual experience which is as real as any other element in the most real thing we know or can conceive.

I will not develope these considerations any further, for two reasons. In the first place the question of time is the most difficult question of Metaphysics, and any approach to a serious criticism of Mr. Bradley's treatment of it would be wholly beyond the limits which I have designed for this paper. And in the second place much has already been done in the way of protest against the cheap and easy attempts to transcend the time-antinomy which were in vogue not many years ago. Without mentioning others, it will be enough to say that I recognize this as one of the most permanent and valuable elements in the philosophy of M. Bergson. Whatever becomes of his system as a whole, M. Bergson's insistence on the reality of experience as seen from the inside, and on change and temporality as inherent elements in that reality, has I think, supplied just the criticism which Mr. Bradley's attitude towards time demands, although there may be not an equal insistence on the complementary principle that change implies something permanent.

I have no disposition to deny the reality or the gravity of some of the difficultie sabout time, but the moral which I should draw from them is different from Mr. Bradley's. The general conclusion of his whole argument is that, though everything is appearance, yet 'in our

appearance we can discover the main nature of reality'. If it were true that the Absolute is out of time, while the appearances are all in time, it certainly could not be said that we could discover the main nature of Reality from the appearances. The difference between an existence in time and an existence out of time is so fundamental, so abysmal, that it is difficult to say what the one could have in common with the other. Mr. Bradley is, as it appears to me, too sceptical in his premisses, much too dogmatic in his conclusions. He is too sceptical about the validity of our knowledge in its parts; he is too unwarrantably confident and dogmatic in his assertions about the Universe as a whole. The difficulties which he insists upon about time do not warrant the assertion that the Absolute is out of time, or that time-distinctions are purely subjective or in any sense unreal. But they do warrant the assertion that we do not and cannot understand fully the nature of time, and consequently cannot fully understand the nature of ultimate Reality. Till this difficulty is removed, the pretentious systems, Hegelian or other, which profess to explain all difficulties and to give full and complete insight into the ultimate nature of things are doomed to failure. But I believe it is possible to show that a system which takes time and things in time as we find them and treats them, notwithstanding the difficulties, as real and objective is in all probability nearer the reality than any of those which ignore or pretend to explain them away—nearer the absolute truth speculatively and still more so when treated as imperfect and inadequate representations of Reality for the purposes of life and practice.

There are aspects of Mr. Bradley's chameleon-like system which would enable it to be represented as merely amounting to such an assertion of the inadequacy of a knowledge which is nevertheless sufficient to supply us with guidance through life. Much in it might fit in with a system of thought which accepted the primacy of the Practical Reason. But his distrust of the Moral Consciousness prevents our looking at it in this light. That is precluded by his admission that we have to assume in practice moral distinctions which we know speculatively to be not only inadequate but false. For one who believes that our moral consciousness gives us the fullest glimpses of insight into the nature of Reality that we possess, the mere fact that his system condemns us to adopt this attitude of ethical scepticism, supplies by itself a considerable presumption against its speculative truth.

The question of time is not the only direction in which I recognize that Mr. Bradley has performed good service in pointing out the inadequacy of our knowledge, and undermining the philosophies which

tend to conceal this fact by substituting imposing rhetoric for thought. There is at least some truth in Mr. Bradley's doctrine that in a sense we cannot know anything perfectly without knowing the whole. It is, as it seems to me, an exaggeration to say that this implies that all our knowledge is partial error; for sometimes—as for instance in Arithmetic and Geometry—we can see immediately that all further knowledge must be irrelevant to the accuracy of the particular truth which we grasp when we pronounce, for instance, that two and two make four. In mathematics abstraction is so complete that we know that here abstraction involves no error. But that is decreasingly the case as Science becomes more concrete, and the maxim attains its maximum truth as the highest objects of knowledge are reached. Above all, with regard to our knowledge of God, it is most undoubtedly true that our knowledge must be inadequate, that nothing short of complete knowledge of the Universe and every part of it could give us complete and adequate knowledge, and here it may well be true that every proposition that we can lay down may be to some extent infected with error on account of the inadequate and partial character of our knowledge. Here we have no immediate knowledge that what we know not could not modify the inferences that we draw from what we do know. Our knowledge may be sufficient for practical guidance—not merely for actual conduct, but also for religious emotion, and faith, and aspiration. If Pragmatism would only limit itself to insisting upon this inadequacy, and upon the importance of the knowledge which guides life as compared with mere speculation, instead of substituting wilful caprice for the use of our Reason up to the point to which its powers enable us to penetrate, I could recognize its influence on Philosophy as a wholesome one: but, because our brightest guide through the darkness of this world is but a rushlight, that seems to me a poor reason for blowing it out, and insisting on walking blindly and unnecessarily in the dark.

Whether our knowledge is sufficient for practical guidance and for the support of those religious beliefs and aspirations which so powerfully influence practice, depends mainly upon the confidence which we repose in the Practical Reason. Perhaps in order that this paper may not be more incomplete than it is I may be allowed briefly to repeat the criticism which I have elsewhere elaborated. I believe it to be possible to show that Mr. Bradley's discovery of a fundamental contradiction in our practical Reason is a sheer *ignis fatuus*. Our moral consciousness does not say that all self-development and all self-sacrifice are right (that would be a contradiction): it does not even say that *all* self-development and *all* self-sacrifice are good; though, if it

did, there would be no contradiction there.[1] It does tell us that *some* self-contradiction and *some* self-sacrifice are good, and (difficult of course as such questions are in practice) it is not unequal to the task of balancing one good against another, and of seeking to realize an ideal of human life in which both self-development and self-sacrifice shall have their due and proper place. It is always right to aim at the greatest good; though there is no contradiction in saying that one good can sometimes only be attained by the sacrifice of another. And if our Practical Reason involves no such contradiction, there is no ground for distrusting it, any more than for distrusting our scientific reasoning, in spite of the obvious fallibility of any particular individual mind, and the inadequacy of all human knowledge. If our moral consciousness is not to be trusted, we have no right to use moral categories at all in our theory of the Universe, and Mr. Bradley has no right to say that good is an attribute of the real while evil is merely appearance. If our judgements of value are to be trusted, we have no reason for doubting that for the Mind and Will which is the source of all Reality this ideal is as valid as for us. There is no reason for attributing to God a different Morality (as regards its fundamental principles) than that which we recognize as applicable to human conduct, any more than for supposing that for God quantity and number are essentially different from that recognized by the purely human affair which we call Arithmetic.

And if our moral consciousness is to be trusted as an inadequate revelation of the Divine—two things must follow. Firstly, we may and must think of the divine Will as morally good, and directed towards the greatest attainable realization of what presents itself to the Moral Consciousness as the highest good. Secondly, we cannot think of a Universe in which our Moral Consciousness pronounces that there is much evil as perfectly good. The evil exists, though (if our moral ideas contain any revelation of the divine) it can only exist for the sake of the good. The series of events which make up the world's history is directed towards the good. But the good is not fully realized yet. How much good is destined to be realized, we cannot tell. Enough for us to know two things: (1) that enough good will be realized to justify its being willed by a righteous and all-wise Mind, (2) that our co-operation is required in realizing it. And this is all that is necessary to justify religious faith and to inspire moral effort.

[1] I have dealt with this point at length in my *Theory of Good and Evil*, II. 85 sq., 268 sq.

SECOND ANNUAL SHAKESPEARE LECTURE

CORIOLANUS

By A. C. BRADLEY

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read July 1, 1912.

Coriolanus[1] is beyond doubt among the latest of Shakespeare's tragedies: there is some reason for thinking it the last. Like all those that succeeded *Hamlet*, it is a tragedy of vehement passion; and in none of them are more striking revolutions of fortune displayed. It is full of power, and almost every one feels it to be a noble work. We may say of it, as of its hero, that, if not one of Shakespeare's greatest creations, it is certainly one of his biggest.

Nevertheless, it is scarcely popular. It is seldom acted, and perhaps no reader ever called it his favourite play. Indeed, except for educational purposes, I suppose it is, after *Timon*, the least generally read of the tragedies. Even the critic who feels bound to rank it above *Romeo and Juliet*, and even above *Julius Caesar*, may add that he prefers those dramas all the same; and if he ignores his personal preferences, still we do not find him asking whether it is not the equal of the four great tragedies. He may feel this doubt as to *Antony and Cleopatra*, but not as to *Coriolanus*.

The question why this should be so will at once tell us something about the drama. We cannot say that it shows any decline in Shakespeare's powers, though in parts it may show slackness in their use. It has defects, some of which are due to the historical material;

[1] Shakespeare's treatment of his subject is often best understood through comparison with his authority, Plutarch's Life of Coriolanus in North's translation, a translation most conveniently read in the volume edited by Prof Skeat and entitled *Shakespeare's Plutarch*. For a full development of the comparison, and, generally, for a discussion of the play much more complete than mine could be, see Prof. MacCallum's book, *Shakespeare's Roman Plays and their Background* (1910), which is admirable both for its thoroughness and for the insight and justice of its criticism. I should perhaps say that, though I read the greater part of Prof. MacCallum's book when it appeared, I was prevented from going on to the chapters on *Coriolanus*, and did so only after writing my lecture. I left untouched in it the many observations which this reading confirmed, but on one or two doubtful points I have added a note.

but all the tragedies have defects, and the material of *Antony and Cleopatra* was even more troublesome. There is no love-story; but then there is none in *Macbeth*, and next to none in *King Lear*. Thanks in part to the badness of the Folio text, the reader is impeded by obscurities of language and irritated by the mangling of Shakespeare's metre; yet these annoyances would not much diminish the effect of *Othello*. It may seem a more serious obstacle that the hero's faults are repellent and chill our sympathy; but Macbeth, to say nothing of his murders, is a much less noble being than Coriolanus. All this doubtless goes for something; but there must be some further reason why this drama stands apart from the four great tragedies and *Antony and Cleopatra*. And one main reason seems to be this. Shakespeare could construe the story he found only by conceiving the hero's character in a certain way; and he had to set the whole drama in tune with that conception. In this he was, no doubt, perfectly right; but he closed the door on certain effects, in the absence of which his whole power in tragedy could not be displayed. He had to be content with something less, or rather with something else; and so have we.

Most of the great tragedies leave a certain imaginative impression of the highest value, which I describe in terms intended merely to recall it. What we witness is not the passion and doom of mere individuals. The forces that meet in the tragedy stretch far beyond the little group of figures and the tiny tract of space and time in which they appear. The darkness that covers the scene, and the light that strikes across it, are more than our common night and day. The hero's fate is, in one sense, intelligible, for it follows from his character and the conditions in which he is placed; and yet everything, character, conditions, and issue, is mystery. Now of this effect there is very little in *Coriolanus*. No doubt the story has a universal meaning, since the contending forces are permanent constituents of human nature; but that peculiar *imaginative* effect or atmosphere is hardly felt. And, thinking of the play, we notice that the means by which it is produced elsewhere are almost absent here. One of these means is the use of the supernatural; another a treatment of nature which makes her appear not merely as a background, nor even merely as a conscious witness of human feelings, sufferings, and deeds, but as a vaster fellow-actor and fellow-sufferer. Remove in fancy from *Hamlet*, *Lear*, and *Macbeth* all that appeals to imagination through these means, and you find them utterly changed, but brought nearer to *Coriolanus*. Here Shakespeare has deliberately withdrawn his hand from those engines. He found, of course, in

Plutarch allusions to the gods, and some of them he used; but he does not make us feel that the gods take part in the story. He found also wonders in the firmament, portents, a strange vision seen by a slave, a statue that spoke. He found that the Romans in their extremity sent the priests, augurs, and soothsayers to plead with Coriolanus; and that the embassy of the women which saved Rome was due to a thought which came suddenly to Valeria, which she herself regarded as a divine inspiration, and on the nature of which Plutarch speculates. But the whole of this Shakespeare ignored. Nor would he use that other instrument I spoke of. Coriolanus was not the man to be terrified by twilight, or to feel that the stars or the wind took part against or with him. If Lear's thunderstorm had beat upon his head, he would merely have set his teeth. And not only is the mystery of nature absent; she is scarcely present even as a background. The hero's grim description of his abode in exile as 'the city of kites and crows' is almost all we have. In short, *Coriolanus* has scarcely more atmosphere, either supernatural or natural, than the average serious prose drama of to-day.

In Shakespeare's greatest tragedies there is a second source of supreme imaginative appeal—in one or two the chief source—the exhibition of inward conflict, or of the outburst of one or another passion, terrible, heart-rending, or glorious to witness. At these moments the speaker becomes the greatest of poets; and yet, the dramatic convention admitted, he speaks in character. Coriolanus is never thus the greatest of poets, and he could not be so without a breach of more than dramatic convention. His nature is large, simple, passionate; but (except in one point, to which I will return, as it is irrelevant here) his nature is not, in any marked degree, imaginative. He feels all the rapture, but not, like Othello, all the poetry, of war. He covets honour no less than Hotspur, but he has not Hotspur's vision of honour. He meets with ingratitude like Timon, but it does not transfigure all mankind for him. He is very eloquent, but his only free eloquence is that of vituperation and scorn. It is sometimes more than eloquence, it is splendid poetry; but it is never such magical poetry as we hear in the four greatest tragedies. Then, too, it lies in his nature that his deepest and most sacred feeling, that for his mother, is almost dumb. It governs his life and leads him uncomplaining towards death, but it cannot speak. And, finally, his inward conflicts are veiled from us. The change that came when he found himself alone and homeless in exile is not exhibited. The result is partly seen in the one soliloquy of this drama, but the process is hidden. Of the passion that possesses him

when his triumph seems at hand we get a far more vivid idea from the words of Cominius than from any words of his own:

> I tell you he does sit in gold, his eye
> Red as 'twould burn Rome.

In the most famous scene, when his fate is being decided, only one short sentence reveals the gradual loosening of purpose during his mother's speech. The actor's face and hands and bearing must show it, not the hero's voice; and his submission is announced in a few quiet words, deeply moving and impressive, but destitute of the effect we know elsewhere of a lightning-flash that rends the darkness and discloses every cranny of the speaker's soul. All this we can see to be perfectly right, but it does set limits to the flight of Shakespeare's imagination.

I have spoken of something that we miss in *Coriolanus*. Unfortunately there is something that a good many readers find, or think they find, and that makes it distasteful to them. A political conflict is never the centre of interest in Shakespeare's plays, but in the historical plays it is an element more or less essential, and in this one it is very prominent. Here, too, since it may be plausibly described as a conflict between people and nobles, or democracy and aristocracy, the issue is felt to be still alive. And Shakespeare, it is thought, shows an animus, and sides against the people. A hundred years ago Hazlitt, dealing with this tragedy, said: 'Shakespeare himself seems to have had a leaning to the arbitrary side of the question, perhaps from some feeling of contempt for his own origin; and to have spared no occasion of baiting the rabble. What he says of them is very true; what he says of their betters is also very true, though he dwells less upon it.' This language is very tentative and mild compared with that of some later writers. According to one, Shakespeare 'loathed the common Englishman'. He was a neuropath who could not endure the greasy aprons and noisome breath of mechanics, and 'a snob of the purest English water'. According to another, he was probably afflicted for some years with an 'enormous self-esteem'. A hero similarly afflicted, and a nauseous mob—behold the play!

I do not propose to join this dance, or even to ask whether any reasonable conjecture as to Shakespeare's political views and feelings could be formed from study of this play and of others. But it may be worth while to mention certain questions which should be weighed by any one who makes the adventure. Are not the chief weaknesses

and vices shown by the populace, or attributed to it by speakers, in these plays, those with which it had been habitually charged in antiquity and the Middle Ages; and did not Shakespeare find this common form, if nowhere else, in Plutarch? Again, if these traits and charges are heightened in his dramas, what else do we expect in drama, and especially in that of the Elizabethans? Granted, next, that in Shakespeare the people play a sorry political part, is that played by English nobles and Roman patricians much more glorious or beneficent; and if, in Hazlitt's phrase, Shakespeare says more of the faults of the people than of those of their betters, would we have him give to humble unlettered persons the powers of invective of lordly orators? Further, is abuse of the people ever dramatically inappropriate in Shakespeare; and is it given to Henry the Fifth, or Brutus (who had some cause for it), or, in short, to any of the most attractive characters? Is there not, besides, a great difference between his picture of the people taken as individuals, even when they talk politics, and his picture of them as a crowd or mob? Is not the former, however humorously critical, always kindly; and is a personal bias really needed to account for the latter? And, to end a catalogue easy to prolong, might not that talk, which is scarcely peculiar to Shakespeare, about greasy caps and offensive odours, have some other origin than his artistic nerves? He had, after all, some little gift of observation, and, when first he mixed with a class above his own, might he not resemble a son of the people now who, coming among his betters, observes with amusement the place held in their decalogue by the morning bath? I do not for a moment suggest that, by weighing such questions as these, we should be led to imagine Shakespeare as any more inclined to champion the populace than Spenser or Hooker or Bacon; but I think we should feel it extremely hazardous to ascribe to him any political feelings at all, and ridiculous to pretend to certainty on the subject.

Let us turn to the play. The representation of the people, whatever else it may be, is part of a dramatic design. This design is based on the main facts of the story, and these imply a certain character in the people and the hero. Since the issue is tragic, the conflict between them must be felt to be unavoidable and wellnigh hopeless. The necessity for dramatic sympathy with both sides demands that on both there should be some right and some wrong, both virtues and failings; and if the hero's monstrous purpose of destroying his native city is not to extinguish our sympathy, the provocation he receives must be great. This being so, the picture of the people is, surely, no darker than it had to be; the desired result

would have been more easily secured by making it darker still. And one must go further. As regards the political situation the total effect of the drama, it appears to me, is this. The conflict of hero and people is hopeless; but it is he alone who makes the conflict of patricians and plebeians, I do not say hopeless, but in any high degree dangerous. The people have bad faults, but no such faults as, in his absence, would prevent a constitutional development in their favour.

I will not try to describe their character, but I will illustrate this statement by comparing two accusations of their opponents with the facts shown; for these we must accept, but the accusations we must judge for ourselves. In the first scene the people are called cowards, both by the hero and by their friendly critic Menenius. Now there is no sign that they possess the kind of courage expected of gentlemen, or feel the corresponding shame if their courage fails. But if they were cowards, how could Rome be standing where we see it stand? They are the common soldiers of Rome. And when we see them in war, what do we find? One division, under Cominius, meets the Volscians in the field; the other, under Coriolanus, assaults Corioli. Both are beaten back. This is what Cominius says to his men:

> Breathe you, my friends: well fought: we are come off
> Like Romans, neither foolish in our stands,
> Nor cowardly in retire.

Nothing hints that the other division has not fought well or was cowardly in retire; but it was encouraged beforehand with threats, and, on its failure, with a torrent of curses and abuse. Nevertheless it advances again and forces the enemy to the gates, which Coriolanus enters, calling on his men to follow him.

> *First Sol.* Fool-hardiness; not I.
> *Second Sol.* Nor I.
> *First Sol.* See, they have shut him in.
> *All.* To the pot, I warrant him.

Disgusting, no doubt; but the answer to threats and curses. They would not have served Cominius so; and indeed, when Lartius comes up and merely suggests to them to 'fetch off' the re-appearing hero, they respond at once and take the city. These men are not cowards; but their conduct depends on their leaders. The same thing is seen when Coriolanus himself appeals to the other division for volunteers to serve in the van. For once he appeals nobly, and the whole division volunteers.

Another charge he brings against the people is that they can neither rule nor be ruled. On this his policy of 'thorough' is based. Now,

judging from the drama, one would certainly say that they could not rule alone,—that a pure democracy would lead to anarchy, and perhaps to foreign subjection. And one would say also that they probably could not be ruled by the patricians if all political rights were denied them. But to rule them, while granting them a place in the constitution, would seem quite feasible. They are, in fact, only too easy to guide. No doubt, collected into a mob, led by demagogues, and maddened by resentment and fear, they become wild and cruel. It is true, also, that, when their acts bear bitter fruit, they disclaim responsibility and turn on their leaders. 'that we did, we did for the best; and though we willingly consented to his banishment, yet it was against our will'. But they not only follow their tribunes like sheep; they receive abuse and direction submissively from any one who shows goodwill. They are fundamentally good-natured, like the Englishmen they are, and have a humorous consciousness of their own weaknesses. They are, beyond doubt, mutable, and in that sense untrustworthy; but they are not by nature ungrateful, or slow to admire their bitterest enemy. False charges and mean imputations come from their leaders, not from them. If one of them blames Coriolanus for being proud, another says he cannot help his pride. They insist on the bare form of their right to name him consul, but all they want is the form, and not the whole even of that. When he asks one of them, 'Well then, I pray, your price of the consulship?' the answer, 'The price is to ask it kindly', ought to have melted him at once; yet when he asks it contemptuously it is still granted. Even later, when the arts of the tribunes have provoked him to such a storm of defiant and revolutionary speech that both the consulship and his life are in danger, one feels that another man might save both with no great trouble. Menenius tells him that the people

> have pardons, being ask'd, as free
> As words to little purpose.

His mother and friends urge him to deceive the people with false promises. But neither false promises nor apologies are needed, only a little humanity and some acknowledgement that the people are part of the state. He is capable of neither, and so the conflict is hopeless. But it is so not because the people, or even the tribunes, are what they are, but because he is what we call an impossible person.

The result is that all the force and nobility of Rome's greatest man have to be thrown away and wasted. That is tragic; and it

is doubly so because it is not only his faults that make him impossible. There is bound up with them a nobleness of nature in which he surpasses every one around him.

We see this if we consider, what is not always clear to the reader, his political position. It is not shared by any of the other patricians who appear in the drama. Critics have called him a Tory or an ultra-Tory. The tribune who calls him a 'traitorous innovator' is quite as near the mark. The people have been granted tribunes. The tribunate is a part of the constitution, and it is accepted, with whatever reluctance, by the other patricians. But Coriolanus would abolish it, and that not by law but by the sword. Nor would he be content with that. The right of the people to control the election of the consul is no new thing; it is an old traditional right; but it too might well be taken away. The only constitution tolerable in his eyes is one where the patricians are the state, and the people a mere instrument to feed it and fight for it. It is this conviction that makes it so dangerous to appoint him consul, and also makes it impossible for him to give way. Even if he could ask pardon for his abuse of the people, he could not honestly promise to acknowledge their political rights.

Now the nobleness of his nature is at work here. He is not tyrannical; the charge brought against him of aiming at a tyranny is silly. He is an aristocrat. And Shakespeare has put decisively aside the statement of Plutarch that he was 'churlish, uncivil, and altogether unfit for any man's conversation'. Shakespeare's hero, though he feels his superiority to his fellow-patricians, always treats them as equals. He is never rude or over-bearing. He speaks to them with the simple directness or the bluff familiarity of a comrade. He does not resent their advice, criticism, or reproof. He shows no trace of envy or jealousy, or even of satisfaction at having surpassed them. The suggestion of the tribunes that he is willing to serve under Cominius because failure in war will be credited to Cominius, and success in war to himself, shows only the littleness of their own minds. The patricians are his fellows in a community of virtue—of a courage, fidelity, and honour, which cannot fail them because they are 'true-bred', though the bright ideal of such virtue become perfect still urges them on. But the plebeians, in his eyes, are destitute of this virtue, and therefore have no place in this community. All they care for is food in peace, looting in war, flattery from their demagogues; and they will not even clean their teeth. To ask anything of them is to insult not merely himself but the virtues that he worships. To give them a real share in citizenship is treason to Rome; for Rome

means these virtues. They are not Romans, they are the rats of Rome.

He is very unjust to them, and his ideal, though high, is also narrow. But he is magnificently true to it, and even when he most repels us we feel this and glory in him. He is never more true to it than when he tries to be false; and this is the scene where his superiority in nobleness is most apparent. He, who had said of his enemy, 'I hate him worse than a promise-breaker', is urged to save himself and his friends by promises that he means to break. To his mother's argument that he ought no more to mind deceiving the people than outwitting an enemy in war, he cannot give the obvious answer, for he does not really count the people his fellow-countrymen. But the proposal that *he* should descend to lying or flattering astounds him. He feels that if he does so he will never be himself again; that his mind will have taken on an inherent baseness and no mere simulated one. And he is sure, as we are, that he simply cannot do what is required of him. When at last he consents to try, it is solely because his mother bids him and he cannot resist her chiding. Often he reminds us of a huge boy; and here he acts like a boy whose sense of honour is finer than his mother's, but who is too simple and too noble to frame the thought.

Unfortunately he is altogether too simple and too ignorant of himself. Though he is the proudest man in Shakespeare he seems to be unaware of his pride, and is hurt when his mother mentions it. It does not prevent him from being genuinely modest, for he never dreams that he has attained the ideal he worships; yet the sense of his own greatness is twisted round every strand of this worship. In almost all his words and deeds we are conscious of the tangle. I take a single illustration. He cannot endure to be praised. Even his mother, who has a charter to extol her blood, grieves him when she praises him. As for others,

> I had rather have one scratch my head i' the sun
> When the alarum were struck, than idly sit
> To hear my nothings monster'd.

His answer to the roar of the army hailing him 'Coriolanus' is, 'I will go wash'. His wounds are 'scratches with briars'. In Plutarch he shows them to the people without demur: in Shakespeare he would rather lose the consulship. There is a greatness in all this that makes us exult. But who can assign the proportions of the elements that compose this impatience of praise. the feeling (which we are surprised to hear him express) that he, like hundreds more, has simply done what he could; the sense that it is nothing to what might be done;

the want of human sympathy (for has not Shelley truly said that fame is love disguised?); the pride which makes him feel that he needs no recognition, that after all he himself could do ten times as much, and that to praise his achievement implies a limit to his power? If any one could solve this problem, Coriolanus certainly could not. To adapt a phrase in the play, he has no more introspection in him than a tiger. So he thinks that his loathing of the people is all disgust at worthlessness, and his resentment in exile all a just indignation. So too he fancies that he can stand

> As if a man were author of himself
> And knew no other kin,

while in fact public honour and home affections are the breath of his nostrils, and there is not a drop of stoic blood in his veins.

What follows on his exile depends on this self-ignorance. When he bids farewell to his mother and wife and friends he is still excited and exalted by conflict. He comforts them; he will take no companion; he will be loved when he is lacked, or at least he will be feared; while he remains alive, they shall always hear from him, and never aught but what is like him formerly. But the days go by, and no one, not even his mother, hears a word. When we see him next, he is entering Antium to offer his services against his country. If they are accepted, he knows what he will do: he will burn Rome.

As I have already remarked, Shakespeare does not exhibit to us the change of mind which issues in this frightful purpose; but from what we see and hear later we can tell how he imagined it; and the key lies in that idea of *burning* Rome. As time passes, and no suggestion of recall reaches Coriolanus, and he learns what it is to be a solitary homeless exile, his heart hardens, his pride swells to a mountainous bulk, and the wound in it becomes a fire. The fellow-patricians from whom he parted lovingly now appear to him ingrates and dastards, scarcely better than the loathsome mob. Somehow, he knows not how, even his mother and wife have deserted him. He has become nothing to Rome, and Rome shall hear nothing from him. Here in solitude he can find no relief in a storm of words; but gradually the blind intolerable chaos of resentment conceives and gives birth to a vision, not merely of battle and indiscriminate slaughter, but of the whole city one tower of flame. To see that with his bodily eyes would satisfy his soul; and the way to the sight is through the Volscians. If he is killed the moment they recognize him, he cares little: better a dead nothing than the living nothing Rome thinks him. But if he lives, she shall know what he is. He bears himself among the

Volscians with something that resembles self-control; but what controls him is the vision that never leaves him and never changes, and his eye is red with its glare when he sits in his state before the doomed city.

This is Shakespeare's idea, not Plutarch's. In Plutarch there is not a syllable about the burning of Rome. Coriolanus (to simplify a complicated story) intends to humiliate his country by forcing on it disgraceful terms of peace. And this, apart from its moral quality, is a reasonable design. The Romans, rather than yield to fear, decline to treat unless peace is first restored; and therefore it will be necessary to assault the city. In the play we find a single vague allusion to some unnamed conditions which, Coriolanus knows, cannot now be accepted; but everywhere. among both Romans and Volscians, we hear of the burning of Rome, and in the city there is no hope of successful resistance. What Shakespeare wanted was a simpler and more appalling situation than he found in Plutarch, and a hero enslaved by his passion and driven blindly forward. How blindly, we may judge if we ask the questions: what will happen to the hero if he disappoints the expectation he has raised among the Volscians, when their leader is preparing to accuse him even if he fulfils it: and, if the hero executes his purpose, what will happen to his mother, wife, and child. and how can it be executed by a man whom we know in his home as the most human of men, a tender husband still the lover of his wife, and a son who regards his mother not merely with devoted affection but with something like religious awe? Very likely the audience in the theatre was not expected to ask these questions, but it *was* expected to see in the hero a man totally ignorant of himself, and stumbling to the destruction either of his life or of his soul.

In speaking of the famous scene where he is confronted with Volumnia and Valeria, Virgilia and her boy, and the issue is decided, I am obliged to repeat what I have said elsewhere in print[1]; and I must speak in the first person because I do not know how far others share my view. To me the scene is one in which the tragic feelings of fear and pity have little place. Such anxiety as I feel is not for the fate of the hero or of any one else: it is, to use religious language, for the safety of his soul. And when he yields, though I know, as he divines, that his life is lost, the emotion I feel is not pity. he is above pity and above life. And the anxiety itself is but slight: it bears no resemblance to the hopes and fears that agitate us as we approach the end in *Othello* or *King Lear*. The whole scene affects me, to exaggerate a

[1] *Shakespearean Tragedy*, p. 84.

little, more as a majestic picture of stationary figures than as the fateful climax of an action speeding to its close. And the structure of the drama seems to confirm this view. Almost throughout the first three Acts—that is, up to the banishment—we have incessant motion, excited and resounding speech, a violent oscillation of fortunes. But, after this, the dramatic tension is suddenly relaxed, and, though it increases again, it is never allowed to approach its previous height. If Shakespeare had wished it to do so in this scene, he had only to make us wait in dread of some interposition from Aufidius, at which the hero's passion might have burst into a fury fatal even to the influence of Volumnia. But our minds are crossed by no shadow of such dread. From the moment when he catches sight of the advancing figures, and the voice of nature—what he himself calls 'great nature' —begins to speak in his heart long before it speaks aloud to his ear, we know the end. And all this is in harmony with that characteristic of the drama which we noticed at first,—we feel but faintly, if at all, the presence of any mysterious or fateful agency. We are witnessing only the conquest of passion by simple human feelings, and *Coriolanus* is as much a drama of reconciliation as a tragedy. That is no defect in it, but it is a reason why it cannot leave the same impression as the supreme tragedies, and should be judged by its own standard.

A tragedy it is, for the passion is gigantic, and it leads to the hero's death. But the catastrophe scarcely diminishes the influence of the great scene. Since we know that his nature, though the good in it has conquered, remains unchanged, and since his rival's plan is concerted before our eyes, we await with little suspense, almost indeed with tranquillity, the certain end. As it approaches it is felt to be the more inevitable because the steps which lead to it are made to repeat as exactly as possible the steps which led to his exile. His task, as then, is to excuse himself, a task the most repugnant to his pride. Aufidius, like the tribunes then, knows how to render its fulfilment impossible. He hears a word of insult, the same that he heard then,—'traitor'. It is followed by a sneer at the most sacred tears he ever shed, and a lying description of their effect on the by-standers; and his pride, and his loathing of falsehood and meanness, explode, as before, in furious speech. For a moment he tries to check himself and appeals to the senators; but the effort seems only to treble his rage. Though no man, since Aufidius spoke, has said a word against him, he defies the whole nation, recalling the day of its shame and his own triumph, when alone, like an eagle, he fluttered the dovecotes in Corioli. The people, who accompanied him to the market-place, splitting the air with the noise of their enthusiasm,

remember their kinsfolk whom he slaughtered, change sides, and clamour for his death. As he turns on Aufidius, the conspirators rush upon him, and in a moment, before the vision of his glory has faded from his brain, he lies dead. The instantaneous cessation of enormous energy (which is like nothing else in Shakespeare) strikes us with awe, but not with pity. As I said, the effect of the preceding scene, where he conquered something stronger than all the Volscians and escaped something worse than death, is not reversed; it is only heightened by a renewed joy in his greatness. Roman and Volscian will have peace now, and in his native city patrician and plebeian will move along the way he barred. And they are in life, and he is not. But life has suddenly shrunk and dwindled, and become a home for pygmies and not for him.[1]

Dr. Johnson observes that 'the tragedy of *Coriolanus* is one of the most amusing of our author's performances'. By 'amusing' he did not mean 'mirth-provoking'; he meant that in *Coriolanus* a lively interest is excited and sustained by the variety of the events and characters; and this is true. But we may add that the play contains a good deal that is amusing in the current sense of the word. When the people appear as individuals they are frequently more or less comical. Shakespeare always enjoyed the inconsequence of the uneducated mind, and its tendency to express a sound meaning in an absurd form. Again, the talk of the servants with one another and with the muffled hero, and the conversation of the sentinels with Menenius, are amusing. There is a touch of comedy in the contrast between Volumnia and Virgilia when we see them on occasions not too serious. And then, not only at the beginning, as in Plutarch, but throughout the story we meet with that pleasant and wise old gentleman Menenius, whose humour tells him how to keep the peace while he gains his point, and to say without offence what the hero cannot say without raising a storm. Perhaps no one else in the play is regarded from beginning to end with such unmingled approval, and this is not

[1] I have tried to indicate the effect at which Shakespeare's imagination seems to have aimed. I do not say that the execution is altogether adequate. And some readers, I know, would like Coriolanus to die fighting. Shakespeare's idea is probably to be gathered from the hero's appeal to the senators to judge between Aufidius and him, and from the word 'lawful' in the last speech:

> O that I had him,
> With six Aufidiuses, or more, his tribe,
> To use my lawful sword!

He is not before the people only, but the senators, his fellow-patricians, though of another city. Besides—if I may so put it—if Coriolanus were allowed to fight at all, he would have to annihilate the whole assembly.

lessened when the failure of his embassy to Coriolanus makes him the subject as well as the author of mirth. If we regard the drama from this point of view we find that it differs from almost all the tragedies, though it has a certain likeness to *Antony and Cleopatra*. What is amusing in it is, for the most part, simply amusing, and has no tragic tinge. It is not like the gibes of Hamlet at Polonius, or the jokes of the clown who, we remember, is digging Ophelia's grave, or that humour of Iago which for us is full of menace; and who could dream of comparing it with the jesting of Lear's fool? Even that Shakespearean audacity, the interruption of Volumnia's speech by the hero's little son, makes one laugh almost without reserve. And all this helps to produce the characteristic tone of this tragedy.

The drawing of the character of Aufidius seems to me by far the weakest spot in the drama. At one place, where he moralizes on the banishment of the hero, Shakespeare, it appears to some critics, is himself delivering a speech which tells the audience nothing essential and ends in desperate obscurity.[1] Two other speeches have been criticized. In the first, Aufidius, after his defeat in the field, declares that, since he cannot overcome his rival in fair fight, he will do it in any way open to him, however dishonourable. The other is his lyrical cry of rapture when Coriolanus discloses himself in the house at Antium. The intention in both cases is clear. Aufidius is contrasted with the hero as a man of much slighter and less noble nature, whose lively impulses, good and bad, quickly give way before a new influence, and whose action is in the end determined by the permanent pressure of ambition and rivalry. But he is a man of straw. He was wanted merely for the plot, and in reading some passages in his talk we seem to see Shakespeare yawning as he wrote. Besides, the unspeakable baseness of his sneer at the hero's tears is an injury to the final effect. Such an emotion as mere disgust is out of place in a tragic close; but I confess I feel nothing but disgust as Aufidius speaks the last words, except some indignation with the poet who allowed him to speak them, and an unregenerate desire to see the head and body of the speaker lying on opposite sides of the stage.

Though this play is by no means a drama of destiny we might almost say that Volumnia is responsible for the hero's life and death. She trained him from the first to aim at honour in arms, to despise pain, and to

> forget that ever
> He heard the name of death;

[1] But Prof. MacCallum's defence of this passage is perhaps successful (Appendix F).

to strive constantly to surpass himself, and to regard the populace with inhuman disdain as

> things created
> To buy and sell with groats.

Thus she led him to glory and to banishment. And it was she who, in the hour of trial, brought him to sacrifice his pride and his life.

Her sense of personal honour, we saw, was less keen than his; but she was much more patriotic. We feel this superiority even in the scene that reveals the defect; in her last scene we feel it alone. She has idolized her son; but, whatever motive she may appeal to in her effort to move him, it is not of him she thinks; her eyes look past him and are set on Rome. When, in yielding, he tells her that she has won a happy victory for her country, but a victory most dangerous, if not most mortal, to her son, she answers nothing. And her silence is sublime.

These last words would be true of Plutarch's Volumnia. But in Plutarch, though we hear of the son's devotion, and how he did great deeds to delight his mother, neither his early passion for war nor his attitude to the people is attributed to her influence, and she has no place in the action until she goes to plead with him. Hence she appears only in majesty, while Shakespeare's Volumnia has a more varied part to play. She cannot be majestic when we see her hurrying through the streets in wild exultation at the news of his triumph; and where, angrily conquering her tears, she rails at the authors of his banishment, she can hardly be called even dignified. What Shakespeare gains by her animation and vehemence in these scenes is not confined to them. He prepares for the final scene a sense of contrast which makes it doubly moving and impressive.

In Volumnia's great speech he is much indebted to Plutarch, and it is, on the whole, in the majestic parts that he keeps most close to his authority. The open appeal to affection is his own; and so are the touches of familiar language. It is his Volumnia who exclaims, 'here he lets me prate like one i' the stocks', and who compares herself, as she once was, to a hen that clucks her chicken home. But then the conclusion, too, is pure Shakespeare; and if it has not majesty it has something dramatically even more potent. Volumnia, abandoning or feigning to abandon hope, turns to her companions with the words:

> Come, let us go:
> This fellow had a Volscian to his mother;
> His wife is in Corioli, and his child
> Like him by chance. Yet give us our dispatch:

I am hush'd until our city be a-fire,
And then I'll speak a little.[1]

Her son's resolution has long been tottering, but now it falls at once. Throughout, it is not the substance of her appeals that moves him, but the bare fact that she appeals. And the culmination is that she ceases to appeal, and defies him. This has been observed by more than one critic. I do not know if it has been noticed[2] that on a lower level exactly the same thing happens where she tries to persuade him to go and deceive the people. The moment she stops, and says, in effect, 'Well, then, follow your own will', his will gives way. Deliberately to set it against hers is beyond his power.

Ruskin, whose terms of praise and blame were never over-cautious, wrote of Virgilia as 'perhaps the loveliest of Shakespeare's female characters'. Others have described her as a shrinking submissive being, afraid of the very name of a wound, and much given to tears. This description is true; and, I may remark in passing, it is pleasant to remember that the hero's letter to his mother contained a full account of his wounds, while his letter to his wife did not mention them at all. But the description of these critics can hardly be the whole truth about a woman who inflexibly rejects the repeated invitations of her formidable mother-in-law and her charming friend to leave her house; who later does what she can to rival Volumnia in rating the tribunes; and who at last quietly seconds her assurance that Coriolanus shall only enter Rome over her body. Still these added traits do not account for the indefinable impression which Ruskin received (if he did not rightly interpret it), and which thousands of readers share. It comes in part from that kind of muteness in which Virgilia resembles Cordelia, and which is made to suggest a world of feeling in reserve. And in part it comes from the words of her husband. His greeting when he returns from the war and she stands speechless before him:

My gracious silence, hail!
Wouldst thou have laugh'd had I come coffin'd home,
That weep'st to see me triumph? Ah, my dear,
Such eyes the widows in Corioli wear,
And mothers that lack sons:

his exclamation when he sees her approaching at their last meeting and speaks first of her and not of Volumnia:

What is that curtsy worth, or those doves' eyes
Which can make gods forsworn? I melt, and am not
Of stronger earth than others;

[1] What she will utter, I imagine, is a mother's dying curse.
[2] The point is noticed by Prof. MacCallum (p. 554).

these words envelop Virgilia in a radiance which is reflected back upon himself. And this is true also of the lines about Valeria, probably the lines most often quoted from this drama:

> The noble sister of Publicola,
> The moon of Rome, chaste as the icicle
> That 's curdied by the frost from purest snow,
> And hangs on Dian's temple: dear Valeria!

I said that at one point the hero's nature *was* in a high degree imaginative; and it is here. In his huge violent heart there was a store, not only of tender affection, but of delicate and chivalrous poetry. And though Virgilia and Valeria evoke its expression we cannot limit its range. It extends to the widows and mothers in Corioli; and we feel that, however he might loathe and execrate the people, he was no more capable of injury or insult to a daughter of the people than Othello, or Chaucer's Knight, or Don Quixote himself.

WARTON LECTURE ON ENGLISH POETRY

III

THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF ENGLISH LYRIC

By G. SAINTSBURY

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read October 30, 1912

The title which has been chosen for this lecture is perhaps open to criticism; but one of the first considerations which led to the choice of it was a wish to exclude, as far as possible, one of the thorniest, and not perhaps one of the most fruitful, of the innumerable questions of literary definition. The problems whether Lyric, as such and in the abstract, owes its differentia to form or to matter; whether its essence is subjective or objective; or whether this is to be found in such a very accidental and circumstantial essentiality as suitableness for actual singing, might of course be dragged into the present discussion, but only by a kind of not very heavenly violence. 'The historical character of those sorts or parts of poetry which would generally be recognized as composing English lyric at successive periods' might, reversing the ordinary practice of giving a 'short title', be recognized as the 'long title' of this paper.

The sonnet will indeed be excluded; but not so much because its lyrical character has been contested as because it lies outside the specific if not the generic content of the subject. The sonnet is much the same, whatever its possibilities of subdivision, in all countries, times, and languages. The unknown genius who created it—much more probably the unknown Fortunatus in whose way it was placed and who found it—gave it, or left on it, something that is cosmopolitan and independent of time. And so *we* may leave it.

In general English lyric there are undoubtedly features which are on the one hand peculiar and on the other traceable in the evolution

of their peculiarity. We Englishmen—or at least such of us as think about the matter at all, and have taken some pains to sift our thinkings thoroughly—are for the most part perhaps apt to think very highly indeed of it. But it has to be remembered that this estimate is not universal by any means, even among ourselves; and has sometimes been distinctly traversed by foreigners of various nations, some of whom have by no means been hostile in disposition or inappreciative of English literature generally.

It can hardly be regarded as necessary to cite these latter; but I may perhaps remind you that in the middle of the nineteenth century a writer who was a scholar, really a man of letters and interested in the subject, Archdeacon Evans, went to the extravagant length of declaring that 'English lyric must always be a blank'; while much later Mr. Swinburne, himself a consummate practitioner of it, deliberately excluded lyric from the position of competitor with similar functions of other languages as representing the greatness of English literature.

This latter dictum was, it is true, cursory, and may be to some extent subject to discount in view of the fact that the writer was one very apt to be carried away by advocacy and was at the moment in the position of advocate of another department, Drama. But in other decriers of our lyric I think it is possible to discover certain general prejudices—in the strict meaning of that word—which throw a good deal of light on their mistake. And I know no better way of doing this than to undertake, if only in outline, but perhaps from more than one point of view, the survey indicated in my title.

There is perhaps no point which ought to strike the inquirer into this matter more forcibly than the fact that while English literature is notoriously composite in character, no part of it is more manifestly so than its lyric. Whether, in Old English itself, there is next to no lyric, or whether there is next to nothing else—propositions both of which have been advanced—need not be discussed here: for the question, like so many others, is again a mere logomachy of definition. But when we come to Middle English there is no further doubt about the matter. It is of course, in a fashion, a coincidence that the first distinguished and delightful collection of lyric that has come down to us is trilingual, but, as in the case of not a few other coincidences, causation is not absolutely far off. The influence of Latin and of French is upon *Alison* and its companions, as obviously as the poem itself is found in company with examples of these actual languages. And—fact complementary of this, but too often neglected —the peculiar fashion of mixed obligingness and self-reliance in which

English has always taken foreign influences is manifest likewise. From the Latin hymns and proses which our unknown song-writers were constantly hearing, from the French and Provençal romances and varied lyric forms of all kinds that they were in not a few cases reading, but most probably hearing still more, they drew rhyme and metre, stanza-form and trick of refrain, diction almost always and accent-quantity sometimes. From their own ancestral tongue they took less in appearance—so much less indeed that careless or prejudiced inquirers have constantly undervalued and sometimes actually denied the importance of this factor in the problem. But those who had eyes to see have always seen the abiding influence of English phrase; the singular and probably unique effect produced by the intermixture of the two accentuations; and, above all, the characteristic—differencing from all French and from the majority of at least mediaeval Latin—of the great Old English principle so often ignored and to this very day mistaken or denied, the principle of Equivalence—of the allowance of two syllables as equal to one, not as a licence, not as a mark of irregular and slovenly composition, not as an occasional device to produce a particular and exceptional effect, but as a main and principal feature of the language and as an ancestral beauty of the poetry.

We may see, towards the close of our survey, how this peculiar hybridity may have acted to the detriment, critically speaking, of our lyrical reputation, not merely with foreigners, which is hardly surprising and comparatively unimportant, but with natives, which is both surprising and grievous; but for the present let us keep to the straight path of history. Of all the manifold misjudgements which have made the study of English literature to too large an extent a very warren and covert for the chase of such game, there have been few more strange and more discreditable than the obstinate delusion that English lyric begins with the Elizabethans—Wyatt and Surrey being graciously, and sometimes with a considerable expense of rhetoric, admitted as 'morning stars', 'Dioscuri of the dawn', and I know not what else. There never has been much excuse for this since the labours of that most worthy scholar in whose honour this lecture was instituted, and there has been none since those of Thomas Wright and his colleagues of the Percy and Warton Societies, excellently taken up in a general way by the Early English Text Society under the unflagging impulse of our regretted colleague Dr. Furnivall—in particular by Mr. Bullen in his five-and-twenty years old collection of carols, and more recently by Messrs. Sidgwick and Chambers in theirs. But to kill these prejudices—

though some of us have endeavoured to help this most just execution in the duller way of literary history—is a pretty hard task, and a desperately long one. I have sometimes felt inclined to ask my scientific friends whether they christened that mosquito whom some of them try to destroy by the name of *Anopheles*, because there is nothing so hard to destroy as a thoroughly useless thing.

But it may be hoped that, in this audience at least, it is not necessary to explain at great length that the lyric of the thirteenth century is existent and not seldom charming, that that of the fourteenth is more abundant and more charming still, though, as it happens, none of the greater poets of its closing years, neither Chaucer, nor Gower, nor Langland, contributes to it in genuine English kind; and that, in the fifteenth, the dullness of the rest of South English verse is compensated by delightful bursts of carol and ballad, of song profane and divine, in the most diverse kinds.

But in all this—and I think that some even of this audience would be a little astonished if there were to be produced a *Corpus Poetarum Lyricorum* for these three centuries—the characteristic hybridity, or rather the characteristics resulting from the hybridity, continued. There was still the association of the rather elaborate forms of the Romance languages in all cases which would admit of it—some, such as the *ballade*, would not—of the ancestral and ineradicable English freedom, elasticity, and swing. I used to think, many years ago, that you could discover, sometimes at any rate, anapaests in Old French, but the late M. Gaston Paris, with all that urbanity which he possessed, and which is perhaps not invariably born with the scholar, assured me that to a French ear at any rate they were inaudible. My English ear never hears them in Old English, though it hears something that is capable of becoming or yielding them. But it hears them, in the making, from almost the very first in Middle English, and by the fifteenth century they are as clear and finished, if not as sustained—they are sometimes even that—as in Prior or in Anstey, in Barham or in Mr. Kipling. It is by their admixture that the marvellous powers of the ballad or common measure are brought out; by their charm that such a measure as that of 'E.I.O.', or 'Back and side go bare, go bare', almost unthinkable in a Romance language, is rendered possible. While the so-to-speak official and literary poetry of Southern English moves in a dull and regular march or (more frequently) staggers in hopeless efforts, as solemnly catalogued and classified by some; while the beautiful but mannered and artificial poetic diction or dialect of Middle Scots permits itself no such curvets; our ballads and carols, our drinking songs and

nursery rhymes always preserve the hybridity which has become fruitful and perpetual—which in its fruitfulness and its perpetuity no other language, not even German, can match.

It should be only for a moment, if even for that, surprising that the famous reform of Wyatt and Surrey produced at first effects upon our lyric which were, if improving from one point of view and in the long run, positively impoverishing for the time and from another point. It was still from Romance languages that they drew their lessons; and though the Romance languages, with their tried and polished poetry, could well enough correct the intolerable slovenliness that had come upon English verse of what should have been the more formal kind, it was not at all likely to leave our lyric as supple as before. Indeed, it was at this time that there first established itself the deplorable heresy that there was in English only 'a foot of two syllables'—from which it almost necessarily followed that lyric must be crippled or at least fettered.

In Wyatt and Surrey themselves, and in the generation that followed them, such cripplement or fettering did in fact follow. Not that the results were not often very pretty: but they were restrained within a vicious circle, and if emancipation had not followed, English lyric might have shared the fate of French. But when the greater Elizabethan generation came on, this could not continue: for the very essence of that generation was, while aping much that was foreign, to turn everything into English. First the influence of the almost universal fashion of song-writing and singing to actual music twisted or lured the 'feet of two syllables' themselves into movement of various times; then the popular ballad, which had always maintained the true liberty, began to force its way into literature: then, last and best of all, the dramatists, and especially Shakespeare, began to combine in their songs the formal variety and beauty of the miscellany and song-book kind with the informal beauty and variety of the ballad. So did English lyric, recovering its old many-strainedness, advance to far more than its old beauty in such things as 'Under the Greenwood Tree' and the songs of Ariel.

Yet this recovery was curiously partial, and the history of English Lyric during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is a thing almost unique in literature. The trisyllabic foot maintained its place, but enlarged that place with singular slowness. One has a vague idea, till the question is actually studied, that metres like that of 'Under the Greenwood Tree' are largely represented in the abundant and exquisite melodies of what is sometimes called Jacobean-Caroline, sometimes Cavalier, and sometimes 'metaphysical' poetry.

As a matter of fact they are rather rare: and are only brought in tentatively in a few pieces of Waller and Cleveland. And as they grow commoner after the Restoration, the true lyric spirit drops. All through the century the very best work is done in the old common measure, informed and transformed indeed by such a wonderful touch that even the consummate lyrical poets of the nineteenth were hardly able to recover it. And when, on the other hand, the anapaest had thoroughly established itself by the hands of Dryden and Prior and certain unknown or half-known contributors to miscellanies, the prosodic critics (who were at last making their appearance, to no great purpose) set themselves to snub it, to tell it that it was low, disagreeable, only fit for burlesque, and the like.

Partly as a result of this the docile eighteenth century, though it did some charming light work in such measures, did not employ them for much that was serious; contenting itself for this latter class, as well as for not a little of the lighter kind also, with others of plain iambic run, especially the famous old *rime couée* or Romance six. But it did something else for what Johnson calls 'the greater Ode', which was of the highest importance for all lyric, and may justify, as it indeed requires, a certain return in the historical account. Up to this time nothing has been noticed but the smaller and more definitely song-like variety: and though, on one of the views of Anglo-Saxon poetry above referred to, such pieces as *The Ruin* and *The Seafarer* might have started lyric of a major compass, yet it was hardly till the Renaissance that really elaborate forms of this found a home with us. But then the imitation of the Italian *canzone* and the Greek Ode, whether choric in the dramatic fashion, or Pindaric, was practically certain. The magnificent instances of Spenser's *Prothalamion* and *Epithalamion*, if nothing else, would have made other attempts certain. Ben Jonson of course made attempts at the regular Pindaric: and it was not for want of experience of the real thing that Cowley set the example of the spurious variety which produced such Saharas of the dreariest stuff, with Dryden's and a few other fine things for oases. Congreve endeavoured to 'regularize': but it was not his vocation, and the matter was left for the epoch-making performances, in different styles, of Collins and of Gray. History, not appreciation, is the object here: but it is, if a criticism, a truly historical one to point out that, in these various attempts at the larger lyric, fresh strains of new hybridity were introduced into the kind. There is not merely a difference of subject and scale, there is not even merely a difference of treatment, between Gay's 'Molly Mog' and Collins's 'Passions',

between Chesterfield's lines on the other Molly—Lepel—and Gray's *Progress of Poetry*. The pairs present a contrast not merely in these respects (wherein similar contrasts can be found elsewhere, say in French), not merely in metre, not merely in diction, but, so to speak, in their whole specific differentia, if not actually in their very genus. One can perfectly well imagine the foreigners—it is not difficult in a way even to pardon or at least to understand the natives—who have at certain times refused to admit the different kinds as duly free-born or even as sufficiently naturalized sheep of the same fold. To what extent it may be legitimate to admit a fresh importation of foreign influence—or several such—at the Romantic revival, may be a debatable point. There certainly was once a tendency to exaggerate German influence. To me it seems that though there may have been a certain stimulation from Germany—which was very largely a reflux from that which older and even modern English had long been exercising on the literature of that country—the greater part by far of the yeast which effected the new fermentation was furnished directly from home-grown but long-neglected sources. But, in this way or that, an immense flood of new influence did of course come into all kinds of poetry, and into none more than lyric;—thus multiplying the peculiar appearance of heterogeneousness, the peculiar reality of many-sidedness and complexity with which I am endeavouring to deal in this paper. It had been by no means unknown or even uncommon for English poets, of great note in other departments of poetry, to write no lyric or very little: there was not one of the greater or lesser stars of the new school who was not prodigal of it.

No one need be told that their successors have even bettered the instruction. Tennyson, Browning, and Swinburne all wrote long poems: but they all also wrote great numbers of lyrics, and there are at least some who think that it is by these rather than by the others that not only the youngest of the three but his two great elders will live. Matthew Arnold wrote nothing that can be called a long poem, and hardly anything that is not lyric of one of our innumerable kinds. William Morris may be quoted on the other side: but the quotation would be open to several animadversions. In fact, the nineteenth century in English poetry was nothing if not lyrical. Nor was it so merely in abundance of undoubted, if apparently heterogeneous, lyrical work. It was so even more in the fashion in which it forced everything into the service of this branch of poetry. It would not have needed a specially hidebound example of the preceptist critic at any time earlier, to maintain—I am not sure that

we should have to go far at the present moment to find authorities of distinction who would still maintain—that a lyric composed exclusively in blank verse is a monstrosity if not an actual contradiction in terms, who would in fact 'tell it to its face that it was no lyric'. Yet nineteenth-century poets, and great ones, have paid not the slightest attention to the rule. To name nothing else, what is 'Love and Duty' if it is not a lyric, and, as some of us would add, a most beautiful one? I can think of no other designation for it unless you call it a monodramatic soliloquy, and then I should for once allow a criticism which I am generally inclined to bar, and pronounce it a great deal too lyrical for anything that has a presumable connexion, not as a mere inset, with drama.

Yes, the body of nineteenth-century poetry is certainly in the first place (I do not say wholly) a *Corpus Lyricorum*, and if the survey which has been made is not entirely 'out' we may almost say also that the body of English poetry generally has been growing more and more lyrical throughout the ages, albeit with certain not unhwolesome arrests and deviations from time to time. And once more, if that survey be not wholly a delusion, this lyrical determination has been effected under even more than the usual amount of foreign influence; by the absorption of even more than the usual proportion of extraneous matter, and by extending itself into varieties and complications unusual even in an English literary kind.

And now perhaps we approach something like an interim explanation at any rate of those doubts and undervaluations, at home and abroad, which have been glanced at. We are not, in this country, quite so unhappy without 'kinds' and tickets for kinds, as they are to some extent, though not so much as they were, in France, and as they are still more in Germany. But there are not a few, even of us, who experience discomfort in face of the unclassifiable, and he would be a very bold man, or else a mere mechanical nomenclator, who should attempt to classify English lyric. From that very first or almost first period when it was being written by men who were finding their patterns if not also using their pens indiscriminately in Latin, in English, and in French, there has been something of the buccaneer or of the free-lance (if that be a more respectful comparison) about its readiness to run up any flag, to follow any pattern, almost to be patient of any prosody.

Somebody, I think, has said that in the days of Elizabethan drama that form swallowed everything else, like the serpent from Aaron's rod. I should not be afraid to apply something like the same figure to English lyric. Take *The Ancient Mariner*. If anybody denies that it

is a lyric, I do not know that I can prove it to be one by any method strictly recognized or recognizable by the schools. And yet if it is not a lyric I confess myself unable to recognize lyrical quality. Take *Rose Mary*. A precisian may endeavour to satisfy his principles by calling this a romance with lyrical insets; but surely the lyrical character abides throughout. The fact would seem to be that the extension which the ballad early received in our letters, and the way in which, though it was in a fashion turned out for a time, it forced itself back and has spread over the whole field of poetry since, puts English in a practically unique position. The French Romantics strove hard to rival it; and by the force of individual genius in one or two cases for a time succeeded. But the thing is not really in accordance with the genius of their poetry. On the other hand history, which cannot lie (though people sometimes, in fact rather frequently, try to make it do so), shows that this immense extension is in accordance with the genius of English. From the first we have, in the famous military phrase, 'let everything go in'—nay, have invited and almost forced everything to go in. We started with a dualism or a trinity of essence; I should hardly dare to attempt to indicate in any such notation the degree of complexity at which we have arrived.

But it should not be difficult to see that this overrunning of the fields of poetry by lyric may create difficulties with critics not to the manner born, and even with some who are. To me I confess the critical separation, so much favoured in Germany and very frequently adopted by our docile scholarship, of 'folk-poetry' and 'literary poetry', has never commended itself; while I have seldom been able to perceive that any great good arises from precise and elaborate separation of any literary kinds in so far at least as English is concerned. But, in the case of those who think differently, I can, of course, see their difficulty. Those who think, as I believe the majority of Germans do, that a lyric should be a distinct *lied*, may feel it anomalous when they are asked to accept *Lycidas*, or the *Epithalamion*, or Dryden's *Anne Killigrew* ode, or Collins on *The Superstitions of the Highlands*, or Wordsworth's *Immortality*, or *The Lotos Eaters*, or *The Triumph of Time* as a lyric. Those who—as almost all Frenchmen once did and as it may safely be said a great many of them in their hearts still do—regard a certain considerable regularity of form as a decency and almost a necessity, must constantly come across things of ours that seem to them only admissible to the outer courts where the licence of the *chansonnier* is permitted. And everybody who has the slightest acquaintance with the history of even English criticism knows the

constant objections that have been raised, the slow and grudging admission that has been granted, to every new extension, whether borrowed or invented, of the lyrical franchise.

Yet the historic genuineness and inevitableness of these extensions justifies itself the more we alter the points of view for historical survey. Suffer me to do this once more, and to trace, in a somewhat different way, the great procession of lyrical reinforcements which have gathered round English during the ages. It so happens that neither the 'all-lyric' nor the 'next-to-no-lyric' view of Anglo-Saxon prevents us from beginning once more at the beginning here. On the former view we find an original explanation of that all-absorbingness of the kind which has been noticed. On the other the peculiar character of the one indubitable example, *The Complaint of Deor*, and its possession of that quintessentially lyrical feature the refrain, at least gives us a notable start. In the passage of the earliest Middle English from alliterative-accentual rhythm to accentual-quantitative metre it is not fanciful to suspect the origin, to some extent at any rate, and perhaps to a large one, of that floating and unfettered if not positively Protean variety of form which, if to some of us it is the main source of beauty, has been allowed here to be to others a source of distrust if not of positive dislike. But with the firmer and completer impression of the new mould on the old mass the cleaner-cut models for which these others yearn are provided, in abundance and not without exquisiteness, yet by no means to the exclusion or annihilation of the wood-notes. The rush of contribution from all quarters, during the thirteenth century more especially, is only less marvellous than the ease with which this rush was accepted, disciplined, and absorbed. The ordered elegance and strength combined of the Latin hymn metres; the more fantastic outline and the more elaborately symphonic melodies, chorused and trilled with all kinds of musical refrain, that came from the romances and *pastourelles* of Northern France; the still more elaborately woven paces of Provençal song-magic which, alien as it might seem, was to furnish us with many things and in particular to flood the miracle plays with that artful and ancient measure long afterwards to be associated with the name of Burns,—all these we accepted and made ours. We took, possibly in the long run from Brittany, that peculiar device of the 'Lai'-hybrid between romance in the English sense and romance in the French. And in the midst of all this borrowing we were able to show how little we were driven to borrow anything, though it pleased us to borrow so much, by elaborating—it would seem from purely home sources and by mere natural evolution of the long line which had itself been one product

of the double stave of Old English, as the octosyllabic couplet was another—the great common or ballad measure.

Indeed this simple-seeming but mighty metre—possessed with a difference by other nations of course, but nowhere existing in such a wonderful variety of application as with us—is a sort of mirror in little of the nature, history, and character of English lyric generally. Its crossbred development has been noticed; but even after the generic or specific form has been reached it is constantly taking on new colours, acquiring fresh tones from its neighbours, and for its purposes it lends itself, as in *Gamelyn*, to the accentual alliterative revival, it shows itself patient, as in *Chevy Chase*, of extensions, enlargements, and variations which, centuries afterwards, will give the great result of *The Ancient Mariner* itself.

But side by side with it, or almost so, English lyric tries another development as opposed as possible to this in principle—the following of the elaborate forms, *ballade*, *rondeau*, and the rest, which had been so popular in France for some time past, and had indeed rather too much mannerized French lyric itself. The result with us was rather indecisive, nor can the attempts that have been made to renew the experiment—the last and most serious some thirty or forty years ago, though by writers some of the best of whom are still living—be said to have settled the question. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries these forms were tried by poets whose genius was not specially lyrical; in the nineteenth century poets of excellent lyrical capacity tried them, but did not altogether succeed in freeing them from the taint of the literary exercise. I think it is safe to say that, in that unequalled process of literary importation and colonization which is supplying great part of the subject of this paper, it will always be found that the successful examples have been made to be themselves with a distinctly English difference—with a bold indulgence in equivalence and substitution. And I think there is something more to be made of *ballade* and *rondeau* than has yet been accomplished, charming as some of the actual accomplishments are. But the question is still under the judgement of Time.

Enough has been said already of the wonderful and still too much neglected flow of almost entirely anonymous lyric which, in measures mostly between the essentially native common measure and the essentially foreign 'forms', flooded the despised fifteenth century; and something has been said already of the alterations—less free than the ballad and freer than the *ballade*—which formed part of the Wyatt and Surrey Renaissance. But a little should be added as to the sources of the immense and delightful flood of lyric which belongs to

until it has been proved so; and that the proof is by no means always forthcoming—that it is, in fact, never to be accepted from the first apparent failure. Here, indeed, the failure was only in his own ears, but it is pretty certain that he had wilfully, if not perhaps quite consciously, organized that failure beforehand by allowing an arbitrary Alien Act to exercise sway over them, and by rejecting the probability, if not even the possibility, of that naturalization which, as I have tried to show, is the very first law of our poetical, especially of our lyrical constitution.

But we should come to results. One result, which has for some years brought itself home to me, is the impossibility of reducing the forms of English lyric to any kind of tabular classification that shall be even at the moment satisfactory, still more to any that shall not be defeated, while it is in the very making, by the restless energy and vivacity, and the magnetic attraction for new matter and form, which is characteristic of the kind. I attempted it once myself on a very small scale and in material which was rounded off and finished—the lyric, that is to say, of the mediaeval drama and of one or two single MSS. of miscellanies. The work was severe enough even there, where there was no fear of the dead men rising to put in more inventions. But the additions since mediaeval times have made the task practically impossible, though I know that it has been tried by a most worthy hand; and the considerations which have been now advanced make it, I think, certain that the enumerator only lays himself open to the charge of *μόχθος περισσός*, though I will not continue the Aeschylean tag. Innumerable are the forms of English lyric as the famous comparisons of the love-poets of antiquity, or as the subjects on which those comparisons are usually made.

There is, however, one point of some importance on which I should like to make some remarks before concluding, and which may give this paper something more than the interest of a mere retrospect. It is sometimes objected to critics who are not young, that though they may have been very ready to acknowledge and welcome the innovations of the past, there comes a time when, like the ingenuous Mr. Baxter, they say, 'Ah, but we were in the right, while these fellows are dreadfully in the wrong.'

My withers are not wrung by this insinuation. It is, I suppose, known to most people who take an interest in English poetry that for some time past efforts have been made to construct it, and especially the lyrical parts of it, on principles different from those which, since Spenser at any rate, to avoid controversy as much as possible, have governed the matter; and partly to revert, partly to shift in an experi-

mental advance, to a system of 'stresses' independent of such distribution as is necessitated by any arrangement of feet, if we use that term in the sense of identically or equivalently valued groups of syllables.

Now I do not profess to be *cupidus novarum rerum* in anything, but I make a very grave distinction between the matters or departments where *res novae* have generally shown themselves to be bad, and those where they have frequently shown themselves to be good. And I make a further and still graver distinction between the matters and departments where the bad consequences are more or less irreparable, or only to be got rid of at frightful cost and pain, and those where these bad things simply die of their own badness. This last is the fortunate case with poetry. English lyric—we have just seen it—has been built up of experiment—sometimes bad, more often good. The latter experiments are a joy unto this day and will be a joy for all time: the former are harmless and even rather interesting mummies—dead long ago of their own want of life, but preserved as lessons for us by Time, the embalmer, who leaves nothing but clean work, though sometimes a little dusty!

We may therefore, perhaps, endure for the present and await for the future these and other innovations with complete equanimity. I must confess that I have not as yet derived much profit or delight from them as such. I have read some agreeable poems or lines avowedly constructed on the new principles; but it has in these cases happened, curiously enough, that I could always reduce them to the old. I have read some that did not delight me at all, but then I found that the old principles clearly accounted for the want of delectableness. And the true critic is always, as they say in those publications which have so largely replaced literature in general favour, 'open to offers': his mind is like the old basket at the Foundling, ready to receive deposits legitimate and illegitimate. He cannot indeed prevent some of these infants from having been born with incurable defects, or save them from more or less immediate death. But he does not kill them, he only announces with decent regret that their maladies are remediless and their chance of survival small.

Those of us who are young enough, therefore, may perhaps see stress-lyric without strict metre, but relying on peculiarly ordered rhythm only, re-established in English poetry. *Non moror, non sum invidus.* They may also see actual Russian and Chinese measures brought in, as those languages come to be more studied among us. If these strangers can put on the wedding garment, as, it has been shown, so many other strangers have done before, well and good: happiness and luck go with them as with their forerunners in naturaliza-

tion from the time when (and for the matter of that long before) Sidney borrowed *Willelmus van Nassau*, to that when Moore attempted the strange and beautiful if not perfectly achieved measure of

'At the mid hour of night, when stars are weeping, I fly'.

At the same time, lest I seem to any one to have manifested an unacademical promiscuity, and to have abandoned that duty of coast-guard in matters literary which is certainly one of the first obligations of the *sacramentum* of such an institution as this, let me finish with a reference of the most serious and unaffected character to two words I lately used—the words 'wedding garment'. There *is* a wedding garment of English in regard to lyric as to all other divisions of literature; and it is not to be found pell-mell or at random even in such a warehouse as that of Mr. Solomon Lucas, of Eatanswill and immortal memory. Rather is it like the famous and painfully discriminating mantles of Romance—if not even like the garment which Morgane la Faye sent by that unlucky damsel to her brother. If it be assumed hastily, unwisely, or by the wrong person, unpleasant things will happen. History tells us that, as it practically tells us everything. But it tells us also that adventures are to the adventurous and, save by mere accident, to the adventurous only. I have endeavoured to show, on the strictest historical grounds, that the accomplishment of English lyric is one long and almost unbroken record of successful adventure, now less successful, now more, but always or almost always pursuing, if sometimes faintly, and always in the long run extending the boundaries of its kingdom. Other kinds have dwindled or died, have become fossil or have at least gone into apparent abeyance. This has not. As it has been, so may it be.

THE ORGANIZATION OF IMPERIAL STUDIES IN LONDON

By SIDNEY LOW

Read November 27, 1912

In the observations which by the courtesy of the Council of the British Academy I have the honour to address to you to-day I shall endeavour to show that the present condition of Imperial studies in this country deserves the attention of your distinguished body. That attention, stimulated I believe in the first instance by a Paper read to you by Mr. Rhys Davids, has already been most fruitfully bestowed upon Oriental studies, with the result that the Oriental Institute has been established and has now found a commodious and dignified home in the City of London.

It is necessary at the outset to explain what I mean by Imperial studies. The adjective is one which I should prefer not to use for this particular purpose if any other were available; for to that high-sounding word 'Imperial' with its great and splendid history there are sometimes attributed unjustifiable meanings. But Imperial, at any rate, signifies that which appertains or is essential to Empire; and I employ the term as expressing with practical convenience and sufficient accuracy that kind of knowledge which is concerned primarily with the Empire of Britain, and secondly with the Empires of other nations and peoples so far as they are connected with this or tend to throw light upon its origin, growth, and condition. By Imperial study, then, I mean principally that of the discovery, the acquisition, the development, and the institutions of the British Dominions and Dependencies. I include those territories which are inhabited by subject races under British control, as well as those which are colonies or self-governing communities. But the expansion of England is only one manifestation of a national or racial energy that has been exhibited in greater or less degree by the other peoples of Northern and Western Europe. Britain has founded an Empire beyond the seas of Europe, but she is not the only country that has done so. Our Imperial studies should include some examination of the history and institutions of the dependencies and colonies of France, Spain, Holland, Germany, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy, partly because these throw light on our own complex story,

partly because they help us to elucidate the principles and the practices by which Empires are gained or lost, and new nations created. The history of the British realms will be our 'special subject', but it should be treated in relation to modern European expansion and colonization in general. Nor can we wholly leave out of account the lessons of a past which ended before what we call modern history began. Without trenching unduly on the domain of the teachers of the classical languages and literature, we may be allowed to interest ourselves in the colonies of Athens and Corinth, in the proceedings of Roman lieutenant-governors in Asia, of Roman civil commissioners in Egypt and Cyrene, of Roman frontier officers in Dacia and Illyria. If ever there is a Professor of Imperial History in the University of London, I hope he will find time to deliver an occasional course of lectures on the ideas and the methods of Empire in the Graeco-Roman world.

These however must be regarded as educational luxuries. In the main we must be concerned with the evolution, the morphology, and the anatomy of the Empire of Britain, past and present. We shall study the history of the American colonies till the Revolution; the discovery, settlement, federation, and constitutional development of the self-governing dominions; the exploration, acquisition, and administration of the tropical and sub-tropical dependencies, and those of the Pacific Islands, the Central African territories and protectorates. India can be left to the orientalists or the mediaevalists until such time as the mercantile and political activity of the modern European nations was directed upon it. After that it comes within the scope of our interests. In the statute of the University of Oxford establishing the Beit Professorship of Colonial History in 1905, it is laid down that the professor is to deal with 'the detailed history of all British possessions, past and present, other than India and its dependencies'. There were doubtless good reasons for the limitation in this particular case. But I hope it will not be regarded as a precedent. If we are to establish a school, a faculty, or a professorship of Imperial Studies in London we ought not to exclude the history of the British in India. We cannot omit from our consideration of the dynamics of Empire the processes by which Englishmen have become responsible for the government of a quarter or a fifth of the population of this planet. Our Imperial studies will embrace India under the rule of the Company and under the rule of the Crown, as they will embrace the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, the Protectorate of British East Africa, the Crown Colony of Nigeria, the island-groups of the West Indies, and the relations of the

Crown, the legislature, the government, the statesmen, the electorate, and the people, of Britain to them all.

It is, in all its branches, a vast and imposing subject. To have established the overseas Empire, to have created and nurtured the colonies which have become or are becoming nations—this is the greatest of the deeds of our race, its indisputable claim to the attention of mankind. Splendid as our achievements have been in arms, in literature, in philosophy, in artistic production, and in scientific discovery, we should hardly be permitted to assert an unchallenged superiority in all, or perhaps in any, of these spheres. But our least indulgent rivals do not deny us the credit of our political achievements, or fail to regard with interest and curiosity, if sometimes with admiring jealousy, the British Constitution and the British Empire.

One might suppose that this interest would be even more emphatically exhibited at home, and that ample means would be provided for its legitimate gratification. But the opportunities which the United Kingdom offers for pursuing the serious study of Imperial history are still extremely scanty, and very little has been done to give it a recognized status in our educational system or to encourage research and original work. The 'history of England' as taught in the majority of our elementary and secondary schools is strangely limited in its scope. A sedulous student may emerge from these seminaries knowing next to nothing even of the history of Scotland, scarcely anything beyond the names—if even he knows that—of the dominions and dependencies beyond the sea. At our older Universities historical studies are pursued with zeal, and they have been accorded an importance in the academic scheme comparable with that assigned to the classical languages and natural science. The Modern History School at Oxford and the Historical Tripos at Cambridge are, I believe, in a very flourishing condition. They attract many undergraduates and are under the supervision of a staff of eminent professors and accomplished tutors. But the history of the British Empire and of the other modern Colonial Empires receives little attention either in the lecture-room or the examination hall. At Cambridge a candidate for honours in the Historical Tripos, Part II, may offer as one of his special subjects 'The Struggle for the New World 1751–63', studied in the original authorities. But this is only one of *seven* optional topics, and any candidate may make his choice among the other six. One or two questions on Indian and Colonial history may be set in the general papers on Modern History; but there are plenty of other questions on which the candidate can fall back if he pleases, and it is not required of him that he shall have read any book on the subject

more recondite than Seeley's popular essay on the Expansion of England.

At Oxford, thanks I believe mainly to the efforts of the Regius Professor of Modern History and the Beit Professor of Colonial History, a little more encouragement is given to these subjects. Within the past eighteen months, owing to Professor Firth's recommendations, it has been enacted that candidates for honours in the Modern History School must show a knowledge of the documents included in Professor Egerton's book on Federations and Unions within the British Empire. At the same time it was decreed that the study of English Political History should be carried down to the year 1885, instead of stopping short at 1837, at which date it appears that the topic was supposed to have lost its interest for the student. Moreover, candidates may if they like select a specified period of Colonial history as one out of ten 'special subjects'. In 1909 and 1910 the subject was the excellent one of the 'Evolution of Canadian Self-Government'. In the former year it was taken by five out of the 150 candidates who obtained honours, in the latter by seven out of 142. In the general papers one or two questions out of forty-two, and in the constitutional papers one out of twenty-four, will deal with the Colonies.

It will be seen therefore that at these two great Universities it is possible, it is easy, and I may even add that it is usual, for a student to have devoted the major portion of his time for two or three years to the exclusive study of modern history, and to have obtained the very highest honours in that study, without having paid any serious attention to the history of the British Empire, without acquiring any clear and systematic knowledge of the growth and constitutional development of the self-governing colonies, or of their economic relations with the Mother Country either under the mercantile system, or during the period of the colonial preferences, or after the establishment of free trade in England. Of the rich and intricate story of the establishment, extension, and consolidation of British rule over 300 millions of Asiatics he may know no more than can be gleaned from the casual perusal of a few popular essays, biographies, and works of travel. On these and kindred matters—on what I have called Imperial studies—our graduate who leaves his University with the *cachet* of a first-class in history may be no more accurately informed than the majority of Englishmen of average education, and that is saying little indeed. I venture to suggest that in all University examinations in history, the rise, growth, and constitution of the British Empire should be not an optional but a

compulsory subject, and that no candidate should be able to obtain distinction unless he has shown an adequate acquaintance with it not only in its main outlines but in some at least of its details. For us modern Englishmen the transactions which led to the Battle of Assaye are not less important than those which led to the Battle of Agincourt; I will even go so far as to say that the administration of the American colonies is as well worth our notice as the Petition of Right; and that Lord Durham's Report on Canada and Pitt's India Bill may claim as much attention as we bestow upon the Firma Burgi and the Ordinance of the Hundred.

On the value of the systematic study of British Imperial history it should indeed be superfluous to dilate. We live in a time when a good deal is said of the British Empire. In a sense it may be said that we are all Imperialists now. No one in these days ventures to refer to the oversea territories and populations with the grudging coldness which was not unfashionable in certain circles of political thought sixty years ago. Enthusiasm for the Empire is the mode, and our Colonial fellow subjects certainly cannot complain that they are treated with any lack of warmth in the legislature, by the press, or at the public meetings of the Mother Country. But our zeal is not always founded upon knowledge of the past. Facilities of intercommunication have no doubt diffused a certain amount of practical information. An eminent politician appointed to the governorship of a Crown Colony would not now require to consult an atlas in order to ascertain where the colony was situated. The most untravelled Briton is probably aware that the English language is spoken in New Zealand, and that tomahawks are not habitually carried in the streets of Toronto; he may even have grasped the fact that the inhabitants of Bengal cannot be appropriately described as 'niggers'. Many Englishmen have found it necessary to make themselves acquainted with the geography, the statistics, and the economic position of some portions of the Empire. Very few are familiar with their political or administrative system; fewer still with the causes and events that have influenced their development, and determined their existing relations towards the people and government of this country, and towards the other nations of the globe.

Yet, even if we abandon the standpoint of the educationalist and the scholar, such knowledge is of the utmost importance. The maxim that 'history is politics teaching by example,' may be pressed too far; but it cannot be ignored, least of all by those who live under a political system so plastic as our own. We are told daily that the closer union of the British Empire, the creation of an Imperial constitution

of some kind, is among the most urgent of the problems that await solution in this generation or the next. But we are ill equipped to solve it if we have not considered with some care the attempts which have been made to deal with it in the past, if we do not appreciate the extent to which an approximation has been made to it, if we do not know that the present loose alliance of the English-speaking countries of the Empire was preceded by a much closer formal organization, if we do not rightly apprehend why this arrangement broke down and was superseded by that which exists at present. The affairs of the American colonies before the Revolution form a part of English history which is full of valuable lessons for the Empire-builders and the Empire-rulers of this age. Other lessons, not less fruitful, are offered to us by our kinsmen in the self-governing colonies. For in these states we have the principles which are supposed to animate the English constitution applied to the changed conditions of modern society. We find English-speaking peoples across the seas who have already adopted, or perhaps discarded, some of the methods and processes which are being discussed by ourselves. I hope I shall not be venturing too near the fires of controversy if I even allude to such topics as Federation, Provincial Home Rule, Tariff Reform, Compulsory Arbitration in Labour Disputes, a legal Minimum Wage, or Woman Suffrage; but I do so only to point out that all these devices have been actually submitted to the test of practice in one or other of our self-governing colonies. It has often been claimed that the time spent in our schools and colleges in studying the history of Ancient Greece is well spent, since the cities of Hellas were a laboratory of political and social experiment, all the more instructive to us because of the simplicity of the environment, and the political division into small urban states. I am far from denying that the hours are wasted which we consume over Thucydides and the Politics of Aristotle. But as Professor Egerton has pointed out there is a good deal of the same simplicity and directness in modern colonies. The Australian states are also engaged in political and economical experiments, and they approach their problems free from most of the complications caused by the pressure of international politics, or by that inheritance from the past which weighs so heavily upon the present in any ancient community.

Whether the colonists have solved these problems successfully, or whether the solution could always be applied in conditions so different as those which prevail in this country, need not now be considered. But we should at least be able to appreciate the lessons that can be derived from the experiences and the endeavours of these small and

unfettered democracies of Englishmen beyond the seas, particularly when they throw light on controversies arising among ourselves. We are, for instance, engaged in the task of revising the British constitution and changing it, in some respects at least, from what has been called the 'unwritten' to the written form. Many of the men who will be most actively concerned in that operation are, I doubt not, closely acquainted with the legal and historical side of our insular institutions. Few I fear have made any careful study of those written and statutory constitutions which are scattered over the English-speaking world, or are aware that many of the questions which have to be discussed theoretically in a British Parliament have been disposed of in practice by the legislatures and executives of the Dominions. English constitutional history should be treated, though it seldom is treated, as only a part of a greater whole. It is not rightly understood unless we study the development of the system and the principles which the British people carried down with them from the Middle Ages, not only in that part of the United Kingdom which is called England, but also in the American Colonies and the American Union, in Canada, in Australia, and even, I would add, in the Crown Colonies and Dependencies. In fine, I contend that alike for the historian, for the jurist, for the publicist, the politician, and the administrator, the studies which we agree to call Imperial are essential.

Let us ask then what are the opportunities open to the student in this branch of knowledge. They cannot be deemed adequate in any degree to their importance or their interest. I have pointed out how small a place they occupy in the academic scheme of our most famous Universities. When so little value attaches to them in the examination-hall it is not to be supposed that much attention will be paid to them in the lecture-room. A few years ago it might have been said that even if there had been any learners they would have found no teachers. Something has been done to remove this reproach. There has been since 1905 a fully endowed Chair of Colonial History at Oxford. One cannot speak too gratefully of the munificent public spirit which induced the late Mr. Alfred Beit to enable the University to give worthy and dignified recognition to this study, or too highly of the distinguished scholar who has held the Beit professorship since its foundation. Professor Egerton has done admirable work during the past six years. His own writings, and those of the lecturers who assist him, have contributed to the elucidation of our Colonial history; and the professor has trained some able young historians who are diffusing the light over other fields. Mr. W. L. Grant, who was for four years Beit Lecturer at Oxford, has now become Professor of

Colonial History at Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, and is one of the leaders of that promising body of Canadian scholars who are investigating the annals and records of the Dominion with industry and enthusiasm. The Beit foundation further includes provision for a prize of the value of £50 which is awarded annually for an essay on some subject connected with Colonial History or Imperial Citizenship. India, as I have said, does not come into Mr. Beit's scheme; but at Oxford there is a Reader in Indian Law, and a Reader and Deputy-Reader in Indian History, who among their other duties furnish special instruction to the probationers for the India Civil Service keeping terms at the University. Oxford, as befits the University which has become the seminary for so many Colonial students under the terms of Cecil Rhodes's noble bequest, does then provide a fair amount of instruction in Imperial subjects, and what it chiefly needs is some modification of the examination system which would cause these subjects to 'pay in the Schools' better than they do at present. Cambridge is considerably behind her sister, and has no University chair in either Colonial or Indian History, though there are lecturers who give instruction in Indian Law and in Indian History to the India Civil Service men. The same provision is made at the University of Dublin, and at the Indian School of the University of London, located at University College. The University of Edinburgh has lately established a Lectureship in Colonial History, and has very judiciously appointed to this post Mr. J. Munro, who succeeded Professor Grant as Lecturer at Oxford on the Beit Foundation.

It will be seen that except at Oxford there is little provision for the group of subjects in which we are interested; and even at Oxford, though a certain amount of sound instruction is to be obtained, apparently little advantage is taken of it. There is nothing that can be called a School of Imperial Learning, by which I mean an organization that will not only impart such knowledge as is available but will also add to its sum: an institution for Imperial research as well as for Imperial teaching, a means for collating and co-ordinating the results of investigation into all branches of the science, history, economics, and jurisprudence of Empire. It is not in Oxford, nor Cambridge, not in Edinburgh, Manchester, Toronto, or Melbourne, that this central storehouse and distributing reservoir of Imperial studies can properly find its home. Its place, and the only place where its functions can be quite satisfactorily performed, is in the capital city of the Empire. If we are to have an Imperial School or a faculty of Imperial learning, it must be located in London. For London has advantages and opportunities which are unique. It is

the centre of Imperial government, *Imperial administration*, Imperial finance, and Imperial commerce, of all the great practical activities of which an Imperial Academy would represent the theoretical and scientific side. The graduates of that Academy in the future will be the men who will hold the high places in the India Office and the Colonial Office, and in the great banks and business corporations of the City of London which are in the closest touch with the oversea communities. In London the school will find its Imperial students *in situ*; it will not need to draw them far from their homes, for it will have within easy distance of its own doors hundreds of young men preparing for some career in which Imperial knowledge will be useful. The government official, the aspirant to honours in public life, the politician, the banker, the journalist, the India or Colonial merchant, with many other London residents, should have the opportunity of attending some course of lectures in the particular branches of Imperial study in which they are interested. London, moreover, has a large floating student population, Indians and Colonists reading for the Bar, candidates for the Civil Service examinations, young men who have already obtained their appointments in India and the Crown Colonies and are receiving special instruction in order to equip them for their duties. Many of these would avail themselves of the facilities offered by the School. London, again, is the home, or at least the residence during some portion of the year, of many experts in some branch of Empire knowledge, men who have held responsible office in the administration of India and the Colonies, who have been employed in the diplomatic service, the consular service, or the educational services of our Asiatic or African dependencies, or have been engaged in important scientific, industrial, and commercial occupations in some part of the British dominions. And some of these authorities would no doubt be willing to deliver occasional courses of lectures on topics with which they are specially conversant.

In London, it must be added, a good deal of Imperial education, though chiefly on the practical side, is already pursued. The School of Tropical Medicine is doing excellent work towards the scientific elucidation of those hygienic and sanitary problems on which the whole future of Western culture in the tropics so largely depends. The Imperial Institute at South Kensington, now directed by a Joint Committee of the Colonial Office, the Indian Office, and the Board of Trade, has valuable collections illustrating the resources and industries of the Empire, and in addition to the special work of its scientific staff in connexion with Imperial industries and Colonial products it gives instruction on these subjects to the candidates selected for

appointments in the Crown Colonies and African Protectorates. Then there is the School of Modern Oriental Languages which is divided between University College and King's College, and has classes in Arabic, Persian, Modern Greek, Chinese, the Indian vernacular languages, Hausa, and Zulu. Further provision is made for the India Civil Service probationers at the Indian School of University College under the direction of Professor J. W. Neill, formerly Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces, who lectures on Indian Law and Modern Indian History. Moreover, the Colonial Office, conscious of the limitations of the English public-school system, takes some steps to furnish its future pro-consuls and magistrates with a certain amount of necessary information. It engages tutors to give them elementary instruction in criminal law and procedure, and in mensuration, land-surveying, and official book-keeping. I do not know whether these young officials find time to attend the London School of Economics, where there is just now a course of lectures on the British Constitution by Mr. Lees Smith, in which a section is devoted to the Dominions, the Crown Colonies, the Protectorates, and the Government of India. At the same admirable seminary of political and economic thought there is a course on Arbitration Courts and Wages Boards for the regulation of the conditions of Labour in the Oversea Dominions and the Mother Country, delivered by the distinguished New Zealand statesman who is now Director of the School. We have also the Royal Colonial Institute in Northumberland Avenue, which is a club-house where persons from all parts of the Empire can meet and exchange experiences as well as an information bureau for the collection and diffusion of Imperial knowledge. Papers on the industries, economics, and politics of the Colonies are read at its meetings by men of the highest authority, and subsequently distributed to the members and the press. The Institute has established standing Committees on Empire Trade and Industries and on Emigration, both of which are accumulating a body of useful facts and evidence, and are likely to exercise a considerable influence upon the development of public opinion and public policy. It publishes a monthly journal of news and articles relating to the Empire, and it is raising an 'Empire Lectures Fund' for the purpose of 'spreading throughout the United Kingdom detailed knowledge as to the present resources and future development and consolidation of the Empire by means of illustrated lectures'. At the other side of the metropolis the East London College is assisting the dissemination of Imperial knowledge by a course of lectures on Indian Sociology.

We have in all this the nucleus, and many of the elements, of

a school or faculty of Imperial learning. But it needs co-ordination, systematization, and direction. At present such facilities as exist are scattered, irregular, unrelated; and if some parts of the ground are covered there are other large areas still left waste. The diligent student, even if he could take advantage of all the opportunities mentioned, would still find serious *lacunae* in his scheme of Imperial culture. He might, though not without difficulty and expense, obtain instruction and advice on some points, but on others he would be left to his own unaided resources. What one would desire is that the student of political science, the official, the visitor from overseas, or the man of business with Colonial and Indian interests, should be able to obtain systematic and accessible instruction suited to his special needs as easily as if he were preparing for any of the learned professions.

To be of the largest utility that instruction, instead of being split up among different authorities, some of which, like the Colonial Office, have no special educational experience and interests, must be under the general control of some academic body which is closely in touch with higher education and understands its character and functions. And it should be directed by those who could indicate to the learner not only the best available means of information but also the best method of pursuing his studies further and making, if he is fit for it, original investigations. For I hold that education and research are intimately connected and that the latter task is hardly ever likely to be pursued with success unless it is closely associated with the former. We shall not get a school of Imperial research—a group of trained investigators engaged in reconstructing the history of the British Empire from the authentic sources—unless we have also a seminary of Imperial teaching.

For work of this kind London offers facilities which are absolutely unrivalled. It is not too much to say that the history of the Empire, and of the other colonial Empires and nations whose annals are interlaced with our own, cannot be written elsewhere; for London possesses the great storehouses in which the printed and manuscript materials for this enterprise are deposited. The public and private libraries of our capital are a mine into which but few shafts and galleries have as yet been driven by Imperial explorers. I need only refer to the magnificent collections at the Public Record Office, still largely unclassified and unexamined, though we may hope that easier access will be given to them before long if the recommendations of the recent Royal Commission are adopted. The Admiralty Library, which has just been methodically rearranged and catalogued,

is another repository deserving the attention of the student of Imperial affairs as much as that of the specialist in Naval History. The India Office and the Colonial Office have also loaded shelves and presses, the contents of which have as yet only been partially scrutinized by trained eyes. In other metropolitan collections, in the libraries of the British Museum, the Guildhall, the Royal Asiatic Society, the Royal Geographical Society, and the Oriental Institute, there is a mass of early printed material, books, official publications, and maps, relating to our subject; and at the Royal Colonial Institute there are 90,000 volumes in English and other languages, dealing with the British Empire, and forming one of the most comprehensive and complete bibliographical collections of a special kind which is to be found anywhere.

London, then, one may say, is plethoric with the materials for Empire study, and it is humiliating to reflect how restricted is the use that has been made of them. Little has been done to render the vast store of original documents in the Record Office, in the public offices, and in private collections, available for our purpose. For what has been accomplished already one cannot be too grateful. We may be justly proud of the Colonial Series in the Calendar of State Papers, edited by Mr. Sainsbury and Mr. John Fortescue, which gives invaluable summaries of the manuscript materials, and has thrown much light on our earlier Colonial history, accompanied as they are by editorial introductions which are the most creditable examples we have of English scholarship applied in this field. An enterprise of almost equal importance is the publication of the Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series, five volumes of which have been issued under the editorship of Professor Grant and Mr. Munro. Then we have the series of volumes of the Letters received by the East India Company from its officers and agents, admirably edited by Mr. Danvers and Mr. Foster, and abounding in information on the history of the Eastern settlements and factories in the seventeenth century. These official publications show that some of our Government departments are not unconscious of the responsibility which attaches to them with regard to our Imperial Archives, and of their obligation to draw their treasures from the repositories in which they have been too long hidden.

But much more remains to be done. The reservoirs have been tapped, but we cannot suppose that their contents will be drawn off in sufficient volume by the slow and fitful efforts of public offices, burdened by more pressing duties than those of assisting historical scholarship or research. If statesmen and party leaders give some

encouragement to these efforts it is a work of supererogation on their part in no way essential to political salvation; for assuredly there are no votes to be gained by it, and I am afraid too little credit in the House of Commons or elsewhere to stimulate the liberality of a reluctant Treasury. There is no public opinion, even among the educated classes, as to our Imperial records like that which has induced the United States Government to expend nearly three million dollars during the past twenty years in printing documentary texts, calendars of manuscripts, presidential messages, old congressional journals, and historical compilations. One of the most valuable continuous records of colonial activity in the seventeenth and eighteenth century is the Journal of the Board of Trade and Foreign Plantations. We learn with satisfaction, not wholly untempered by another feeling, that the publication of this series up to the year 1782 is being undertaken, not by the British Government or by a British University, but by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Another American society is preparing to collect and print all the royal proclamations dealing with America before the Revolution; while the United States Government will probably itself publish the commissions, warrants, and letters of instructions issued by the Crown to the governors of American Colonies. I hope that an Imperial school or faculty in London would have as one of its departments an Imperial Records Society, which would do for Empire History what the Navy Records Society, the Hakluyt Society, the Early English Text Society, have achieved in other departments of knowledge, both by stimulating and directing official effort, and by itself publishing, with competent editorial introductions and commentaries, manuscripts and early printed works of interest. Indeed I would suggest that, whether it be possible to establish a school of Imperial Studies or not at an early date, this comparatively modest enterprise of an Imperial Records Society should be undertaken without delay.

If a body of trained teachers and trained students be required for sifting and collating the materials of Imperial history, it is also needed in order to place the results before the educated public at large. In this respect our deficiencies are patent and deplorable. The greatest of Imperial nations has no Imperial literature worthy of the name. We compare by no means favourably with nations which have far less inducement to engage in such labours. Not long ago, when I was lecturing at one of the London colleges, a very promising young student asked me how he could obtain sound instruction in the detailed history of European colonization, with special reference to that of the Continental nations. I had to inform

him with regret that I knew of no facilities such as he desiderated in London, and I could only recommend him to obtain permission to attend the courses at the École Coloniale in Paris, or the Kolonial-institut in Hamburg. I undertook, however, to supply him with a list of books which would assist him in his reading; and when I had compiled this catalogue I was a little mortified to observe how many of my titles were those of works which were written and published outside the United Kingdom. England could supply him with little except some meritorious text-books and popular summaries. I am not unaware of the praiseworthy efforts which have been made during the past few years to supply the deficiency. To Sir Charles Lucas's admirable *Historical Geography of the British Colonies* with Mr. J. D. Rogers's brilliant volume on Australasia, the late J. A. Doyle's *The English in America*, and Alpheus C. Todd's classic *Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies*, we can now add Professor Egerton's *History of British Colonial Policy*, his *Federations and Unions within the British Empire*, two elaborate editions with commentaries of the Durham Report, Mr. Hertz's *Old Colonial System*, published by the University of Manchester, and Mr. A. B. Keith's *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, a monument of erudition and industry.

Other creditable books might be mentioned. We are doing something; but we are still behindhand. If you turn to the publications of a single foreign society, the Institut Colonial International of Brussels, you will find they form a library in themselves. There are three volumes on *Les Lois organiques des Colonies*, of which one volume is devoted to the British Crown Colonies and Protectorates. Another three substantial volumes, sold at twenty francs each, deal with Labour Questions in the Colonies, with one volume occupied with India and other British possessions. There are no less than six large volumes (at twenty francs) on *Le Régime foncier aux Colonies*, one volume mainly on British India and another on our African Colonies; there are three volumes on the Colonial Railway systems, and a volume on Irrigation. The professors and lecturers of the Paris École Coloniale have issued a number of scholarly monographs on such subjects as the Organization of the French Colonies,[1] and the history of Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese, and German colonization. In Germany we have a remarkable work on *Kolonialpolitik* by Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, in six volumes, two of which deal with Great Britain, one with France, one with Portugal and Spain, and one with the Netherlands. It is to these German, and French,

[1] *Organisation des colonies françaises*. Par Édouard Petit, Professeur à l'École Coloniale. 2 vols. 680 pp. 12 francs.

and Belgian publications that we must go if we wish to study in detail various portions of the subject on which there are no adequate modern authorities in English.

Nor is our deficiency alone in works intended mainly for the use of scholars and publicists. That highly important person the general reader is equally ill served. It is strange that no one of the greater masters of modern historical writing in England should have turned his attention to the story of the British Realm in its extension beyond the seas of Europe. What might the subject have become in the hands of a Froude, a Freeman, a Stubbs, a Samuel Rawson Gardiner, a John Richard Green! Seeley, who seemed marked out for the task, contented himself with a single suggestive, if somewhat superficial, essay. Macaulay has given us a vivid indication of what he could have done with the theme if he had not limited his share in it to two dazzling biographical sketches. We have had no modern History of the English in India written on a large scale and with the dignity and literary power the subject demands. We have not even an adequate life of the great man who was the founder of our Empire in the East; for the English language is still without a really sufficient historical biography of Robert Clive. If he had been a Frenchman or a German how many notable books would have illustrated every phase of his activity by this time! Or to turn to another portion of the field, we are still waiting for a comprehensive and precise account of the struggle between the British and the Dutch for commercial supremacy in the East and West. We have no study in minute detail of the Mercantile System and the effects and application of the Navigation Acts. If there are some good histories of particular colonies we owe them not to English, but to colonial writers, such as Kingsford for Canada, and Theale for South Africa. And for the story of the struggle for the New World between France and Britain we go to no British historian, but to the prose epic of Francis Parkman, an American citizen and the graduate of an American University.

It would be hammering at an open door to adduce further evidences of the backward conditions of our Imperial studies. Other countries pursue them with more system and method. I have referred to the Paris École Coloniale. This school is under the control of an Administrative Committee of which the Under-Secretary for the Colonies is *ex officio* president, and it receives a subvention from the State of 138,000 francs per annum. It is divided into (1) the *Section Indigène*, which is intended to give instruction to natives of Indo-China and other French Asiatic and African territories; and

(2) the *Section Française*, which prepares young Frenchmen for the Colonial diplomatic and consular services, for administrative or judicial offices, or for employment by railways, banks, and commercial and industrial firms. The School has a large staff of professors and lecturers, which has included such distinguished men as the late M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, who was Director, MM. Louis Renault, Alfred de Foville, Élie Halévy, André Tardieu, Louis Léger, and other well-known historians, scholars, and publicists. There are professors or teachers of such subjects as Colonial Administration, Colonial Constitutions, the Colonial Policy of Foreign States, Indo-Chinese Geography and History, African Geography and History, Mohammedan Law, Hygiene, Industrial Economics and Public works. The normal course lasts two years, with a third year allowed to students of ability. A diploma is granted to those who pass the prescribed examination at the end of the second year. Asiatic languages are not taught at the École Coloniale, I presume because of the facilities which exist for studying them at another Paris seminary, the *École des Langues Orientales* (Rue de Lille 2), which has professors of about 25 oriental languages, and of oriental geography, history, and law. The 'regular' courses at the École Coloniale comprise such subjects as the constitutional history of France, England, and the United States, the history of colonization up to and since 1815, the commercial policy of the principal civilized nations, the ethnology and ethnography of the French colonies, the military and naval organization of the great Powers, international law, public finance, and the English and German languages. Whether the diplômé of the École Coloniale makes a better inspector or magistrate than the English public-schoolboy sent out from his cricket-field to Nigeria or East Africa, I am not competent to determine. Character and tradition may counterbalance educational deficiencies. But I cannot think that the young British official would forfeit his special advantages if he received the same systematic and liberal instruction as is bestowed upon his French rival, instead of starting upon his practical duties with no preliminary training worthy of the name. At any rate the École Coloniale is a centre of political and economic learning, and its professors and advanced graduates have inducements to study the subjects which are its special interest and to produce those valuable works upon them to which reference has already been made.

It is however to Germany that we must go for a fuller realization of the idea of an Imperial Seminary. The Hamburg Kolonialinstitut deserves more attention than it has yet received in England. It is one

of the most remarkable educational establishments in the world, and a striking example of German thoroughness, liberality, and method. The Institute was established in Hamburg rather than at Berlin because it was felt that its theoretical studies could be prosecuted with most advantage in contact with the practical life of a great mercantile and shipping community. It has two main objects: first, to train officials, functionaries, settlers, traders, and other persons proposing to adopt a Colonial career; secondly, to serve as a centre for the collection and dissemination of knowledge relating to the history and condition of the Colonies. Hamburg already possessed ample facilities for technical and scientific study, in its natural history and ethnological museums, its botanical, mineralogical, and zoological collections, its agricultural laboratories, and its school of tropical medicine, besides an elaborate organization of lectures and courses in most branches of learning and culture. These resources were placed at the disposal of the Kolonialinstitut. It was able to call upon the services of a large staff of teachers, many of them already resident in Hamburg; and since last year it has been housed in a noble building, which has been presented by a patriotic burgess of Hamburg to his native town.

By its constitution the Institute is directed to carry on its work in association with the Imperial Colonial Office, the German Colonial Society, and the governments of the German colonies. It has the use of the City Library with its six hundred thousand volumes, the Commercial Library, and the libraries of the *Historisches Seminar*, the *Seminar für Nationalökonomie und Kolonialpolitik*, the *Seminar für Öffentliches Recht und Kolonialrecht*, the *Seminar für Geographie*, and the *Seminar für Geschichte und Kultur des Orients*, all with collections of special books, documents, maps, and objects of technical, scientific, and industrial interest. These seminars, which are assisted by grants from the State and liberal contributions by private individuals, form a valuable part of the work of the Institute, and they have published useful papers on colonial ethnology, technology, natural history, and African and Asiatic languages. Owing to a liberal subvention from the State the fees of the Institute are moderate. A payment of twenty marks gives admission to all the lectures of one of the faculties into which the Institute is divided, and attendance at a single course can be obtained for five marks. Indigent students who can produce evidence that they are likely to profit by the instruction are admitted free. The full educational course for those in the *Wissenschaftliche* Section occupies two semesters of six months each; in the Section of Colonial Economics, Technology, and Industries, four

semesters. The curriculum is so comprehensive that it would occupy a considerable portion of the space at my disposal merely to give the titles of the subjects on which lectures are delivered and classes held. There are some sixty professors and *Dozenten* on the regular staff, and their interests range from Colonial History, Colonial Law, and Anthropology to Book-keeping, Destructive Insects, and Tropical Cookery. There are European teachers of Swahili, Hausa, Fula, Duala, and Cape Dutch, and in addition natives of Africa have been imported to furnish opportunities for acquiring colloquial familiarity with those languages. Among the persons who attend the lectures of the Institute are students of law, philosophy, economics, and medicine, engineers, chemists, candidates for the public services, teachers of both sexes, and young men preparing for a commercial career. A diploma can be obtained by examination or by submitting a thesis approved by one of the seminars at the close of the prescribed period of study.

I turn now to the practical question of what should be done towards amending the deficiencies I have dwelt upon and placing Imperial studies among ourselves upon a more stable basis. I venture to hope that the British Academy, following its own precedent in the case of Oriental studies, will use its influence to establish an organization for the study of Imperial history and institutions in London. Such an organization might be a subsection or department of your Academy itself; but no doubt it would find its eventual place in the academic scheme as a school or faculty of the University of London. I believe the University would need little persuasion to establish such a faculty and a Board of Imperial Studies if the means were at its disposal for adequately remunerating the staff. Even in the absence of such resources the University might do a good deal towards this end. I would suggest that it should make the detailed study of Imperial history, and of the development and institutions of the British Empire, compulsory for all students who offer Modern History in the examination for Arts degrees, or in the faculty of Economics and Political Science. I would also suggest that the University, following the example of the French École Coloniale and the German Kolonialinstitut, and its own example in the case of Pedagogy, should institute a special diploma for Imperial studies. There should be a University professor of Imperial History or of Indian and Colonial History, who should be *ex officio* Director of the School of Imperial studies. He should be assisted by a staff which need not, in the first instance at any rate, be a large one. For, as I have already pointed out, it will not be necessary in London to provide for instruction in

those special technical, industrial, and linguistic subjects which are all included within the comprehensive curriculum of the Hamburg Institute, or even within the more restricted scope of the Paris School. Oriental languages, tropical medicine and hygiene, and Colonial industries and products being dealt with already can be left out of our present scheme, though I hope there will be a close relation and intercommunication between their teachers and those of the proposed University faculty. We can confine ourselves more particularly to academic, historical, political, and philosophical developments. The Professor should have the support of a minimum of five Lecturers or Readers, who should deal with (1) Indian history, (2) Colonial history, (3) the Laws and Institutions of the British Empire, (4) Imperial economics, and (5) Imperial ethnology and geography. A larger number could no doubt easily be suggested, and indeed we might hope, if the resources were sufficient, that all these lecturers would be elevated to the full professorial dignity and provided with assistants or readers of their own. In the meantime we can be content with the professor-director and these five lieutenants. It would no doubt be necessary to engage a number of teachers of special subjects and to arrange for occasional courses or isolated lectures by professors from Colonial Universities or from eminent authorities resident in the metropolis, who would be willing to offer their services, from time to time, without being permanent members of the academic staff.

The functions of this staff should be in the first instance to provide such instruction as may be prescribed by the Senate of the University of London to meet the wants of the students reading for its examinations. Secondly, it will attend particularly to the requirements of those who aspire to obtain the proposed diploma in Imperial studies. Thirdly, it should arrange lectures and classes for those interested in such studies, whether they are members of the University or not. It should particularly consult the needs of Colonial and Indian students resident in London, of the India Civil Service probationers, and of the young men nominated by the Colonial Office for service in the Crown Colonies and Protectorates. Some provision, as I have pointed out, is already made for the instruction of these two latter classes; but they could derive nothing but benefit from that wider academic culture which they might obtain under the Imperial faculty. It might indeed be expected that the Colonial Office would eventually decide to hand over the entire training of its probationers to the School, and would even insist that these young men should obtain the proposed Imperial diploma before taking up their appointments, or within

some specified period after joining the service. The School might continue in touch with some of these young officers even after they have entered upon their active duties. The officials of our tropical and sub-tropical dependencies enjoy considerable intervals of compulsory leisure, and spend no inappreciable portion of their whole period of active service on leave in Europe. In some of the African colonies an officer is able, and is indeed required by the terms of his engagement, to be on vacation in England or some other temperate country for six or eight months out of every two years. These long holidays are prescribed in order to maintain the health and vigour of those employed in arduous duties in exhausting climates; but it does not seem essential that they should be spent in complete idleness, at any rate during the formative years of life. The young Indian or African official would return to his district better equipped for his duties, and in equally good health, if a certain amount of intellectual labour were permitted to distract him from golf and shooting and Alpine sports and the amenities of Continental pleasure-resorts. Some, I am sure, of these young and zealous administrators would welcome the opportunity of systematizing and developing the results of their practical experiences by the study under suitable direction of the history, geography, economics, or ethnology of their own provinces or other portions of the British Empire.

Another body of students with whom the director and his staff would be engaged would be those persons of both sexes preparing for commercial, industrial, scientific, or philanthropic careers in the oversea colonies and dependencies, or in connexion with them. The London School of Economics has already shown that there are plenty of young bankers, merchants, financiers, and manufacturers, who are eager to combine the practical work of their professions with a knowledge of its higher principles and wider relations. A school of Imperial studies would no doubt have the same experience.

Finally, the Imperial School would endeavour to meet the needs of a limited number of advanced students who desire to carry their studies beyond the mere educational level. It should have a seminar, which would promote research and encourage the consultation and publication of original authorities. It would, I hope, be closely associated with the society for examining, summarizing, and printing the Imperial records of which we stand in need.

It remains to say a few words upon the important question of cost. Everything, of course, turns upon this, and if the expense of equipping such a seminary or sub-academy as I propose were excessively heavy we should have small hope for the project. For while as

a nation we are lavish in so many other things we are prudent to the point of penuriousness in our contributions to the higher education. Fortunately no prohibitive sum is required for the scheme which I have briefly outlined. In most educational reforms of an ambitious kind the larger part of the initial outlay must be devoted to brick and stone. In the present case we shall be under no obligation to expend vast sums of money in providing our school with its local habitation. Such an abiding-place is designated by circumstances and will presently become available. The seat of the School should obviously be in the Imperial Institute at South Kensington. A portion of that magnificent building is at present occupied by the University of London; but the Royal Commission has strongly recommended that the University shall have its own building and offices in some central portion of London, and there is, I take it, no doubt that this recommendation will be carried into effect. With the removal of the University from South Kensington the apartments it occupies in the Imperial Institute will become vacant, and one might hope that it would be found possible to allocate them to the use of the Imperial School. If that is done Empire learning, upon the theoretical and historical side, will be conducted in the closest proximity to that practical study of Colonial industries and productions which is pursued in the adjacent laboratories and collections; and the Imperial Institute will have at length fulfilled the large and beneficent intentions of its original founders. The interval which must exist before the new University buildings are completed could probably be bridged over by allowing the Imperial lectures and classes to be held in the rooms of one or more of the colleges or schools of the University. We might, without presumption, expect that University College, King's College, the London School of Economics, the Goldsmiths' Institute, and others would be willing to extend their hospitality to a body of students and teachers whose general objects would be so largely in accordance with their own.

If we need not spend money on buildings, we need not also contemplate any large outlay on libraries or educational collections. The great storehouses to which I have already referred will enable us to dispense with costly appurtenances of the kind. For the seminar and the research scholars the Record Office will be available. For all the students there will be the great public libraries, and no doubt permission will be obtained for the use under suitable conditions of the shelves of the Royal Colonial Institute, of the London School of Economics, and others. A comparatively small collection of text-books, with maps and official publications, would be sufficient for all our needs in this respect.

It follows, therefore, that the main expenditure of the School will come under the heading of salaries to the teaching staff. Fortunately—at least from this point of view—the emoluments of the higher education in England are never excessive, and professorial salaries are as a rule extremely moderate in amount. I believe that a competent professor and director of studies, a man of high standing and recognized authority, could be obtained for a salary of about £800 a year. Even with that income he would be as well off as most of our University professors, and better remunerated than a large number. The readers and lecturers would be content with a much smaller emolument. I am advised that capable young scholars of high academic distinction would be willing to accept these dignified and interesting posts at a salary of no more than £300 per annum, with, of course, a share of the fees paid by their pupils. The amount assigned for the provision of occasional lecturers and special classes must be more or less dependent upon the resources of the School and the number of its students; but a sum of £800 a year would cover a reasonable amount of activity in this department. For the library, the expense of the seminar, the cost of printing papers and transactions, and assisting the publication of original documents, we might be content, at the outset at any rate, to allow a further sum of £700 annually. The account then will stand as follows:—

Professor-director	£800
Five Readers at £300 each	£1,500
Occasional courses and special lectures	£800
Seminar and library	£700
Total	£3,800

This, it must be admitted, is not an amount which should be beyond the resources of the metropolitan community and the Empire at large. We must not, of course, expect that the Government of the United Kingdom will subsidize Imperial and Colonial studies to the same extent as the Free City of Hamburg or the French Republic. If we were to ask for a subvention of £8,000 or even £4,000 a year for our purpose from the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Education Department I find no difficulty in imagining what our reception would be. But something we might reasonably expect even from Anglo-Saxon government departments habitually suspicious of wanton extravagance on such wasteful luxuries as the higher education. We might perhaps hope that of our £3,800 a year one half, under due pressure from the British Academy, the London University, and

public opinion, would be supplied by the India Office, the Colonial Office, and the governments of the self-governing Dominions, all which powers and authorities might reasonably be asked to make some minute contribution to a work which would be of direct benefit to each of them. This then, not to place our expectation of public or national liberality too high, might account for £1,900 of our desired £3,800. For the remainder I suppose we must look to private generosity; and I really cannot entertain the idea that we should look in vain. There must surely be some British or Colonial or Indian subjects of the Crown of sufficient wealth and patriotism to provide the capital necessary to produce £2,000 a year. It seems incredible that a project so important alike in its educational, its political, and its literary and scientific aspects will be defeated for the want of so small a sum of money. I cannot think that means will be lacking to bring the School into existence, or to maintain it in being if its utility and its value are demonstrated beyond the possibility of question.

OBITUARY NOTICES

HENRY CHARLES LEA

1825–1909.

Henry Charles Lea, who died in October, 1909, at the age of eighty-four, had long been recognized as the leader among American historical scholars. The length of his period of production, the subjects he had chosen for investigation, the independence, originality, and extent of his work, and the vigour of his thought had given him an influence in America and a reputation in Europe equalled only by the group of writers of narrative history, consisting of Prescott, Parkman, Bancroft, and Motley, who had long before passed from the stage. And yet Lea stood distinctly apart from other historical students of his time. He was for many years engaged in business as a publisher, and was never connected with any educational or learned institution; he had no training of a formal kind for his work, and took but little share in the combined effort for the progress of historical study that has characterized American scholarship.

Lea's career as an historian must therefore be considered as peculiarly an individual experience, not typical of any special period or group. He was born in Philadelphia in the year 1825, and was never away from his native city more than a few weeks or months at a time. He was well trained in Greek, Latin, French, and the fundamental branches of education by private tutors in his early youth, but did not attend any school, college, or university. At eighteen years of age he entered his father's publishing house and remained engaged in active business for thirty-seven years, until his retirement in 1880. Even during the twenty-nine years that remained to him he kept up a partial connexion with the family publishing house, and devoted considerable time to the management and careful investment of his large fortune. His historical work was therefore done after the business day was over, on Sundays and occasional holidays, in one or two periods of enforced abstinence from more active exertion, and during those last three fortunate decades of vigorous and relatively undisturbed age allowed him by the fates for the continuance of his labours.

In Lea's study and writing three periods are clearly distinguishable. As a very young man he wrote and published in various journals

many articles on literary and scientific subjects. His literary interests gathered largely about the Greek classics and contemporary English poetry. These obviously arose from his reading. His scientific studies, which ranged from the analyses of certain chemical salts to the classification of freshwater bivalves, were a reflection of the interests of his father, Isaac Lea, a naturalist of some distinction.

Then there was a period when he read largely in history, especially in the early modern chroniclers. Through them he was gradually led back in time to the Middle Ages and in subject to the field of mediaeval social and legal institutions. Naturally inclined to production, the results of ten years or more of these studies appeared in a small volume, first published in 1866 and frequently reissued with additions, under the title 'Superstition and Force'. It was a careful and original study of four forms of mediaeval judicial trial—compurgation, the wager of battle, ordeals, and torture. In this book appeared clearly one of the characteristics of his work already noted, his absolute independence of other studies in the same field. There had been at the time but little investigation of mediaeval law; but what had been done he either did not know of or disregarded. Instead, he sought his materials in his own way in the mediaeval codes, commentators, and chroniclers, and worked out his own results from them. This remained true of his work during his whole life. He was singularly little influenced by secondary writing, strikingly devoted to the search for and use of the sources. This neglect of other modern writing was undoubtedly uneconomical of time, and laid him open to certain dangers which might otherwise have been avoided. It gave him, on the other hand, a detachment and distinctiveness which added much to the interest and value of his work. All of his writing has that note of directness and simplicity which is usually associated with the early stages of a science and is almost impossible to be attained by those who have thought much about its controversies.

Another requirement of his subject and method of working was the collection of a library of his own. No collection existed at that time in Philadelphia or indeed in America that could furnish the original materials for the study of such a subject; and Mr. Lea's engagements and inclinations alike prevented him from going to Europe to obtain the necessary works. Fortunately, he had abundant means, and he began, soon after the middle of last century, acquiring collections of printed sources, the writings of mediaeval theologians and lawyers, and such other books as he gradually came to require in the course of his study. Patient watchfulness and persevering search through

many years, aided by the efforts of book-dealers throughout the world, put him in possession of a surprising body of material, much of it of the most recondite and even obscure nature, but none without applicability to his investigation. Ultimately, the impossibility of making a satisfactory study of certain subjects without the use of unprinted materials became evident, and he met this difficulty by having considerable bodies of manuscript copied in Spain, France, and Italy. Certain original manuscripts also he was able to buy. Besides these materials, the University of Oxford allowed him to borrow from the Bodleian Library such manuscripts as he might need. He continued to add to his library, until at the time of his death it amounted to something over ten thousand volumes, corresponding closely to the successive phases of his work. It is a matter of gratification that this highly specialized and complete library will remain intact, having been bequeathed by him to the University of Pennsylvania.

In 1867 appeared his 'History of Sacerdotal Celibacy', and in 1869 his 'Studies in Church History'. The subjects of these works indicated a still more definite restriction of his study to those institutions especially connected with the Church. His choice of this field marks the third period of his historical work, which continued during the rest of his life and resulted in the publication of 'The History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages', in three volumes, in 1888; 'Chapters from the Religious History of Spain connected with the Inquisition' in 1890; 'A Formulary of the Papal Penitentiary' in 1892; 'The History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences,' in three volumes, in 1896; 'The Moriscos of Spain, their Conversion and Expulsion' in 1901; and above all the 'History of the Inquisition of Spain', in four volumes, 1906 and 1907, and its sequel 'The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies' in 1908. He had early begun a history of witchcraft, and had resumed work upon it shortly before his death.

Besides this extensive historical output, Mr. Lea wrote many articles in journals and published a number of pamphlets, most of which had reference to current questions of American policy, which he discussed in the light of historical origins or analogies. He was deeply interested in the Civil War, and later in municipal reform and international copyright; and the only part he ever took in public affairs was in connexion with these interests.

He received many academic honours, including the degree of LL.D. from Harvard, Pennsylvania, and Princeton, that of Doctor of Theology from Giessen, and the honorary membership of more than thirty learned societies. Of all these there was probably none in which he took

more pleasure than in his fellowship of the British Academy. His inveterate habit of remaining at home probably prevented his reception of other academic degrees which are never conferred except on the recipients in person. He had, however, a wide group of correspondents in various countries, including Lord Acton, Mr. Lecky, Mr. Bryce, M. Salomon Reinach, Professors Sabatier, Molinier, Dollinger, and Frédericq, and many other historical scholars in America and England, and on the Continent. He was also President of the American Historical Association and Honorary Vice-President of various learned bodies.

The subjects of Lea's writings lay in fields in which diversities of opinion are many and conflicts unavoidable. Controversy was largely obviated by his habit, already referred to, of paying little attention to modern writings; but this did not of course preclude criticism. On the whole, however, he was moderate in his attitude and more interested in facts than in opinions. He seldom expressed general theories; his judgements were usually cautious, and his statements so well fortified by reference to his sources that they could hardly be controverted. There is, and of course must be, differences of opinion about the results of investigation in such fields, but the portion of his work that has been adversely criticized, even by those who would naturally be expected to take a different view, is remarkably small in proportion to the whole.

It may be of interest to follow in some detail the method of work pursued by a self-trained scholar who achieved such substantial results. In seeking material for the work he had in hand, he went continuously through such original sources as he could discover, copying, translating, epitomizing, classifying names, calculating numbers, or following such form of abstract as seemed most desirable. The books and manuscripts in his library are full of the annotations he made in them during this process. He thus amassed a great amount of manuscript largely uncorrelated, but containing all the material he expected to use in the preparation of the final work. This was then re-read and arranged. Finally, sometimes after years of such preparation, writing was begun and the book constructed from the materials thus gathered and in the light of the views that had gradually taken shape in the process of collecting, reading, and re-reading the material. In this process of investigation and writing one can hardly fail to see the effect of two external influences, one the orderly and somewhat formal habits carried over from mercantile business, the other the objective and systematic cast of mind resulting from those studies in natural

history with which Lea had begun his career. The business man or the naturalist, when he becomes an historian, is just as likely to develop a characteristic method of work as the man trained in some particular school of methodical research, or the one who is under the influence of the dominating personality of some teacher.

But personality and native genius counted in his, as in so many cases, for more than training. His practice of investigation and subsequent publication, dating from early youth, indicated him as one of those men whose creative impulses are strong. The form such creative impulse takes is more or less a matter of chance. His habit of steady work, day after day, and year after year, concentrated, persistent, and intelligent, always with the general end in view, but never neglecting the immediate detail, was again a personal characteristic. He was also one of that group of historians whose life and undiminished ability were prolonged to a late age. Like Ranke at ninety, Mommsen at eighty-six, and Léopold Delisle at eighty-four, Lea at the same age as the French historian was still studying and writing; and he was in the midst of his work on the history of witchcraft at his desk in his library when he laid down his pen, less than a week before his death.

E. P. CHEYNEY.

SIR A. C. LYALL

BY LORD REAY

ACTING PRESIDENT

At a Meeting of the Fellows, May 31, 1911

WE meet again under the shadow of a great loss. As man of letters Sir Alfred Lyall held an eminent place in our ranks; but his services to his country were many-sided. I would recall but a few facts of his record as a great Anglo-Indian official. He saw the Indian Mutiny through, and with Sir George Campbell rode in to the relief of Delhi. He was regarded as a good soldier.

As Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana among the ancient Rajput States, in this romantic and poetical part of India, he was very much in his element and he was much liked by the Rajputs.

As Foreign Office secretary through the Afghan war time he rendered eminent services to Lord Lytton, to whom he was invaluable. Being very tender hearted and sensitive he was deeply impressed by the massacre of Cavagnari and the Cabul Mission.

As Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces he gave them a Legislative Council and a University anxious to keep the Province self-centred.

His great desire was to see India contented, and to avoid taxation. He wished to uphold the dignity and the sense of responsibility of ruling chiefs, and to conciliate the nobles of India and the fighting classes.

He was not in favour of the forward policy. He did not resist reform, because he had a clear conception of the mainspring of British power. As he stated in his *Life of Warren Hastings*, 'the standards of English proof ought always to be the measure of Englishmen who represent their country abroad.'

In his *Asiatic Studies* Lyall was the interpreter of the East to the West. He revealed the various aspects of Oriental life because he understood them. Being free from prejudices Lyall dealt with facts, viewing them in relation to their aggregate significance.

As a historian he brought his knowledge of European history, especially of the eighteenth century, to bear on the history of India. His *British Dominion in India* is by far the most suggestive history of India. He wrote an excellent *Gazetteer of the Central Provinces*.

He took a deep interest in the fortunes of our Academy. He believed in its future. He associated himself with all movements which brought us into friendly relations with continental scholars, who had a great regard for him. French Orientalists looked up to him and appreciated his finesse and critical faculty. Lyall, on the other hand, took the greatest delight in any masterpiece which appeared abroad. He followed closely international relations.

He was an excellent chief. As a friend nothing could exceed his kindness and loyalty. He would stand up for a man in difficulties —unasked—in a way very few men would.

He had genius which is rare, and a peculiar social charm. The future historian of the Administration of India will assign to Lyall a very exceptional and superior position. We cannot be sufficiently grateful that his talents were consecrated to the strengthening of British rule, and that he has left us an example of high-minded patriotism and of devotion to duty which represents the best side of the English character.

As poet, historian, and critic Sir Alfred Lyall held a position of no small distinction among his contemporaries. The very spirit of India, its introspection and haunting melancholy, seems to inspire many of his *Verses written in India*, and the tenderness of his being finds expression in many of his lines. Taken all together these verses are the poetical counterpart of his life—that of a man of action and of affairs—and are the best commentaries we possess on his views and aspirations, as set forth in his *Asiatic Studies*, and his valuable survey of *British Dominion in India*. In all his literary work we feel we are face to face with a mind eminently philosophical, reminding one constantly of his kinship with the great Indian writers whose spirit he so well interpreted. But he brought to bear upon the problems he treated the more orderly method of the well-trained western intellect. This is strikingly the case in his attempt to deal with the problem of *British Dominion in India*, as evidenced in some of the chapters of that remarkable work.

He was not only a poet, but a critic of poetry, and his luminous book on Tennyson, more especially the chapters dealing with the philosophy of the poet, takes rank among the best of its kind.

Among the noble band of Anglo-Indians he will long be

conspicuous as one who had imbibed the *spirit*, the *genius loci*, one in whom there was inbred much that was almost elemental in the mind and soul of ancient India:

> Fanciful shapes of a plastic earth,
> These are the visions that weary the eye;
> These I may 'scape by a luckier birth,
> Musing, and fasting, and hoping to die.
> When shall these phantoms flicker away?
> Like the stroke of the guns on the wind-swept hill,
> Like the sounds and colours of yesterday:
> And the soul have rest, and the air be still.[1]

[1] *Studies at Delhi* (1876), 'The Hindu Ascetic.

SIR ALFRED LYALL

1835-1911

ALFRED COMYN LYALL was born on January 4, 1835. His grandfather, John Lyall, came of a Berwickshire family, but migrated to London and became a prosperous shipowner and merchant. Three of John's sons attained to such distinction as earns a place in the *Dictionary of National Biography*: George, the eldest, who was in his time member for the city of London, chairman of the East India Company, and a great authority on mercantile matters; William Rowe, who was well known as a writer on historical and theological subjects, and died as Dean of Canterbury; and Alfred, the youngest, who edited the *Annual Register*, took holy orders, and wrote narratives of his travels and philosophical treatises. It was this Alfred that was the father of two of the most eminent Indian civilians of our day, Sir Alfred Lyall and Sir James Broadwood Lyall, formerly Lieutenant-governor of the Punjab.

Lyall went to Eton, as a colleger, at the age of ten. Had he stayed longer at the school, he might have carried a Newcastle scholarship to Cambridge. But he went instead to Haileybury in 1853, and arrived in India on the 1st of January, 1856, as a member of the last generation of Haileyburians who were then being supersededby the 'competition wallah'. He was posted to Bulandshahr, in the region known as the Doab, between the two great rivers Ganges and Jumna. The outbreak of the mutiny and the fall of Delhi in the following year plunged the Bulandshahr district into anarchy. The town was pillaged, the English bungalows were burnt, and the young assistant magistrate had to ride off with some half-dozen comrades to Meerut. Here he joined the Meerut cavalry, took part in their skirmishes, shared Sir George Campbell's tent, and in the month of September, 1857, rode with him into Delhi immediately after the end of the siege. But before the month was over he was riding out again with Greathed's column, to which he was attached as a volunteer, and which was charged with the duty of clearing the road to Agra. Lord Roberts, then a young lieutenant of artillery, has described how he and Sir Henry Norman and Lyall, riding together, fought their way into Bulandshahr. In the following year he was riding and fighting again,

as a volunteer, with the troops in Rohilkhand and on the borders of Oudh. He was mentioned in Lord Canning's minute of July 1859 among the officers to whose excellent services Her Majesty's notice was invited, and he received the Mutiny medal.

Of his experiences during this time of tragedies and horrors Lyall was always reluctant to write or speak. Here and there the veil is lifted by verses which are familiar to many, verses such as 'Theology in extremis' and 'Retrospection'. But as a rule his pen was stayed and his lips were sealed. Before he had been three years in India, Lyall was marked out for early and rapid promotion, and his official career is that of service in a succession of responsible posts, with short intervals of rest in England. In 1867 he was made Commissioner of West Berar, part of the 'assigned districts' of Hyderabad, which, though not, technically, part of British India, are under British administration, and his period of service there was fruitful of much in future years. Under his supervision was brought out the *Gazetteer of Berar* which became the model of those storehouses of information, the provincial gazetteers, whose contents are now summarized in the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*. And it was his experiences and meditations in Berar that laid the foundations of his *Asiatic Studies*.

In 1873 Lyall was called up to the important post of Secretary to the Government of India in the Home department, and in 1874 he went, as Governor-General's agent, to Rajputana, spending there four years which have left deep traces in his published essays.

More eventful were the next four years of Lyall's life. In 1878 he became Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and held that post during the whole of the Afghan war under the vice-royalties of Lord Lytton and Lord Ripon. He went twice on diplomatic missions to Afghanistan, and, before resigning his office in 1881, he wrote an important minute laying down the principles on which the settlement of the North-West frontier of India was eventually based.

In 1881 Lyall became Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces and Chief Commissioner of Oudh, and for six years he ruled wisely and peacefully the provinces in which he had once fought as a volunteer. He applied to them Lord Ripon's principles of local government, reformed their land laws, and obtained for them a legislature and a university of their own.

In December 1887 he retired from the Indian Civil Service, and, in January 1888, immediately after his return to England, he was appointed a member of the Council of India. He remained a member of that Council for fifteen years, having, at the expiration of his normal term of ten years, been reappointed for a further term, and he did not

finally retire from the Council until January 1903. Had he so chosen he might have undertaken more arduous and responsible work, for he was offered the Governorship of the Cape. But, his health was not strong, by more than thirty years' service in India he had earned rest, and he wisely declined to break social ties and sacrifice literary interests by returning to exile. For, when he returned to England at the age of fifty-two, he leapt at once into a position in the English literary and social worlds such as had never been occupied by any Indian civilian.

His mere external appearance, the whitened hair, the musing grey eyes, lit from time to time by gleams of humour, the clearly chiselled features, made him a noticeable figure in any company. And his literary fame, his intellectual distinction, his social and conversational charm, the romantic part which he had played in some of the most stirring episodes of Indian history, the influential part which he had played in others, opened to him the doors of English society and procured him admission into the most exclusive and esoteric clubs. Nor was he less fascinating under more solitary conditions. The present writer will never forget the midnight hours that sped swiftly as he listened under Indian canvas to the outpourings of Lyall's thoughts, soliloquies rather than talk.

In February 1872 there appeared in John Morley's *Fortnightly Review* the first of the remarkable series of articles which were afterwards collected as *Asiatic Studies*. The first volume of these was published in 1882, a second volume, including the Rede Lecture of 1891, was added in 1899. Long before Lyall left India his poems were well known, and were on the lips and in the memories of a wide circle of friends and admirers. But it was not until 1889 that they were published in the modest little volume entitled *Verses written in India*. After he left India his pen was rarely idle. He contributed a life of Warren Hastings to the series of *English Men of Action*, a biography of Tennyson to *English Men of Letters*. His *Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India* first appeared as a University extension manual in 1891, but was much enlarged in subsequent editions. He wrote a *Life of Lord Dufferin* in 1905. He contributed an article on Indian Native States to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and a chapter on the Moghul Empire to the *Cambridge Modern History*, and in many other ways, not always acknowledged, he helped to advance the knowledge of subjects of which he was a master. For instance, he presided over the International Congress for the History of Religion held at Oxford in 1908.

What were Lyall's chief and most enduring contributions to thought

and knowledge? More than any man of his time he did two things. He revealed and interpreted to the West the mind and soul of India. He brought the development of Indian history into living relation with the development of European history.

Lyall took up and carried on Maine's work of showing how Indian and European thought, habits, and institutions throw light upon each other. But whilst Maine worked chiefly in the field of law, Lyall worked chiefly in the field of religion. And the knowledge of Indian life and thought which Lyall brought to bear upon his work was more intimate and profound than had been attainable by Maine. His knowledge was derived, not from books, nor from the reports of travellers or missionaries, but from personal observation, stimulated by sympathy, illuminated by wide culture, and controlled by a critical habit of mind.

For the comparative student of religions the interest of India lies in its having preserved against the attacks of later creeds one of the old-world creedless religions, still operating as a living and moving force, not only among barbarous or semi-barbarous races, but in classes which have reached a high mental level. A stroke of good fortune gave a man who was at once a scholar, a philosopher, and a poet, an official position in a field exceptionally favourable for observing and studying the phenomena characteristic of Hinduism as a religion. In Berar Lyall lived in a world where miracles are normal, because physical laws are unknown. He could study religious symbolism in its crudest and in its most sublimated forms. He was acquainted with a Hindu officer 'of great shrewdness and very fair education, who devoted several hours daily to the elaborate worship of five round pebbles, which he had appointed to be his symbol of Omnipotence'. He could see gods in the making, and watch the incipient god in his progress up the Jacob's ladder, much shorter in India than in Europe, which leads from earth to heaven. He could tell one of 'a native official, well known in the Bombay Presidency, in whom the signs of divinity had been detected' and who 'was so harassed by an incessant following of devout folk that he became unable to do his business'. It is realistic touches such as these that give life and colour to his studies of Indian religion. And it is the first-hand knowledge which they imply that gives weight and force to his criticisms of the 'solar myth' theories once popularized by Max Müller and of the brilliant generalizations with which Mr. J. G. Frazer fascinates his readers.

If the comparative study of religions came first among Lyall's intellectual interests, the study of history came next. He always dis-

claimed being an expert in any branch of history, but in some of its branches, especially in European history of the eighteenth century, he was exceptionally well read. The thesis which he maintained in his treatise on the *Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India* was that this dominion does not, as has often been asserted, owe its origin and extension to a series of happy accidents, but has been the necessary and inevitable result of causes and converging influences which the historian can explore and verify. In support of this thesis he traces, in a series of broad, vigorous sketches, the political and economic changes and the geographical discoveries which deflected the course of trade routes to the East, and the European events which brought about the rise and fall of Portugal, Holland, and France as predominating influences in India. And he shows how British dominion in India was founded and still rests on her command of the sea, and how, unlike previous conquerors of India, England advanced to the conquest of the great peninsula, not through the traditional passes across the mountain ranges of its North-west frontier, but by an attack on its 'soft side' from a naval base. An adequate history of British India still remains to be written, but Lyall's essay is the most luminous and suggestive introduction to that history which has yet been produced.

The *Verses written in India* were given with some reluctance to the world, for their author was too fine an artist to be satisfied with their form. But they are the natural and spontaneous expression of experiences, remembrances, moods, questionings for which prose was not a suitable vehicle; they are instinct with genuine poetical feeling; and they contain lines and stanzas which have long haunted many memories, and which will not easily be forgotten.

Lyall was one of the earliest members of the British Academy, and of its Council. His public services and literary work obtained, in due measure, official recognition. He was made a K.C.B. in 1881, a G.C.I.E. in 1896, and a Privy Councillor in 1902. Honorary degrees were conferred on him by the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and he was a trustee of the British Museum.

Death came to him, with a swift and gentle shaft, on the 10th of April, 1911, when he was on a visit to Lord Tennyson at Farringford in the Isle of Wight.

C. P. ILBERT.

JOHN WORDSWORTH

BISHOP OF SALISBURY (1885–1911)

1843–1911

If ever there was a scholar of whom it might be said that he was 'born in the purple' surely it was John Wordsworth, Bishop of Salisbury for close upon twenty-six years. His grandfather, Christopher Wordsworth (1774–1846), brother of the poet, was Master of the great foundation of Trinity College, Cambridge. His father, also called Christopher (1807–85), was in succession Head Master of Harrow, Canon and Archdeacon of Westminster, and Bishop of Lincoln, a classical scholar, a theologian, and a Biblical commentator (he was one of the band of classically trained English travellers who did so much for the rediscovery of Greece, and he wrote a commentary, full of patristic learning, upon the whole Bible!). His two uncles, John, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, whose career was cut short at the early age of thirty-four, and Charles, who became Bishop of St. Andrews, were both scholars of distinction. He was thus born and lived in an atmosphere of learning, and it might be said that learning came to him like a second nature. His family was mixed up not only with learning but with affairs; and here too John Wordsworth showed the influence of his surroundings. Things that cost labour to many came easy to him; he would dispatch secular business with the same promptitude and rapidity with which he would work out a problem of research. Only exceptional gifts of this kind made possible the combination of so much knowledge with so much administrative activity; for I doubt if the most active bishop on the bench worked harder in his own diocese.

His sister, Miss Elizabeth Wordsworth, says of her brother:[1] 'One can never remember the time when he was not an omnivorous reader. He had a remarkably good and accurate memory—a false quantity or a misquotation was not likely to escape him, and he was very thorough in whatever he undertook—practical matters as well as scholarship. He had quite a fair amount of mathematical ability and an excellent head for figures.' We can see here the natural aptitude for learning.

[1] In putting together this sketch I owe a special debt to a series of recollections contributed to *The Salisbury Diocesan Gazette* for October, November, December, 1911.

And that aptitude had everything to favour and develop it. The future bishop enjoyed an excellent training, first at a dame's school, then at Ipswich (where he was not happy but where he must have been thoroughly well taught), and afterwards at Winchester, the school of his father and of his uncle John, where his uncle Charles had also been master. The omnivorous reading and a certain oddness of speculation that went along with it militated a little against success in examinations; but that was a trifle. The Latin Essay Prize and a Craven Scholarship made up for a 2nd Class in *Lit. Hum.*; and, after two years' schoolmastering at Wellington, Wordsworth was brought back to Oxford as Fellow of Brasenose in 1867. He remained here as tutor for sixteen years, working hard at his own studies and with his pupils, by whom he was as much respected as beloved. To this happy relation his wife, daughter of H. O. Coxe, the well-known Bodley's Librarian, to whom he was married in 1871, greatly contributed.

This was the time for building up that solid edifice of learning which marked off John Wordsworth among his contemporaries. In any case he would have been a learned man; he could not help imbibing learning through every pore of his mind. But for these sixteen years duty and inclination pointed in the same direction; his whole time was spent in acquiring or imparting knowledge.

At first it was not clear what was to be the goal. Wordsworth was never a man to be engrossed by a single subject. As classical tutor he began by specializing somewhat upon Latin. His first publication was a small book containing three *Lectures Introductory to a History of Latin Literature*, which came out in 1870. Four years later followed *Fragments and Specimens of Early Latin*, which at once showed its author's true calibre. The Oxford of that date produced little that was massive. It is tempting to speculate what would have happened if John Wordsworth had continued on these lines and had spent the rest of his days as a rival in erudition to Prof. J. E. B. Mayor at Cambridge. We can imagine how such a *par nobile fratrum* would have been fitted to speak with the scholars of other nations in the gate. But that was not to be. We can see how a gradual change took place in the latter half of the seventies. The young tutor felt keenly his obligations for the religious training of his pupils; and his interests were more and more deflected in the direction of theology. The writer of this has in his possession a pamphlet of 56 pp., without a date and not published, but prepared for the use of his pupils and entitled, *Some Elements of Gospel Harmony*. It would be wrong to attach too much importance to this pamphlet, which does

not profess to be more than a collection of notes. And yet it is (to the best of my belief) the only direct treatment by him that we have of the central question of the Gospels; and there is some significance both in what it contains and in what it does not contain. The strong point about it is the scholarly presentation of external data; the most notable omission is that of any attempt at internal critical analysis. In regard to the origin of the Gospels the writer's mind appears to be in a state of suspense; the authority that he seems most inclined to follow is Bishop Westcott's *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*—one of the least satisfactory of its author's works, and calling for criticism all the more because it is so full of ingenuities. Throughout his life Wordsworth appears to have maintained a considerable reserve on the deeper questions of criticism; he was naturally conservative, and yet he moved with the times in a restrained and sober way. The diocese of Salisbury was not one that was troubled by acute critical controversy.

Among the influences of these years which doubtless helped to strengthen the claim on the young tutor of theological studies as against classics must have been his friendship for Dr. James B. Mozley, Regius Professor of Divinity from 1871 to 1878. Wordsworth lectured for him during the long illness which preceded his death; and, as we now look back, it would not have seemed at all surprising if he had been chosen as his successor. In the year 1881 he was selected to deliver the Bampton Lectures, which were published under the title, *The One Religion: Truth, Holiness, and Peace desired by the Nations, and revealed by Jesus Christ.* The subject is chiefly noticeable as an early application of the new science of Comparative Religion. Its attraction for the lecturer probably lay in the scope which it gave for his remarkable power of rapid assimilation. This is the most striking feature of the book; at the same time the categories with which it dealt were too vague to make a very deep impression.

By this time the plans had been laid and were gradually maturing for the *magnum opus* by which, in the world of scholarship at least, the name of John Wordsworth was to go down chiefly to posterity. In 1877, 1878,[1] the negotiations appear to have been begun with the Delegates of the Clarendon Press which ended in his definitely undertaking to produce a full critical edition of the Vulgate New Testament.

[1] So the first prospectus, p. 4; but an examination of the papers preserved at the Press shows that the real date was Easter, 1878. The motion came from the Delegates of the Press, who consulted Cardinal Newman and Dr. B. F. Westcott. Wordsworth on his side (through Dr. Liddon) took the advice of the Divinity Professors.

Here again there was a convergence of interests which smoothed over the transition from classical scholarship to theology. Her brother, as Miss Wordsworth says, was a 'born philologist', and the philological side of his great undertaking was by no means the least noteworthy. The large number of early MSS. in which Jerome's Version is found make it of special value for determining nice points of orthography and the like; and the new editor made ample use of his opportunities in this respect. An attractive feature of his work, and one that does much to lift it to the high level of scholarship to which it attains, is the occurrence from time to time of notes specially devoted to points of this kind. Justice is done to this side of the *Vulgate* and *Old-Latin Biblical Texts* by that great palaeographer Ludwig Traube (*Nomina Sacra*, p. 149).

A work on such a scale naturally took some time to prepare. I have before me the draft scheme of 'The Oxford Critical Edition of the Vulgate New Testament', dated Nov. 2, 1882, and revised May 25, 1883. Here once more the editor was indebted to Dr. Westcott, whose article 'Vulgate' in Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* (1863) stood out as the most complete and the most exact survey of the whole subject. At the same time there is no lack of details which bear the impress of the editor's own vigorous personality.

This is perhaps the point at which we may suitably introduce some general remarks on the characteristic features of his scholarship.

He had an ample command of the resources of a scholar, and in particular of a Latinist; but it was essentially a workmanlike command. Though fully equipped as a writer of idiomatic Latin, neither in Latin nor in English did he aim so much at elegance as at a clear and accurate presentation of his subject. Sincere to the very core, few men cared less for appearances or wrote with a more single eye to the substance of what they were saying. The scholarship of John Wordsworth was before all things genuine *learning*. Even as it was I doubt if the Oxford of the nineteenth century produced a more learned man; and, if he had not been carried off and made a bishop, I do not think that there would have been even a doubt. But learning with him meant, first and foremost, a knowledge of libraries, of books and MSS. It was, if I may use the phrase, a folio and quarto-learning. He was as much interested in the accumulated knowledge of past centuries as in the science of to-day. He took an interest in old books—provided that they were, or had been at their time, good books—for their own sake. He used them lovingly, and knew his way about them by a kind of instinct—the instinct by which a man knows his way about his own home. He had all the scholar's fondness for

digressions; he was always wanting to get to the bottom of things—or, I should say perhaps rather, of what was known about things. He did not like to leave an allusion unexplored; he was always wanting to follow out his clues to the end. This was not exactly the scientific impulse which will not let the inquirer rest until he has got at causes; it was rather the literary impulse which drives him on to the limits of what is known. I imagine that these characteristics mark a certain difference between John Wordsworth and some of the leading continental scholars of the present day. They too—the greatest of them, such as a Mommsen or a Harnack—may be credited with a passion for completeness, for penetrating to the bottom of things; but the dominant motive in these cases is scientific; the bottom that they aim at reaching is that of origin. Wordsworth was not a philosopher; the completeness at which he aimed was not philosophical. Neither was it, as I have implied, exactly scientific; but it was before all things completeness of knowledge, as such and for its own sake. In other words, the learning to which he was devoted and which was inbred and native in him, was the more old-fashioned type of learning, the learning of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

There are of course two distinct types of textual criticism. There is, on the one hand, the concise and severe type, which confines itself rigorously to the one sole object of producing a trustworthy text, which is content with a minimum of apparatus, and which cuts down everything that does not contribute directly to the ascertainment of what was originally written. Finished examples of this type may be seen in Dean Armitage Robinson's edition of *The Philocalia of Origen* (1893) and Mr. A. E. Brooke's of the same writer's *Commentary on St. John* (1896), or on a fuller scale but still with not a little self-repression, in Prof. Bywater's editions of the *Ethics* (1894) and *Poetics* (1897, 1909) of Aristotle. On the other hand there is what may be called the exhaustive type, of which the most thorough-going example known to me is Mr. C. H. Turner's *Canons of the Western Church* (from 1899 onwards). It was impossible to aim at exhaustiveness in an edition of the *Vulgate.* We hope some day to see an edition that may deserve that name carried out by the vast and combined resources of the Benedictine Order in the Church of Rome. But as a work begun by a single scholar and carried on up to the present by the allied labour of two, the *Oxford Vulgate* approaches as nearly to this second type as the conditions permitted. It does indeed much more than this; the chief editor from the first followed his bent, and the consequence is that his work—if not exhaustive—is nevertheless a striking monument of the wealth of detail, textual, historical, and

illustrative, that could be brought together by a single hand. When I say this I am sure that the second editor, Mr. H. J. White, will not feel that any injustice has been done to him. Invaluable and essential to the success of the work as his continued and devoted labours have been, he joined it at a time when the whole plan of the work was already settled and already had imprinted upon it the individual stamp of its first projector.

I have already tried to convey something of what that individual stamp was. It may be seen at every turn in all the places where it is natural to look for it—in the original prospectus, in the introduction and epilogue to the first volume, and in a number of special notes expanded beyond the limits of what was strictly necessary in the wider interests of scholarship and learning.

I referred a little way back to Bishop Westcott's article 'Vulgate' as the nearer basis upon which the work was constructed. The remoter basis was the plan drawn out (in 1720) and the collections made for Bentley's great edition—proposed, but unfortunately never completed or published—of the Greek and Latin New Testaments. Behind Bentley there were the Sixtine and Clementine editions—witnesses at once to the power of combined studies and to the active interest of the Popes of the end of the sixteenth century; and, behind these, as first of the series to contain express reference to MSS., the edition of Robert Stephens (1538-40). Not one of these antecedents was the new editor content to take simply as he found it. He must needs turn aside to identify the MSS. used by Stephens (Appendix I to *Old-Latin Biblical Texts*: No. I). In addition to the Sixtine and Clementine editions are cited not only the Hentenian edition of 1547 but also the readings noted in the margin of a fine later copy of this work which represent, as it would seem, the judgement of the Sixtine revisers as distinct from the text ultimately authorized by the Pope. The work of Bentley and his assistants, John Walker and David Casley, is traced out and fully described, partly in the prospectus and preface and partly in *Old-Latin Biblical Texts*. Besides these, the readings of a long list of other editions are occasionally noted. Special attention is paid to the 'correctoria', or early attempts at criticism, made in the Middle Ages and especially in the thirteenth century. And, besides as complete a text as possible of the Vulgate and the apparatus of prefaces, tables of sections, and *capitula* associated with it, there is also printed a full text of Cod. Brixianus (*f*) of the Old Latin and a collation, ever increasing in fullness, of the other MSS. of the older form of the Version. This may seem at first sight a work of supererogation; but

it is one for which future students will have special reason to be grateful. The Vulgate, after all, is only a link in an extended chain, and it cannot be rightly judged apart from the preceding links. This is a point that needs close and careful consideration, and it constitutes one of the special difficulties of the subject.

The examples that have been given are only specimens of the wide research on which this edition of the Vulgate rests. They are all characteristic, and they should be borne in mind by those who in time to come will try to form for themselves a picture of the mind by which it was planned and (primarily) executed. It would be tempting to make a study of characteristic notes in detail; but from that I must refrain.

The first rough design of the work had been sketched, as we have seen, in 1878; it had been digested and set out in print in 1882. All this time the editor had been acting with the cordial co-operation of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press, of which body he himself became a member in 1881. Through the mediation of Dr. C. R. Gregory the Delegates had acquired a quantity of material left behind by Tischendorf. This included (1) a collation of Cod. Amiatinus (A); (2) a collation of the Ingolstadt MS. (I); (3) a transcript of Cod. Bobiensis (*k*) of the Old Latin; (4) a similar transcript of Cod. Frisingensis (*q*), also of the Old Latin; (5) some smaller Old Latin fragments from St. Gall. The last three items were taken as the basis of editions published in the series of *Old-Latin Biblical Texts* (*O.-L. B. T.*).

These purchases were certainly a help, but one of them proved something of a snare. All the rest were duly verified by the editors, but unfortunately this was omitted in the case of Cod. I. The collation of this MS. by Tischendorf—who was usually very accurate in such matters—was faulty, and the handwriting moreover rather difficult to decipher. In this way a number of errors crept in, which were animadverted upon somewhat sharply by E. von Dobschütz in his tract *Studien zur Textkritik der Vulgata* (1894). Another flaw was caused by the use of Belsheim's edition of the Old Latin MS. (ff_2). Belsheim, unlike Tischendorf, bears by no means a good character as a collator; but this was not known at the time. A trustworthy edition has since been produced by Mr. E. S. Buchanan in *O.-L. B. T.*, No. V (1907). Under these two heads the earlier *fasciculi* of the *Vulgate* need correction; but for the rest there is ample testimony to the general accuracy of both the editors. In a work of such magnitude this is of great importance.

I have spoken of 'both the editors': and this leads me back to the

course of the history. From 1878 onwards Wordsworth was actively engaged in preparations for the Vulgate along with his work as Tutor of Brasenose. In 1883 he received the first appointment to the Oriel Professorship of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture, which carried with it a Canonry in Rochester Cathedral and a Fellowship at Oriel. He took up the duties of this new office with characteristic energy, but held it only for two years. In 1885 he was called away to an altogether different sphere as Bishop of Salisbury. To many men the change would have been even greater than it was to him. From 1868 to 1885 his father had held the bishopric of Lincoln; his son acted as chaplain to him, and paid frequent visits to Riseholme; so that he had had abundant opportunities, of which he was not slow to take advantage, of making himself familiar with the work of a bishop. Still, the exacting character of that work made it clearly impossible to carry on the work at the Vulgate single handed. So that in 1886 he called in the help of Mr. (now Professor) H. J. White. The choice was a natural and a happy one. Mr. White had already been engaged on work for the Vulgate and on the Old Latin; he had all the gifts of a coadjutor in such studies—especial skill in penmanship, a neat and orderly mind, clearness and method along with indefatigable perseverance and assiduity. The partnership lasted until the Bishop was called away from this world, and the work which he (alas!) left unfinished is now in Prof. White's hands. In the meantime, in the early years of his episcopate (or possibly before), the Bishop had become acquainted with M. Samuel Berger, who often found his way to Salisbury, where he and Madame Berger were always welcome. This brought a new tributary of knowledge to the main stream of Vulgate studies. M. Berger had taken as his special province research among the MSS. of the Vulgate so plentifully scattered over Western libraries. The fruits of these researches were published in the volume *Histoire de la Vulgate pendant les premiers siècles du moyen âge* (Paris, 1893). This is a rich repertory of detailed information about the MSS. M. Berger was unhappily cut off by death at the too early age of fifty-seven in 1900. Since that time the most important contribution to the subject has been made by Dom John Chapman, O. S. B., in his *Notes on the Early History of the Vulgate Gospels* (Oxford, 1908). These brilliant investigations should in the strict order of logic and of science have preceded the construction of a text; and yet they could not themselves have been carried out if it had not been for the Wordsworth-White collection of materials. It is by such gradual spiral steps that progress is made.

The first *fasciculus* of the first volume containing the Gospels appeared in July, 1889; the last, as Epilogue, in 1898, the Acts came out in 1905. It is interesting to look back and to ask, especially in relation to the Gospels, how the work looks now that it is finished in comparison with the prospect at the time when it was begun; how it has been affected in its progress by the accessions of new knowledge. On the whole we may say that the work stands as a monument of skilful scholarship not more impaired by lapse of time and that which lapse of time brings than is inevitable in human affairs. We may probably adopt the language of Dom Chapman, who, after sketching certain desiderata, says: 'The outcome of such a system of restoration would not, I imagine, differ substantially from the text given us by Wordsworth and White. But in some difficult places the verdict might be altered, or (what is just as important) confirmed by stronger reasons.' It would have been a great misfortune (such as has happened in not a few examples) if after all that has been done a wrong family of MSS. had been regularly followed; but that peril I believe has been escaped.

A few remarks may perhaps be made on particulars:

1. The most important additions to the list of MSS. consulted between the first draft of 1882–3 and the edition as finally brought out in 1889–98 are the Utrecht Fragments (U), portions of a Northumbrian MS. of quite small extent; the Salisbury MS. (W) written in the year 1254 and characteristically given as a specimen of a later mediaeval text; and the two MSS. represented by special signs, the so-called Benevento MS. (𝔅) and the Echternach Gospels (𝔓). A peculiar interest seemed to attach to these two MSS. from the presence in them of notes which appeared to throw light upon their history. The first, which is in the British Museum, was supposed to be dated between the years 739–60 and to be localized in the neighbourhood of Benevento in S. Italy. M. Berger, however (*Histoire de la Vulgate*, p. 92), has shown reason for thinking that the indications from which these conclusions were drawn are not to be trusted. In any case the text of the MS. (which was quoted systematically for St. Luke and St. John) is disappointing; it appears to be Gallican of an ordinary type and to belong to the ninth century rather than the eighth.

With the Echternach Gospels the case is different. This MS. comes from the Abbey of Echternach, founded by St. Willibrord, who died in 739, and in style and date of writing may well be connected personally with him. The note which it contains is apparently copied from an older exemplar of the year 558, and is to the effect that this

exemplar had been corrected from a copy in the library of the Presbyter Eugipius (*sic*) which was said to have belonged to St. Jerome himself. I am inclined to think that both M. Berger and Bishop Wordsworth do rather less than justice to this MS.; and that for a very simple and natural reason. The text is corrected throughout in a Hiberno-Saxon hand, and the original text contains also a number of Hiberno-Saxon features. But we really need to look behind the original text, and to resolve it into its elements. When that is done I believe there will be found to be a nucleus of very ancient and important readings which may well go back, through Eugipius, to the more immediate surroundings of St. Jerome himself; the Hiberno-Saxon elements count for very little, but this older nucleus counts for a great deal. Dom Chapman has followed up the pedigree of this MS. in a way that I would gladly endorse.

2. One problem of considerable importance relating to the Vulgate is not quite so settled as it ought to be. Wordsworth and White print throughout the Gospels beneath the Vulgate text the text of Cod. Brixianus (*f*) as representing what is commonly regarded as the form of the Old Latin which St. Jerome took as the basis for his emendations. The editors made this assumption, which they took over from Bishop Westcott, and not only from the art. 'Vulgate' but from the joint edition of Westcott and Hort. They (the Vulgate editors) were evidently not shaken in their assumption, but held it as strongly at the end of their task as at the beginning (see esp. p. 666). But it has been challenged, most notably by Professor Burkitt. Professor Burkitt still held the old opinion when he wrote his essay on 'The Old Latin and the Itala' (*Texts and Studies*, 1896). He then wrote that certain peculiarities to which he called attention were 'not due to the intrusion of a Vulgate element in *f*. The more that MS. is studied the more evident appears the probability of the common opinion, that *f* is an example of the type of text from which St. Jerome prepared his Revised Version' (*op. cit.*, p. 56). But four years later he was beginning to change his mind: he raises the question definitely in an article on 'The Vulgate Gospels and the *Codex Brixianus*' contributed to vol. i of the *Journal of Theological Studies*, pp. 129–34. His doubts were chiefly prompted by a comparison of the text of *f* with that of the Gothic Version. This, however, does not seem to be at all conclusive, and my impression is that the old view is still the more probable. But impressions count for very little. The subject deserves, and I believe will reward, closer study.

3. The position in which the Wordsworth-White *Vulgate* leaves us

appears to be something of this sort. It is a great work, and it marks a great stride in advance; but it is still some way from being final. It is to be hoped that the papal edition, when it comes, will be final; it will at least create a standard of its own beyond what is possible to a single scholar or pair of scholars. Enough that there will have been no other edition since St. Jerome took pen in hand to which it will have owed so much as to this. Judging by the provisional standard which alone is suitable, it may be said that for the British Isles the work has been, not quite exhaustively but for practical purposes, sufficiently done. There still remain a few texts that might be more completely collated; but, broadly speaking, the forms of text current in these islands are now fairly well ascertained. I am not sure that I ought to say that next to the British Isles comes France. The French MSS. have indeed been very fully catalogued by M. Berger, and the Wordsworth-White edition embodies a knowledge of prominent and important samples of them. There are also valuable materials brought together by Dr. P. Corssen in *Die Trierer Ada-handschrift* (1889), pp. 29–61. But the problem of the Gallican texts is difficult just because the MSS. are so numerous that their lines of relationship cross each other in such complicated patterns. The great Caroline codices in particular, splendid as they are as works of art, serve to obscure the issues rather than to elucidate them. The total effect is still somewhat confused. About Spain we know a little, and the problem is easier because the MSS. to be examined are comparatively few. But several leading MSS. are not yet really known.

It is ever to be regretted that M. Berger's labours were cut short where they were. He had acquired a considerable mastery of British and Gallican MSS. and had some knowledge of those of Spain. But his explorations had not extended far into Germany. The information that he gives, e.g. about Wurzburg, is (I believe) derived from Schepss. It is perhaps a little strange that Wordsworth and White do not include at least the MS. called after St. Kilian. Still less, if I am not mistaken, had M. Berger's researches penetrated at first hand into Italy. And yet Italy is the most important region of all; and, though it may seem a paradox to say so, I believe that our knowledge of Italian texts really goes deeper than our knowledge of those of France. This is due to two fortunate circumstances: (i) the fact that Italian codices of first-rate value were brought at such an early date to England—to Wearmouth and Jarrow before the end of the seventh century; and (ii) to the happy chance—which was of course not really chance—that Bishop Wordsworth's authorities include, besides the reconstructed Cassiodorian and Eugipian texts, such priceless direct

evidence as that of Codd. F, J, M, and probably in large part of O, X, and Z. It is especially fortunate that we have in this way evidence at once from South Italy, clearly and definitely localized and set in its place in the chain, and also (presumably) from North. To this another valuable link will be added when Mr. C. H. Turner is able to give us his Fragments from St. Gall. And the Italian scholars may be able to contribute more.

4. The next step in Vulgate criticism will involve a much larger use of patristic quotations. Wordsworth deliberately excluded these from his original plan—and perhaps with reason, as the conditions then stood. I say 'perhaps' because, although it was no doubt true that a full use of quotations would have been beyond the powers of a single editor with limited leisure, I could imagine a restricted use which might have been of great value. We ought of course in fairness to consider the state of things in 1878, and not that which exists now. In 1878 there were hardly any Latin patristic texts in really trustworthy critical editions; but anything short of a thoroughly critical edition would have been valueless; the work would have simply had to be done again. Further, it was not (I believe) at that time known that in some of the later treatises of St. Augustine a Vulgate text was employed. Still less was any one upon the track of the genuine commentary of Pelagius on St. Paul's Epistles, which appears to have been also based upon a Vulgate text. We owe our knowledge of the first fact to Prof. F. C. Burkitt (in *Texts and Studies*, 1896), and of the second to Dr. A. Souter (see *Trans. Brit. Acad.*, 1906). But in 1887—two years before the appearance of the first *fasciculus* of the Vulgate—there was published Weihrich's critical edition of the two writings each of which bears the name *S. Augustini Speculum*. One of these has a text similar to that used by the Spanish writer Priscillian, and therefore does not concern us; but the other appears to be genuine Vulgate, and is in any case very near the time of St. Augustine. It is easy to be wise after the event, and to see that it might have been worth while to collate the readings of this work. That certainly ought to be done now. Without implying any blame upon the editors, it must yet be said that an edition of the Vulgate without use of the criterion afforded by patristic quotations can be no more final than a Greek text of the New Testament would have been produced under like conditions. When this criterion comes to be applied the text will be reconstructed with a surer grip and with greater confidence.

5. Other things will have to be done in the edition of the future. Among them we must look for a clearer identification of the sources

from which is derived the large amount of subsidiary matter (prefaces, capitulations and the like) which is found accompanying many MSS. of the Vulgate. It is a difficult task, and will require prolonged research; but a beginning has already been made. I may refer particularly to Dom Chapman's book, and to some recent researches by Dom de Bruyne of Maredsous in the *Revue Bénédictine*. What Wordsworth and White have done was (very properly) to collect the materials as fully as they could; it will be for future criticism to label and localize them.

6. I cannot leave this great work on the Vulgate without a word on the printers' share in it. Provisional and intermediate as the total result could not but be, it was yet conceived and has been so far executed 'in the grand style'; and it is clothed with an outward form which is also 'in the grand style'. The stately quarto-volume is really a work of fine art. In carrying out this there must have been a close and continuous co-operation between the editor and the printers. It seems right to speak in this case of the 'editor' in the singular, because the details of the form had all been settled when Mr. White joined. But indeed there is nothing of which this country has more reason to be proud than of the presentation to the world of the results of its scholarship. I have in my mind more especially *The New English Dictionary*, Mr. C. H. Turner's *Canons*, the Oxford *Vulgate*, and the Cambridge *Septuagint*. That quartette will not easily be surpassed.

The transference of the Oriel Professor to the see of Salisbury could not be otherwise than for him personally a momentous change. In this instance it is curious to note that the effect of the change was seen at once in that subordinate region to which I have just been referring—the region of the relations between author and printer. The stream of the Bishop's productions never ceased, and did not even slacken, but I believe that in all the rest of his life he brought out only three more books in full library form—the *Life* of his uncle, Bishop Charles Wordsworth, in 1899, *The Ministry of Grace* in 1901, and the Hale Lectures in 1911. The other products of his pen would make a most untidy regiment; they came out in every possible shape and size, many of them in the modest little 12mo of the S.P.C.K. There could be no more striking testimony to the complete absence of anything like literary foppery in the man.

Now it might quite well be thought that his significance from the special point of view of the British Academy would cease more or less completely from this time onward. But it would be a real mistake if such an idea were entertained. It would be a mistake even if it were

thought that the Academy had no concern with the active work of his episcopate. I will venture to say that the future historian of England and the English Church, or a foreign observer or inquirer at the present time, not to speak of his own contemporaries and colleagues, must have a direct concern in it. It would be difficult to find a diocese the working of which was more thoroughly characteristic of the Church of England in nearly every way at its best, and still more difficult to find one in which its working was more abundantly illustrated by documents, and those documents for the most part from the hand of the Bishop himself.

I desire to write as objectively as possible. I do not wish to make any claim for the Church of England as compared with other Churches. I leave it an open question what may be the precise value of the Anglican ideal of a bishop. But I will venture to say that John Wordsworth came up very nearly to that ideal. And I think it may be worth while, even from the point of view of the British Academy, for me to aim at describing him as he was.

The characteristics of the Wordsworth family are strongly marked, and to a surprising degree permanent and hereditary. All the Wordsworths, from the Poet onwards, have been patriots, and their patriotism has been of the best sort, not loud but deep. They have also all been convinced Anglicans, thoroughly content with their position, using it to the full but wanting nothing either less or more than Anglicanism could give them. It is this which makes the Bishop's diocesan work important.

The Bishop was a strong ruler of his diocese, but he was also a constitutional ruler. The simplicity of his habits, his warm-hearted sympathy and his generous support with money where money was needed, won for him the deep attachment and loyalty of his clergy; he took them freely into his counsels through the regular diocesan machinery; but he never failed to give them a lead. The latter half of the past century saw a rapid development of the organization of Anglican dioceses. One of those who contributed most to this, both in theory and practice, was Dr. E. W. Benson (who afterwards became Archbishop of Canterbury) as Chancellor of Lincoln in the years 1872–77; his work *The Cathedral* was published by him as Bishop of Truro in 1878. Bishop, chancellor, and chaplain at Lincoln had worked cordially together; and John Wordsworth took with him to Salisbury the Lincoln tradition. But he found there the foundation already laid. The Diocesan Synod, instituted by Bishop Moberly, had been at work for fifteen years. Besides this, the Bishop made a habit of consulting the Greater Chapter, and he also held regular

conferences of his archdeacons and rural deans. His published communications with the diocese, which were numerous and important and kept both clergy and laity fully abreast of the questions of the day, were usually associated with one or other of these bodies, where they did not take the form of Visitation Addresses.

It was natural, as I have said, that the change from professor to bishop should correspond with a change from scholarly research to the discussion of questions of practice. The literary products of the episcopate were all more or less directly concerned with questions of practice. But at the same time the Bishop was so essentially the scholar and learned man that he could not help treating them from the side of scholarship and learning. It is just this that invests them with special value. It does not often happen that a bishop's charges and pastoral letters and addresses possess so much of permanent significance.

The topics discussed in these various ways fall under two main heads: (1) the principles and practice of Public Worship; and (2) the relations of the Church of England to other communions.

In his first Visitation Charge (1888) the Bishop discussed, besides local matters, '(i) The English Church—Its Organization, Blessings, Dangers, and Duties. (ii) Marriage Law—Impediments to Marriage, Preliminaries to Marriage, Remarriage of Divorced Persons. (iii) Home Reunion.—The Principles of Church Order and their Exercise. Our Present Duty.' His second Charge was devoted entirely to the subject of the Holy Communion. It forms a volume of 212 pp., and is packed with close detail. It is characteristic that it should end with a bibliography of the diocese of Salisbury 'during the past few years'. It should be said in passing that the Bishop did all in his power to encourage serious study in the diocese. Two notable works, W. S. Swayne, *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man* (1891), on a smaller scale, and H. C. Powell, *The Principle of the Incarnation* (1896), on a larger, were directly due to the Bishop's initiative. Among the Pastoral Letters ('issued after consultation with the Greater Chapter') may be mentioned especially *Considerations on Public Worship and on the Ministry of Penitence* (published in 1898). This class of publications may be said to have culminated in the book (486 pp.) *The Ministry of Grace* (Longmans, 1901).

It must not be thought that these deliverances were just 'got up' for the occasion; they sprang from a background of profound knowledge. The Bishop was much more than a liturgiologist, but he might be described as an expert in liturgiology. But there are experts and experts, and it may be interesting to try to define the

sense in which the Bishop was an expert. He was not so quite in the highest class of all. He knew (practically) all that there was to be known; he kept up his reading in the literature from year to year; he was capable of making discoveries, in libraries or otherwise, and he was able to put into its place at once a new discovery (e. g. *Sarapion's Prayer Book*, 1899). But he was not exactly an expert in the more intensive sense in which Mgr. Duchesne or Mr. Edmund Bishop or Mr. F. E. Brightman might be called by that name; *The Ministry of Grace* would not have been so good as it is if there had not been Mgr. Duchesne and Mr. Brightman to build upon. At the same time it is a very useful repertory of knowledge, clearly and systematically set forth.

The other class of subjects which most calls for consideration here is that which is concerned with the relations between the Anglican and other Christian communions. It must be confessed—and this again is a Wordsworthian trait—that the Bishop was rather markedly anti-Roman. He tried to be fair to that great communion, and mellowed somewhat in his opposition as time went on; but it was an inheritance from the past of which it was not possible for him to divest himself all at once. And this attitude partly tends to explain the special interest that he took in those movements for reform which ended in separation from the Roman Church, and also in the great Churches of the East which have maintained complete independence of Rome. There is a growing feeling in the Church of England that it is not well for its members to interfere in the internal affairs of other Churches or to go out of their way to befriend those who secede from them. It goes against the grain with Englishmen to put this restraint upon themselves; their natural impulse is to side everywhere with the cause of freedom. They need not altogether suppress this feeling; but they are coming to see that the lesser end must yield to the greater. If the Reunion of Christendom is ever to be brought about, the first step towards it must be a scrupulous respect not only for the rights but also for the susceptibilities of other Churches. The Bishop, as I have said, did not quite see this. He was cautious in his actions, but he acted; and up to a certain point the effect of his action was good. He was in very friendly relations with the Old Catholics, at whose councils he was more than once present and whom he visited in their homes; and he was in touch with other reforming movements. He took an hereditary interest in the Churches of the East, and for sixteen years acted as President of the Jerusalem Mission. On two occasions he made journeys to the East in connexion with the work of this Mission, and in 1898 he paid formal visits to the heads of the Orthodox Church

and presented to them in the name of the Archbishop of Canterbury the Resolutions of the Conference recently held at Lambeth. The first place must no doubt be given to Bishop Blyth, who since 1887 has discharged his duties as Bishop in Jerusalem with great tact and wisdom. But, after him, it is due to no one more than the Bishop of Salisbury that such an excellent understanding exists between the Anglican and the Eastern Churches. In the last years of his life the Bishop played a leading part in the opening up of friendly relations with the Church of Sweden. He was Chairman of the Committee of the Lambeth conference of 1908 which dealt with the question of Reunion and Intercommunion. This led to the further appointment by the Archbishop of a Commission to follow up relations with the Scandinavian Churches. With his usual energy and predilection for investigating matters on the spot, the Bishop of Salisbury with other members of the Commission went over to Upsala in September, 1909. Here he made many friends; and it was the knowledge which he had thus acquired that furnished the materials for a course of Hale Lectures delivered at Chicago on the history of the Swedish National Church. It is greatly to be feared that the exertion involved in the visit to America for this purpose, which took place in the autumn of 1910, cost the Bishop his life. In the field of Home Reunion the Bishop had for a long time taken a special interest in Scottish Presbyterianism. This was another 'family matter'; for the Bishop's uncle, Bishop Charles Wordsworth of St. Andrews, had devoted to it a large part of the active work of his episcopate.

It was inevitable that with one of the Bishop's temperament, with his ingrained zeal for verified knowledge, this whole group of questions should be the cause of much writing; and the pamphlets and books to which it gave rise are by no means the least valuable part of the legacy that he has left behind him. I should not indeed know exactly where to lay my hand on any systematic defence of his relation to the Old Catholics. I should imagine that he grew into this in such a natural way that he was hardly aware that it needed any defence. His father had been an ardent champion of the Old Catholic cause, and father and son had been present together at their Second Congress in 1872. At that time English people were still suffering from the repellent effects of the Declaration of Infallibility. It was not until a later date that they began to veer round to the principle and policy of non-intervention. In this respect the Bishop of Salisbury was perhaps to the end of his days a little behind the times. The same might be said still more emphatically of another great scholar to whom I have referred, Prof. J. E. B. Mayor of Cambridge. I expect that

there must have been many who like myself were in the habit of receiving trenchant little sermons and pamphlets from that quarter; I doubt if Mayor ever felt any qualms or even saw that there were two sides to the question. But I have said that John Wordsworth mellowed as time went on. His wide knowledge and experience of affairs made him cautious from the first. While his intercourse with individuals, especially with the recognized leaders of the Old Catholic movement, was extremely warm, he was yet careful in the discrimination of character, and was on his guard against the less worthy motives and actions of some whom such movements are apt to bring to the front. He also came to take a larger and more balanced view of the history and place in the providential order of the Church of Rome. This is apparent in his latest utterance on the subject, the fourth Visitation Address on 'The Roman Church and Christian Unity', published in the small volume *Unity and Fellowship*, S.P.C.K., 1910. I would invite attention especially to pp. 73–5.

On his return from the East in 1898 the Bishop delivered a lecture to a gathering of clergy which was published under the title, *The Church of England and the Eastern Patriarchates*. This contains a rapid but scholarly survey of the relations of the English Church with the East since the Reformation, with a brief sketch at the end of existing conditions and of the general lines of policy that should be followed. This was reissued four years later by the Eastern Church Association with instructive appendices. Just before this (in 1901) the Bishop had drawn up and published, with the approval of the two archbishops and several bishops, a statement of leading points in the teaching of the Church of England, for the special information of Orthodox Christians of the East. This was translated into Greek by Dr. John Gennadius.

With even greater fullness the Bishop dealt with the relations of the Church of England to two other Churches, the Presbyterian Church or Churches of Scotland and the Church of Sweden. When the Bishop wrote his *Episcopate of Charles Wordsworth, Bishop of St. Andrews 1853–1892*, he expressly terms it, 'A Memoir, together with some materials for forming a judgment on the great questions in the discussion of which he was concerned.' The career of the Bishop of St. Andrews had been indeed a somewhat weaker and less impressive reflection of his own. One of its chief interests had been the possibilities of reunion between Presbyterians and Episcopalians; and his nephew is careful to register with much exactness both his uncle's mature opinions on the subject and his own. He returned to the point in one of his latest publications, *Ordination Problems* (S.P.C.K.,

1909). So far as my knowledge goes, no better or weightier treatment of the subject is available from the Anglican side.

It was, as we have seen, in his last years and in direct continuation of the special share that he took in the Lambeth Conference of 1908 that the Bishop was led to make a special study of the history of the Church of Sweden. The writings under this head for which the Bishop was wholly or largely responsible are: (1) the *Report* of a Commission which paid a visit to Sweden and held a conference with the Archbishop of Upsala, the Bishop of Kalmar, and other Swedish divines in September, 1909; (2) the popular account given of this visit in an address delivered on November 2 of the same year and published in *Unity and Fellowship*, pp. 110 ff.; and (3) the Hale Lectures which the Bishop was invited to give at Chicago, *The National Church of Sweden* (Mowbray, 1911).

The department of his duties in which the Bishop of Salisbury was perhaps, comparatively speaking, least effective was in the debates in the House of Lords. He had none of the orator's skill in taking his cue from the audience. This may have been partly due to the short-sightedness which prevented him from seeing his audience. But his speeches were apt to be rather of the nature of soliloquies in which he followed the course of his own thoughts.

But, as if in compensation for this, it may be said that there was probably no department in which his influence was more strongly felt than in the highest counsels of the Church. Wherever learning was needed, as it constantly is, his advice was sure to be asked; and it was given with unfailing promptitude and ability, and with that masculine sobriety of judgement which was characteristic of all that he did. The Archbishop of Canterbury has borne the warmest testimony to this (*Salisbury Diocesan Gazette* for December, 1911). In this respect his place will be indeed hard to fill.

Looking at the Bishop's work mainly as a scholar, he would perhaps find his nearest counterpart in Isaac Casaubon (1559–1614). If he could have led undisturbed the life of a student, there is little doubt that he would have rivalled the literary output of that famous scholar; and if we could conceive of Casaubon as a bishop, he would have been a bishop on John Wordsworth's lines. And yet the assignment of parts was really appropriate; because Wordsworth possessed, what his prototype did not, that commanding force and quiet energy of character which carries with it the qualification for rule.

W. SANDAY.

DR. FAIRBAIRN.

1838–1912

ANDREW MARTIN FAIRBAIRN was born near Edinburgh on November 4, 1838. At an early age his pious Scotch parents dedicated him to the ministry. For this purpose he studied in Edinburgh University, in the Academy of the Evangelical Union Churches under Morison and Guthrie, and later at Berlin under Dorner. His first charge was at Fraserburgh. From thence, after a brief ministry, he removed to Bathgate, and remained there from 1860 to 1872. In 1872 he became minister of St. Paul's Evangelical Union Church in Aberdeen, where he made a deep and lasting impression as a preacher. In 1877 he became Principal of Airedale Congregational College, Bradford, whence he was called in 1886 to take the lead in removing Spring Hill College from Birmingham to Oxford, and to become the first Principal of the new foundation, Mansfield College. In Oxford he remained for nearly twenty-three years, and he retired from active service in the spring of 1909. Dr. Fairbairn was Chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales in 1883; Muir Lecturer at Edinburgh from 1878 to 1882; Gifford Lecturer at Aberdeen 1892–1894; Lyman Beecher Lecturer at Yale 1891–1892; Haskell Lecturer in India 1898–1899. He was a member of the Royal Commission on Secondary Education in 1894, and of the Commission on the Endowments of the Welsh Church in 1906. He was one of the promoters and first Fellows of the British Academy, and he received honorary degrees from the Universities of Oxford, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Wales, Manchester, Leeds, Yale, and Göttingen.

In the full and strenuous career thus barely sketched, two main interests were dominant. The first was the restatement of Christian theology in modern terms, and the second was the training of men for the ministry of the Free Churches. Dr. Fairbairn's theology was largely the outcome of his own experience. It was only at the cost of a great struggle that he passed from the Calvinism of his upbringing to the wider outlook which he afterwards attained, and it was his ambition to make the transition for others easier. The bent of his mind was wholly theological, but his theology was wrought out under the peculiar historical and philosophical conditions of his time. The

expression he gave to it met a felt and pressing need and enabled him to exercise a marked influence over at least two generations of theological students. He wrote much, but it is to be regretted that the pressure of a busy life did not suffer him to write more. He had collected a vast store of material for a complete Philosophy of Religion, but the only part of the work which saw the light was the 'Philosophy of the Christian Religion' published in 1902. His first book 'Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History' (1876) laid down the lines which the main work of his life was destined to follow. He aimed at a philosophy of religion which should be something more than a merely speculative system. It was to be based on the facts of religious history and progress, and should be in harmony with modern ideas of development, and with a scientific anthropology. To this task Dr. Fairbairn brought an almost encyclopaedic knowledge of the religions of the world, a keen critical insight, and a profound grasp of religion on its practical and experimental side. But he addressed himself, in the first instance, to that part of the work which he believed to be of more immediate interest and usefulness, viz. the study of the Christian religion and the reconstruction of Christian doctrine. This led to the publication of the first and best of his larger books, 'Christ in Modern Theology' (1893). It was a book that, in some senses, marks an epoch. It gathered up the results of a century of Christological study, and laid down the lines for a history of Christian doctrine and for a restatement of it from the standpoint of a thoroughly Christian conception of God. To this purpose most of his other books, viz. 'Studies in the Life of Christ' (1880), Religion in History and in Modern Life' (1884), and 'Catholicism, Roman and Anglican' (1899), were ancillary. They show great learning, critical acumen, and historical insight, but they fall short of that constructive endeavour which was always the writer's goal, but which he never quite reached. It may be said with truth that he showed a master hand in laying his foundations and gathering his materials, but that time and strength failed him so that the building was never completed. Some of his best work remains buried in the lectures which he gave to his students and will probably never see the light. But it is not altogether lost, for it inspired a number of men to carry on the task which he had so well begun. It may be said of him that he did much to restore theology to the position of Queen of the Sciences, and to win for the study a new respect and enthusiasm. Though fresh problems have arisen since the bulk of his work was done, and the standpoint that he occupied can never quite be that of his successors, there is yet much in his work that will abide. The

bold way in which he related the Christian religion to the religions of the world, and his insistence on the application of the historical method to the study of Christian origins and Christian thought, marked something like a revolution in his own time and helped to shape the permanent equipment of the Christian theologian.

But Dr. Fairbairn was no mere student or bookman. His vivid and arresting style witnesses to his many-sided human interests. It has been described as half Scotch and half German, but by the sheer force of his personality he was able to turn it into a great instrument of oratory, and by it to make himself a master of assemblies. He was, too, a man of affairs with a strong practical bent, and a wide and liberal outlook. In private he was the most kindly and lovable of men. To his students he was not only a great and inspiring teacher, but in every sense a friend whose large-hearted wisdom was ever at their disposal. His death has removed a great figure not only from the world of theological scholarship, but from the religious life of our time.

W. B. SELBIE.

ANDREW LANG

1844–1912

'When the news spread over England of Mr. Thackeray's sudden death, it was felt that a personal loss had been sustained by every one who cared for books and for style.' These are the words of Andrew Lang regarding one of his best-loved authors. With equally startling suddenness for the general public his own end came (1912), and in his case, also, every one who cared for books and style felt that he had sustained a personal loss. It was indeed hard to realize that the indefatigable writer who had so long charmed, amused, and provoked his generation, was at length silent. Even those to whom his mental characteristics and general point of view did not appeal felt that with him had passed one of the brightest spirits of his time. Perhaps it is to those most competent to judge it as a whole that his literary career must seem the greatest marvel. By its range, its quantity, its quality, the work he produced from first to last must ensure him a permanent memory, if only as a literary phenomenon. Poet, translator, biographer, historian, anthropologist, novelist, journalist and editor—by his various fecundity, his unfailing vivacity and deftness of literary touch, he would seem (due proportion guarded) to have his like in only one other writer—Voltaire.

A life so preoccupied is not favourable to the retention of the deeper emotions, but out of his own nature and from fortunate early associations Andrew Lang received certain impressions at the outset of life which entered into all his subsequent thought and feeling. Born at Selkirk in 1844, he came at a time when the national memory and imagination were fully charged with all the poetry and romance of the Border country. That the scenes and associations of his native district remained throughout life his treasured memory his lines, *Twilight on Tweed*, perhaps the most deeply-felt he ever wrote, are the moving and permanent record. It was doubtless with a true instinct that, on his death, these lines were generally quoted as revealing the deepest

feelings of the man; and, indeed, no conception of him can be complete without having them in our minds.

> Three crests against the saffron sky,
>   Beyond the purple plain,
> The kind remembered melody
>   Of Tweed once more again.
>
> Like a loved ghost thy fabled flood
>   Fleets through the dusky land;
> Where Scott, come home to die, has stood,
>   My feet returning stand.
>
> A mist of memory broods and floats,
>   The Border waters flow;
> The air is full of ballad notes
>   Borne out of long ago.

The reference to Scott in these lines reminds us of another emotion, evoked in his early youth, which grew in intensity with his advancing years. Scott was the genius of the country where his youth was passed, and it was with something like worship that Andrew Lang regarded him at every period of his life. In the man he saw the exemplar of honour and genial humanity; in the writer, the type of unspoiled genius. It was thus a work of piety towards a revered memory when he became Scott's editor, commentator, and champion against all gainsayers. Of the depth of his feeling for Scott we have touching proof in words which were the last he wrote of him, and which have a further pathetic interest as appearing in a book that Lang himself did not live to see given to the world—his *History of English Literature.* 'The eyes are dimmed as these words are penned,' he wrote, 'so potent is the spell of that rich, kind genius, of that noble character, over the hearts of those who love and honour the great and good Sir Walter.'

Fortunate in the district of his birth and early home, to his own lifelong feeling he was not less fortunate in his choice of St. Andrews —'the dear city of youth and dream'—as the home of his first university studies. After the 'fabled' Border, St. Andrews was the spot that most deeply touched his heart and imagination. His home for a time in early manhood, it was there that his latest and ripest years were mainly spent, and there he is buried.

> St. Andrews by the Northern Sea,
>   A haunted town it is for me!

So he wrote in his poem *Almae Matres*, in which he blends a personal grief with the aspect and memories of 'the little city, worn and gray'; and in words even more deeply felt, though in prose, he has expressed all the strange charm of the place. 'Not in summer, among crowds of holiday-making strangers, but in winter, when the scarlet gowns of the students brighten the dim streets, and the waves fill the roofless fanes with their monotone, is the time to see St. Andrews. The world alters; new cries ring above the unceasing brawl of men, but the northern sea, with its changeless voice, we hear as Eadmer heard it, and St. Margaret, Beaton, and Queen Mary, Knox in his chamber in the besieged castle, and Bruce in his priory.' Whatever claims Andrew Lang may have to remembrance elsewhere, in his own country he is assured of enduring memory by his association with the city of his choice.

Henceforth thou art the genius of the shore.

It was another happy turn in his life, as he himself recognized, that after St. Andrews Oxford became his home. The stamp that Oxford left upon him is visible in all his work, which, indeed, made the impression on his countrymen of being the product of Oxford more than of his native university. Yet, as frequent passages in his writings show, he remained a Scot, and even a perfervid one, to the last. When Goldwin Smith wrote a somewhat petulant travesty of early Scottish history, Lang took him to task with all the vivacity of a sensitive patriotism. But, in the poem *Almae Matres*, already quoted, he has said plainly which of the two, Oxford or St. Andrews, had most of his heart.

All these hath Oxford: all are dear,
But dearer far the little town,
The drifting surf, the wintry year,
The college of the scarlet gown.

During the eleven years (1865–1876) which he spent at Oxford, first as undergraduate at Balliol and subsequently as Fellow of Merton, he did not produce much, but what he did produce indicated what were to be among the main lines of his future literary activity. He wrote on Ballads and Apparitions for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and he published (1872) his first volume of poems, *Ballads and Lyrics of Old France*. With his marriage in 1876 and his settlement in London at the age of thirty-two began his career of literary productiveness, lasting for thirty-six years, which rivals the record of De Foe. Be it said that, apart from his purely journalistic work demanded by the occasion of the hour, he wrote on no subjects, however diverse they may seem, in which he had not a keen personal interest. Thus his work was saved

from becoming mechanical drudgery, and, as proceeding from his deepest affinities, has a central unity in all its diversity.

It may be regarded as significant that Lang's first publication was a volume of poems, and as still more significant that to his latest years he continued to produce new books of verse. The amount of verse he published forms but a small proportion of his entire literary output, but the fact that among his miscellaneous activities he retained his interest in poetry shows that verse-making was with him not a mere accomplishment. And whatever may be our individual estimate of his poetical work as a whole, it is the fact that he has written many things in varying moods and on widely different themes which, once read, cling to our memories—the final test for each of us of a poet's success. What a man conceives of the nature and function of poetry is probably the fullest revelation of his own character and his prevailing attitude to the deeper questions of life. In his Preface to the poems of Edgar Allan Poe (1881) there is a passage which, written in middle age, may be taken as the mature expression of his poetical faith. 'To any one', he writes, 'who believes that the best, the immortal poetry, is nobly busied with great actions, Poe's theory seems fatally narrow. Without the conceptions of duty and truth we can have no *Antigone* and no *Prometheus*. These great and paramount ideas have always been the inspirers of honourable actions, and by following them men and women are led into the dramatic situations which are the materials of Shakspeare, Æschylus, and Homer.' The conception of poetry thus set forth is virtually that of Matthew Arnold, and their common point of view is interesting since both, by their vivacities, incurred the charge of a lack of intellectual seriousness.

Lang's conception of the function of the poet shows his essentially serious view of things, and his lifelong interest in another subject leads to the same conclusion. In religion, as the highest concern of man's hopes and fears, he was as deeply interested in his own way and as deeply impressed with a sense of its importance, as Arnold. A mechanical view of the universe, which would exclude every spiritual agency, filled him with a blank horror of which all that he wrote on religion is the vehement expression. Some form of faith that would give wings to his spirit was a necessity of his nature. In his poem entitled *An Aspiration* he has given humorously-serious utterance to this need. His prayer was that he might be—

> Nursed in some faith
> Wherein a man might live and die.

Of the scientific value of his successive books on the origins of

religion it is not for me to speak, but what is borne in upon the ordinary reader of them is that they are inspired throughout by one feeling—an intense realization of the importance of the issues involved. It is doubtless in the first place due to the intensity of this feeling that his contributions to the history of religion are more or less characterized by a liveliness of polemic, apt to give the impression that facts are handled controversially and not in the dispassionate spirit of the simple inquirer after truth. And this super-sensitiveness in the case of every subject that engaged his interest affected not only the scientific value of his work, but its literary quality. Diderot said that an essential characteristic of a good book is that it should have *le ton de la chose*; if this characteristic be occasionally absent from Lang's work, its absence is due to a keenness of feeling which was perhaps inseparable from the nature of the gifts allotted to him.

In his later years Lang broke ground in two new fields: he became a biographer and a historian, and the amount of work he produced in both fields was sufficient to have occupied a lifetime of more than ordinary diligence. Among his Biographies is one—the life of Jeanne D'Arc—which, of all the books that came from his hand, probably contains most of himself. In the 'Maid' he saw incarnate all that most deeply moved him—a saintly martyr to a great cause, the supernormal experiences which fascinated him throughout life, and the evidence of what he deemed supernatural aid vouchsafed to a struggling mortal. Inspired as he had been by no other of his many themes, he produced a book the success of which must have been one of the pleasantest experiences of his career as a man of letters.

In 1900, when he was in his fifty-seventh year, appeared the first volume of a work—his *History of Scotland*—on a larger scale and entailing a greater expenditure of labour than anything he had yet attempted. The four large, closely printed volumes to which the work eventually extended, appearing only as an item of his life's labours, must raise our wonder equally at his facility of production and his capacity for toil. When the first volume appeared, there was a general feeling that it was not what had been expected of him. What had been looked for was a work which, with a distinctiveness of its own, would be comparable to the Histories of Macaulay or Froude as a brilliant expository narrative of the national history. But the expectation was based on a misconception of Lang's special gifts and characteristic interests. Simple narrative in itself had little interest for him; problematical characters, tangled incidents, and

unexplained mysteries, were the themes to which he naturally turned, and to these themes he applied an independence of judgement and an acumen which constitute his originality as a writer of history. What he says of Horace Walpole (in whom he evidently saw traits of himself) is true in his own case: Walpole's *Historic Doubts*, he says, 'show a new spirit of historic scepticism and a desire to trace accepted historical ideas to their ultimate sources of evidence'. Of his disregard for conventional or traditional opinion we have even more signal proof in his posthumous *History of English Literature*, which (remarkable attestation to his perennial freshness of spirit) will probably remain the most permanently interesting of all his prose writings.

No notice of Lang would do him justice that did not take cognizance of a quality that distinguishes all his writings, in every kind and mood. It is the unmistakable quality that comes of natural taste inspired and directed by the discipline of the scholar. With what insight and sympathy he assimilated the classics of antiquity we know from his renderings of Homer, of Theocritus, and the poets of the Greek Anthology, which of themselves would suffice to give him a distinguished place among the literary figures of his time. But in his original writings the distinctive quality everywhere impresses itself upon the reader. The words in which he describes the style of another writer are equally true of his own. 'It is as simple as Swift's, admirably lucid . . . and as entirely spontaneous as if the author had been writing an ordinary letter.' In one of his poems he expresses the regret that his 'recreant sires' had doomed him to 'Pen and Ink', but if ever man of letters was born to his craft, it was Lang. Whatever the subject that might be engaging him, whatever the mood to which he desired to give utterance, the fitting word was at his immediate call. Nowhere in anything he wrote is apparent what he describes as a besetting sin of certain masters of style among his contemporaries—'over-anxious effort towards novelty and perfection of phrase.'

'Personality', Goethe said, 'is everything in literature and art.' Like his fellow-countryman and contemporary, Robert Louis Stevenson, Andrew Lang had a personality which stamped itself on everything he wrote. Even for those who had but a partial acquaintance with his writings, his name connoted an individuality with gifts and characteristics all his own. In many respects, indeed, the popular impression of him was mistaken. He was generally regarded as a writer of brilliant and varied gifts whose natural vocation it was to amuse a reading public. How far this impression was from the

truth has been indicated in what has been said of the motives and ideals that inspired all his most serious work. Take him all in all, in himself and in his achievement, as a man and as a writer, with heightened emphasis we may say of him what he himself said of Walpole: 'he was a true friend and a good patriot, a delightful wit, and an agency in the advance of literature and taste.'

P. HUME BROWN.